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WAR IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY

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WAR
IN THE
TWENTIETH
CENTURY

EDITED BY
WILLARD WALLER

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Editor's Introduction

In our moments of despair we sometimes liken the world we live in to a lunatic asylum. The comparison breaks down because it is unfair to the madhouse; nevertheless the contrast remains illuminating. A modern mental hospital is a sane, decent, well-ordered place. The only lunacy there is in the minds of human beings. A mental hospital is a sane society populated by madmen. Modern society, however, is thoroughly deranged, but the people in it are mostly sane.

The madness of our world usually escapes observation because it is on such a fantastically large scale. Each one of us plays reasonably his part in the great human drama. We are all sane, more or less, but the play which we enact is utterly mad. In the years 1914-1918 the civilized nations of the world staged the most gigantic holocaust of man-made destruction the world had ever seen. Millions were slaughtered; millions more were made homeless or fatherless; the destruction went on until starvation stopped it. It was a senseless butchery, but while it was going on we somehow deluded ourselves with the notion that a better world would come of it. How many times we uttered, with the orotund voice considered appropriate for such speeches, the words "not in vain!"

Germany surrendered, and then came the peace, a bizarre combination of idealism and cruelty. A reasonable man, when he has his enemy at his mercy, will either kill him or make friends with him. The victorious nations did neither. They were not hard enough to make a Roman peace nor kind enough to make a just peace. The so-called peace that followed the war was not exactly war and yet it certainly was not peace. The Allies demanded reparations, but refused to accept the goods which furnished the only possible means of payment. Through tariffs, quotas, and other measures European nations managed after the war to reduce their trade to the vanishing point, and through these devices, upon which their best minds expended much thought, they greatly impoverished themselves as well as their enemies. International economic relations since 1918 furnish

perhaps the best example in history of large-scale nose-cutting and face-spiting.

Meanwhile strange and terrible tyrannies arose in various countries. A ridiculous little neurotic who had been a house painter became the strong man of Europe. The post-Versailles world had given him his opportunity. Aided by hate and hysteria within Germany and profiting by the stupidity and cowardice of the leaders of other nations, he rose to a position where he held the peace of Europe in his hands.

In 1939, European civilization entered once more upon its homicidal phase. The long-expected war at length materialized. The nations came to the end of their patience; they forsook the sweet reasonableness which had so eminently characterized their relationships in the past two decades and began to fight. In 1914 and again in 1939, the long files of young men marched off to war, and as they passed by the great men who were sending them into battle they raised their arms in the salute of those who were about to die.

Lunacy can be understood, and, possibly, cured. Many scholars have in fact devoted themselves to the study of the war complex of our time. The difficulty has been that for the most part they have studied war as specialists, and have cultivated one phase of it intensively while neglecting the rest. Naturally, the findings of the specialists are scattered through some hundreds of volumes written in technical language and known only to scholars. There is great need for a book in which these specialists will pool their knowledge for the public benefit. With that end in view the present symposium has been arranged. Each of the contributors to this book has devoted special study to the aspect of war concerning which he writes. Each of them has tried to make his findings intelligible to the student and general reader who have not had extensive training in the subject treated.

The subject of war in the twentieth century seems to develop itself in a rather logical manner through the essays which are here presented. In the introductory essay the editor discusses the subject in the most general form, dealing briefly with causes of war and then essaying an equally brief summary of what war does to society.

Barnes and Walter Consuelo Langsam, discuss the War of 1914-1918 and the developments in Europe under the peace which followed it. While we should suspend final judgment on these events, it is urgently necessary that we acquaint ourselves with the best-known facts and the best-tested interpretations that have been established to date. Barnes and Langsam have given us excellent factual treatments of their subjects. Wisdom dictates caution and temperance in drawing conclusions from these facts. As to war guilt, we should be sadly in error if we continued to believe the myths which were circulated by the Allies during and just after the war, but it would probably be equally erroneous to attempt to "whitewash" the pre-war German Government. It is clear that the Treaty of Versailles has had much to do with producing the present situation, but it is probably a mistake to regard it as solely responsible for the ills of Europe since 1918. It is only fair to warn the reader that historians have not attained anything resembling unanimity of opinion with regard to the interpretation of many events in the period under study. In dealing with this difficult material, both Barnes and Langsam have chosen the wiser course of sticking closely to demonstrable facts.

In the succeeding section, four specialists discuss the cultural and political aftermath of 1914-1918. The essay on "The Economic War Since 1918," by Benjamin Higgins, advances the subject by describing and analyzing the preposterous economic practices which prevailed between 1918 and 1939. The contribution of Frances Winwar tells in charming fashion the story of the effect of the war upon literature and the arts. Fascism and Communism, heritages of this period, are treated in separate essays by Clifford Kirkpatrick and David Krinkin. Most Americans regard these fantastic tyrannies with a thoroughly understandable repugnance, but we ought nevertheless to inform ourselves about them. With regard to the essays on these subjects, it should be noted that their authors have tried to account for these phenomena by seeking their causes, but that this does not necessarily involve any justification of them. When a social worker makes a case study of a delinquent boy, showing how he became a thief, she does not necessarily approve of stealing. Likewise the aim of Kirkpatrick and Krinkin in their studies has been to understand but not to defend the institutions under scrutiny.

The two succeeding papers take up the thread of history once more, dropping it when the cannons begin to roar in 1939. Lamar Middleton's discussion of the changes in treaties and in the techniques of diplomacy further develops our theme. Quincy Howe then gives us a crisp account of the outbreak of war.

Modern war, we say, is total war. It is total in several senses, total almost any way you look at it. Every citizen must co-operate to the full and must run the risks of combat. Every economic resource must be fully utilized. The hate behind the war tends to be total, and established restrictions on the conduct of war tend to go by the board. Every available weapon must be used in such a war, including the very convenient and effective weapons of falsehood and propaganda. In the next series of essays, the implications of total war for various social institutions are described and analyzed. Franz Wolf deals with the economics of war time states concisely and authoritatively. Max Lerner discusses the state in his usual arresting manner. Ralph D. Casey tells the story of propaganda in war time. The editor of the symposium then tackles the task of tracing the effects of war upon other social institutions.

In the concluding essay, Ralph Linton discusses the probable effect of the War of 1939 from the long view of the anthropologist. By setting the events of war in their long-term perspective, he contributes incisive new insight.

Such a book as this has the advantages and disadvantages peculiar to the symposium form. Its greatest advantage is that every subject is discussed by someone who can lay claim to some special knowledge. It would be next to impossible for any single author to discuss competently all of the subjects which this book takes up. A certain discontinuity and some overlapping of subject matter are unavoidable in a symposium; these, however, have been minimized, so far as possible, in editing the material; and such duplication as remains has been retained because it was considered useful. A further advantage of the symposium form is that it gives the reader the benefit of several points of view. Where much of the material covered is controversial in nature, this open-forum aspect of the symposium treatment is particularly useful. No attempt has been made in editing to

of opinion was valuable. Such agreement as exists among the various writers—and there are in fact wide areas of agreement—is wholly genuine.

Certain omissions will also be noted by the careful reader. There is nothing about the numerous wars that have taken place outside Europe during the twentieth century. There is only passing mention of such episodes as the Spanish war or Italy's Ethiopian adventure. These omissions are regrettable, but necessary; the volume is already long and would exceed all reasonable limits if such material were included. It will also be noted that the book is focussed upon the social aspects of war, so that discussion of military affairs is slighted. This emphasis is intentional; the reason for it is that the editor feels that the military side of war has been adequately treated in countless volumes while the social side has not. Besides, the social aspects of war are more important than its military aspects. We can not learn very much about war by studying battles. If we would really understand war we must know how its roots spread through the whole of our society, we must know what dislocations it produces in every social institution, and we must try to conceive of the changes which it works in the lives of every adult and every child of the warring nation; by comparison with such things, battles are insignificant.

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INTRODUCTION

WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY



Willard Waller

What most of us would like to know about war is why it happens and whether it can be prevented. This is a simple and very important query, and one to which the social sciences have not sufficiently applied themselves. There are a great many theories about the causes of war, each of which has some merit. Let us examine each of these theories in turn, and see whether we can arrive at an understanding of war.

Perhaps the simplest theory and the most widely held is what we may call the moralistic theory.¹ Wars are made because bad men make them. When a people goes to war, it commonly believes that it is fighting because the wicked leaders of the other people have precipitated the battle by an attack upon a peaceable folk. When the war is over, it often turns out that the supposedly wicked leader of the enemy was only an intensely patriotic citizen who tried to further what he considered the legitimate interest of his country in the way that seemed to him best. Sometimes, indeed, a

¹ One should observe the distinction between the moral interpretation and the moralistic interpretation. The moralistic interpretation is that wars are made because bad men make them, a thoroughly unsound view. The moral interpretation, in terms of the mores, would explain war as resulting from a conflict of moral systems, and would be vastly more plausible.

wicked leader or an irresponsible fanatic does comes to power and does start a war, but there are still many things that require explanation in such a situation. What peculiar set of political processes, what extraordinary moral or economic factors, brought such a person into power? How was he able to impose his will upon other leaders? Why did the masses follow him into war? What delusions did they harbor and how did they come by them? There are, in fact, enough of these subsidiary questions to invalidate the moralistic theory of war altogether. Such a theory is valid only for purposes of propaganda. To say that wicked men make wars does not help us very much. It is well to remember that we nearly always find out afterwards that such beliefs were false.

Another moralistic view is that wars are made to right wrongs and to remedy evils. Germany precipitated the War of 1939 in order to redress the wrongs perpetrated by the Versailles Treaty. The North fought the South in our own United States in order to free the Negro and abolish the institution of slavery. There is some merit in this explanation, at least as regards the participation of the average man. Most men must believe their cause is just if they are to be good soldiers. This moralistic explanation, however, calls for another explanation before it tells us very much: How did men come to have these moral ideas and to consider them worth fighting for? Why did the northern half of the United States discover that slavery was wrong? The fact is that in most wars both sides passionately believe in the justice of their cause. There are earnest and God-fearing men on both sides; neither side has a monopoly of right. If we are to understand war, we must seek to discover the forces behind morality.

A second theory may be labelled the psychological theory. Men fight, it is said, because they have an instinct of pugnacity. It is born in them: men fight for the same reason that bulls fight, because they are fighting animals. A major weakness of this instinctivist explanation is that it is certainly very doubtful that there are any instincts at all in human beings. Even if we have instincts, there is little evidence of an instinct of pugnacity. Suppose we grant that

channels by which the instinct of pugnacity might be expressed much better than in war. The pattern of conflict pervades our lives. If we wish to find an outlet for our alleged instinct of pugnacity we may do so by quarrelling with our families, falling out with our colleagues, writing a letter to the newspaper, booing somebody on the screen, bullying a waitress, attending a prize fight, by suing somebody for something, or in countless other ways.

War itself, as anybody knows who has seen military service, is an extremely poor way of fulfilling one's combative instincts. Many soldiers never see the enemy; most of them never come to grips with him in close quarters. When fighting occurs, it is a mass affair, with little opportunity for individual hates or heroics. The soldier usually does not see the man he kills. He fights men he has never seen before, men whose very names he does not know, men for whom he can hardly have an intense personal hatred. The soldier's life is for the most part spent in a rather dull routine of training, physical labor, movement from place to place, and waiting. And it is marked throughout by subjection to discipline. Modern soldiers have little chance to "drink delight of battle with their peers." Indeed, if a soldier has a highly developed instinct of pugnacity, it probably does not make him a better soldier but a worse one. A soldier is always under orders; if he gets angry easily, he becomes a discipline problem to his officers. Nor is his lot a happy one if he cannot stand the rough give-and-take with his fellows. Furthermore, if there is an instinct of pugnacity, we must suppose that it is universal among men—but there are peoples which do not know war. And we must suppose, if wars are caused by the instinct of pugnacity, that a once-warlike people will always be so—and yet we know that this is not true. The Scandinavians, for example, were once the scourge of Europe, but now they have become pacific. What has happened to their instinct of pugnacity? Suppose, however, that we pass over all these objections, it still remains true that the theory of an instinct of pugnacity explains only one small part of war. It explains why men fight. It does not explain why nations go to war, which is an important part of the problem.

If war is the result of an instinct, then we must always have wars, because it is not feasible to change the instincts of man. If,

however, there is no instinct of pugnacity, or that instinct is not indissolubly tied to war, then it may be that in a better organized society there will sometime be no war. Proponents of the instinct theory of war are chiefly found in very conservative groups. Such persons are so well satisfied with the world as it is that they dislike to think that it could ever be changed in even the smallest particulars. If it would be possible to have a world without war, then who knows what other innovations might come?

Another theory of war is that it results from the pressure of population upon the food supply. A group of people with an unrestricted birth rate remains for some generations within the same territory, which in time becomes crowded. The population then flows over into surrounding regions under the impulsion of hunger. There is a measure of truth in this theory. There have been wars for which the pressure of population furnished a principal cause. The great tribal migrations and far-flung conquests at the dawn of history seem to have been conditioned in large part by population pressure. There have been a great many wars in which the pressure of population was a contributing factor. More often than not the pressure of starvation is the ostensible reason for a war, while other and more decisive reasons lie hidden in the background. We remember the case of the Helvetians in the day of Julius Caesar. Their reason for disturbing the peace was that such a mighty people should not be confined within such narrow boundaries, but behind all this was the scheming of the crafty Orgetorix and who knows what other practitioners of power politics. This situation, in essence, has been repeated many times in human history.

Before we regard population pressure as a principal factor in war, we must explain a number of facts which seem, to say the least, peculiar. In the first place the nations which have the greatest amount of population pressure are often singularly pacific. China and India are densely populated, and, by common report, overpopulated, but, at least in recent times, they have bred no swash-bucklers to demand *Lebensraum* with a rattle of the sword. Again, the nations which give population pressure as a reason for aggression

this remedy the pressure of population upon food supply? Further, those very nations which profess to need room for their existing population are most anxious to keep up the birth rate. It is also quite possible for such nations to relieve the pressure of population by encouraging permanent emigration to other less populous nations, with, of course, loss of nationality, but in fact every attempt is made to combat permanent settlement of nationals abroad. How does this make sense?

The fact is that population pressure alone does not make a people warlike. When a nation experiences some pressure of population on the food supply, and has also the peculiar economic and social structure of militarism, imperialism, and nationalism, the pressure of population becomes an important factor in the causation of war.

A pseudo-Darwinian theory of war perhaps deserves passing mention, although it is less an attempt to understand the causation of war than a justification and glorification of it. The essential notion of this theory is that war aids the survival of the fit, and is therefore a eugenic factor of the first importance. This is quite untrue. War kills off the fit, and leaves the lame, the blind, and the halt to reproduce the race. Only the physically fit can get into the armies and run the risks of combat. A long series of wars may, therefore, lower the physical standards of a population considerably. War is not a eugenic factor in human society.

The Economic Interpretation of War²

The so-called economic interpretation of war is widely accepted, and in fact has considerable merit. It is more nearly able to stand on its own feet than any of the interpretations examined so far. Unfortunately, a great many people believe that the economic interpretation of war is a complete explanation which stands in no need of supplementation from other sources, that it contains all that need be known about the causation of war, that it is, in short, the one and only valid theory of war.

The proponents of the economic interpretation of war usually begin their argument by demonstrating the necessary connection

² A more extensive discussion of the economic interpretation of war is given in the essay below by Higgins, "The Economic War Since 1918."

between capitalism and imperialism. Capitalism, the system of production for private profit, developed in the highly industrialized nations, necessarily leads to the production in every nation of more goods than can be sold there. Under the spur of competition and production for profit, capitalism expands the productive plant almost infinitely, so that it becomes necessary to find foreign markets. This surplus, composed not of more goods than can be used within the nation but of more than can be disposed of on the domestic market, must be sold in some way; it is therefore urgently necessary to find a market abroad. But foreign trade with other highly industrialized nations results in a mere exchange of goods; it does not dispose of the surplus of manufactured goods. The search for markets therefore turns to the less developed regions of the world, to predominantly agricultural countries, to peoples who lack manufacturing and machine guns. Several reasons conspire to cause the capitalists of industrial nations to strive to control the trade of these less developed portions of the earth's surface: the desire to dispose of a surplus of manufactured goods, to secure raw materials at a low price, to exploit the labor and economic naïvete of less sophisticated races, and to build up highly profitable investments in the virgin natural resources of countries on the edge of civilization. There is thus a powerful drive toward the control of less advanced regions implicit in the structure of industrial capitalism. This is the reason for the desire for colonies; this is what is behind the demand for "a place in the sun."

The economic interpretation of war then goes on to show that where business interest leads, the state must follow, for the state is only the "executive organ of the ruling class." And the ruling class, of course, is composed of the nation's leading businessmen. It happens inevitably that the business interests of leading nations must often clash in the attempt to control particular areas. When two imperialistic powers come into serious competition, war frequently results. And when the less developed nations resist the rule of the great powers, war may also result from that.

There is certainly a great deal of truth in this interpretation of

the clash of British imperialism and German imperial aspirations. The European nations have also fought countless big and little wars in order to reduce other peoples to colonial status, for the task of ruling all races was thought to be "the white man's burden."

Some wars fit this classic picture of imperialism perfectly; others show fragments of it. In other words, the economic interpretation of war fits many of the facts of some wars, and it fits some of the facts of nearly all wars. The American Revolution was a war by means of which colonies which had developed some economic independence finally put an end to their colonial status. The Civil War involved, among other things, a conflict between rival economic systems; the industrialism of the North, whose leaders wanted a tariff, and the plantation economy of the South, whose leaders demanded free trade. In order to get the Civil War into the picture of imperialistic conflict, we should have to regard it as a clash between the industrialists of the North and those of Great Britain for the control of the South; and this is certainly a bit strained. The War of 1812 and the Mexican War were motivated in part by imperialism, but in each case it was largely an agrarian imperialism; industrial leaders and merchants had little part in either conflict. In yet other wars, we can find only traces of the generally accepted picture of imperialistic war. We may find one class controlling national policy in terms of its own self-interest, either by precipitating or avoiding war. An economic analysis of the political process is often revealing in the extreme, showing as it so often does that men vote as they believe their interest indicates. This is true not only of issues of war and peace but of other issues as well.

In recent years we have heard much of a sort of primitivized economic interpretation of war. Wars, it is said, are promoted by munitions makers in order to create a market for their wares; these merchants of death gladly sell arms to the enemies of their country and even stir up national rivalries in order to promote business. For other writers, international bankers play the same Satanic rôle. Enough unsavory facts are known about members of each group to lend some credibility to this view, but it may be doubted that their influence has ever been sufficient to start a major war. We must remember that both the munitions makers and the international

bankers of the United States were recently investigated by the Senate, and that this investigation, in the judgment of most observers, disclosed little evidence that either group had very much to do with involving the United States in the first World War.

We must concede that the clash of rival economic systems frequently initiates the friction between nations which later leads to war and that it also sustains this conflict by affording a fresh supply of incidents. Economic interest also supplies influential groups with a powerful motive to promote war. While admitting all this, we must insist that economic factors are not the only factors involved in war. A multitude of things not covered by this theory must necessarily enter into any war. There are always moral and sentimental elements, for men must love their country before they are willing to die for it; most soldiers are not very brave unless they feel that their cause is just. We shall shortly call attention to a number of these non-economic factors in war.

While admitting the presence of these moral, or "ideological," factors in war, the orthodox economic determinist insists that economic factors are always dominant, and that morals and ideology assume the form which economic interest dictates. Here again we are faced with a proposition which contains some truth, but not the whole truth. Morality is influenced by economics, but it also has an independent existence of its own. Standards of right and wrong are not altogether dependent upon self-interest, and sometimes morality runs contrary to economic interest. It seems to the economic determinist that economics is the prime mover in society; it *makes* things happen, and other than economic phenomena merely change to conform to economic interest. This notion is simply an optical illusion. The economic determinist starts with the economic factor, and tries to discover changes in other social phenomena conforming to changes in the economic sphere. The changes actually occur, but it is erroneous to believe that the economic factor *makes* them happen, or that the economic factor is not itself determined. If one started with, say, moral ideas, one

fields conforming to changes in moral ideas. If one starts with scientific knowledge, he may see the entire course of human history as a function of the growth and development of the various branches of science. Such interpretations are all equally valid and all equally false. The truth is that all phases of society are closely interwoven; they hang together in nature and can only be separated in the mind of the scientist, and there imperfectly. It is therefore false to say that one of these aspects of society dominates over all the others. A person who is accustomed to studying one factor in social change naturally comes to overestimate its importance, whether the factor he studies be economics, geography, morality, the family, science, education, or technology. The economist's one-sided view of society can be matched with unilateralisms from all the fields mentioned and from many others; taken together these views furnish an admirable corrective for one another. If specialists could realize how easily they fall into error merely because they know so much about one of the aspects of society, there would be a great gain in our understanding of society.

There are yet other reasons for believing that the economic interpretation of war does not account for it in its entirety. The majority of the men who fight the battles of any war have little or no economic interest in their outcome; frequently they are fighting against their own best interests, but there is no record that they are any less valiant because of that. The economic interpretation may sometimes explain why great men make wars, but it does not tell us why humble men fight in them. Again, it is probably true that in any war a great number of business men have little stake, and in some wars the majority of business men stand to lose more than they gain. Why does the economic interest of one group predominate over the interest of other groups? If we explain why one economic interest triumphs over another and greater interest, are we not already outside the field of economics? Further, there are many wars for which the clearest economic reasons exist, and yet these wars do not take place. One must explain why certain wars, such as an imperialistic war against Mexico by the United States, never come off. In order to answer these questions, one would be forced

to consider so-called "ideological" factors in some detail, and perhaps to grant them equal importance with the economic factor.

It is sometimes argued that the economic interpretation of war is the one correct interpretation because some economic interest can always be found in every war. Since the economic factor is always present, therefore it must be the one true cause of war. This is utterly fallacious. The fact that there are always economic elements in any modern war proves nothing at all; certainly it does not prove that the economic elements in the war make it happen. Our economic life is now so complex and ramifying that many citizens are bound to profit by any conceivable rearrangement of our life and many others to lose by it. When the economic consequences, with profit to some and loss to others, of changing the date of the Thanksgiving holiday by one week are so considerable as to start a nation-wide controversy, we can see how great the effect of a war may be. When the matter of war with some nation comes up for discussion, those who would profit by it naturally attempt to promote it, and it thus seems that they have brought the war about. But these people did not make the war; at most they merely helped it along.

Although the economic interpretation of war affords some illumination, its popularity is greater than its merits seem to warrant. It is popular, no doubt, partly because of its simplicity and because its proponents are kind enough to advance it in a way which does not invite doubt or inflict upon the listener the pain of a divided mind or the torture of suspended judgment. Again, it is a theory which supplies for some persons the need for a personal devil; the men who make wars, the merchants of death, the grasping traders and the international bankers, are ~~obviously very wicked men~~, and it is a pleasure to hate them. Perhaps the greatest advantage of the economic interpretation is its essentially hopeful character. If wars are the product of capitalistic imperialism, then we may hope to do away with them in a society in which capitalism has been replaced by another form of economic organization. The economic

Elements of a Theory of War

We have now passed in review a number of theories of the causation of war. Each of them contains some truth, but not the whole truth; each of them accounts for the phenomena of war only in part. The interpretations reviewed are particularistic. Each one holds fast to a bit of truth, but denies the truth of other explanations. Obviously, a really valid theory of war must not deny the operation of economic or other factors; it must rather show how these economic factors operate in conjunction with other factors in a larger social setting. Someone has said of the drama that the dramatist must learn not to look at life through the eyes of the drama but at the drama through the eyes of life. So the social scientist must learn to correct the bias of specialism by studying life itself.

As we have seen, one of the most striking things about modern war is its total character. It is total war, total in several senses. It affects the totality of society. Above all, its causes are deeply rooted in the whole of modern society; every institution, every ingrained morality is likely to be in some way a cause of war. As difficult as it would be to tear sin from the heart of man, so difficult may it prove to remove war from modern society. We sometimes strive to characterize the age in a single phrase; we say it is the age of machines, or the age of science, or the era of humanitarianism; we say that our culture is extroverted or that our civilization is always catching its trains. It would be more justifiable to say it is the age of war. European civilization in the twentieth century has to date always been getting ready for a war, fighting a war, or recovering from a war. And these modern wars are not fought by a few adventurous young men in armor or by a handful of hoodlums in professional armies. Everybody fights nowadays. Everybody makes war. Anybody may become a casualty. Any valid theory of war, therefore, must consider the fact that it grows out of the totality of our civilization.

As a step toward framing an inclusive theory of the causation of war, let us list the elements which such a theory would need to include. We may list the following:

Indoctrination with warlike attitudes. Wars would not be possible

if men would not fight, and men would not fight if they had not somehow acquired fighting attitudes. These attitudes are implanted in us by suggestions in the years of our youth; they remain latent for some time, and are later called forth by the appropriate stimuli. Such attitudes are the idea that war is glorious, the creed, *Dulce et decorum pro patria mori*, the identification of one's quite personal self with the prestige of his nation, the idea of the self-determination of peoples, the notion of national honor, and so on. These attitudes are inculcated upon the young by all the agencies of the family and the community. In the schools children learn a highly provincial sort of history: our country has always been right; our flag has never been sullied by defeat and it has never been raised in an unjust cause; our heroes were braver than those of other nations; we are a glorious people. Such is the history that the child learns in almost any country. If the history teacher makes any departure from the customary fictions, there are plenty of persons to remind him of his duty. In our family life there is likewise much transmission of military attitudes; he who fights is a hero and he who refuses to fight is a slacker. It is the tradition of our family that the Blanks have always been brave soldiers; your grandfather was a major; your father won the *Croix de guerre*; and your uncle's sword hangs over the mantel. In the United States various veterans' organizations have taken special charge of the task of training children to be patriotic; unfortunately, the leaders of such organizations often promulgate a jingoistic brand of patriotism. The church likewise cooperates in inculcating warlike attitudes, in spite of some tenets of the Christian religion which are opposed to war. The culture complex of war ramifies in such a way throughout the whole of the culture that it would be virtually impossible to rear a child to maturity without inculcating the attitudes of the potential soldier.

(*The economic system.* The economic system of each leading nation is so constructed as to bring that nation into competition with others for the privilege of trading with and building up investments in the less developed regions of the world. The contacts between nations which result in international incidents and wars are usually in some

way related to this process of competition. This is the well-known pattern of capitalistic imperialism.

The agencies controlling public opinion. The development of a war psychology in a democratic people is made possible in part by the character of the agencies controlling public opinion. The press, radio, church, and school are not merely agencies which perform the functions usually attributed to them; they are also attention-getting agencies, and from this ensue certain consequences with regard to war. These agencies are necessarily conducted by persons striving for the attention and approval of the public. Thus a newspaper, when an international incident has occurred, must play up the conflict element in order to sell its papers. Similarly, the radio commentator must uncover and disseminate interesting information, which must often mean information which inflames public opinion. As a crisis gains momentum, more conservative agencies, such as the school and the church, must fall in line. Since all these agencies strive for social approval the stand taken must be strongly "patriotic." The competitive nature of these agencies of opinion brings it about that if any leader of opinion fails to act in the manner described he will shortly be replaced by someone else. The situation is similar to the economic situation which is said to compel all employers to exploit labor if their competitors do so.

Self-appointed agitators. Many unattached or only partially attached individuals become self-appointed agitators and lead public opinion toward war by stimulating discussion of war. In striving for attention and approval, such persons take an extreme stand. Many of them are minor politicians and politicians out of office who use this occasion as a means of self-aggrandizement. It hardly seems necessary to add that most of these self-appointed agitators are sincere patriots.

Propaganda. Propaganda from interested parties contributes to the general effect. While its influence should not be underestimated, it seems likely that propaganda alone does not suffice to involve a nation in war. Propaganda must work on pre-existing attitudes, and it is probably powerless to reverse established social trends.

Classes. Growing antagonism between social classes may lead to an attempt, more or less consciously planned, to deflect this

hostility within the group to objects outside the group. A social class or a political party which finds itself losing its hold may attempt to create a war psychology in order to stabilize internal conditions and perpetuate itself in power. When anciently the people grumbled, their leaders gave them bread and circuses or they gave them war. We have now improved upon this old custom, for modern war combines elements of both these ancient remedies.

Frustrations of individuals. Individuals obtain release from their frustrations and internal tensions by the creation of a war psychology. They react to, say, a Panay incident with a vast wave of emotion not generated by the incident itself but only exploded by it. They find in the idea of war a release from their daily routine and an opportunity to discharge repressed emotions. In venting their wrath upon the enemy they momentarily forget and perhaps partially redress the balance for bullying employers and nagging wives. The spacing of wars in time, the manner in which the war psychosis develops in a people, and the analysis of motivations of leaders all seem to show a relation between the causation of war and the life cycle and inner states of individuals. Social machines such as the R.O.T.C. and plans for industrial mobilization may help to create war because of the expectations which individuals build up and hope to realize in the event of war. The economic situation also produces certain effects by working directly upon the psychology of individuals; prolonged hard times certainly predispose a people to the outlet of war. It seems certain that the depression of the 'thirties has had much to do with developing the warlike spirit throughout the world today.

Idealization of past wars, including the last. Immediately after the conclusion of a war, there are many persons who realize its futility and are conscious of its terrible cost. As time goes on, the memory of its unpleasant phases fades from the picture, and its more glorious aspects, its tales of heroism and sacrifice, remain. Those who died in the war are at length forgotten or remembered only through a euphoric haze; those who were impoverished by the war come in time to the end of their struggles and its cripples pass out of sight. The survivors, moreover, grow old and slowly forget their hardships; they remember only the glorious days of their youth.

Rationalizations emerge which overcome the sense of futility. 'The injustices of war or of a peace settlement may after a time come to seem less cruel, for a new set of folkways and mores arises in adaptation to the changed conditions created by the war. Or exactly the opposite reaction may appear, and the injustices done to a defeated nation may come to seem like something that has no parallel in human history. This is particularly likely to happen in the development of opinion in the nation that loses the war. Here, again, idealization is in play, but it is negative rather than positive.' The desire to be avenged for a Versailles Treaty or for the loss of a province may thus be a potent factor in causing another war.

In the field of international relations it should be noted that each nation's acts by way of preparation for war are interpreted by itself as legitimate measures of defense but by its neighbors as a threat against their safety. A circular process is thus released which leads to ever greater expenditures for armament, an armament race, and this produces concomitant changes in public opinion.

To this total picture should be added some conception of the workings of the military machine in each nation. The general staffs of armies have in fact great political influence, and are usually aligned with industrial and political groups which also have both influence and power. In fact, alliance with such groups is often very useful to politicians, even in times of peace and in the most peace-loving nations.

War and Social Interaction

All of the elements which we have mentioned undoubtedly have something to do with the causation of wars. They set off processes of change in society which unite with one another to form the major process of going to war. (We may say that in the last analysis wars result from movements of public opinion which the factors mentioned combine to create.) We have wars because we develop war fever. The process of going to war may be thought of as a sort of spiral movement of public opinion which is largely beyond control. The war process is like certain phases of the economic system: no one wills it, and yet the totality of the process is the result of the interaction of many wills. No one wills that prices shall go up or down,

as a rule, and yet they move in response to certain conditions created by a multitude of individual choices. Nobody effectively wills that we shall go to war, and perhaps nearly everyone ardently desires that we shall not, but everyone does his part in bringing a war about. A newspaper, for example, writes headlines and publishes pictures which inflame the public mind, and at the same time argues strongly for peace on its editorial pages; no doubt the editorial comment represents the editor's sincere belief, but in the end the headlines and the pictures win.

The interpretation of war as produced by the development of war fever in a people is, of course, subject to numerous qualifications. It is most true of democratic nations, for in such countries war occurs only when the majority of the people demand it. But even in a dictatorship, a war must be sold to the populace. A modern dictator is only a kind of demagogue who adds the arts of the propagandist to the ancient weapons of the tyrant. He rules by consent and sufferance under the Damoclean sword. So that he, too, can wage only those wars which his people can be induced to support.

The Milling Process

{ It is obvious, too, that the growth of war fever is subject to law. It is a response to economic, cultural, political, social, psychological, and other factors. We may say that these factors co-operate in producing war in more or less the way in which chemicals combine to produce different compounds. We may gain a clearer idea of the process of combination by studying the way in which wars usually start. The typical process of going to war may be described as follows:

Conflict begins (if under the international conditions of the past few years it may be said that it ever has a beginning or an end) with certain crises between nations, "incidents," in which there is a definite clash of the power systems of two or more nations. Such incidents are usually occasioned, directly or indirectly, by economic competition, but other than economic elements rapidly become involved in them.

These incidents set off definite conflict, which, however, remains within bounds, that is, it is not so great that diplomatic machinery

is unable to handle it. The power systems of the two nations confront one another for a time, and there is difficulty in preventing conflict without loss of face by one side or the other. Public opinion in each nation comes to regard the other nation as a potential enemy. When the conflict subsides into diplomatic interchange, it leaves the situation substantially changed. Each side has now acquired a heightened sensitivity to affronts or challenges from the other. On each side the public appetite for news of conflict has been stimulated. One or both sides may feel that they have lost face. In consequence it is much easier for new incidents to occur.

As a result of such a crisis preparations for war increase on both sides. This helps to build a war machine which in time stimulates the war psychology. In addition, this program is interpreted by other nations as a threat to their security.

There now ensues a series of "incidents," each of which leaves the nations involved somewhat closer to war. There is a recognized drift toward war, a process which we may compare to the milling of a herd of cattle getting ready to stampede. In each nation the following changes of public opinion tend to take place:

The agencies which control public opinion fall in line in favor of war. Newspapers print an increasing amount of news in which the conflict is featured; headline writers and makeup men give prominence to news which previously went on the inside pages, and editors blue-pencil domestic news in favor of news of the current crisis. Politicians make issues on the basis of foreign policy; domestic issues are forgotten. Self-appointed agitators keep the populace stirred up; they create what the politicians call a ground-swell of opinion. Among the agencies controlling opinion, the church and the school are probably the last to take a stand for war. Sooner or later, however, the ministers and the teachers discover that this war is different; this is a holy war.

There is a gradual growth of myths about the other people, a depersonalization of the people and a personification of their government. A vicious stereotype is substituted for other conceptions of the potential enemy; cartoons portray him as a bestial figure; he often comes to be known by names denoting derision and hatred. The first atrocity stories often appear at this time.

War fever gradually takes possession of the masses. There is an increasing loss of objectivity in discussing the issue of war or peace. Attention is rapidly deflected from internal affairs and directed to foreign affairs. Needed internal reforms go by the board because they come to seem of minor importance. Individuals identify themselves increasingly with the nation, and feel that each new incident is an affront to their quite personal selves.

This process may be hastened by propaganda emanating from interested parties. In any case, war fever affects different classes, regions, interest groups, religious and cultural groups, in different ways and to different degrees. Some groups necessarily take the lead in the agitation for strong measures or for war. A vociferous minority often forces into line a majority which at first regards the war passively.

What apparently happens when a warlike climate of opinion develops is that certain propositions get established as unquestioned truths, and everyone accepts them because everybody else accepts them, and it comes to be regarded as bad form to question them. Biased news reports and propaganda furnish a multitude of suggestions which are hard to resist. In addition, these suggestions are reenforced by the powerful sentiments of loyalty to one's country. It becomes a sort of patriotic duty to believe the current slogans. Gradually people become angry, and as anger mounts, their minds close, and they hear arguments against their wrath most reluctantly: they believe ill of the enemy because they ardently desire to believe it. It is not strange that the average citizen should be helpless in such a situation. It is quite understandable that he should be caught up and swept along. It does seem a little odd that the leaders of the people should apparently offer so little resistance to the winds of opinion. In general, the intellectual leaders of the various peoples do not cover themselves with glory when war is in the offing. The disturbance of reasoning during the milling process is seemingly so subtle and insidious that even those persons who but a few years or a few months before were violently opposed to war now come to believe that this particular war is both necessary and desirable. None of their beliefs concerning war in general has changed, but this war is an exception to the rules. This war is different. Like

the man who has been in love ten times before, they believe that this time it is real.

New methods of communication, particularly the radio, seem to have greatly expedited the milling process. They seem also to have given it certain new dimensions. A fighting speech unifies one's own group, but if it is heard in other countries as well, it may also unify the opposition. When a Hitler speaks, the world is his audience, and the effect of his words on this larger audience is great. It is not, certainly, what the German government ought to desire, for the bellicose expressions of a Hitler may do a great deal to alienate the world from himself and his people. The contrast between the crisis of 1914 and those of 1938 and 1939 is explicable in considerable part as the result of modern methods of communication.

Involvement of Neutrals

(Once a war has begun between two major powers or groups of major powers, there is a tendency for the conflict to spread, other nations taking sides until every great power in the world is involved.) Every country must go through something of a milling process before deciding to join in. The gradual involvement of the United States in the Napoleonic Wars and the World War of 1914 illustrates this process nicely. The forces determining whether neutrals shall become involved, and on which side, are many and varied. (Neutrals generally tend to take the side of the nations with whom their economic ties are closest.) Both sides interfere with the normal flow of economic processes, and there are sharp struggles over neutral rights. If trade is principally with one belligerent, then the other belligerent is cast by nature for the rôle of the interfering, meddlesome, and ruthless enemy. Loans and investments play an important part, although their influence has sometimes been exaggerated. Still there can be no doubt that if loans are made to one belligerent, a vested interest in the victory of that belligerent is thus created. Modern warfare is particularly likely to spread because of its economic ramifications; in fact, through blacklists and such devices, it enters neutral countries immediately after war begins.

(It is also true that a nation tends to take the side of the belligerent to which it is culturally and morally most akin. The Germans, for

example, appear to regard the participation of civilians in the defense of their country as the worst of crimes. They make no secret of their ruthless treatment of such civilians, whom they call *franc-tireurs*. It happens that the American does not regard such actions as crime; he cannot help thinking of the Belgian or Polish *franc-tireurs* as brave men defending their homes against the invader. When he sees a picture of a Polish woman *franc-tireur* before a German court-martial, awaiting almost certain death, his sympathies can hardly be on the side of the Germans. The picture referred to was no doubt intended to prove that the Poles were guilty of "sniping," but that is not what it proves to the average American. It is worthy of remark that such pictures should be released by the exceedingly clever German propagandists. Evidently the art of the propagandist does not enable him to span the gulf created by profound moral differences between nations.³

Stages of War

Once a war has begun, a major war which strains the resources of both contestants, it seems to go through several well defined stages. This is particularly true of war on its mental and social side. A modern war resembles a siege in many respects. It is a long-drawn out ordeal which gradually wastes away the combatants. Attrition is not, of course, purely physical; morale may be consumed

³ In a recent article Professor Sidney B. Fay lists the causes of American involvement in the War of 1914-1918 in the order of importance as follows: (1) Disregard of American rights involved in the German submarine policy; (2) German methods in beginning and conducting the war; (3) Anglo-Saxon tradition and sentiment, and native American idealism; (4) Allied propaganda, successful in part because of the above factors; (5) Economic influences; (6) Fear for our own ultimate safety. In discussing his second point, Fay speaks as follows: "The German methods in beginning and conducting the war: German militarism; support of Austria in July, 1914; invasion of neutral Belgium; severities or 'atrocities' which were caused by the panicky feeling of German officers in Belgium and Northern France but which were often deplored by German soldiers, as we know from their captured diaries; deportation of Belgians to forced labor in Germany; introduction of poison gas; blowing up of American bridges and munition plants; and finally the Zimmerman Note with its *spurslos versenkt* and proposed incitement of Mexico." In the course of this essay Fay also takes occasion to state his opinion that the importance of Allied propaganda and of economic motives has been considerably exaggerated. Sidney B. Fay, "Recipes for Neutrality," *The Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. XXI, November 4, 1939, pp. 3 ff.

as well as men and goods. The first World War displayed a clearly marked sequence of stages. These stages are demarcated and analyzed below. Although it is possible to find a somewhat similar pattern in many other wars, perhaps it is best to claim no more for this formulation than that it accurately represents the course of the World War of 1914 and suggests certain phases of other wars.⁴ For convenience, the sequence of stages is stated in a general form.

War really begins with the milling process which leads to war. After the milling process, the World War of 1914 developed by the following stages:

The declaration of war terminates the milling process, coming when war fever is at its height. This final step is greeted with a strange medley of emotions from which elements of pleasure are not absent. The war releases in the individual a number of emotions founded on the frustrations of his daily life; for any routine of life, however gratifying on the whole, involves a considerable amount of denial of natural desires, and any change, even a disaster, releases the individual from some of these blockings. In addition, there is a release of tribal emotions from massing and exerting the power of the group: people commonly believe that the war will be brief and glorious. People have a sense of participating in events of historic importance. The formal declaration of war is greeted with cheers and apparent rejoicing. (This phase of war is quite rudimentary in the War of 1939, probably because of the recency of the previous war, the wide diffusion of knowledge concerning the nature of modern war, and the fact that the mores have undeniably changed.)

With mobilization of troops come the first disruptions of the normal pattern of family and community life. With this begins also the bifurcation of life into civilian and military channels. While the soldier learns to look at war and the enemy in a professional manner, the civilian reaches and maintains a higher pitch of hatred.

In the War of 1939 these dislocations of life, as described by the current newspapers, prove more far-reaching than any that have occurred before. In the first months of the war hundreds of thou-

⁴ Extensive evidence in support of the generalizations given here may be found in the succeeding essays. Since these essays were written independently, the agreement is altogether genuine.

the way. Liberals, on the other hand, find themselves for once in complete agreement with the national objective, which is to win the war; to this end they gladly surrender those personal rights for which in time of peace they struggle unceasingly. Liberals may become very popular indeed in time of war; war is a great time for liberals, if a poor time for their cause, for the achievements of wartime liberalism are in fact either doubtful or shadowy. All of this contributes to the breakdown of liberalism in the period of post-war reaction. There are always, of course, a few liberals, radicals, and dissenters who decline to declare a truce on matters of reform and oppose the conduct of the war. They suffer intensely during the period of war, and may count themselves fortunate if they do not pay with their lives for their opposition to the national program.

The influence of the soldier and the soldier's morality also begins to be observable. Vices and virtues of the military life are not those of civil life. The soldier's morality is primitivized. Since monogamy is hardly ever the soldier's strong point, many violations of sex morality occur. Consumption habits are also modified; there is an increase in the consumption of satisfactions not related to the ordinary pattern of family living and in other hedonistic gratifications. The adjustment of the civilian to army life is not effected without strain. This adjustment was a fertile source of humor to the American soldier during the first World War. Much of the wit which he displayed was of a sort which expressed hostility toward army officers and military regulations.

When war begins, the common man gains a certain importance which he has not previously had. Ordinarily we keep our lives wrapped up in separate packages, and it is our greatest pleasure so to do. Along comes a war, and we are overwhelmed by it; we lose our privacies and refinements and the values which have seemed important to us. But there is also a gain. The nation now has an objective to which even the humblest and obscurest citizen contributes his proportionate share, and this gives meaning to the routine of his life. Perhaps for other reasons, but also in part for these, crime and suicide rates decline. There is, however, an increase in the civilian death rate.

Period of High Morale

Now ensues a more or less protracted period in which the nation struggles on grimly. The emotionalism of the early period fades out; flag-waving disappears; other patriotic songs are often substituted for the national anthem. There is a growing respect for the enemy, and a realization of the seriousness of the conflict. There are long casualty lists. The crippled and wounded come home. The state of mind of civilians is about that portrayed by H. G. Wells in *Mr. Britling Sees It Through*.

Hocking distinguished between the first and second stages of war in a splendid essay written toward the end of the first World War. We quote his discussion briefly:

No one going from America to Europe in the last year could fail to notice the wide difference between the minds of nations long at war and that of a nation just entering. Over there, "crowd psychology" had spent itself. There was little flag-waving; the common purveyors of music were not everywhere playing (or allowed to play) the national airs. If, in some Parisian cinema, the *Marseillaise* was given, nobody stood or sang. The reports of atrocities roused little visible anger or even talk—they were taken for granted. In short, the simpler emotions had been worn out, or rather, had resolved themselves into clear connections between knowledge and action. The people had found the mental gait that could be held indefinitely. Even a great advance finds them on their guard against too much joy. As the news from the second victory of the Marne begins to come in, we find this dispatch: "Paris refrains from exultation."

And in the trenches the same is true in even greater degree. All the bravado and illusion of war are gone, also all the nervous revulsion; and in their places a grimly reliable resource of energy held in instant, almost mechanical readiness to do what is necessary.⁵

As war goes on, soldiers settle down to the business of war in their age-old manner. They have no illusions, but are determined to do their duty. *Le Feu*, by Barbusse, describes their state of mind. Soldiers now live by their own characteristic morality, which the populace condones. Even those who have formerly been staid citizens develop military mentality marked by bravery and obedience and irresponsibility, by short-time plans and a hedonistic philosophy of life.

⁵ Ernest William Hocking, "Morale," *The Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1918, Vol. 122, pp. 721-8.

Personal, social, and economic dislocations of war are now painfully apparent. People try to take them in their stride. War refugees appear in large numbers, straining the resources of communities. The morale of the refugees is naturally low. Possibly the fortunes of war confront the nation with the task of large-scale social reconstruction in a devastated area. The strain of war begins to tell upon the health of the people; death rates go up; birth rates fall to surprisingly low levels. Social institutions are disorganized; the education of the young is carried on with difficulties; higher education is crippled. The value of many of the common goods of life, such as soap and cigarettes, is metamorphosed. Food tastes change under the impact of hunger; grease is no longer something to be avoided, and a bar of chocolate is the price of a woman's virtue. A strain of escapism may appear in literature and the arts.

A new set of folkways and mores, adapted to war conditions, begins to become established and accepted. People never thereafter return to the pre-war moral system.

War Weariness

At length, this period of high morale gives way to war weariness. In the civilian population, bereavements and deprivations weigh heavily upon some, inflation and economic disturbances upon others. The personal-social dislocations of war increase greatly and become very irksome. There are many changes. There are severe health problems, possibly, even probably, epidemics. The engine of war seems to devour men and materials without ever producing any results. It is difficult to carry on any of the ordinary routines of life, difficult to get food and to keep warm in winter, difficult to clothe a family, difficult or impossible to educate children. For most people, all the little luxuries to which they were once attached have gone long since and life seems cruelly hard. There is a feeling that the country has been "bled white," and the desire for peace without victory begins to be expressed. Mysticism and spiritism now appear as a solution for many, especially for bereaved persons.

The soldiers also begin to give way somewhat under the strain of war. They are still resolved to do their duty, but are painfully tired

of war. Their state of mind is that described in *All Quiet on the Western Front*, *Paths of Glory*, *The Case of Sergeant Grischa*, *A Farewell to Arms*, *Journey's End* and similar bits of post-war literature. St. George myths now begin to be credible, as well as stories of comrades who have risen from their graves to carry on the fight. The morale of the soldiers has begun to crack, but at the same time this may be the period when one final, desperate battle becomes possible. Soldiers begin to develop "the sympathy of percussion," that is, they begin to fraternize with the enemy.⁶ Perhaps because they feel that the soldier on the opposite side is also at the mercy of the juggernaut, and that the things which all soldiers have in common are greater than those which divide them. (This tendency toward fraternization may, and in the last war did appear quite early. Nevertheless, it is usually regarded as a dangerous symptom of declining morale.)

Opposition to war grows and becomes articulate. It is fought by propaganda, which sometimes emanates from interested parties. There may be political changes, reflecting the changed mood of the nation. Morale declines more rapidly on the home front than in the army.

The pre-existing moral consensus has by now been profoundly disturbed. Sex mores have been permanently modified; men and women alike have adjusted to the changed conditions of war, and family ties are less binding than previously. Other mores have also been disturbed. There may be a great wave of idealism and social reform, partly as a reaction to mass suffering. Struggles between the social classes, formerly suspended, are now reactivated; there is distinctly a revolutionary situation. The class structure has also been greatly altered by the rise of war profiteers and the damage done to the middle class by inflation. Standards are confused and agencies of social control disorganized.

It should be noted that war weariness is a result of the cumulative frustrations and deprivations of war. The greater the sacrifices demanded of individuals by the war, the sooner may war weariness be expected to set in.

⁶ For an example of "the sympathy of percussion," see the essay below by Frances Winwar, p. 207.

Post-War Reaction

Victory or defeat emerges from this situation. Then comes the confused post-war period, marked by the following characteristics:

A peace which contains the seeds of further conflict. Social arrangements are set and attitudes engendered in individuals which make war immediately impossible and ultimately inevitable.

There are widespread economic disturbances and disruptions involved in the process of returning industry to a peacetime basis. There may be further inflation in the post-war period, either of the boom type or of the runaway type. In any case, there must be ultimate deflation. These disturbances are, of course, world-wide; neutral nations as well as belligerents must share in them.

There is a changed morality and a very confused morality. The mores have partially adapted to the changed situation but they remain unclear and confused on many points. Those who grew up in the pre-war period are subject to severe conflicts in matters of morality. A generation of post-war youth grows up which escapes the conflict by flaunting many features of conventional morality. The crime rate is usually high in the post-war period.

The struggle between social classes is bitter and intense. Wartime gains in many fields, such as labor, are often largely lost in post-war reaction. Chaotic social conditions make revolution and reaction possible. Liberals are now thoroughly discredited, and the backbone of liberalism is broken.

The soldier struggles to find his way back to civilian life and does not always succeed. The soldier cannot adjust to the moral autonomy, the routine, and the long-term plans of civilian life. The difficulties of this adjustment have been dramatized by the so-called "lost generation," a group of sensitive youngsters wounded and permanently depressed by the horrors of war but also disorganized and confused by the loss of moral landmarks, cut off from their local communities, their families, the hierarchy of the social classes and evermore unable to find their place again. There is a bitter reaction to the idealism of war, a burgeoning of futilitarianism, a growth of ivory-tower estheticism, and even a cult of unintelligibility, all of which may be interpreted as a product of idealism and

subsequent disillusionment. The common soldier does not become a member of a voluble and endlessly self-pitying lost generation, but he is nonetheless disorganized. It has been said that every war leaves three armies: an army of heroes, an army of beggars, and an army of thieves. In spite of all this, it is likely that most soldiers adjust to civilian life quite easily. Veterans' organizations, though likely to become politically vicious, probably help the soldier to readjust.

An unfortunate remnant of wartime solidarity is the curtailment of civil liberties. Individuals voluntarily give up many of their rights in time of war; at least they make no objection when the rights of free speech and free assemblage and the freedom of the press are abolished and such safeguards as the writ of *habeas corpus* suspended. In the confused period following a war, it seems impossible to restore these rights at once. They are regained, if at all, only after bitter struggles. It is a matter of years before courts and legislators return to their usual procedures. This is one of the least regarded, and in the long run one of the worst, of the consequences of war.

The chaos of a post-war period is almost indescribable. In 1920 James Westfall Thompson felt that the age might justly be compared with the period following the Black Death. He wrote as follows: "It is surprising to see how similar are the complaints then and now: economic chaos, social unrest, high prices, profiteering, depravation of morals, lack of production, industrial indolence, frenetic gaiety, wild expenditure, luxury, debauchery, social and religious hysteria, greed, avarice, maladministration, decay of manners."⁷ It would not be easy to find a better summary description of the social and cultural aftermath of war.

War Settles Nothing

The most unfortunate thing about war is that it accomplishes nothing. All the effort that goes into it is wasted; all its sacrifices are vain. The issues between nations, over which they go to war, still remain when war is done; war does not settle anything. The diplomats at their conventional green tables come to the end of their

⁷ James Westfall Thompson, "The Aftermath of the Black Death and the Aftermath of the Great War," *The American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1920, Vol. 26, pp. 565-72.

arguments and their nations go to war. In the end the diplomats must take up again where they left off before, not exactly at the same place, of course, but with the arguments on both sides not very much changed.

War settles nothing because defeated nations will not accept defeat. War is an arbiter whose decisions the contestants refuse to accept as final, for there is always the chance that another trial will turn out differently. If nations go to war over a matter of territory, one side takes the territory and the other side is dissatisfied with the situation. Twenty years later all is to do again, and the war has settled nothing. If it is a matter of right or morality or justice that sets nations at one another's throats, war cannot settle that because force is utterly irrelevant to any claim of truth or right. Arguments concerning a matter of right can be affected by force; one of the contestants can be compelled to withdraw his claim altogether, but the conquered people remains unconvinced; after a lapse of years the vanquished nation will urge the same old arguments and back them with better guns, and it will be seen that the war did not settle the matter.

If war is waged over the status of a minority, it is almost certain to be bootless, especially in Europe. Europe is populated by a large number of peoples—language groups, culture groups, races, nationalities—scattered discontinuously over wide areas. It is impossible to work out the boundaries of nations in such a way that they will include no minorities. Wherever the frontiers of a nation are located, they are certain to include minorities which may consider themselves oppressed. From this side of the Atlantic, it certainly seems that many of the struggles of Central Europe revolve around the question who shall oppress whom. Any solution effected by force is certain to be unstable. The Czechs have lost their liberty, but they say, "We will live again." Many generations of Babylonian captivity failed to crush the nationalistic spirit of the Poles. (The only real solution of the problem of minorities would be for all these peoples to abandon their claims to absolute sovereignty and to work out their common destiny together. Such a solution is the moral opposite of a solution by force.)

If war arises over the possession of supplies of raw materials it is

worse than useless. German industry requires, let us say, some millions of tons of iron ore which Germans must annually purchase in the open market outside of Germany. If Germany goes to war and obtains control of the iron ore, the situation of the German manufacturers and the German people is not materially changed. German manufacturers must still purchase the ore at the price set by economic processes; costs are little if any less now than before. Or let us suppose that the French seize this ore from Germany. It is likely to come about, as a result of the adjustments of international trade, that German manufacturers purchase the same iron ore as before and with relatively little change in the price. It would be wrong to say that war is completely without effect in such cases, but the effect is less than the uninitiated suppose, and it is produced at an exorbitant cost. (The impoverishment of a nation by war far outweighs any possible economic gain. There are always two losers in a war.)

War does not even mean the end of the fighting. It does not cause peoples to expend their hate, so that nothing is left; it breeds hate more rapidly than it exhausts it. The war goes on after the war in other forms. A great war is followed by dozens of little wars. The nations of the world have fought with tariffs and other economic measures ever since the Armistice in 1918. War does not end the fighting; it is not the cure for hate. Only the orderly processes of peace can end the fighting. Only compromise and conciliation and the passage of time can cure hate.

(The truth is that nationalism is an anachronism.) That sort of nationalism which will not renounce war as an instrument of policy has no place in the modern world. (The organization of world trade binds the peoples of the world together, so that each is dependent upon all the others, and no one people can live in its accustomed way without the others.) The culture of the peoples binds them together; science is international; art and literature are addressed to all men regardless of nationality or creed. The humanitarian spirit is international. Technology has annihilated distance; it has been said that the airplane has made Europe an absurdity. All these things bring the peoples of the earth closer together. Only nationalism keeps them apart. War might settle our problems if we waged wars to the point of extermination, but we cannot and will not do that.

Our civilization has progressed so far that it will not permit a really decisive war, but it has not progressed far enough to do away with war altogether.


For centuries Western civilization has been periodically devastated by its wars which recur with seeming fatality. While there has been no slackening to date of wars and rumors of wars, there is some reason to hope that we may sometime come to the end of them. Whatever be the case with their governments, no one can deny that the people of Europe have come to look upon war with inextinguishable horror. Their folkways have grown peaceful; there is no people in Europe that has any appetite for slaughter; in no country does any great proportion of the people really want war. The so-called Munich peace was possible only because the masses of the people in Britain and France recoiled with horror from the thought of war. The change in the folkways is certainly not limited to the democratic nations; it shows itself in the dictatorships as well. The flaming protest against war in the 'twenties, the world-wide popularity of such books as *All Quiet on the Western Front* and *The Case of Sergeant Grischa*, the case of the great clergyman who apologized to the unknown soldier for supporting a war, and the English youths who took the Oxford oath—these things seem to have been forgotten now. Have they really been forgotten? Have they disappeared without a trace? It may be that the world has changed more than it seems. It may be that stubborn, resistless changes in the folkways will shortly outlaw war as an instrument of national policy.

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HISTORICAL



THE
WORLD WAR
OF
1914-1918



Harry Elmer Barnes

In this opening section of the book we shall review the fictions of wartime propaganda, indicate how these have been wiped away, and recount the solemn facts about the origins, character, and results of the first World War. Only through a mastery of these can we adequately comprehend the realities of the world conflict which began in Poland in September, 1939.

The Entente epic of 1914-18 ran essentially as follows: For years prior to 1914, France, Russia, England, and their associates had been working steadily for the peace of Europe and a concert of nations. But they had been blocked at every turn by German bluff, aggression, and ill will. Germany was impatiently awaiting the arrival of "Der Tag," when she would overrun all Europe as she had France in 1870-71. She had built up a colossal and unmatched military machine, having become nothing less than a great military octopus threatening the peace of the world.

"Der Tag" came when the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated at Sarajevo in Bosnia on June 28, 1914. It was even asserted by some Entente

writers that this assassination was plotted by militarists in Germany and Austria who could tolerate no further delay.

Immediately, the Allied states tried to hold the situation in check by diplomatic measures, but Germany spurned them all. When her ally, Austria, seemed likely to listen to reason, Germany threw everything to the winds and plunged Europe into blood and ruin through a premature and utterly unprovoked declaration of war on Russia. Turning westward, she declared war on France and invaded the defenseless little neutral state of Belgium, thus transforming the solemn obligations of nations into scraps of paper.

The Allied states, thus suddenly surprised in an ambush attack by the German "gorilla," reluctantly but gallantly took up the sword in self-defense. England came in solely to champion the cause of "poor little Belgium" after she had vainly exhausted every resource of diplomacy and persuasion. The war, thus begun with clean hands on the part of the Entente, was carried on as a noble and idealistic enterprise. There was no thought of territorial or financial aggrandizement. The Allies fought for the sanctity of international law, for the rights of small nations, for the end of military dictatorship, for the freedom of the seas, for democracy, and for world organization to prevent another season of carnage. There were no secret agreements among them. All was above board and exposed to the clear noonday light of truth and sincerity. Never before had so many states united to shed their blood in the cause of pure and limpid idealism.

On the other hand, Germany continued her brutality after the fashion of her brazen acts in the summer of 1914. She reduced war to the lowest level of savagery, not only crucifying captured soldiers, but even brutally and wantonly assaulting, mutilating, and murdering non-combatants, many of them women and children. German submarines transferred the barbarism from land to the waters, turning their guns on the poor devils who were struggling to keep afloat.

This pretty myth might have been believed for generations had not revolutionary overturns in Germany, Austria, and Russia permitted the publication of the secret documents in foreign offices, which told the real truth about 1914. They also exposed the facts

about the Allied agreements after the war broke out—i.e., the notorious Secret Treaties.

The Realities of 1914

We now have the actual facts about 1914. They demolish the Entente picture, though nobody of sense regards Germany as a helpless lamb in the midst of a pack of howling wolves.

In the decade before the war, Germany had made vigorous efforts to arrive at an understanding with Russia, France, and England, but had failed. This was partially because of France's determination to recover Alsace-Lorraine, Britain's jealousy of German naval, mercantile, and colonial power, and Russia's desire for the Straits leading out of the Black Sea. It was in part because of the maladroit diplomacy of Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow and his evil genius, Baron von Holstein. They bungled German relations with France and Britain. Between 1912 and 1914, Izvolsky, Russian Ambassador in Paris, and President Raymond Poincaré of France carried through a diplomatic revolution which placed France and Russia in readiness for any favorable diplomatic crisis that would bring England in on their side and make possible the French recapture of Alsace-Lorraine and the Russian seizure of the Straits.

This opportunity came after the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke in 1914. Germany accepted all the important diplomatic proposals of 1914 save one. For this she substituted one which even England admitted was far superior. She tried to hold Austria in check after July 27, but France and Russia refused to be conciliatory. In the very midst of promising diplomatic negotiations, Russia arbitrarily ordered a general mobilization on the German frontier. France had given her prior approval. Such a mobilization had long been recognized in the European capitals as tantamount to a declaration of war on Germany.

After vainly exhorting the Russians to cancel their mobilization, Germany finally set her forces in action against the numerous Russian hordes. France informed Russia that she had decided on war a day before Germany declared war on Russia and three days before Germany declared war on France. England came in to check the growth of German naval, colonial, and mercantile power. The

Belgian gesture was a transparent subterfuge, used by Sir Edward Grey to inflame the British populace. He himself admitted that he would have resigned if England had not entered the war, even though Germany had respected Belgian neutrality. The documents show us that Grey refused even to discuss the German proposal to respect Belgian neutrality as a condition of British neutrality. Belgium had not even figured in the British cabinet discussions when war was decided upon. Lord Morley's *Memo-randum on Resignation* proves this.

In the light of the well-established facts about 1914, it is now clear that, under existing circumstances, Serbia, Russia, and France wished a European war in the summer of 1914; that Austria-Hungary wished a local punitive war but not a European war; and that Germany, Great Britain, and Italy would have preferred no war at all, but were too dilatory, stupid, or involved to act with sufficient speed and decisiveness to avert the calamity.

In 1918 the Bolsheviks of Russia published the hitherto suppressed Secret Treaties of the Allies. These proved that the idealistic Entente pretensions about the aims of their war were no more valid than their mythological assertions about the events of the summer of 1914. Russia was to get the Straits, Constantinople, and adjacent districts. France was to get Alsace-Lorraine and the left bank of the Rhine. Italy was to make the Adriatic an Italian lake. Great Britain was to be rewarded by the destruction of the German navy, merchant marine, and colonial empire. Altogether, the Allies were to destroy the "economic power of Germany." These treaties, of course, sent the Allied "Holy War" myth gurgling to the bottom of the sea, *spurlos versenkt*. Wilson tried to block their execution at the Versailles Conference, but with indifferent success.

The courageous works of Ponsonby, Avenarius, Lasswell, Grat-tan, Viereck, Peterson, Chambers, Mock and Larson, and others have likewise upset the wartime myths about German atrocities. It has been amply proved that even the Bryce Report was consciously falsified and was thoroughly unreliable. Even Admiral Sims admitted that there was but one German submarine atrocity, and for this the German commander was punished.

This remarkable modification of historical opinion relative to

responsibility for the World War of 1914 does not, of course, give Germany any ground for assuming a holier-than-thou attitude. She did not wish war in 1914 because her aspirations and policies were being realized remarkably well through peaceful channels and activities. Her pacific attitude did not grow out of her superior moral principles or a more sincere devotion to the cause of peace. *Had some of her basic goals and public policies been realizable only through war, as was the case with France and Russia, there is every probability that Germany would have been just as bellicose in 1914 as were these other powers.*

How We Know About the Causes of the World War of 1914

As a result of the revolutions in Russia, Austria, and Germany, new governments appeared on the scene which had no reason for desiring to conceal facts which might possibly turn out to be discreditable to the preceding royal regimes. Indeed, they hoped that the documents in the foreign offices would actually show that the old imperial governments had been responsible for bringing on the war. They believed that such proof would help to maintain the new revolutionary governments in power. They presumed that an increased popular hatred of the former regimes would grow out of the knowledge that the monarchical governments had been responsible for the sufferings which the World War had entailed.

Therefore, the new Austrian and German governments voluntarily published a full and complete edition of the documents in their respective foreign offices bearing on the crisis of 1914—the so-called *Red Book* and the *Kautsky Documents*. The Germans subsequently published all the important documents on the whole period from 1870 to 1914, the voluminous *Grosse Politik*. These allowed the facts to speak for themselves as to German foreign policy in the half-century before the war, and challenged the other states to do likewise.

The Austrians were long delayed in the publication of material on the period before 1914 because of the opposition of the Entente to the appearance of such potentially damaging documents. Finally,

in 1930, Austrian scholars published an eight-volume collection of source material on Austro-Serbian relations from 1908 to 1914. This has made necessary a much more lenient judgment of Austria than was possible when Professor Sidney B. Fay's important work, *The Origins of the World War*, appeared in 1928.

The Russian Bolshevik Government did not systematically publish its diplomatic documents on the period before 1914, but allowed French and German scholars, such as René Marchand and Friedrich Stieve, to have access to the archives and to make adequate selections. The Stieve collection, known as *Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis*, is the most complete material, and its honesty and adequacy cannot be challenged. It deals particularly with the work of Izvolsky in carrying through the great diplomatic revolution of 1912-14, in collaboration with President Poincaré of France.

The British Government was the first non-revolutionary government voluntarily to publish its documents bearing on the outbreak of the World War. This it began in the autumn of 1926, and ten other volumes were later published on the period from 1898 to 1914.

Finally, and last in order, the French began in 1928 to publish a collection of diplomatic documents on the pre-war period. The fact that the supervisory authorities have been mainly public functionaries rather than impartial scholars makes it highly improbable that the French documents possess the completeness or the candor to be observed in the earlier publications. But so much documentary material has now been published by other states which enables us to check up on the French documents, that we may be certain that the colossal frauds and forgeries which characterized the original French *Yellow Book* are not embodied in this more extended collection of French documents.

This documentary material has been supplemented by special monographs, by biographies and memoirs of leading figures in the diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to 1914, and by able general works which have sought to assemble, summarize, and appraise the significance of the documentary evidence, the mono-

graphs, the biographies, and the memoirs.¹ The overwhelming majority of such books, of which Professor Fay's *The Origins of the World War* is an outstanding representative, reverse our wartime judgments in the manner which we have above described. Differences of opinion among students today relate to details rather than to the general picture.²

Levels or Types of Responsibility for the World War

In generalizing about responsibility for the World War of 1914 it is necessary to be specific as to the meaning of "responsibility."

Some scholars contend that all the Great Powers involved were about equally responsible. Others state that, in 1914, France, Russia, and Serbia were primarily responsible for a European war under conditions as they then existed. Both of these opinions can be sustained if one clarifies what is meant by each interpretation.³

Those who argue for equal responsibility in this sense usually mean that, if we consider primarily the more general causes of war in European society from 1870 to 1914, all the Great Powers were about equally responsible for the *war system*. They do not have in mind the crisis of 1914, but rather the cultural and institutional situation behind the July clash. Those who contend for the primary guilt of France, Russia, and Serbia concentrate on the responsibility for exploiting the Austro-Serbian dispute of 1914 for the purpose of launching a general European conflict. It is necessary, therefore, to know just what one implies when he says that

¹ Most of these post-war publications are described and appraised by G. P. Gooch in his *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*, Longmans, 1928.

² The latest and, one may fairly say, the final desperate effort to revive and vindicate the wartime conceptions of war guilt is contained in Prof. Bernadotte E. Schmitt's *The Coming of the War, 1914*, Scribner, 1930. This has been devastatingly answered by M. H. Cochran in his *Germany Not Guilty in 1914*, Stratford, 1931, probably the most severe criticism to which an American historical work has ever been subjected. Even those who defend Schmitt personally refute his work and conclusions by implication. For example, Prof. F. L. Schuman sweepingly defended Schmitt's scholarship and impartiality in reviewing Schmitt's book in *The Nation*. At the same time, Schuman's own work, *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic*, presents a revisionist interpretation wholly at variance with Schmitt. The history of war-guilt scholarship is recounted in my *World Politics in Modern Civilization*, Knopf, 1930, Chaps. XXI-XXIII.

³ The views of a third group who believe the Central Powers solely responsible no longer require serious consideration.

everybody was guilty or that this or that group of nations was guilty.⁴

The most thoughtful authorities on the question of responsibility contend that we must examine the problem on at least four levels: (1) Those general causes of war which made war possible if not inevitable in 1914—i.e., the war system; (2) the diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to 1912; (3) the diplomatic revolution of 1912-14; and (4) the crisis of June 28 to August 5, 1914.

The War System

By the general causes of wars we mean those divers aspects of the European social order in the half-century before 1914 which predisposed governments to war whenever a crisis of sufficient proportions arose. As representative factors making for war, one would naturally list such things as the cult of war, racial and national arrogance, the growth of great armaments, secret diplomacy, the competition for raw materials and markets, the system of differential and discriminatory tariffs, population pressure, the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty, the conception of national honor, opposition to international organization and arbitration—in short, the whole complex of factors that led to what G. Lowes Dickinson has so well described as “the international anarchy” that prevailed throughout Europe in 1914.

When we consider such fundamental causes of war as those listed above, it must be frankly admitted that all the nations involved in the war in 1914 were about equally guilty. They were all a part of the system; if one had a larger army than his neighbor, the neighbor was likely to have a greater navy. If one was more patriotic, another was more strongly impelled by inexorable economic forces. If one pursued a more clever program of international duplicity through secret diplomacy, another disturbed the peace more by startling frankness in international behavior. *Therefore, it can be held that, so far as general causes of war are concerned, no one European state or group of powers was uniquely at fault.*

⁴ The most judicious brief analysis and summary of the whole matter known to the writer is contained in C. L. Becker, *Modern History*, Silver, Burdett, 1931, Chap. xx. See also Sir C. R. Beazley, *The Road to Ruin in Europe, 1890-1914*, London, 1932.

During the war the Entente asserted and reiterated that Germany was, beyond comparison, the chief representative of the war system in Europe; that, for example, it had a larger army than any other state, was more given to enthusiastic reading of the prophets of war, such as Nietzsche and Bernhardt, whose names were on the tongues of every German school child, and was dominated in its foreign policy by the bellicose and arrogant Pan-German League, which advocated German domination throughout the world. Let us examine the facts involved in this Entente indictment of Germany.

A leading French authority on military organization, General E. A. L. Buat, has shown that on July 1, 1914, before a soldier had been called to the colors because of the crisis of that year, the active French army numbered 910,000 with 1,250,000 reservists, while the active German army at this time numbered 870,000 with 1,180,000 reservists.⁵ The Russian army lacked little of being twice as large as the German. The British navy was about twice as large as the German, while the combined British, Russian, and French navies made the Austro-German naval combination appear almost insignificant. Of course, numbers do not mean efficiency, but they are surely the test of the existence and degree of armament, and the Entente contention was that Germany far surpassed any other nation in the world in 1914 in the extent of its armaments. The fact that the Germans proved the most efficient soldiers once war broke out does not alter the case in any degree. The French army was, in general, as well prepared for war as the German, and the Russian army was well prepared for the short war that it had expected.⁶

Likewise, the assertion that Nietzsche and Bernhardt were worshipped by the German people receives no support from the facts. In the first place, the patriotic and militaristic writing in Germany could easily be matched by cogent examples of jingoism in the other European states; for example, in the writings of Barrès and

⁵ E. A. L. Buat, *L'armée allemande pendant la guerre de 1914-18*, Paris, 1920, pp. 7-9.

⁶ Editor's note. However, Wolf says that "In 1914 Germany was more systematically prepared for war than any other country." See below, pp. 365-66.—W. W.

Déroulède in France; of Kipling, Lea, Cramb, and Maxse in England; of D'Annunzio in Italy; and of the Pan Slavists in Russia. In the second place, Nietzsche was in no sense an exponent of the Prussian military system. He hated the Prussian military oligarchy, and, as Professor Charles Andler, the foremost French authority on Nietzsche, has shown, he was by no means an indiscriminate eulogist of the war cult. As Andler says, "It is a mistake to continue to picture Nietzsche as the apologist of Saint Devastation." Yet, even if we conceded the worst things said about Nietzsche by the Entente propagandists during the World War, it cannot be shown that he had any appreciable influence upon either the German masses or the German officialdom before 1914. He was vigorously anti-Christian in his philosophy, and, hence was anathema to the majority of the Germans, especially the Prussian bureaucrats and militarists, who were loyal and pious Protestants. No one could have been more repugnant to them than was the prophet of the Antichrist. Nor was Bernhardi any more widely followed. He was not read by the masses, and the present writer once ascertained that not a single official in the German Foreign Office in 1914 had ever read his book on *Germany and the Next War*—portrayed by Entente writers as their veritable Bible.

During the war Americans were frequently warned by André Chéradame and other propagandists as to the dangerous nature of the Pan-German plot to annex the world.⁷ We were told that the German people and government were willingly in the grip of the Pan-German League and were eager abettors of its aggressive plans.

The nature, activities, and influences of the Pan-German League were made the subject of a learned study by Dr. Mildred Wertheimer,⁸ who showed that it was made up of a small group of noisy jingoes, who had little influence on the German government. The latter regarded the organization as a nuisance and an embarrassing handicap to German diplomacy. It could be matched by similar groups in any leading country in Europe, and had about as much influence on the Kaiser and Chancellor von Bethmann-

⁷ Cf. André Chéradame, *The Pangerman Plot Unmasked*, Scribner, 1917.

⁸ M. S. Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League, 1890-1914*, Columbia University Press, 1924.

Hollweg as the National Security League or the "Preparedness" societies had on President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan in 1915.

It may be true that the German people accepted the military yoke somewhat more willingly than certain other European populations, but in 1914 the civil government in Germany retained control of affairs to the last and resolutely held out against war until all hope for peace was destroyed by the Russian general mobilization.⁹

We may therefore conclude with complete assurance that with respect to the general causes of war, the guilt from 1870 to 1914 was divided; in fact, about equally distributed. In holding Germany, along with England and Italy, relatively less responsible for war in 1914,¹⁰ we do not in any sense attempt to find these states innocent of an equal share in producing the system of international anarchy which made war probable whenever Europe faced a major diplomatic crisis. At the same time, it can no longer be asserted with any show of proof that Germany was uniquely black in its general pre-war record.

High Lights of European Diplomacy from 1870 to 1912

Some may express surprise that diplomatic history since 1870 is here divided into two sections: (1) 1870 to 1912; and (2) 1912 to 1914. Why should we not treat it as a single unit from 1870 to 1914? The answer is that down to 1912 the European system of alliances and European diplomacy were, at least ostensibly, devoted to the preservation of the balance of power and the maintenance of peace. Between 1912 and 1914, however, Russia and France, through their agents Izvolsky and Poincaré, abandoned this order of things and laid plans to exploit an appropriate European crisis in such a manner as either to humiliate the Central Powers or to enter upon a war that would bring to Russia the Straits (Dardanelles and Bosphorus) and a warm-water port on the Black Sea,

⁹ See below, p. 68. Von Moltke spoke only for himself, and the Austrians so understood it. The definitive treatment of the civil government versus the General Staff in Germany in 1914 is contained in M. H. Cochran, *Germany Not Guilty in 1914*, Stratford, 1931, Chap. VII.

¹⁰ See below, pp. 70-1.

and to France the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. They also endeavored, with much success, to get England so deeply involved in their Franco-Russian Alliance that it would be almost bound to come in on their side in the event of a European war. Therefore, we have to draw a dividing line in European diplomacy at 1912, while fully realizing that the break was not sharp and that the policy which Izvolsky brought to fruition in 1914 was begun by him as early as 1908.

In the diplomatic history from 1870 to 1912 the developments and episodes of greatest moment were: (1) The genesis of the two great alliances—the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente; (2) the French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine; (3) Russia's desire to obtain the Straits leading out of the Black Sea; (4) the diplomatic clashes between France, Germany, and Britain over Morocco; (5) the superficial and somewhat hypocritical effort of the nations to secure disarmament and arbitration at the Hague Conferences of 1890 and 1907; and (6) the development of Anglo-German naval rivalry, especially after 1908.

The Triple Alliance was arranged by Bismarck between 1878 and 1882, and brought Germany, Austria, and Italy together in a defensive pact designed primarily to frustrate a French war of revenge. Bismarck also secured benevolent relations with Russia through a Reinsurance Treaty made in 1884 and renewed in 1887.

After Bismarck's retirement in 1890 the Kaiser abandoned the Russian link and turned to England as the most promising country outside the Triple Alliance to cultivate. The French were on the alert and quickly picked up Russia. They had successfully negotiated a defensive military alliance with the Tsardom by 1893.¹¹ When England and Germany failed to draw together between 1898 and 1903, because of the inadequacy and insincerity of the British offers and the opposition of the misanthropic Baron von Holstein, the French made a bid for British friendship. By 1904 they had succeeded in forming an Anglo-French agreement. Indeed, they even created a Triple Entente in 1907 through promoting an under-

¹¹ See Georges Michon, *The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1891-1917*, Macmillan, 1929, Chaps. I-IV; and W. L. Langer, *The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1914*, Harvard University Press, 1929.

standing between England and Russia over the Near East; and they successfully tested British support in the second Morocco crisis of 1911, when England actually took a more bellicose stand than either France or Germany.¹²

The two great counter-alliances were certainly organized at the outset primarily to preserve the peace of Europe. Bismarck formed the Triple Alliance to prevent France from fomenting a war of revenge,¹³ and Grey accepted the Triple Entente to preserve the balance of power, whatever may have been in the back of the heads of Paul Cambon and his associates, who led the English safely into the Entente.

Yet in due time the counter-alliances became a menace to Europe, because both groups of powers hesitated to back down in a serious crisis for fear of losing prestige. Further, as we shall show later, Izvolsky and Poincaré were successful in 1912 in transforming the purpose of the Triple Entente from a defensive and pacific organization into one that was preparing for a European war and was arming itself so as to be ready when the crisis arose. This does not imply any deliberate plot on the part of Izvolsky and Poincaré to bring on a war for war's sake. It merely means that, by the end of 1912, Izvolsky was convinced that Russia could gain its objectives only by war and that Poincaré was determined that France should achieve its ambitions in the same conflict.

As between the two armed camps, it must be held that after 1911 the Triple Entente was much the greater menace to Europe:¹⁴ (1) because the Triple Alliance was gradually going to pieces on account of the secret Italian withdrawal in 1902 and the Austro-German friction over Serbia in 1912-1913; and (2) because from 1912 to 1914 the Triple Entente was being transformed into a firm and potentially bellicose association.

At the close of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 the Germans had annexed the two former German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which had been taken from Germany and added to France

¹² Fully confirmed to the writer by M. Caillaux.

¹³ See W. L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, Knopf, 1931.

¹⁴ See S. B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Macmillan, 1928, 2 vols., Vol. I, pp. 312-46.

by Louis XIV and other French monarchs. It proved an unwise move for Germany, for the French never ceased to hope for their recovery.

France could not fairly hold Prussia responsible for the War of 1870, for even the *Revanchard*¹⁵ Clemenceau admitted that "in 1870 Napoleon III, in a moment of folly, declared war on Germany without having even the excuse of being in a state of military preparedness. No true Frenchman has ever hesitated to admit that the wrongs of that day were committed by our side."¹⁶ But the German annexations at the close of the war in 1871, whether justified or not, aroused a French aspiration for a war of revenge and laid a basis for the diplomatic maneuvers that ultimately led Europe to war in 1914. As Dr. J. S. Ewart well stated it:

The Alsace-Lorraine annexation by Prussia, in 1871, was the principal factor in the counter-alliances, ententes, and antagonisms which perturbed continental Europe for forty-three years. . . . Not France only, but all Europe, kept in mind, between 1871 and 1914, with varying intensity, the prospect—one might say the assumed certainty—of the recurrence of the Franco-Prussian War.¹⁷

Since the reign of Peter the Great, Russia had desired a good warm-water port to assure free and unimpeded passage for its commercial products and its war vessels. It had attempted to secure access through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in the Crimean War and in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, but was blocked by Great Britain and other European powers. Russia next turned to the Far East and sought a warm-water port on the Pacific after the building of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. It secured this in Port Arthur, but was soon driven out of this commercial and naval base as a result of its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. An attempt to get a port on the Persian Gulf also failed. Russia then returned to the Near East, to the Black Sea Straits, which were now all the more desirable, as Russia had in 1907 come to terms with its old

¹⁵ *I.e.*, an apostle of a war to avenge the defeat of 1870-71.

¹⁶ Georges Clemenceau, "The Cause of France," *Saturday Evening Post*, October 24, 1914.

¹⁷ J. S. Ewart, *The Roots and Causes of the War (1914-1918)*, Doran, 1925, 2 vols., Vol. I, p. 671; Vol. II, p. 1169.

rival, Great Britain, which controlled the outlet from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic (Straits of Gibraltar).

In order to get the Straits, the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky, first tried diplomacy. He proposed, in 1908, that the Austrians should annex two South Slav provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in return for which Austria was to support the Russian demand for the Straits. Austria agreed and promptly annexed the two provinces, but England blocked the Russian plan in regard to taking over the Straits. Izvolsky, usually bankrupt personally, did not dare openly to criticize England, as he was then being supported in part by gifts from Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg.¹⁸ So he dishonestly alleged Austrian aggression and denied previous knowledge or approval of the annexation plan.

This blocking by Grey of Izvolsky's plan to trade the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria for Russian control of the Straits must not only be regarded as a flagrant example of short-sighted British self-interest, but also as probably the most important single indirect cause of the World War.

Izvolsky next turned to Turkey, and in the fall of 1911 Russia offered Turkey a defensive alliance if it would open the Straits to Russian war vessels. Turkey was still under the scrutiny of the Germans in 1911 and did not care to accept this risky offer of Russian protection against the Balkan states. A most significant aspect of the diplomacy of Izvolsky in 1908 and 1911 was that, on both occasions, he was prepared to sacrifice the interests of the Slavic states in the Balkans when Russia stood to gain by such action. In 1914, however, Russia justified her measures that brought on the war by the contention that it was bound by honor, tradition, and precedent to act as the protector of its little Slavic kinsmen in the Balkans!

After the failure of his Balkan diplomacy, Izvolsky became convinced that the Straits could be obtained only by a war. Therefore he logically decided to see if he could not get them by a local war rather than by a general European war, provided peace could be

¹⁸ A fact revealed to the writer by Count Pourtales (German Ambassador to Russia in 1914) in 1927.

maintained on the larger scale. He helped to organize the Balkan League in 1912 and urged the Balkan states on to a war against Turkey, hoping that the former would be victorious and that Russia could then use its influence with them to secure the Straits. The Balkan states soon began fighting among themselves, however, and this third plan of Izvolsky's collapsed.

He then became convinced that only a European war would bring the Straits to Russia, and the Russian government in time followed him in this decision. Such was the state of affairs in the Near East in 1913.

In the Morocco crises of 1905 and 1911, Germany was in the right, but its diplomatic methods left much to be desired as to both tact and finesse.¹⁹ In 1905, Germany insisted that France should not be allowed to occupy northern Africa without taking the other European nations into consideration, and in 1911 it endeavored to prevent France from violating the Pact of Algeiras, which had been drawn up at the close of the first Morocco crisis. Incidentally, in the last Morocco crisis (1911) Germany desired to break down the Anglo-French Alliance, but only made it firmer and more bellicose.²⁰

The most important result of the second Morocco crisis was its effect upon internal French politics. The French jingoes attacked Caillaux for his pacific policies in 1911 and drove this great French statesman from power, supplanting him by the able and valiant but revengeful and bellicose Raymond Poincaré. Had Caillaux remained in power, there is little probability that Izvolsky could have brought France around to a warlike policy by 1914.

In the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 Germany made a rather worse showing than the other major European states by being more frank about its attitude toward war and armament. Germany was no more opposed to land disarmament than was France and no more opposed to naval reduction than was Great Britain. But it did not conceal its attitudes on these subjects from

¹⁹ Cf. O. J. Hale, *Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931. The Casablanca crisis of 1908 was not important; it was settled by the Hague Court.

²⁰ Indeed, England seems to have been more eager for a test of arms in 1911 than either France or Germany. The writer possesses first-hand information that, in 1911, the English urged Caillaux to adopt an attitude which would probably have led to war had he yielded to British advice.

the public as carefully as did France and Great Britain, and made a less hypocritical show of pacific intentions. To this degree Germany was diplomatically less competent than the other states. The disarmament proposals, started by Russia, were not made in good faith, as Count Witte later admitted. Finally, there were no serious plans submitted at The Hague for the arbitration of any of the real causes of wars. Therefore the common allegation that Germany at The Hague prevented Europe from putting an end to all wars a decade or more before 1914 is seen to be pure fiction. But Germany's candor, in other words, its diplomatic stupidity, enabled its enemies to portray Germany as the outstanding challenge to the peace of Europe.

We may therefore say that from 1870 to 1912 the responsibility for diplomatic arrangements likely to make for war was divided. On the whole, however, with the doubtful exception of England, Germany had the best record of any of the major states during this period. After a most careful examination of the *Grosse Politik*, reviewing German policy from 1870 to 1914, Professor Fay came to the following conclusions:

While it is true that Germany, no less than all the other Great Powers, did some things which contributed to produce a situation which ultimately resulted in the World War, it is altogether false to say that she deliberately plotted to bring it about or was solely responsible for it. On the contrary, she worked more effectively than any other Great Power, except England, to avert it, not only in the last days of July, 1914, but also in the years immediately preceding.²¹

Izvol'sky's Diplomatic Revolution: 1912-1914

In 1910, Izvol'sky, who had been Russian Foreign Minister since 1906, resigned to become Ambassador to France. This he did in part because of the Russian criticism of his failure to secure the Straits in 1908 and the resentment over the Russian humiliation that followed. He accepted the new appointment chiefly, however, because he believed that he could do more in Paris than in St. Petersburg to forward the desirable Franco-Russian diplomatic maneuvers. During 1910-11 he was unable to make much headway, as

²¹ S. B. Fay, in *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, December, 1926, p. 903.

Caillaux and the friends of peace were in power in Paris and a pacifically inclined ambassador, Georges Louis, represented France at St. Petersburg. In January, 1912, the Caillaux group was superseded by Poincaré and his supporters. This marked a momentous turning point in European international relations. These two able diplomats, Izvolsky and Poincaré, had at heart goals that could only be realized by one and the same method, namely a war with Germany. Izvolsky contended that "the road to Constantinople runs through Berlin," and Poincaré's life passion, as he himself confessed, was to recover Alsace-Lorraine, which could be achieved only by a victory over Germany. Poincaré once asserted in an address to university students:

In my years at school, my thoughts, made somber by the defeat, were always crossing the frontier that the Treaty of Frankfurt had imposed upon us, and when I descended from my metaphysical clouds I could discover no other reason why my generation should go on living except for the hope of recovering our lost provinces.²²

This is a matter of great importance, for Poincaré and his group represented the first Republican bloc willing to go to war for Alsace and Lorraine. Hitherto, the active French *Revanchards* had been, for the most part, Royalists and enemies of the Third Republic. Plenty of Republicans had hoped for the return of the provinces, but no party of them had been willing to face the responsibility of waging a war to recover them. The linking of the Straits and Alsace-Lorraine as the common program of France and Russia, once a European war broke out, had of course been long taken for granted as a vital part of the Franco-Russian Alliance.²³

Izvolsky reported to his home government that he "felt like a new man" after his first conference with Poincaré. While the two

²² Cited by Mathias Morhardt, *Les Preuves*, Paris, 1924, p. 135.

²³ As early as 1910, Georges Louis, French Ambassador in Russia, tells how, for many years, the Straits and Alsace-Lorraine had been inseparably connected in Franco-Russian diplomacy: "In the Alliance, Constantinople and the Straits form the counterpart of Alsace-Lorraine. It is not specifically written down in any definite agreement, but it is the supreme goal of the Alliance that one takes for granted. If the Russians open the question of the Straits with us, we must respond: 'Yes, the day you aid us with respect to Alsace-Lorraine.' I have discovered the same idea in the correspondence of Hanotaux with Montebello." (Cited by E. M. A. Judet, *Georges Louis*, Paris, 1925, p. 143.)

men disliked each other personally, distrusted each other to some degree, and differed frequently over details, they worked together cordially in all broad matters of diplomacy.

Their first practical step was the negotiation of a naval treaty between France and Russia in July, 1912, the military alliance of the two states having been completed nearly twenty years before.

In August, 1912, Poincaré visited St. Petersburg. There he learned much more of the ambitious Russian plans in regard to the Straits and other territorial readjustments. He seems to have been convinced that France must co-operate enthusiastically to gain its objectives in the dual arrangement. It was made perfectly clear to Poincaré that France had little prospect of obtaining Alsace-Lorraine unless it was done at the same time that Russia made war to obtain the Straits.²⁴ On November 17, 1912, Poincaré informed Izvolsky that if a crisis broke out in the Balkans and brought Russia into war against Austria, and if Germany followed to protect Austria, then France would most certainly aid Russia and fulfill all the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance. From then onward it was chiefly a matter of getting ready for the crisis when the latter arrived.²⁵

November, 1912, was second in importance only to July, 1914, in witnessing events that helped on the World War. It was in this month (1) that Poincaré pledged France to execute its full obligations to Russia in support of Russian diplomacy in the Balkans; (2) that Grey pledged British naval, and, by implication, military,

²⁴ One of the most famous of contemporary French statesmen, M. Joseph Caillaux, in speaking to the present writer, of Poincaré and Izvolsky, rather colorfully compared them to Jesus and the Devil, respectively, the difference being that in 1912 Poincaré actually capitulated to the diabolical suggestions of Izvolsky. It is the belief of some of the best historical students who have gone through the Russian source-material that Poincaré's collapse before temptation was chiefly the result of his Russian visit in 1912. Before that, he had contemplated war as a possible eventuality. After the return from St. Petersburg, he came to regard it as almost a certainty to be prepared for and accepted at the most advantageous moment, preferably not until after the Franco-Russian military plans had been completed.

Some historians have pointed to the fact that Poincaré was scandalized in the summer of 1912 when he learned of Russia's patronage of the Balkan League and that France had been kept in the dark about it for four months. But it was the last fact—the Russian secrecy—that scandalized him, not the Russian policy of aggression in the Balkans.

²⁵ Cf. Friedrich Stieve, *Izvolsky and the World War*, Knopf, 1926, pp. 113-14.

support to France; and (3) that Russia drew up its secret military protocol in which it was stated that when the war crisis came, diplomatic negotiations were to be employed mainly to screen military preparations leading to war.

The Russian army had made a poor showing against the Japanese in 1905. Though something had since been done to improve the Russian military situation, the French believed that much further preparation was essential. Hence, the French made large loans to the Russians, on condition that they should be spent under French supervision, chiefly for munitions and strategic railroads to the German frontier. The Russians also greatly increased the size of their army and the French reciprocated by enacting the Three-year Service Act, thus notably adding to the active French army.

In 1911-12 Izvolsky had found French opinion generally opposed to having France enter a European war over the Balkans. Something had to be done about this if the French public was to be made to support the diplomatic plans of Poincaré and Izvolsky. Some of the French money lent to Russia was, therefore, sent back to be used by Izvolsky in bribing the leading French papers to publish incendiary articles against Austria and Germany and to make it appear that it was to the interest of France to block the alleged Austro-German intrigues in the Balkans.²⁶

Many of the leading French papers were on the pay roll of Izvolsky. The list included the *Temps*, the leading Paris paper, as well as the organs of Millerand and Clemenceau. Hundreds of thousands of francs were dispensed in this way, Izvolsky ultimately putting the papers on a monthly-payment basis and withdrawing his subvention if they failed to be useful to him. He wrote home to his government frequently, telling them of the success of his campaign and asking for further finds. After the press campaign had been operating for some time, so Izvolsky wrote, the French were impatient because the Russians were so complacent about Austria's threats against Serbia.

Izvolsky even imported Russian gold to assist in the election of

²⁶ See H. E. Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War* (Knopf, 1929 edition), pp. 119 ff. André Tardieu contributed many articles in this press campaign.

Poincaré to the French presidency early in 1913.²⁷ A French Prime Minister can be easily overthrown, but a President holds office for seven years, and a forceful man like Poincaré, by approving weak Foreign Ministers, could direct French foreign policy about as easily in the President's office as in the much more precarious position of Prime Minister. In fact, Poincaré told Izvolsky after his election to the presidency that he proposed to be his own Foreign Minister, and this he was right down through the outbreak of the World War.²⁸

In order to keep their plans moving smoothly it was desirable for Poincaré and Izvolsky to have a sympathetic French ambassador in St. Petersburg. M. Georges Louis, who held the office in 1912, was a member of the old Caillaux régime and was opposed to the bellicose schemes of Poincaré and Izvolsky. Therefore, he was removed and replaced by M. Théophile Delcassé, second only to Poincaré as an apostle of the war of revenge among the Republicans of France. Poincaré cleverly arranged it so that the Russians seemingly requested M. Louis's recall. With Delcassé and his successor, M. Paléologue, as the French ambassadors in St. Petersburg, there was no longer any danger of opposition to the policies of Poincaré and Izvolsky from this quarter.

It was also necessary to convince Sergei Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, of the necessity of a European war to obtain the Straits. This was done (1) by a ceaseless bombardment of letters written by Izvolsky from Paris; (2) by Sazonov's consciousness that the Balkan wars had proved futile as a means of obtaining the Straits for Russia; and (3) by Sazonov's resentment when, in 1913, a German general, Liman von Sanders, was sent to Constantinople to train the Turkish army.²⁹

Hence, on December 8, 1913, Sazonov sent a famous memorandum to the Tsar stating that Russia could not tolerate any other nation in control of the Straits, that Russia must have the Straits, and that Russia could obtain the Straits only by a European war. On De-

²⁷ Stieve, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-36.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²⁹ This was no worse than what had already taken place, namely, that an English admiral had been put in charge of the Turkish navy, but England was friendly with Russia.

ember 31, 1913, and February 8, 1914, the Russians held long and secret ministerial councils at which they carefully laid out the strategy to be followed when this war came. The Tsar approved the minutes of these councils in March, 1914. Incidentally, Sazonov mentioned the fact that English aid must be assured if France and Russia were to hope to crush Germany, though he thought that they could probably defeat Germany and Austria even if England did not intervene on the side of France and Russia.³⁰

This brings us to the final scene in the dramatic revolution of European diplomacy from 1912 to 1914, namely, getting England so involved in the Franco-Russian net that it scarcely hesitated in the crisis of 1914. In the Morocco crisis of 1911, through the Mansion House speech of Lloyd George, the British government had lined up decisively with France against Germany and had done all it could to inspire in the British press an anti-German tone. But both Caillaux and the German leaders were inclined toward peace, and war was averted. In September, 1912, Sazonov visited London in behalf of an Anglo-Russian naval alliance. While he was not immediately successful in this, he received from the British hearty assurance of naval co-operation against Germany in the event of war and was told of a secret engagement to help France if war broke out.³¹ In late November, 1912, Poincaré induced Sir Edward Grey to agree to an arrangement whereby the French fleet could be concentrated in the Mediterranean Sea while the British fleet could be relied upon to protect the French Channel ports. In 1912, also, Poincaré was able to help frustrate the possible Anglo-German agreement growing out of Lord Haldane's visit to Germany. In April, 1914, the British King and Grey went to Paris and there Grey, with Izvolsky and Poincaré, laid the basis for an Anglo-Russian naval alliance that was moving towards completion in June, 1914.³²

³⁰A view shared by the French and Russian General Staffs in the spring of 1914. It is quite true, as certain Russian writers have insisted, that the holding of these council meetings does not prove that Russia was planning war immediately, but it does show that Russia was very seriously considering the prospect of a war that would not have to be started by an aggressive German action against Russia. (Compare Prof. Schmitt's horror over the dubious Moltke-Conrad "understanding of 1909.")

³¹Cf. Stieve, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 197 ff.

The fact that, nevertheless, England and Germany seemed to be coming to an agreement over Portuguese colonies in Africa, the Bagdad Railway project, and German armament alarmed the French and Russians early in 1914 and probably explains why they decided in July, 1914, that the European war should be fought before England might slip away from the Triple Entente. France and Russia never felt absolutely certain of British support until August, 1914, though the British documents show that the British Foreign Office never had any doubts about its obligations to the Entente in the crisis of 1914, and made its decision to come in on the side of France and Russia in July, 1914, without reference to the Belgian question.³³ As the eminent English publicist, E. D. Morel, once remarked, the French and Russians had thoroughly "hooked" the British by the close of 1912, even if Izvolsky and Poincaré did not entirely realize that they had done so.

While Northcliffe was bringing the Tory public and the British masses round to his bellicose point of view,³⁴ the imperialistic and nationalistic propaganda was being successfully spread among the British Liberals by J. Alfred Spender, editor of the *Westminster Gazette* and chief upholder of imperialism and Continental entanglements among the Liberal newspapermen of England. Spender was probably a more dangerous influence than Northcliffe, for a Liberal government was in power in 1914 and the Liberals were not likely to be greatly influenced by the Tory press.³⁵

In this way Izvolsky and Poincaré transformed the character of European diplomacy in the two years prior to 1914 and were ready for whatever crisis arose. They did not originally expect that 1914 would be the year of the decisive crisis which would bring on the

³³ Fully confirmed by Lord Morley's *Memorandum on Resignation*, Macmillan, 1928.

³⁴ See A. G. Gardner's slashing denunciation of the war-monger, Northcliffe, reprinted in Barnes, *In Quest of Truth and Justice*, 1928, pp. 30 ff.

³⁵ A member of the British cabinet in 1914 informed the writer in 1927 that he regarded Spender as second only to the war clique in the cabinet among those who made it possible for Grey to throw England into the conflict. It might be mentioned in this connection that it was Spender who helped Lord Grey write his apologia, *Twenty-five Years*.

(See Spender's apology, *Fifty Years of Europe*, Stokes, 1933. In an amazing review of the book in the *New York Nation*, G. P. Gooch called Spender a sincere friend of peace.)

European war. They had anticipated that this would come at the death of Francis Joseph, which they believed would bring about a serious Austro-Balkan clash. When the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated in the summer of 1914, they appear to have concluded that the potential Anglo-German rapprochement was too dangerous to allow the test to be postponed. England was known not to make wars lightly, and there was little hope that France and Russia unaided could speedily crush Germany and Austria. In any event, it seems certain that they decided that if a diplomatic crisis arose through Austrian demands upon Serbia, it would be better to fight than for Russia, and with it the Triple Entente, to accept humiliation and the resulting loss of prestige.³⁶

While the Triple Entente was thus being more firmly cemented and made aggressive in character, the Triple Alliance was disintegrating. Italy, placated over northern Africa, had made a secret agreement with France in 1902 to the effect that it would enter no war against France. Though the Germans counted on Italian aid in 1914, we know there was little chance of their obtaining such assistance. Then, from 1912 to 1914, there was considerable friction between Germany and Austria over Serbia. The Austrians felt that Serbia must be punished in order to stop Russo-Serbian intrigues in the Balkans. The Kaiser, however, under the influence of the pro-Serbian German minister in Belgrade, Baron J. A. von Griesinger, opposed any imminent Austrian aggression and twice prevented an Austrian offensive against Serbia.³⁷

³⁶ Poincaré has denied the truth of this indictment which we have been able to formulate on the basis of the Izvolsky correspondence and other documents, but he has been unable to bring forward any French documents that convincingly contradict Izvolsky's general interpretation of affairs. Moreover, there is little probability that Izvolsky would have dared to lie persistently to his chief, Sazonov, regarding matters of such vital concern for the foreign policy of his country and for his own diplomatic ambitions. He had suffered enough in 1909 from failure to make good his assurances. Professor William L. Langer, the foremost American authority on pre-war Russian diplomacy, in reviewing the Izvolsky correspondence, writes: "When all is said and done this correspondence still formulates the most serious indictment of Franco-Russian pre-war policy and lends considerable color to the theory that there was a conspiracy against the peace of the world." (*Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1927, p. 656.)

³⁷ The Austrian journalist, Heinrich Kanner, a disgruntled enemy of the old régime in Austria, together with Professor Bernadotte Schmitt, have claimed

In the first half of the year 1914 many developments were taking place which were likely to make any crisis in that year pregnant with the probability of a European war. The growing Anglo-German amiability³⁸ greatly worried the French and Russians and ~~made them feel~~ that any considerable delay of the European war was dangerous. The Tory clique in England was favorable to a European war. Not only were the Tories bellicose and anti-German, but a war would help stop the menacing social reforms of the Liberal party in England, particularly the proposed land reforms, and also make it more difficult to enforce the new Irish Home Rule Act. The Northcliffe press was demanding war against Germany, partly because of its Tory sympathies and partly because a war was good business for newspapers. As has been noted, Russia had decided that it must have the Straits and could only obtain them by a European war, and had held two long ministerial councils in December, 1913, and February, 1914, to decide on the proper strategy for this war.

In March, 1914, the Russian General, G. N. Danilov, congratulated his country on its readiness for the impending conflict and, in June, General V. A. Sukhomlinov, the Russian Minister of War, boasted that Russia was ready for war and that France must also be ready. This was done in part to silence the foes of the Three-year Service Act in France. In the spring of 1914 France had refused to allow the retirement into the reserves of the class normally entitled to leave active service that year, thus having four classes instead of two with the colors in July, 1914. The Tsar had received the Serbian Premier, Nikola Pasic, in February, 1914, asked him how many men Serbia could put in the field if war came, promised him arms and ammunition from Russia, and told him to

to find in the memoirs of Conrad von Hotzendorf, the former Austrian Chief of Staff, evidence of a dark Austro-German war plot secretly laid in 1909 and executed in 1914. Professor Fay, Count Montgelas, and others have shown that there is no factual foundation whatever for this "Schmitt-Kanner Myth."

(Cf. S. B. Fay, *American Historical Review*, January, 1927, pp. 317-19; and Count M. M. K. S. Montgelas, "Une nouvelle thèse relative à la question des responsabilités," *Revue de Hongrie*, Nov. 15, 1926.)

³⁸ Expressed by Lloyd George and Haldane, for example, not by Grey and Crowe.

inform the Serbian King that Russia would do all in its power to aid Serbia.³⁹

From the reports of the ministerial conferences of December 31, 1913, and February 8, 1914, we can readily perceive that Sazonov had seized the helm with determination and knew in what direction he was steering the Muscovite craft.

By January, 1914, the plot to murder the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austrian throne, was under consideration, and by March it had taken definite form. In May it was perfected by officers in the Serbian army, and it has been charged that high Russian military authorities had approved of it and had promised Russian aid in the event of an Austrian attack upon Serbia.⁴⁰

The Russian minister in Belgrade, Nicholas von Hartwig, was organizing a widespread Balkan intrigue against Austria, and the Austrians captured many of his telegrams and decoded them. This enabled the Austrian statesmen to know of the Russo-Balkan menace to the Dual Monarchy. Before the murder of the Archduke they had drawn up a memorandum to be taken to Berlin, asking for German aid in thwarting the Russian intrigues in the Balkans. They particularly desired Germany to drop Rumania and to take

³⁹ In his memoirs, Sir Edward Grey represents Russia as drifting into war because of lack of any decisive policy or leadership: "Perhaps it may be true to say, of Russia, that she was like a huge, unwieldy ship, which in time of agitation kept an uncertain course; not because she was directed by malevolent intentions, but because the steering-gear was weak." (*Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916*, Stokes, 1925, 2 vols., Vol. II, pp. 23.) It is interesting to compare Grey's view with Sazonov's direct denial, embodied in his memorandum to the Tsar on December 8, 1913, telling him that Russia must have the Straits, and in all probability could secure them only by war:

"In considering the future and in impressing upon ourselves that the maintenance of peace, so much desired, will not always lie in our power, we are forced not to limit ourselves to the problems of today and tomorrow. This we must do in order to escape the reproach so often made of the Russian ship of state, namely, that it is at the mercy of the winds and drifts with the current, without a rudder capable of firmly directing her course."

⁴⁰ There is no evidence that Sazonov and the Russian Foreign Office knew anything about the Serbian assassination plot. Indeed, Count Pourtalès, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg in 1914, informed the writer in the summer of 1927 that he was thoroughly convinced that Sazonov was entirely innocent in this matter. Sazonov was at tea in the German Embassy when news was brought to him of the murder of the Archduke. He was obviously surprised and shocked.

on Bulgaria as the pivotal state for Austro-German diplomacy in the Balkans.

The Serbian government was aware of the assassination plot for at least three weeks before the murder of Francis Ferdinand, but it took no active steps to frustrate the scheme or to warn Austria of the danger that was awaiting the Archduke when he visited Bosnia. Such was the state of affairs when the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was shot down on the streets of Sarajevo on St. Vitus' Day, June 28, 1914.

In regard to this third level of war responsibility, that residing in diplomatic developments from 1912 to 1914, we may, thus, hold that the guilt was mainly that of imperial Russia, aided and abetted by Serbia, and to a lesser degree that of France; while Germany, England, and Austria had the cleanest record.

The Diplomatic Crisis of June-August, 1914

After the Archduke's assassination, France and Russia recognized that the impending clash between Austria and Serbia might bring about a European conflict. The year 1914 was a particularly desirable time for the Entente, because there was imminent danger that England might develop more happy relations with Germany, and that the French Radicals might be able to secure the repeal of the French Army Bill. Russia, moreover, was threatened by another revolution, perhaps more serious than that of 1905. Poincaré went to St. Petersburg, and, before even learning the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, renewed his pledge of two years earlier to support Russia in a war over the Balkans. He indicated that the impending Austro-Serbian conflict would meet the conditions demanded by the French in supporting Russian intervention in that region.

The Franco-Russian program in 1914 was to force Serbia to make a formal show of conciliation and concessions and to indicate an apparent Franco-Russian willingness to settle the dispute through diplomacy. Underneath, secret Franco-Russian military preparations were carried on that would ultimately make a diplomatic settlement impossible. Hence, Russia urged Serbia not to declare war on Austria, and, to insure a superficially conciliatory Serbian reply to Austria, the Serbian response to the Austrian ultimatum was drafted/

in outline by Undersecretary Philippe Berthelot and others in the French Foreign Office.⁴¹ Russia did not desire to have Serbia precipitate matters prematurely or unfavorably by a declaration of war on Austria. This would have affected European opinion, particularly English opinion, unfavorably and would also have brought about Austro-German military activities altogether too rapidly for Russia, whose mobilization over a vast area would necessarily be slow as compared to that of Austria and Germany.

On July 24, when the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia were made public, Russia and France began a dual program, namely, a diplomatic barrage combined with secret military preparations which made a European war inevitable by the late afternoon of July 30. ~~Russia sent a diplomatic message to Serbia counseling moderation,~~ but at the same time prepared for the mobilization of the four great military districts of central and southern Russia, as well as of the Russian fleets. Russian money in Germany and Austria was called in.

On the same day (July 24) Premier René Viviani, on his way back from St. Petersburg, telegraphed to the French Foreign Office that the Austro-Serbian situation was likely to develop serious European complications, and the French troops in Morocco were ordered home. ~~Both Russia and France began systematic military preparations for war on July 26.~~ By July 29 the time had come when Russian military preparations had gone far enough to warrant a general mobilization, which would inevitably provoke war, and the Tsar was persuaded to consent to issue this fateful order. A conciliatory telegram from the Kaiser, urging peace, however, induced the Tsar to revoke it, but the next day Sazonov and close associates once more extracted from the Tsar his reluctant consent to the order for general mobilization. This time it was not revoked.

The French and the Russians had understood for a generation that once Russian general mobilization was ordered there would be no way of preventing a general European war. General Sergei Dobrotsky, chief of Russian mobilization in 1914, has told us with great candor that the Russian authorities in 1914 fully realized that a

⁴¹ Berthelot once admitted to Jacques Mesnil, editor of *L'Humanité*, that he had drafted the Serbian reply in outline.

European war was on as soon as the ominous mobilization order had been sent out from the general telegraph office in St. Petersburg, late in the afternoon of July 30.

The French authorities had been informed as to the general nature and progress of the fateful Russian military preparations, but they made no effort to restrain them, though the French well knew that these military activities were bound to render a European war inevitable. They actually urged the Russians to speed up their military preparations, but to be more secretive about them, so as not to alienate England or provoke Germany to rapid counter-mobilization. On the night of July 31 the French government went still further and enthusiastically decided for war, handing this information to Izvolsky about midnight.

The Austrian statesmen in 1914, in turn, had decided that the time had come when it would be necessary to suppress the Serbian menace, and they consciously planned an ultimatum of such severity that it would be unlikely that Serbia would concede the demands. The plan, then, was to make a show of diplomacy but to move toward probable war. This program was much like that of France and Russia, save for the crucial fact that Austria desired to produce only a local punitive war, while the plans of France and Russia envisaged a general European conflict. *This is the most important point to be borne in mind when estimating the relative war guilt of Austria as against that of France and Russia.*⁴²

Germany, lately friendly to Serbia, was alarmed by the assassination of the Archduke and the resulting menace to its chief ally. Germany, therefore, agreed to stand behind Austria and support the plan of the latter to punish Serbia.

The answer of the Serbians to the Austrian ultimatum, however, impressed the Kaiser as a satisfactory basis for further negotiations. On July 27, in co-operation with Sir Edward Grey, Germany began to urge upon Austria direct negotiations with Russia and the mediation of its dispute with Serbia. Austria refused to listen to this advice and declared war upon Serbia on July 28. Germany then be-

⁴² Then, there was the fact that, while the very existence of Austria-Hungary was at stake in punishing Serbia, only Russian prestige and Pan-Slavism were involved in Russia's war to protect Serbia.

came alarmed at the rumored Russian military preparations and vigorously pressed Austria for a diplomatic settlement of the dispute. Austria did not give way and consent to this until July 31, which was too late to avert a general European war because the Russian mobilization was then in full swing.⁴³ Germany endeavored without success to secure the suspension of military activities by Russia, and then, after unexpected hesitation and deliberation, declared war upon Russia.

The Russian general mobilization, undertaken with the full connivance of the French ambassador in St. Petersburg and approved by Paris before it was ordered, was decided upon at a time when diplomatic negotiations were moving rapidly towards a satisfactory settlement of the major problems in the crisis. Hence, the Russian general mobilization not only precipitated military hostilities; it was the main reason for the failure of diplomatic efforts in 1914.

England was for peace but was determined to fight in case France was involved. France decided, from the beginning, to stand with Russia in working for war. Since England refused to attempt to restrain either France or Russia, England was inevitably drawn away from encouragement of the German efforts to find a diplomatic solution of the crisis and into support of the military action of France and Russia.

England made the decision to enter the war in 1914 after Germany had proposed to keep out of Belgium and to refrain from attacking France if England would remain neutral.⁴⁴ In fact, Ger-

⁴³ Count Leopold von Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister in 1914, explained fully and candidly to the writer in 1927 why he did not heed Germany's pressure before July 31. He stated that the Austro-Hungarian statesmen were convinced that a continuance of the Serbian threat was a greater menace to the Dual Monarchy than a war between Germany and Austria, on the one side, and France and Russia, on the other. He had plenty of assurance from the British Embassy in Vienna that England would most certainly not intervene to protect Serbia. Counting on English neutrality, he was determined to punish Serbia after the latter had refused to accede to the only really important items in the Austrian ultimatum. By July 31, Berchtold was finally convinced that England would come in if Germany and France went to war. He then moderated his policy, but the Russian mobilization made the change too late. Lord Grey's evasive and two-faced conduct of British diplomacy in 1914 thus played a very important part in Austrian policy and in the coming of the war.

⁴⁴ Cf. *British Official Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, British Library of Information, 1926-32, 11 vols., Vol. XI, No. 448.

many even suggested that it might guarantee the integrity of France and the French colonies in the event of war if England would promise neutrality.⁴⁵ The Belgian issue in England was a pure subterfuge, cleverly exploited by Grey to inflame British and world opinion against Germany and to secure British support of his war policy.

Even if Grey had wished personally to listen to his major ambassadors and to take steps to check France and Russia, he would have found it difficult to do so because he was constantly inflamed by the passionate anti-Germanism of Sir Eyre Crowe, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who put the worst possible interpretation on every German move in the crisis and held Britain's course steadfastly towards war.⁴⁶

In estimating the order of guilt of the various countries we may safely say that the direct and immediate responsibility for the World War falls upon Serbia, France, and Russia, with the guilt about equally distributed. Next in order—far below France and Russia—would come Austria, though it never desired a general European war. Finally, we should place England and Germany, in the order named, both being opposed to war in the 1914 crisis. Probably the German public was somewhat more favorable to military activities than were the English people, but, as we have amply explained above, the Kaiser made more strenuous efforts to preserve the peace of Europe in 1914 than did Sir Edward Grey.

It has been declared futile and illogical to try to list the European Powers in any rank or order of guilt, on the ground that they were all involved in the morass of diplomatic squabbles and intrigues of 1914. This view, however, challenges the elementary logic applied every day in courts of law. Principals and accomplices are all involved, let us say, in a murder. But the court is able to distinguish among them, and pleas of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter are all permitted. It has further been maintained that it is unfair to say that Russia, for example, was guilty in 1914, because many Russians knew nothing about the issues of the war and many more were opposed to its onset. It should be obvious that we are not engaged in the unfair task of indicting a nation. We

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. XI, Nos. 419, 448, 453.

⁴⁶ Cf. Hermann Lutz, *Lord Grey and the World War*, Knopf, 1928, pp. 218-19, 235, 238, 244-45, 252-53, 266-67, 287, 289-90, 294, 300.

refer only to those statesmen who were responsible in 1914 for the public policy of their respective states and compelled each country to act as a unit.⁴⁷

Some writers whose accounts of pre-war diplomacy do not differ materially from that presented in this chapter have, nevertheless, maintained that no important responsible statesman in 1914 wanted war for war's sake alone—or wanted war in the abstract. We might go even further and concede that nobody in 1914 wanted war if he could get what he wanted without war. Probably Izvolsky can be charged with more responsibility for the World War than any other single person. Yet we have already made clear that even he accepted war only as a last resort in his campaign to get the Straits. He tried diplomacy twice, in 1908 and in 1911, and then he quite humanely and discreetly had recourse to a "little war"—the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Only when all these efforts failed did he reconcile himself to working for a European war to obtain the Straits. It is probable that only a handful of half-wits, neurotics, ultra-militarists, and the like wanted war in 1914 in preference to securing national ambitions by pacific means.

The question that we have to settle, however, is not who wanted or did not want war under conditions quite different from those which existed in Europe in 1914. This is both an insoluble and an irrelevant problem. What we have to deal with is the issue of what responsible statesmen wished war under the precise conditions that developed after June 30, 1914. To this a decisive answer can be given today, if such an answer can be given to any historical question since the dawn of written history. Certainly Izvolsky, Sazonov, and the Grand Duke Nicholas, among the Russians; Poincaré, Viviani, and Berthelot, among the French; and Pasic and the majority of the Serbian cabinet—these thought a European war preferable to

⁴⁷ Another way of stating the ultimate conclusions about the crisis of 1914 would be to say that only Russia, Serbia, and France wished a general European war, under the conditions that existed in the summer of 1914; that Austria-Hungary wished a local punitive war against Serbia, but desired to avert, if possible, a general war; and that Germany, England, and Italy did not wish any kind of war, but were too stupid, dilatory, or involved in entanglements to prevent either the Austro-Serbian war or the wider conflict. The Kaiser had favored an immediate attack on Serbia by Austria right after the assassination, but, following the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum, he favored negotiations and opposed any general war.

permitting Austria to proceed with its punishment of Serbia.⁴⁸ The majority of the Austro-Hungarian cabinet believed a war involving France, Russia, Germany, and Austria to be better than refraining from the invasion of Serbia, but they did not think it worth risking a war in which England would fight on the side of France and Russia. The majority of the responsible statesmen of England and Germany would have preferred peace to war in 1914, but England accepted war rather than attempt to restrain its allies and Germany was unable to dissuade its ally from the Austro-Serbian conflict in time to save the peace of Europe. It is doubtful if any new facts or different logic will ever upset this general line of reasoning. No sensible historian would contend that Germany's wish for European peace in 1914 was based upon any superior moral virtues of that nation. It is to be explained simply by the fact that Germany was gaining its ends, selfish ends if you wish, very well indeed by peaceful means, and its statesmen knew that war might place this German progress in grave jeopardy.

The United States and the First World War

We may now consider the forces, factors, and personalities which brought the United States into the war.

The United States could not have been more perfectly set up for neutrality than it was in July and August, 1914. President Woodrow Wilson was a lifelong and deeply conscientious pacifist. His convictions in this matter were not emotional or impressionistic, but had been based upon deep study and prolonged reflection. Moreover, he was married to a woman noted for pacific sentiments and firm convictions on such matters. She strongly backed up her husband in his pacific beliefs and policies. As Secretary of State, we had in William Jennings Bryan the world's outstanding pacifist. His pacifism was notably courageous; he was willing to stick by his guns even in the face of malicious criticism.

Moreover, Wilson was almost uniquely well informed as to essentials of the European situation before war broke out in the

⁴⁸ Those in the Serbian, Russian and French cabinets, if any, who were personally opposed to war were, of course, in time carried along with the bellicose majority.

summer of 1914. He had sent his personal representative, Colonel Edward M. House, to Europe to study the international situation and to report to him upon it. Whatever his later mistakes, Colonel House sized up matters in Europe with almost perfect sagacity and understanding in May, 1914. He concluded his observations with the statement that "whenever England consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany."

If one were to summarize, as briefly as this, the outcome of the years of scholarly study since 1918, with respect to responsibility for the World War, a more perfect estimate and verdict than Colonel House's phrase could not be rendered in the same number of words. Further, the Colonel pointed out that, whatever the Kaiser's emotional shortcomings, he wished for European peace. On the other hand, he stated candidly that George V of England was "the most pugnacious monarch loose in these parts."

When war broke out, President Wilson's statements were a model of neutral procedure. He issued a formally correct neutrality proclamation and went on to exhort his countrymen to be neutral in thought as well as in action. There is no doubt that he was completely neutral at heart in August, 1914. Less than three years later, however, in April, 1917, he went before Congress and told its members that "God helping her," this country could do no other than make war on Germany. Moreover, he returned from the Capitol to the White House and made statements to his secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, indicating that, at the time of his war message, he had so far changed his attitude that he could not believe he ever had been neutral. He cited with approval an article by the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* stating that Mr. Wilson had always been sympathetic with the Allies and had wished to throw this country into war on their side just as soon as circumstances would permit.

We shall first briefly consider some of the reasons why Wilson altered his point of view, since no other set of circumstances could alone have forced us into the war, if Wilson had not been favorable to our entry by the spring of 1917.

First and foremost, we must take into account the fact that Wilson's intellectual perspective was predominantly Anglo-Saxon. He had little knowledge of, or sympathy with, continental European

culture and institutions. His great intellectual heroes were such English writers as John Milton, John Locke, Adam Smith and Walter Bagehot. He did his graduate work in the Johns Hopkins University Seminar under Herbert Baxter Adams, where the "Anglo-Saxon Myth"⁴⁹ reigned supreme. Wilson was a persistent student and admirer of the English constitution and frankly regarded the British system of government as superior to our own.

Then Wilson had in his cabinet and among his ambassadors men who were intensely pro-English or pro-Ally in their sympathies. Such were Secretaries Lindley M. Garrison and David F. Houston. Walter Hines Page, our ambassador in London, was even more intensely pro-English than Wilson. Indeed, he frequently went to such excesses as to annoy the President. When Bryan was succeeded by Robert Lansing, the most crucial post in the cabinet went to another vehemently pro-English sympathizer. The biases of Page and Lansing made it difficult to pursue forthright diplomacy with Great Britain.

Another major difficulty lay in the fact that President Wilson and Secretary Lansing did not formulate and execute a fair and consistent line of diplomatic procedure. They had one type of international law for England and the Allies, and quite another for Germany. They all but allowed Great Britain to run wild in the violation of international law and of our neutral rights, while they insisted on holding Germany "to strict accountability."

England started out in 1914 by making a scrap of paper out of the Declaration of London governing contraband in wartime. Next, we proceeded to allow her to make use of armed belligerent merchantmen as if they were peaceful commercial vessels. England violated our neutral rights far more extensively between 1914 and 1917 than she did before the War of 1812, even to the point of flying the American flag.

Wilson came to believe, however, that Great Britain was fighting for civilization and that so trivial a thing as international law must not be allowed to stand in her way. Wilson's Attorney-General, Thomas W. Gregory, tells of the rebuke which the President admin-

⁴⁹ I.e., the idea that American political ideals and liberties are a heritage from a racially pure Anglo-Saxon England.

istered to certain cabinet members when they protested over the flagrant British violation of our neutral rights: "After patiently listening, Mr. Wilson said, in that quiet way of his, that the ordinary rules of conduct had no application to the situation; that the Allies were standing with their backs to the wall, fighting wild beasts; that he would permit nothing to be done by our country to hinder or embarrass them in the prosecution of the war unless admitted rights were grossly violated, and that this policy must be understood as settled." Bryan protested against our unfair and unneutral diplomacy and ultimately resigned because he could not square his conscience with it.

Secretary Lansing admits in his *Memoirs* that he made no real pretense of holding England to the tenets of international law. He tells us that after the sinking of the *Lusitania* he thought we should be fighting on the side of the Allies and that he was determined to do nothing which would prove embarrassing to us when we later took up our position as a military comrade of the Allied powers. He persisted in this attitude, even though he was honest enough to write after the war that in 1917 we had as good, if not better, legal grounds for fighting Britain as for fighting Germany.

Ambassador Page even went so far as to collaborate with Sir Edward Grey in answering the protests of his own government, an unparalleled procedure which, when revealed, outraged even so pro-Ally a journal as the *New York Times*.

We thus encouraged and perpetuated the illegally extensive British blockade, which provoked the German submarine warfare. In time, we made war on the latter, though it was our unneutral diplomacy which contributed, in large part, to the continuance of both the British blockade and the German submarine activities.⁵⁰

Wilson was deeply affected by the criticisms to which he was subjected by prominent Americans sympathetic with the Allies and in favor of intervention on their side. He was stung by the famous speeches of Theodore Roosevelt on "The Shadows of Shadow

⁵⁰ From the studies of Professor Charles C. Tansill and others, it would seem that on the rare occasions when President Wilson and Secretary Lansing became outraged over the grossest British violations of our neutrality, Colonel House invariably appeared on the spot to prevent even a show of firmness on the part of our State Department.

Lawn," and by the latter's reference to Wilson's diplomatic statements as examples of "weasel words." He was particularly annoyed by the statement of Elihu Root that "first he shakes his fist and then he shakes his finger."

On the other hand, Wilson was human enough to take note of the praise which was showered upon him by the press when he made a bellicose statement or led a preparedness parade. This contrasted sharply with the bitter criticism he evoked when he made a statesmanlike remark, such as that a country might be "too proud to fight," or that the only desirable peace would be "a peace without victory."

Wilson was also profoundly moved by the British propaganda relative to German atrocities and territorial ambitions. This was particularly true after Lord Bryce lent his name to the prestige and veracity of the propaganda stories as to German savagery. Of all living Englishmen, Bryce was probably the man whom Wilson most admired and trusted. When Bryce sponsored the propaganda lies, Wilson came to believe that they must have a substantial basis in fact. This helped on his rationalization that England was fighting the battle of human civilization against wild beasts.

Personal matters also played their rôle in the transformation of Wilson's attitude. His first wife died and a strong pacific influence was removed. He then courted and married a dashing widow who was sympathetic with the Allied side and friendly with Washington military and naval circles. She was also bitterly resentful of the criticism to which Wilson was subjected on account of his refusal to be stampeded into intervention. She appears to have wished him to take a stronger stand for intervention. The domestic influence on the President was, thus, completely transformed in character as a result of his second marriage. The publication of Mrs. Wilson's *Memoirs* does not make it necessary to modify this statement.

When, as an outcome of these various influences, Wilson had been converted to intervention, he rationalized his change of attitude on the basis of a noble moral purpose. As he told Jane Addams in the spring of 1917, he felt that the United States must be represented at the peace conference which would end the World War if there was to be any hope of a just and constructive peace. But Wil-

son could be at the peace conference only if the United States had previously entered the World War.

It is still asserted by many writers, such as Professor Charles Seymour, that the resumption of submarine warfare by Germany was the sole reason for Wilson's determination to enter the war on the Allied side. But we know that he had been converted to intervention long before January, 1917. A year earlier, he had sent Colonel House to Europe with a plan to put us in the war on the side of the Allies if Germany would not accept peace terms obviously unfavorable to her. But even such peace terms for Germany were rejected by the British leaders, who felt sure of American aid anyway and were determined to crush Germany. Yet this British rebuff did not lead Wilson to lose heart in his efforts to put this country into the war.

His next step was taken in this country. Early in April,⁵¹ 1916, Wilson called into consultation Speaker Champ Clark of the House of Representatives and Congressional leaders Claude Kitchin and H. D. Flood, and sounded them out to see if they would support him in a plan to bring the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. This was the famous "Sunrise Conference" described later by Gilson Gardner in *McNaught's Monthly* of June, 1925. These men sharply refused to sanction any such policy, and Wilson allowed the campaign of 1916 to be fought out on the slogan, "He kept us out of war." Wilson did not dare to risk splitting the Democratic Party over entry into the war before the campaign of 1916 had successfully ended. The existence of the "Sunrise Conference" has been fully verified by Professor A. M. Arnett in his scholarly book on Claude Kitchin.

Wilson was convinced after the failure of the "Sunrise Conference" that there was no hope of getting the country into war until after the election. The sentiment of the nation was for peace. If he was elected as an exponent of peace and then went into war the country as a whole would believe that he had done his best to "keep us out of war." He would have a united country behind him. Hence, he and Colonel House sent Governor Martin Glynn of New York and Senator Ollie James of Kentucky to the Democratic National

⁵¹ Professor Tansill believes that this conference was probably held in February rather than April. I still incline to credit the April date.

Convention at St. Louis, in June, 1916, with instructions to make keynote speeches emphasizing Wilson's heroic efforts to keep us out of war.

Thus was fashioned the famous slogan "He kept us out of war," which re-elected Woodrow Wilson to the presidency almost a year after Colonel House, following Wilson's directions, had declared that: "The United States would like Great Britain to do whatever would help the United States to aid the Allies."⁵²

The campaign and election of 1916 were very really a referendum on war, and the people voted against war. This is illuminating as an illustration of the fallacy that a war referendum, such as the Ludlow Amendment, would, by itself alone, suffice to keep us out of war, but the election of 1916 does offer definite proof that Wilson was not pushed into war by popular demand.

The influence exerted by American finance upon our entry into the World War has been revealed in Ray Stannard Baker's *Life and Letters of Woodrow Wilson*, in the volumes of the Nye armament investigation, and in Professor C. C. Tansill's *America Goes to War*.

At the outset, the international bankers were not by any means all pro-Ally. Some, like the Morgan firm, were pro-British, and had been for years, while others, like Kuhn, Loeb and Company, manned chiefly by men of German derivation, were pro-German. But the financial interests of all the bankers soon came to be pro-Ally, for credit and loans to Germany were discouraged, while large loans were presently being made to the Allied powers.

On August 15, 1914, at the beginning of the war, Bryan declared against loans to any belligerent, on the ground that credit is the basis of all forms of contraband. President Wilson backed him up. For the time being, this position did not operate seriously against the Allies, for the balance of trade and investment was against the United States, and the Allied countries could pay for their purchases by cancelling the debts owed abroad by Americans. This situation took care of matters for a few months. But Allied war purchases became so great that, by the autumn of 1914, there was a credit crisis. The National City Bank addressed Robert Lansing, then Counsellor of

⁵² Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-five Years*, Vol. II, p. 127; and B. J. Hendrick, *The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page*, Vol. III, p. 279.

the State Department, on this matter on October 23, 1914. Short-term credits to European governments were advocated. Lansing talked the matter over with President Wilson at once, and the latter agreed that the government would not interfere with such an arrangement. This information was transmitted orally to Willard Straight of J. P. Morgan & Company at the Metropolitan Club in Washington on the same night.

Shortly afterwards, H. P. Davison of the Morgan firm went to England and signed a contract to become the British purchasing agent in America. A similar contract was soon made with France.

The short-term loans sufficed for some months, but by the summer of 1915 Allied buying had become so extensive that the bankers saw that they must float loans here for the Allied countries if the latter were to continue to buy American munitions on a large scale. So they made strong representations to Colonel House and to the Secretary of the Treasury, W. G. McAdoo.

On August 21, 1915, McAdoo wrote a long letter to President Wilson, pointing out that great prosperity had come to the country as a result of the sale of munitions to the Allies, but that this prosperity could not continue unless we financed it through open loans to the Allies—i.e. selling Allied bonds in our own financial markets.

On September 6, 1915, Secretary Lansing argued similarly in a letter to President Wilson, stressing the crisis that faced American business if the earlier ruling of Bryan and the President on American loans to belligerents was not rescinded. Colonel House supported this position. McAdoo and Lansing won their point. On September 8, 1915, Wilson assented to loans and the Morgan firm was once more given oral information. Very soon, the first public loan, the \$500,000,000 Anglo-French loan, was floated.

The formal loans to the Allies—over \$2,500,000,000 in all—financed their purchases for a little over a year, but their buying was so heavy that even the great investment banking houses could not take care of their needs. By January, 1917, the Allies had overdrawn their credit by nearly \$500,000,000. Only Uncle Sam could save the great banking houses and the Allies. And Uncle Sam could help only if the United States were at war with Germany. We could not, as a government, lend money to a belligerent, unless we were at war with its enemy.

Just at this time the Germans renewed their unrestricted submarine warfare. The United States could now be led into the war, and the bankers would be repaid. They were repaid to the last cent. When the war was over, Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, of J. P. Morgan and Company, stated the facts relative to the attitude of his firm toward the World War and the belligerent powers:

At the request of certain of the foreign governments the firm of Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Company undertook to co-ordinate the requirements of the Allies, and then to bring about regularity and promptness in fulfilling these requirements. Those were the days when American citizens were being urged to remain neutral in action, in word, and even in thought. But our firm had never for one moment been neutral: we didn't know how to be. From the very start we did everything we could to contribute to the cause of the Allies. And this particular work had two effects: one in assisting the Allies in the production of goods and munitions in America necessary to the Allies' vigorous prosecution of the war; the other in helping to develop the great and profitable export trade that our country has had.⁵³

Most American industrialists naturally shared the attitude of the bankers. Since England controlled the seas, our sales were mainly to the Allied powers. We wished to see the Allies continue the war and win it. Upon their purchases depended most of our sales and prosperity, and upon their success and solvency depended the prospect of their being able to pay us in the end. The trade in munitions carried us from a depression in 1914 to boom years in 1915 and 1916.⁵⁴

By abandoning his neutral financial and industrial policy in favor of the Allies, President Wilson made it possible for the Entente Powers to enjoy an enormous advantage over the Central Powers in getting war supplies. The only way for the Central Powers to overcome it was to resume unlimited submarine warfare and try to sweep from the seas the ships that were carrying these supplies to the Allies.

It was our unneutral financing of the Allies that led to the resumption of German submarine warfare, and it was the resumption of

⁵³ *Manchester Guardian*, January 27, 1920.

⁵⁴ There has been much dispute as to whether we were forced into war by the loans and sales to the Allies or by the resumption of German submarine warfare early in 1917. In an important article in *Science and Society* (Spring, 1939) on "Neutrality and Economic Pressures, 1914-1917" Professor Paul Bird-sall shows that the two were inseparably tied together.

this warfare which furnished the "incident" that enabled the war party in this country to put us into the conflict. It is, thus, perfectly clear that economic and financial pressure was the crucial factor which led us into war in 1917.

But no one need hold that President Wilson was moved primarily by any tender sentiments for the bankers. Both McAdoo and Lansing argued that it was essential to American prosperity to finance the Allies.

It was this general consideration of continued prosperity in 1915-16, and the relation of this to the prospects of the Democratic Party in the election of 1916, rather than any direct banker pressure on the White House, that bore in on Wilson's consciousness in the late summer of 1915, when he let down the gates to financing the Allies.

Yet, it is downright silly to contend that the bankers had no influence on Wilson's policy. If he did not listen to the bankers himself, he did listen very attentively to those who did heed banker pressure, namely, McAdoo, Lansing and House.

The active campaign for American preparedness and intervention was engineered by leaders of the war cult in the United States, such men as Theodore Roosevelt, Leonard Wood, Henry Cabot Lodge, "Gus" Gardiner, and the like. They led in the preparedness movement, the Plattsburg camp episode, and other steps designed to stimulate the martial spirit in America. The newspapers warmly supported this movement because of the circulation appeal which preparedness material supplied.

While there were notable exceptions, the majority of our newspapers were pro-Ally and pro-interventionist. Many of them were honestly sympathetic with the Allies. Others were deeply influenced by Allied propaganda. Some were heavily subsidized by the Allies. Still others were bought outright by Allied interests. Moreover, the Allies supplied all American newspapers with a vast amount of war-news material always favorable to the Allied cause. The newspapers also had a natural affinity for the bankers and industrialists who were their chief advertising clients. Finally, the newspapers were not unaware of the enormous circulation gains and increased advertising revenue which would follow our entry into the World War.

In the matter of propaganda the Allies had a notable advantage.

They controlled the seas, the cables, and other means of communication. The Germans had only one crude and temporary wireless contact with the United States. Further, Allied propaganda was far better organized and more lavishly supported.⁵⁵ It was also much more adroit than the German. As a result, a majority of Americans were led to believe in the veracity of the great batch of atrocity lies relative to the German invasion of Belgium, submarine warfare, and the like. This was particularly true after Lord Bryce put the force of his name and prestige behind the authenticity of such tales. Lord Northcliffe, who was in charge of British propaganda, in moments of unusual candor, stated that the Americans proved more gullible in such matters than any other people except the Chinese and called us "a bunch of sheep."

The ministers of the gospel also joined heartily in the great crusade to put us into the World War. Lining up behind such a stalwart as Newell Dwight Hillis, they preached a veritable holy war. They represented the Allies as divinely-anointed promoters of international decency and justice and the Central Powers as the servants of evil and the agents of savagery.

The net result of all this was that we entered the World War in April, 1917. We did so, even though there was no clear legal or moral basis for our so doing. If there ever was an instance in which the facts were clearly in accord with a neutrality policy it was in the spring of 1917. We should have fought both Germany and Britain or else neither. But the country went into war, with most of the

⁵⁵ Editor's note: Compare Wickham Steed's statement in the article on propaganda in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (14th ed., Vol. 18, pp. 581-582): "Before 1914 Germany alone among the great countries of the world carried it [propaganda] on systematically. While other countries and other Governments engaged, from time to time, in special propagandist campaigns for definite objects, German propaganda was continuous and widespread. It was carried on chiefly by the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office among the representatives of foreign newspapers resident in Berlin; by foreign press bureaux and telegraph agencies affiliated to the German press bureau and to the German official telegraph agency; by the staffs of German embassies and legations abroad, and by the head offices of foreign branches of German banks and shipping companies. . . . For some months after the war broke out German propaganda had the field to itself. The Allied Governments were unprepared to meet it." This does not, of course, invalidate Barnes' contention that the Allies, once they got started, conducted their propaganda in the United States more effectively than the Germans. The reader should note that Steed himself was a propagandist. W. W.

citizens of the United States feeling that our self-respect and national honor demanded it. No other course seemed open to us.

The Great Conflict: The Old and the New Warfare

The World War actually began July 28, 1914, when Austria-Hungary sent Serbia an official declaration of war, and continued for over four years, being terminated with the signing of the Armistice by the Allies and Germany on November 11, 1918.

On July 30, 1914, mobilization of the Russian army was ordered, and on August 1, upon Russia's refusal to demobilize, Germany declared war against Russia. Before the end of that month France, Belgium, England, Montenegro, and Japan had joined Russia in the conflict, and in October Turkey allied its forces with Germany. At the conclusion of 1914, the warring Central Powers included Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, and the Entente Allies were Russia, France, England, Japan, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. Bulgaria's entrance in October, 1915, completed the ranks of the Central Powers. The years 1915-18 witnessed the increase of the Allied Powers by the entry of Italy (May, 1915), Portugal and Rumania (1916), the United States, Cuba, Panama, Greece, Siam, China, Liberia, and Brazil (1917), and Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Honduras (1918).

Some ten years before the war, the German General Staff had drawn up the plan to be followed in the event of a general European war. It was to make a rapid drive through Belgium and envelop and capture the armies of France (and of England if the latter should enter the conflict). Having disposed of the enemy in the west, all the German resources were then to be directed against Russia to oust it from the war. As the German Chief of Staff at the time was General Alfred von Schlieffen, this plan of campaign came to be known as the Schlieffen Plan.

When war broke out in August, 1914, this Schlieffen plan was launched with clocklike precision. It worked perfectly, except for a bad blunder committed by General von Bülow in not attacking as ordered; and had it not been for the incompetence of the German Chief of Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, the Germans would, in all probability, have won the war with a smashing victory before

the end of September, 1914. But von Moltke, nephew of the great leader of the Prussian army in 1870, was never an able military man. He had been chosen by the Kaiser chiefly for the legendary prestige of the family name. Moreover, in the summer of 1914 his health was so bad that he should have been in a hospital rather than in the headquarters of the General Staff.⁵⁶ Hence he was unable personally to direct hostilities.

At the height of the great German advance Moltke sent to the front with absolute authority an incompetent subordinate, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Hentsch, who in his confusion ordered a retreat at the very moment when the Germans might have entered Paris and at the same time have driven the British army back in disorder. The French followed up this retreat by what is usually known as the First Battle of the Marne.⁵⁷ This loss of the war through an utterly incompetent commander-in-chief is the major responsibility that the Kaiser must bear for the German defeat in 1914-18. Von Moltke's successor, the boot-licking General Erich von Falkenhayn, was only a slight improvement. By the time Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg were placed in supreme command in 1916 it was too late for Germany to win a smashing military victory. Once the Germans retired after the Hentsch blunder, both sides settled down in the west to a dreary and terrible trench warfare that lasted for approximately four years.

The intrenched western front in 1914-15 stretched from Belfort northward to Verdun, westward to the Aisne River, and then northward again to Ypres and Nieuport, covering a distance of six hundred miles. Although the Germans had vanquished most of Belgium and northern France and controlled many of the French mines and industries, they were unable to make substantial farther advances and conquer all of France.

⁵⁶ Von Moltke's physical incapacity in 1914 was fully described to the writer by Admiral von Tirpitz.

⁵⁷ The common conviction, repeated by most non-expert historians of the war, that the German advance in 1914 was brought to an abrupt halt by the French counter-attack is quite mistaken. In spite of von Bülow's blunder, the Germans could easily have taken Paris and paralyzed the English army if Colonel Hentsch had not advised retreat. Some of the German officers at the front threw their swords in the dust and others threatened to shoot Hentsch, but in the end they obeyed the order to retreat.

The army protecting Germany's eastern front, although inferior in size to the Russian, was able, under the leadership of Generals von Hindenburg, Ludendorff and von Hoffmann, to rout and partially to annihilate the Russian army in the battle of Tannenberg in August, 1914. This was the most decisive defeat administered to any army during the war.

At this time, Austria-Hungary attempted to invade Russian Poland but was decisively defeated, and lost, as a consequence, eastern Galicia, including Lemberg. However, the counter-offensive launched by the Germans in the spring of 1915 under General August von Mackensen drove the Russians from this region and returned practically all Galicia to Austria-Hungary.

Hindenburg, supported by huge armies, attacked Russian Poland, captured Warsaw and Vilna, and by October, 1915, most of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland were in the possession of the Central Powers. This offensive warfare, severely crippling the Russian forces, extended the German eastern front from Cernauti (Czernowitz) on the boundary of Rumania to Riga in the north.

The reverses of Russia under the tsarist régime helped to bring on a revolution in the spring of 1917, in which the Tsar abdicated, to be succeeded first by Prince Lvov and then by Alexander Kerensky. Kerensky, as the head of the new Russian revolutionary government, attempted another invasion of Galicia in July, 1917, but this proved a dismal failure. When the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, obtained control of Russia in November, 1917, they demobilized the Russian armies, signed the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March, 1918, and withdrew from the war to continue the domestic revolution.

The Bulgarians, joining the Central Powers in October, 1915, assisted the Germans in attacking Serbia and Montenegro. Within two months they had succeeded in conquering these countries and Albania, and most of the Balkan Peninsula was occupied by the Central Powers. The Entente effort at a brilliant coup in south-eastern Europe, namely, the attempt to force the Dardanelles and free the Russian man power and grain supply for the Entente, proved an expensive and dismal failure with the collapse of the gallant Gallipoli campaign early in 1916.

Rumania, joining the Allies in August, 1916, invaded Transylvania in Hungary, but von Mackensen, seizing Bucharest, drove them from this region and, with the cooperation of von Falkenhayn, soon occupied the greater portion of the country as the result of one of the most rapid and brilliant campaigns of the war.

The Italians, after their defeat at Caporetto in October, 1917, were pushed back into Italy as far as the Piave River, the Austrians taking about 200,000 men as prisoners and 2,000 pieces of artillery. Thanks, however, to military reorganization, enforced conscription, and British and French reinforcements, the Austro-Hungarians were halted. In June, 1918, they attempted to drive back the Italians stationed along the Piave, getting across the river at several points and even progressing five miles at one place. But the reinforced Italians, under the leadership of General Armando Diaz, recovered their unity and strength and, aided by floods, beat the enemy back and did not cease their offensive until November, 1918, when they invaded and occupied Trent and Trieste.

The strain of the war was becoming intense by the end of 1917; people in many lands, but particularly in France, Russia, and Italy, expressed a desire for peace with Germany based on mutual concessions. The Germans, likewise, were disposed to welcome reasonable peace terms. The spread of an idea such as this implies the disintegration of morale and of the desire for victory. Russia's case has been discussed above. The defeat the Italians sustained at Caporetto at the hands of the Austro-Hungarian army in 1917 was a shock to Italian morale.

It seems highly probable that by the winter of 1915-16 Europe was headed towards a desirable negotiated peace. But the Entente was soon converted to a determination to continue the war to the bitter end as the result of the intimation which Colonel House, as President Wilson's agent in Europe, had given to Allied leaders that the United States would be likely to join the Entente if Wilson was re-elected. The new spirit was evident in the famous "knock-out victory" interview of Lloyd George, given out to Roy W. Howard of the United Press on September 29, 1916. Lloyd George declared that the war must go on until Germany was crushed. This is an important item in the verdict of history against Woodrow

Wilson. Lloyd George was also doubtless influenced by the entry of Rumania into the war in August, 1916, and by the British successes on the Somme.

Another factor in postponing peace was the stupidity of German politics and diplomacy from 1916 to 1918. Ludendorff and von Hindenburg were held back by the jealousy of the Kaiser and von Falkenhayn in 1914-15, when they might have won the war through bold and aggressive military campaigns. Then they were given supreme control of both military and political power after 1916—the period when the war had to be won by Germany through clever diplomacy, if at all. Ludendorff, von Hindenburg, and von Tirpitz were poorly endowed with political acumen or diplomatic skill and finesse. They bungled matters, ordered the resumption of submarine warfare, and lost the war.

During the winter of 1917-18, Ludendorff and von Hindenburg made colossal preparations for a decisive German attack against the Allies in France before American soldiers could render decisive aid. Huge forces were placed on the western front; great guns of unprecedented range were installed for the purpose of firing upon Paris at a distance of seventy miles and thus shaking French morale; vast quantities of guns and ammunition were supplied to the soldiers; and everything possible was set in readiness for the great drive. The British were the first to feel the terrific impact of the German forces. The Germans attacked the British in March, 1918, near St. Quentin in the valley of the Somme River, and marched on to Amiens. In April, the British west of Lille, and in May the French stationed along the Aisne River were the recipients of the German onslaught. At a tremendous cost of both life and property, the Germans had advanced to the Marne at Château-Thierry, some forty miles distant from Paris. Here the tempo of the drives slowed down, owing to the rôle played by the fresh American forces.

After a month in which the opposing combatants faced each other, the Germans, in desperation, thrust forward in the Second Battle of the Marne. But by this time they were disheartened. Their reserves were exhausted, their ammunition was of an inferior grade, and the last great German offensive failed. The French, British,

and Americans, led by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, shifted from the defensive to the offensive and forced a widespread German retreat, taking St. Mihiel, St. Quentin, Cambrai, Lille, the Argonne Forest, and Sedan, until finally, on November 11, 1918, the Armistice was signed in the Forest of Compiègne.

Germany was exhausted by the titanic struggle against most of the powers of the world for four years. There was mutiny in the navy. The Socialists attacked the war policy and demanded peace. Revolution was threatened at home back of the lines. The Kaiser was forced to abdicate, the monarchy was ended, and a socialistic republic was set up.

But Germany was not the only nation which came near to collapse. There had been mutinies in the French army in 1917. But for the entry of the United States France might have cracked up and the Allies might have been forced to consent to a far more temperate negotiated peace. Russia, of course, collapsed completely and a new regime of society was created.

In addition to the main battles fought on European soil, warfare was carried on in the Near Orient and in Africa. Soon after Japan's entry, the Japanese forces seized the German port of Kiaochow in China and, aided by the British, took the entire Shantung Peninsula, Tsingtao, and the German island possessions in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator, while those in the south were captured by the Australians and New Zealanders. Important sections of the Turkish Empire were seized by British and French armies; Turkish Armenia was occupied by Russian troops in 1916. Palestine surrendered to the English in 1917 after a brilliant campaign by General E. H. Allenby, who a year later, aided by T. E. Lawrence and the Arabs, captured Syria, cut the Bagdad Railway, and forced Turkey out of the war. British and French armies took German Togoland in 1914 and Kamerun in 1916; the British troops stationed in South Africa crushed a Boer Rebellion in 1914 and took possession of German Southwest Africa in 1915 and of German East Africa in 1918.

The World War of 1914 differed from other great wars in many respects. Never before had there been such an impressive agglomera-

tion of men assembled to settle a human dispute. Whereas the figures of the armies ran into thousands in previous wars, they ran into millions in this catastrophic conflict. The military strength of the Central Powers has been estimated at 29,787,000 and that of the Entente Allies at 80,108,000. These figures include troops ready for action, reserve forces, unorganized troops, militias, national guards, and colonial armies.

Fighting in the World War was a very complex matter and presented a radical change from warfare in the past.⁵⁸ Because of the great technical advance in making machine guns and artillery efficiently deadly, almost at the beginning of the war open fighting, except for brief attacks, was abandoned, and long and elaborate series of trenches were constructed. These were formed in zigzag parallels, joined by laterals, and had subterranean rooms used for the storage of war supplies and for the resting quarters of the soldiers. Some of these trench lines were most durably and securely built—notably the famous Hindenburg Line. Separating the opposing trenches was “no man’s land,” a mass of barbed wire and artificial banks of earth and stone that had to be traversed before reaching the enemy. These trenches were the parents of the Maginot and Siegfried Lines today between France and Germany.

Artillery was developed with scientific acumen. The “barrage”—a terrific wall of co-ordinated artillery fire—was most ingeniously developed to lay down a protection for troops advancing behind it. Enormous numbers of machine guns, the most effective single instrument of the war, were employed by both sides. Huge cannon were placed behind the trenches to destroy with ruthless force the enemy’s towns, fortifications, and larger targets. Explosives, both grenades and mines, were added to the shrapnel and shot. Poison gas, a deadly innovation, was first used by the Germans, but shortly by the Allies as well. Camouflage—the art of concealment of vulnerable objects both at sea and on land—was a new and widespread practice.

Gasoline played a significant rôle in this conflict as fuel for tanks,

⁵⁸ Cf. J. A. Hammerton, *Universal History of the World*, Amalgamated Press, 8 vols., 1927-29, Chaps. 178-80.

automobiles, and airplanes. The tank, first used by the British and probably the most remarkable of the many new instruments of warfare improvised during the struggle, was a huge caterpillar affair protected by an iron covering, crawling over the battlefield, unstopped by ditches, barbed wire, or mounds, spewing forth bullets, and bringing death and havoc in its path.

The fighting in the air caught the interest of all peoples. One-man airplanes were used in the first year of the war as a means of discovering the position of the enemy and as a guide for the artillery. Later, two-seaters having an unprecedented swiftness were employed as bombing mediums, and for the use of photographers, spies, and scouts. Hydroplanes developed by the British assailed German submarines, and by 1916 squads and formations of airplanes were organized and the battles of the air were regarded as extraordinary feats of courage and valor. The emergence of air "aces," survivors of a succession of air duels, furnished much of the heroics of a war that was otherwise distinguished by a lack of romantic color.

The sea operations during the World War were less decisive in the form of battles than they were in their bearing upon the control of the commerce of the world, so important for the Entente countries, and only less so for the Central Powers. Great Britain's naval superiority never proved of more critical importance. German commerce was swept from the sea, and very quickly also the German warships outside the North Sea were captured or sunk and their raids upon British commerce terminated. An air-tight blockade was imposed on Germany, which did more than British arms ultimately to bring that country to its knees. Admiral von Spee destroyed a small British squadron off the coast of Chile on November 1, 1914, but his fleet was soon wiped out by the British in a battle off the Falkland Islands.

There was only one major naval conflict during the war, the Battle of Jutland, on May 31, 1916. While the Germans were ultimately compelled to retreat before overwhelming odds to their fortified cover, they inflicted heavy losses upon the British. Not since the rise of her navy in the seventeenth century had Britain come off so badly

in a major naval battle. It is possible that Admiral Jellicoe might have repeated the feat of Nelson at Trafalgar had he been less timid or cautious, but he failed to rise to the opportunity. So the Germans had one brilliant exploit on the sea to their credit during the World War, but it proved only a futile show of superior bravery and strategy. The German fleet never again risked its fate.

Rather, the Germans concentrated upon building submarines to offset their inferiority in respect to capital ships. These "U-boats" inflicted terrific losses upon British shipping, but in the end they undid those gains through bringing the United States into the war and turning the balance decidedly in favor of the Entente. It is true that Germany was able to justify its submarine warfare on the ground of the British blockade and that it offered to discuss discontinuing submarine activities if Britain would raise the blockade. It is also true that Great Britain interfered with the rights of neutral shippers far more extensively than did Germany. But Germany's depredations involved lives as well as property.

The Germans exerted themselves most vigorously in the effort to drive British shipping from the seas before the United States could become effective in the war. But America's industrial efficiency proved too much for them. Ships were rapidly and crudely built through the application, to the highest degree, of standardization in construction. The margin between new shipping and that sent to the bottom by submarines grew rapidly, and the destinies of Germany in the World War were doomed when sufficient American troops arrived in Europe to stem the tide of Ludendorff's last desperate drive in the spring and early summer of 1918.

Approximately 4,000,000 tons of Allied shipping were destroyed by German submarines in the first half of 1917. But owing to the entry of the United States, with its navy augmenting that of the British, the wreckage was diminished until in 1918 only 2,000,000 tons of shipping were sunk. The advice of Admiral von Tirpitz and others to disregard diplomacy in the interests of submarine warfare proved the second great German mistake. It lost the war in the last year of the conflict, as the Kaiser's unwisdom in maintaining von Moltke in charge of the German army at the outset had destroyed the possi-

bility of a brilliant and decisive German victory before snowfall in 1914.

Propaganda: A New Weapon of War

As novel and interesting as the vast scope of the conflict, the huge numbers involved, and the colossal costs exacted was the wide use of systematic propaganda by both sides. This, if it did not prove that the pen is mightier than the sword, at least showed that the pen can powerfully supplement it. Germany gave the Allies a great propaganda talking point in its invasion of Belgium, even though we now know that the Allies had intended to do the same thing if this proved indispensable to their strategic program. A systematic campaign of exaggerations and falsifications regarding alleged German atrocities was planned and executed, and this helped mightily to turn neutral opinion against Germany, as well as enraging still further the populace of each enemy country.

No sooner had the effect of the Belgian-atrocity campaign worn off than the Germans provided the Allies with another ace card by their submarine campaign, though this was less horrible in its results and no more illegal than the British blockade. But it lent itself better than the latter to dramatic and colorful exploitation in pro-Ally propaganda. Moreover, the Entente control of the seas made it easier for the Allies to get into contact with neutral sources of opinion. When the Germans did set up contacts with neutrals they were usually quite careless and stupid in their propaganda methods. An exception was Count Joachim von Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington.

As the propaganda plans reached a high development, systematic fabrications were deliberately planned and elaborate establishments were set up for the painting of fake scenes of devastation, falsification of postcards, manufacture of wax models of alleged mutilated figures, and the like.⁵⁹ A vast propaganda system was created by the Entente in the United States, engineered by Lord Northcliffe and directed by Sir Gilbert Parker. Ministers of the Gospel entered

⁵⁹ See Ferdinand Avenarius, *How the War Madness Was Engineered*, Berlin, 1926; *Behind the Scenes in French Journalism*, by a French Chief Editor, Berlin, 1925; Sir Campbell Stuart, *The Secrets of Crewe House*, Doran, 1920; and H. C. Peterson, *Propaganda for War*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1939.

enthusiastically into the fray and represented the war as a divinely-guided crusade against the representatives of the Devil.⁶⁰ These extensive fabrications not only served to promote enlistments, convert neutrals, and intensify passions during the war; they also made it difficult to secure a return to reason after the Armistice that would permit a statesmanlike peace settlement.

The hatreds engendered by falsification and propaganda developed a lust for vindictiveness in the post-war treaties. In England, a general election was held right after the Armistice. Lloyd George ran on the platform of making Germany pay for the war and hanging the Kaiser. All this made it impossible for Lloyd George to exert any moderating influence at the Peace Conference after he had personally calmed down and returned to reason. He was committed to bringing the Kaiser's scalp back with him from Paris. The propaganda during the first World War created mental states which were more potent than any other single factor in creating the chain of consequence that led from the World War of 1914 to the War of 1939.

Balance Sheet of the First World War

The casualties of the World War were so astoundingly extensive as to be almost unbelievable. Kirby Page lists them in the table below:

CASUALTIES OF THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

	Known dead	Seriously wounded	Otherwise wounded	Prisoners or missing
Russia	2,762,064	1,000,000	3,950,000	2,500,000
Germany	1,611,104	1,600,000	2,183,143	772,522
France	1,427,800	700,000	2,344,000	453,500
Austria-Hungary	911,000	850,000	2,150,000	443,000
Great Britain	807,451	617,714	1,441,394	64,907
Serbia	707,343	322,000	28,000	100,000
Italy	507,160	500,000	462,196	1,359,000
Turkey	436,924	107,772	300,000	103,731
Rumania	339,117	200,000	116,000
Belgium	267,000	40,000	100,000	10,000

⁶⁰ See Granville Hicks, "The Parsons and the War," *American Mercury*, February, 1927; and Ray Abrams, *The Preachers Present Arms*, Round Table Press, 1933.

United States	107,284	43,000	148,000	4,912
Bulgaria	101,224	300,000	852,339	10,825
Greece	15,000	10,000	30,000	45,000
Portugal	4,000	5,000	12,000	200
Japan	300	907	3
Totals	9,998,771	6,295,512	14,002,039	5,983,600

Page further details some of the more prominent of the human costs of the war:

10,000,000 known dead soldiers
 3,000,000 presumed dead soldiers
 13,000,000 dead civilians
 20,000,000 wounded
 3,000,000 prisoners
 9,000,000 war orphans
 5,000,000 war widows
 10,000,000 refugees

The total immediate economic cost of the war has been estimated by a careful student, Professor E. L. Bogart, at \$331,600,000,000. Some of the specific economic losses have been computed as follows: (1) Munitions and machines of war during the four years of fighting, \$180,000,000,000; (2) property losses on land, \$29,960,000,000; (3) losses to shipping, \$6,800,000,000; (4) production losses through diverted and non-economic production, \$45,000,000,000.

These are simply immediate economic losses—those things which were actually consumed during the conflict. No account is taken of subsequent costs such as interest on loans, retirement of loans, pensions, and the like. Writing shortly after the war was over, Professor E. L. Bogart commented as follows on the matter of immediate war costs:

The figures . . . are both incomprehensible and appalling, yet even these do not take into account the effect of the war on life, human vitality, economic well being, ethics, morality, or other phases of human relationships and activities which have been disorganized and injured. It is evident from the present disturbances in Europe that the real costs cannot be measured by the direct money outlays of the belligerents in the five years of its duration, but that

the very breakdown of modern economic life might be the price exacted.⁶¹

The editor of the *Scholastic* magazine made an ingenious effort to translate these figures of war costs into terms that we can visualize. He indicated that the cost of the World War of 1914 would have been sufficient to furnish: (1) every family in England, France, Belgium, Germany, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Australia with a \$2,500 house on a \$500 one-acre lot, with \$1,000 worth of furniture; (2) a \$5,000,000 library for every community of 200,000 inhabitants in these countries; (3) a \$10,000,000 university for every such community; (4) a fund that at 5 percent interest would yield enough to pay indefinitely \$1,000 a year to an army of 125,000 teachers and 125,000 nurses; and (5) still leave enough to buy every piece of property and all wealth in France and Belgium at a fair market price. Such was what it cost to return Alsace-Lorraine to France, to try to get the Straits for Russia, and to punish Serbian plotters.⁶²

President Calvin Coolidge, relying on Secretary Mellon's estimates, once frankly stated that the ultimate cost to us of the participation of the United States in the World War would, in his opinion, be \$100,000,000,000. Indeed, Professor Frank Dickinson has estimated that "the total post-war cost of the World War to our nation in terms of post-war price recessions and depressions probably exceeds \$200,000,000,000." On January 16, 1935, the direct cost of the World War, exclusive of \$11,600,000,000 of war loans abroad, to the United States was officially declared to be \$50,000,000,000. Another estimate, in 1939, put the figure at \$57,000,000,000. In 1916 our Federal budget was \$735,000,000; in 1919, \$18,500,000,000; and in 1938, \$7,760,000,000.

We have, however, received little gratitude from our erstwhile Allies for our huge expenditures of money and men in their behalf. We have obtained little but petulance, criticism and repudiation. Though we have written off half the debts incurred, Uncle Sam has been rechristened "Uncle Shylock." Our best friends abroad before 1933 were our former enemies—and their disinterestedness was open

⁶¹ E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*, Oxford Press, 1919, p. 299.

⁶² *Scholastic*, November 10, 1934, p. 13.

to grave doubt. A considerable share of their ostensible amiability certainly sprang from the hope that we might assist them in their current difficulties. Such are the unhappy results that we obtained from the dramatic international foray that put our present Treasury deficit far above our total national budget of the pre-war days.

Among the outstanding announced aims of the Allies during the great conflict were the following: it was asserted that the World War would put an end to great armaments and the expenditures connected therewith. We had a promise that the military preponderance of any one great power or group of powers would be terminated. We were told that the war would bring to a close the secret diplomacy and secret treaties which did so much to cause and prolong the war.

Perhaps the most widely publicized of all the war ideals was the determination to make the world safe for democracy. Likewise, we were assured that arrogant nationalism would be curbed and an adequate world organization would be created. It was maintained that the economic causes of war would be resolutely attacked, Economic imperialism would be ended, colonialism discouraged, and tariff reductions brought about on a wide scale. Let us see how far these laudable objectives have been realized.

In 1938, the world spent just about sixfold more for armaments than it spent in 1913, the last pre-war year. Further, there has been a very notable increase of armament expenditures in 1939 over 1938. These simply dwarf any such expenditures for a comparable period in the years before 1914.

In the place of the fictitious German military preponderance of 1914 we had for many years the very real and actually unprecedented military preponderance of France and her allies which, by 1926, amounted to a 40 to 1 advantage over the Central Powers. And now this has been answered by the even greater menace of German and Italian Fascism, armed to the teeth and committed to war.

There is no evidence whatsoever that secret diplomacy has been ended or that secret treaties are no longer made. Some years ago William Randolph Hearst dug up a secret Franco-British naval treaty which strangely resembled the secret agreement of November, 1912, which the French used to bring England into the war in 1914.

The diplomacy connected with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria revealed secret European diplomacy of the most sinister variety. There is every reason to believe that secret diplomacy played a far larger part in the events leading up to the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia than anything that was publicly revealed through the formal declarations and stage play of the participants of the Munich Conference.

Far from making the world safe for democracy, the World War of 1914 succeeded in putting democracy in greater jeopardy than at any other time since the collapse of the Revolutions of 1848.

In the place of the eighteen national states in Europe in 1914, we have had since 1918 some thirty national states, just as arrogant in their patriotism as those of the pre-war era. The League of Nations was, for more than a decade, nothing more than a league of victors. And since this Versailles policy has been challenged the League evaporated to little more than an impotent formality. The shocks administered by Japan, Italy, and the Spanish Civil War destroyed its vitality.

Imperialism did not disappear. Only the German colonial empire was destroyed. Financial imperialism started up again on a new and unprecedented scale right after the World War, ending up in tremendous defaults and disastrous losses to gullible investors. Militant colonialism reasserted itself in Japan and Italy. More nations have come into being and most of them have erected even higher tariff walls. Even Great Britain has abandoned its pre-war free trade policy. Economic nationalism is better entrenched today than it was in 1914.

It was generally believed in 1917 and thereafter that the intervention of the United States in the World War on the side of the Allies saved human civilization. It was lauded as one of the most noble and fortunate episodes in the history of man on the planet. Today, there is a great deal of skepticism about any such judgment. There is a tendency now to see in American intervention one of the major calamities in modern history—a calamity for the Allies and the United States as well as for the Central Powers.

Let us assume the worst possible result of American neutrality in 1917-18. If we had not gone into the war the worst imaginable result

would have been a German victory. But no sane person can very well conceive that the world would be any worse off today if the Germans had won under the Hohenzollerns.

We used to picture the horrors of a Germany and a Europe dominated by the Crown Prince and his followers. But, compared to Hitler, Mussolini and Company, the Crown Prince and his crowd now appear to be cultivated gentlemen, urbane democrats, and sincere pacifists. A more warlike world than the present could hardly have been created as a result of German victory, and certainly the economic situation in Europe since 1918 would have been far better under a Europe dominated by monarchist Germany.

But there is hardly a remote possibility that Germany would have won the war, even if the United States had not come in on the side of the Allies. Germany was eager to negotiate a fair peace arrangement at the time when Lloyd George's "knock-out victory" interview with Roy Howard put an end to all prospect of successful negotiations. We now know that the Lloyd George outburst was directly caused by his assurance that the United States was surely coming in on the side of the Allies. Had Wilson remained strictly neutral, there is little doubt that sincere peace negotiations would have been actively carried on by the summer of 1916.

There is every reason to believe that the result of American neutrality throughout the European conflict would have been the "peace without victory," which Woodrow Wilson described in his most statesmanlike pronouncement during the period of the World War. We would have had a negotiated peace treaty made by relative equals. This would not have been a perfect document but it would certainly have been far superior to the Treaty of Versailles.

Had we remained resolutely neutral from the beginning, the negotiated peace would probably have saved the world from the last two terrible years of war. Whenever it came, it would have rendered unnecessary the brutal blockade of Germany for months after the World War, a blockade which starved to death hundreds of thousands of German women and children. This blockade was the one great authentic atrocity of the World War period. In all probability, the neutrality of the United States would also have made impossible the rise of Mussolini and Hitler—products of post-war disintegration—and the coming of a second world war.

Not only was our entry into the World War a calamity of the first magnitude for Europe and contemporary civilization, it was also a serious disaster for the United States.

During the first Wilson administration an impressive program of social reform had been introduced, widely known as "The New Freedom." Had this continued until March, 1921, enormous and permanent improvements might have been made in the political and economic system of the United States. But when Wilson allowed himself to be slowly but surely pushed into war, the New Freedom perished overnight. Reaction and intolerance settled down on the country. Some of those who had earlier warmly supported Wilson's domestic policies were thrown into prison, and many others were bitterly persecuted.

The myth of a German menace and the crusading sanctity of the Allies was exploded by Wilson himself shortly before his death. On December 7, 1923, he told his friend James Kerney: "I should like to see Germany clean up France, and I should like to see Jusserand and tell him so to his face."⁸³

Suggested Readings:

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THE PEACE OF PARIS: EUROPE BETWEEN TWO WARS



Walter Consuelo Langsam

The World War of 1914, the costliest combat that humanity had ever engaged in, lasted 1565 days. The number of men killed in battle during this conflict was more than twice the number killed in all the wars participated in by European powers from 1790 through 1913; and the estimated number of civilian deaths owing to the hostilities was even greater. In terms of money, insofar as one can determine the financial equivalent of such things, the war cost a total of \$337,000,000,000; that is, more than five times as many dollars as the number of seconds that have elapsed since the birth of Christ! What the cost was in pain and misery and suffering, imposed by the struggle upon untold millions, one can only sadly surmise. In the circumstances it must be obvious how grave a responsibility rested upon the men who would determine the course of the Peace Conference that followed the war—a responsibility for so arranging matters that this vast expenditure of blood and money should not have been entirely in vain.

Against the better judgment of President Woodrow Wilson, it

was agreed to hold the forthcoming conference in Paris, where, forty-eight years previously, Germany had humbled France. Against the better judgment of judicious friends, on the other hand, President Wilson embarked for Europe in December, 1918, to attend the proceedings in person. He probably went in the sincere belief that he could thus best exercise his influence on behalf of a just settlement, but from the points of view of practical politics and clever diplomacy the move was ill-advised. In close proximity to the wrangling and bickering and bargaining that characterized the Peace Conference, the American President evidently was unable to make felt all the influence that he had hoped to wield. There is reason to believe that he might have exerted more power for good, had he remained aloof from direct personal contacts with the Allied leaders.

The chief British delegate to the conference was David Lloyd George, head of the Liberal Party and prime minister since 1916. Energetic, restless, alert, inconsistent, emotional, and clever, "little Davey" was a master at finding "the weak joints in an adversary's harness." He was overshadowed, if at all, only by his French colleague, Georges Clemenceau, the "Tiger." Clemenceau was an old man at the time of the conference. He had done newspaper work in the United States during the War between the States, and now, more than half a century later, he was a seasoned, disillusioned, and cynical diplomat. More than any other prominent delegate, he seemed to know exactly what he wanted and to march straight toward his goal: the exaltation and securing of France and the weakening of Germany. To these ends he bent all his great skill and abounding energy. The Italian delegates were led by a less forceful man than either of these two. Premier Vittorio Orlando was a learned and eloquent statesman, but he knew no English, found it difficult to communicate with Wilson, and irritated the American President by his insistence on the fulfilment of the terms of the secret treaty under which Italy had agreed to join the Allies during the war.

Each of these men, and every colleague from the other states represented, was accompanied by additional delegates and by numerous experts, secretaries, journalists, and representatives of various busi-

ness and patriotic interests. Even the smaller countries sent groups of from fifty to sixty persons, so that Paris was overrun by diplomats and would-be diplomats all through the winter of 1918-1919 and the following spring. Since so large and unwieldy a group obviously could not function efficiently, the conference held only six plenary sessions. Most of the actual decisions were made by the "Big Four"—Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando—who held a total of one hundred and forty-five sessions. Matters of detail were handled by fifty-eight committees and commissions, each of which was designated to study and report on some special phase of the conference's work. These bodies held approximately sixteen hundred meetings. None of the defeated powers was allowed to send any delegates to the Peace Conference. These were merely to be called in later on—to receive for signature the completed documents. From this point of view, therefore, the Paris Peace Conference was not really a conference, for only one side took part in the deliberations.¹

The number of difficult problems confronting the delegates was legion. The Paris assemblage had to draw up peace terms that would satisfy at least the most important of the twenty-three Allied countries. It had to agree, in response to President Wilson's proposals, on a league covenant that would be acceptable to forty or fifty not especially friendly nations. It had to feed the starving millions in central and eastern Europe. There was the problem of controlling the restless victorious soldiers, most of whom presumably wanted to go home. Hysterical public opinions had to be quieted and it became necessary to strive for peace among the dozen or so nations that precipitated their own little wars almost immediately after the armistice of November 11, 1918, ended the hostilities of the World War.

Simultaneously the delegates were deluged with demands and

¹ Inasmuch as the Allies did not at the time recognize the Bolshevik regime in Russia, this country also was excluded from the conference. The Russians had made peace with the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, through the signing of the dictated Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Under the terms of this treaty Russia lost 500,000 square miles of territory and 66,000,000 people, most of whom were to come within a German sphere of influence. The Versailles Treaty required Germany to renounce the peace treaty with Russia, but the Bolsheviks did not regain all the lost territories. The Ukraine was eventually restored to Russian control, but Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were set up as independent republics.

petitions from all over the world—demands that ranged all the way from Corsican pleas for autonomy to Siamese requests for indemnities. And all the while the chief delegates were themselves generally at odds over what course to pursue. Most difficult of settlement among the representatives were the questions of publicity, of which languages to designate as official, of reconciling the secret treaties which the Allies had negotiated during the war with Wilson's expressed war aims, of wording a covenant for a society of nations, of providing the French with the security for which they yearned, of meeting the extensive Italian and Polish claims, of disposing of Germany's colonies and the former non-Turkish possessions of the Ottoman Empire, and of fixing the amount of reparation for damages to be exacted from the losers. In retrospect it seems miraculous, not so much that the treaty was bad, but that any treaty at all was drawn up by the mere humans who attended the conference.

On May 7, 1919, the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the terms of the German treaty were at last handed by Clemenceau to a delegation from the new Reich. The Germans were given three weeks in which to consider the provisions and submit complaints in writing; no oral discussion was to be permitted. The announcement of the treaty terms in Germany caused, as was to be expected, a great popular outburst, and whereas the treaty itself covered about 230 large printed pages, the German reply occupied 443 pages! A few changes thereupon were made, chiefly at the instance of Lloyd George, and then Germany was given a limited time in which to accept the treaty without further change, under threat of invasion.

After bitter debating, the Weimar Assembly, elected by universal man- and womanhood suffrage in January, 1919, voted to sign, under protest. The Allies were notified of the decision at five o'clock on Monday evening, June 23—two hours before the time limit was to have expired. At last, on June 28th, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the German treaty was formally signed by all parties at Versailles, a suburb of Paris. It now remained to draw up treaties for Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, tasks which were completed, much on the model of the Versailles Treaty, between September 10, 1919, and August 10,

1920. Each of these treaties, too, was signed at and named after a Parisian suburb. Together the five documents are known as the Peace of Paris.²

Summary of the Versailles Treaty

The Versailles Treaty reduced the European area of Germany by one-eighth and her population by one-tenth. It took from the Reich all her colonies and virtually all her foreign financial holdings. These foreign investments had been valued, in 1913, at \$6,000,000,000, a sum equal to about one-tenth of the Hohenzollern Empire's national wealth. Germany further had to surrender one-eighth of her livestock and, in the ceded areas, approximately one-tenth of her factory establishments and one-sixth of her arable land. The German merchant marine was cut down to fewer than 500,000 tons—one-eleventh of its pre-war size, while the Reich navy was limited to a few ships with a maximum personnel of 15,000. The army was restricted to 100,000 men, about one-sixth of its former peacetime strength, and Germany was forbidden to make, purchase, or own any tanks, armored cars, military or naval airplanes, poison gases, and submarines.³

In surrendering the designated territories in Europe, Germany also lost two-fifths of her former coal reserves, nearly two-thirds of the iron ore, approximately seven-tenths of the zinc, and more than half of the lead deposits. The new territorial alignments, moreover, "broke down the pre-war organization of industry and commerce, so that for a long time even the industrial plant which Germany retained was incapable of working at its former level of efficiency." And along with the colonies went present or potential supplies of rubber, phosphates, fibre, foodstuffs, and other raw materials. Finally, Germany was made to sign a blank reparation check. Small wonder that, in some circles, the treaty came to be known as a "Carthaginian Peace."

The remaining peace treaties, except for the one with Turkey

² The treaty with Austria is called that of St. Germain; with Hungary, Trianon; with Bulgaria, Neuilly; and with Turkey, Sèvres. This last was never ratified, being replaced, in 1923, by the Treaty of Lausanne.

³ The full text of the Versailles Treaty was published as a United States Senate Document in 1919 and may be obtained from the Government Printing Office in Washington.

which was replaced by a more moderate agreement in 1923, similarly weakened the other former enemies of the Allies and left each of them with a yearning to bring about a revision of the peace settlement at the earliest possible moment. It is probably no exaggeration to say that most peace treaties contain within themselves the germs of future wars; certainly this was true of the documents known collectively as the Peace of Paris.

Maladjustments of the Peace Settlement: "War Guilt"

Prominent among the more troublesome heritages of the peace settlement was the stigma placed upon the defeated powers by the so-called "war-guilt clause." In the case of Germany, Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty required that state to accept "responsibility" for "causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals [were] subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." There was no trial and no adequate consideration of the basic factors that underlay the World War; it was merely a case of placing all blame upon Germany and then forcing her, under threat of invasion, to accept the full responsibility.

The reaction in Germany consequently was one of indignation and anger, and the Germans also were quick to point out the danger of allowing such a procedure—that of blithely loading all war guilt upon the loser—to remain as a precedent for future action in world affairs. Nor was it entirely a matter of pride and sentiment, for the Allies used the war-guilt charge as the legal basis for heavy reparation demands and stringent unilateral disarmament provisions. It was this connection which doubtless added, on the one hand, to the vigor of the German denunciations of Article 231, and on the other, to the determination shown by some of the former Allies in insisting on its retention in the treaty. The war-guilt clause obviously was rich grist to the propaganda mill of the National Socialist Party in Germany.

The Reparation Question

Although the Versailles Treaty expressly linked war guilt and reparation, it also recognized that Germany's resources were inade-

quate to provide complete restitution for all damage done to the Allies as a consequence of the war. Germany therefore was required to make compensation only for "all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property . . . by land, by sea, and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto." This annex then listed ten loss-and-damage categories, including military pensions and the allowances paid by the Allied Governments to the families of soldiers. In addition, Germany was to reimburse Belgium, with interest at five percent, for all the sums which that kingdom had had to borrow abroad during the war years.

A Reparation Commission was in due time appointed and given until May, 1921, to evaluate the amount of damage according to this formula and to outline a method of payment. Meanwhile Germany was to pay, on account, in gold or in kind, five billion dollars. At the end of April, 1921, the Reparation Commission announced a total reparation bill of thirty-two billion dollars. This was the lowest figure yet to receive official Allied sanction, but it was more than three times as high as the figure recommended by Allied economic experts at the Peace Conference. When the Germans were forced, under threat of further invasion, to accept this debt, there was inaugurated an international dispute whose history for years was filled with suspicion, recrimination, and hatred.

Partly because of her serious internal economic situation, partly because no outside effort was made to help her international credit standing or trade, and partly because the heavy annuities which she had been ordered to pay did not even cover the interest on the reparation debt, the Weimar Republic requested a partial moratorium on reparation payments in March, 1922. Soon thereafter this was converted into a plea for a total moratorium for two years. Thereupon, at the request of the French—who had been spending about fifteen times as much on reconstruction as Germany had been contributing—the Reparation Commission declared Germany to be in general default on her obligations. In January, 1923, accordingly, French and Belgian troops were sent to occupy the Ruhr district, the very heart of Germany's industrial life.

For more than eight months the Germans opposed a "passive

resistance" to this forceful action, an action which the British, incidentally, had refused to support, on the ground that it was illegal. But then Berlin surrendered unconditionally. The capitulation was hastened by the circumstance that Germany had in the meantime been gripped by an inflation fever that did not run its course until the end of November, 1923. By that time the paper-note circulation in the Reich had reached the fantastic height of more than 400,000,000,000,000,000 marks and the German Government had come to owe the Reichsbank alone about 190,000,000,000,000,000,000 marks.⁴ A figure running into quintillions is hardly comprehensible, but it may be of some help, though not much, to quote from an explanatory computation made by Dr. Peter P. Reinhold, a former German finance minister. If one were to take 190 quintillion marks' worth of "old German thousand mark bills," he wrote, "and put one upon the other, pressing them tightly together, one would have a pillar of such inconceivable height, as to be twenty-five billion times the highest mountain on earth." Germany obviously had to surrender—or face disintegration.

Lest the Reich fall into dissolution, the Berlin authorities now resorted to some desperate fiscal measures whereby the nation might lift itself out of the mire "by the hair of the head, like Munchausen." Inflation was stopped by law, the budget was balanced on paper, thousands of civil employees were dismissed, and conditions became a little easier when the Experts' (Dawes) Plan went into effect in September, 1924.

The experts on the Dawes Committee⁵ had approached their task as "business men anxious to obtain effective results," and the plan which they devised did temporarily ease the international situation. Yet the scheme soon betrayed weaknesses and in 1929 a new group of experts, the Young Committee,⁶ tried to find a "complete and

⁴ The equivalent of these 400 quintillion marks was only 60 million dollars. At the end of November, 1923, a quart of milk cost 250 billion marks, and was scarce at that price.

⁵ The Experts' Committee of 1924, named after its American chairman, Charles G. Dawes, was composed of two representatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. It carried on its investigations from January to April, 1924 in Berlin and Paris.

⁶ The Experts' Committee of 1929 was also named after its American chairman, Owen D. Young. It labored for seventeen weeks from February to June 1929, chiefly in Paris, and then handed in to the Reparation Commission a report of 45,000 words.

final settlement of the reparation problem." The next year witnessed the ratification of the Young Plan and again there was a transient feeling of relief. But it presaged ill when both the German Nationalists and Communists strenuously opposed the plan and when Hjalmar Schacht resigned the presidency of the Reichsbank in protest against what he regarded as the assumption of obligations that could never be fulfilled. When, in the German parliamentary elections of 1930, the extremists of both right and left together polled about seven million more votes than they had in 1928, many foreign investors became uneasy and began to withdraw their funds from Germany. And this happened at a time when Europe was just beginning to feel the general depression that was heralded by the stock-market crash in the United States in October, 1929.

German efforts to relieve the growing distress were directed for a time to the cementing of closer relations with Austria. Though the latter was herself in financial difficulties, there evidently was a belief among the leaders in both states that the formation of a united economic front would be mutually advantageous. The opposition of France and her Central European allies to the consequent proposal for an Austro-German Customs Accord in 1931 was so great, however, that the project was dropped. The incident ended by further undermining confidence, and the depression became worse. President Herbert Hoover now proposed a one year's inter-governmental debt moratorium, until June 30, 1932, and after some bickering, his suggestion found general acceptance. This development was hailed with optimism in some quarters, but actually it served chiefly to advertise the financial exhaustion of central Europe and the increasing bitterness of Franco-German relations.

At the Lausanne Economic Conference of June, 1932, the former Allies again showed that they recognized the reparation problem as one of the main sources of the world's troubles by arranging, in effect, for a reduction of the remaining reparation debt to only \$714,000,000. This Germany was ready to accept and pay off quickly through a bond issue, but in a separate "gentlemen's agreement" the former Allies made their offer contingent upon a parallel reduction in their own war debts, that is, in their debts to the United States. This was resented by many Americans as an attempt

to pass on responsibility for the world dilemma to the United States, and Washington made it clear that cancellation of war debts was out of the question no matter what other arrangements Europe might see fit to make. Technically, therefore, the Young Plan continued in effect, and technically Germany would still seem to owe the former Allies a total, including interest charges, of about thirty billion dollars. Actually there have been almost no payments, either on reparation or war-debt accounts, since 1932. Up to that time Germany, according to Allied estimates, had paid in reparation about \$5,500,000,000.⁷

The Arguments over Armaments

The ill-will engendered by the reparation quarrel was made worse by the simultaneous disputes over the question of armaments. When the Allies imposed certain military, naval, and aerial restrictions on Germany, they stated that these limitations were not merely calculated to render it impossible for the Reich to renew its aggression, but that they were to be regarded as the "first steps" toward a general reduction of armaments throughout the world. The promotion of this condition was declared to be one of the first duties of the League of Nations, and the task of formulating plans for armament reduction was specifically imposed upon the League Council by Article 8 of the Covenant.⁸

The initial move in the fulfilment of this obligation was taken by the League in February, 1921, when the First Assembly appointed a Temporary Mixed Commission to draw up proposals for disarmament. Thenceforth several attempts were made ostensibly

⁷ The reparation burdens of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were revised by a Paris Agreement on Eastern Reparations in April, 1930. The first two countries were entirely relieved of payments until 1943 and obligated themselves to meet moderate annuities from then until 1966. Bulgaria was required to pay about 416,000,000 gold francs in thirty-six annual instalments. Turkey, by the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, did not have to pay any reparation money.

⁸ The League of Nations Covenant forms Part I, Articles 1-26, of each of the peace treaties. The first Assembly was called by President Wilson and met at Geneva on November 15, 1920. The first Council meeting, also summoned by President Wilson, met at Paris on January 16, 1920. The Council has averaged more than five meetings per year. The maximum League membership was reached in 1934 with sixty adherents. Five years later the membership had fallen to forty-six.

to achieve the desired end, but rarely did the powers reach agreement on any really vital point. The chief stumbling block appeared to be the circumstance that one group of powers, including Great Britain, believed that security would follow automatically upon the limitation of armaments, while another group, led by France, insisted upon a guaranteed security of its own definition before consenting to any limitation of weapons.

One disarmament plan after another thus came to naught, so that, while Germany was still disarmed, her neighbors increased their armaments annually. Indeed, in 1928, when the Soviet delegate to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission urged complete and absolute disarmament, including the abolition of defense ministries and arms factories, the president of the commission scolded him and requested the Bolshevik delegation to attend future meetings "in a constructive spirit and not with the idea of destroying the work . . . already done." On this occasion only Germany and Turkey supported the proposal of the U.S.S.R. and it was rapidly becoming evident that Berlin was growing impatient with the delay of the former Allies in fulfilling their Versailles commitment to regard Germany's disarmament as "the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." And so it happened that, after an Allied admission on December 19, 1932, of the "principle" of German equality, the Hitler Government eventually proceeded to translate this principle into action. Germany, said the Berlin authorities, was determined to achieve equality in fact: if not in disarmament, then in rearmament.

The Polish Question

A further difficulty arising out of the peace settlement concerned the disposition of the so-called Polish Corridor and Danzig. By this transfer of territory the Reich was divided into two unconnected sections: Germany proper and East Prussia. The procedure was justified by the Allies on the ground that "the interests which Germans in East Prussia, who number less than two millions, have in establishing a land connection with Germany, are less vital than the interests of the whole Polish nation in securing direct access to the sea." To complete the Polish route to the sea, the city of

Danzig, with its then almost wholly German population of three hundred thousand, was converted into a Free City and placed under the economic and diplomatic control of Poland and the administrative supervision of the League.

This arrangement served not merely to give Poland access to the sea—that might as readily have been done by a corridor in easternmost East Prussia, leading to the port of Memel—but it weakened Germany economically and militarily, made it less likely that Germany would exercise any considerable influence in the Baltic area, and fitted in with the French desire to find a strong eastern ally to take the place occupied by Russia in the pre-World War system of alliances. Obviously the region in question was a danger zone from the beginning. Though Germany and Poland signed an agreement in 1921 granting the former freedom of transit for passengers and freight through the Corridor to and from East Prussia, despite a German-Polish treaty of 1934 whereby the two countries agreed for ten years not to resort to war but to settle their disputes by direct negotiation, and notwithstanding the settlement, later in 1934, of an eight-year tariff war between the two states, it was fairly clear that the Germans, privately and officially, were at no point reconciled to the permanent alienation of Danzig and the entire Corridor. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Mr. H. G. Wells, in his *The Shape of Things to Come*, published in 1933, arranged to have the next European war break out over an incident in Danzig in 1940. He erred chiefly, it seems, in placing the outbreak a few months later than it actually occurred!

The German Colonies

The treaty provisions regarding the former German colonies further troubled post-Versailles European relations. Having conquered the colonies during the war, the Allies sought to justify the retention thereof by statements regarding Germany's alleged mistreatment and exploitation of millions of hapless natives. Germany alone of the imperial powers, it was indicated, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, was unfit to control backward areas. The return of the colonies thus became an important German issue, not alone for economic reasons—supposedly to provide raw materials

and serve as industrial outlets—but as a matter of prestige and to free Germany from the written stigma of colonial maladministration. “We Germans owe it to ourselves and to our children,” wrote Dr. Heinrich Schnee, a former and successful colonial governor, “we owe it to our position among the nations that these reflections upon our national honor be rebutted before the world.” The Weimar Republic was not at all backward, in the years after 1919, in encouraging the campaign for the return of the colonies, sponsored by numerous private groups. For a time after the advent of the Nazis to power in Germany there was a lull—but only a temporary lull—in Berlin’s efforts to revive the colonial question. But soon enough the matter was again broached with characteristic Nazi vigor and Nazi directness.

In recent years many persons in Great Britain and the United States have expressed the opinion that Adolf Hitler, in his book *Mein Kampf*, indicated a dislike for colonies and severely criticized the colonial program of Hohenzollern Germany. And certainly it is possible to find, scattered throughout the many hundred pages of the volume, frequent and unflattering allusions to the colonial policy of the old German Empire. But therein lies the crux of the matter: it was the colonial *policy*, not the colonial *aspirations*, that Hitler criticized. He apparently believed that Germany’s mistake was in starting on a colonial career too early, that Bismarck had not waited long enough. In view of the many recent Nazi references to the colonial question, it would appear that the really relevant quotation from *Mein Kampf* is the following one, from the first page of the book: “The German people possesses no moral right to colonial activity so long as it is not able to unite its own sons in a common state. Only when the boundaries of the Reich include even the last German . . . does there arise from the need of its own people the moral right to acquire foreign soil.”

Austro-German Union

The treaties of Versailles and St. Germain also laid the basis for the disquieting problem of Austro-German union, or *Anschluss*. The new republican governments in both Germany and Austria favored a union of the linguistically related neighbors and both made pro-

vision in their constitutions of 1919 for amalgamation. The Allies, however, forbade the union, except with the (unanimous) consent of the League Council. Supposedly independent Austria, indeed, was forced to change its name from "German-Austrian Republic" to "Republic of Austria." Regardless of later conditions, there can be little doubt that sentiment in both Germany and Austria—for economic as well as sentimental reasons—was largely for union between 1919 and the end of 1932, that is, from the end of the war to the appointment of Hitler as German Chancellor in January, 1933.

It was extremely difficult for Austria to remain economically and politically healthy in her independent status. The war left the republic with a population of a little more than six millions, of whom almost a third were concentrated in and about Vienna. The country resembled a head without a body and the rugged hinterland was incapable of feeding or supporting the industrial capital city. Unable to feed itself, Austria depended on manufactured exports to provide the necessary cash balance for food imports, but the high tariffs of its neighbors offered little encouragement to foreign trade. In the end, Austria was kept alive by financial injections, first from the League, then from Italy. It became increasingly difficult for the impoverished state to stand alone, yet the powers withheld their consent to *Anschluss*.

In 1931 economic necessity impelled the two German states to sign a protocol for a projected customs union, but this was so strongly opposed by France and her Central European allies that the matter was dropped even before the World Court, by a vote of eight to seven, rendered an adverse decision as to its legality. The ostensible reason for foreign opposition was the fear that a customs union would inevitably lead to political union; but Berlin and Vienna had expressly welcomed the entrance of any other state or states into the proposed tariff union. At any rate, following the failure of this attempt at economic collaboration, conditions in both Germany and Austria became worse. The Allied violation of the principle of self-determination in the case of the Germans and Austrians definitely contributed to the unrest, fear, and ill will that characterized Europe in the post-Versailles period.

Hungarian and Bulgarian Grievances

Since the minor treaties all bore considerable resemblance to the Versailles model, the lesser defeated states claimed to be the victims of similar maladjustments; but they also had special complaints of their own. We have just examined Austria's precarious economic position and thwarted Anschluss ambitions before 1933. Hungary and Bulgaria had additional grievances that threatened Europe's peace of mind.

Hungary's foreign policy after 1920 was shaped largely by the questions of a Habsburg restoration and boundary revision. Not all Hungarians were agreed as to the desirability of or immediate need for a Habsburg restoration, but there was little dissent from the campaign to reunite with the kingdom certain regions—inhabited, it was maintained, by three million Magyars—that had been awarded by the Treaty of Trianon to Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The chief obstacle to the fulfilment of Hungary's revisionist hopes and to a return of the Habsburgs was the Little Entente, formed among the three states just enumerated. It was understandable that, in the circumstances, Hungary should gradually have been drawn towards Italy, herself desirous of revising the peace settlement (especially with regard to Africa) and herself suspicious of the Little Entente because of the latter's close relation to France. Eventually the Magyar kingdom—ruled since 1920 by a regent—came under the influence of the so-called Rome-Berlin axis. Like Bulgaria, Hungary persistently refused to become a party to any international agreement aimed at upholding the territorial status quo in central Europe.

Bulgaria wanted revision along two main lines: Macedonia and an outlet on the Aegean Sea. The Treaty of Neuilly stripped Bulgaria of most of her Macedonian holdings and allotted them to neighboring Greece and Yugoslavia. Thousands of Macedonians thereupon crossed the border back into Bulgaria, using the latter as a place of refuge from their new masters and as a base from which to agitate for the creation of an autonomous, or even an independent, Macedonia. Resulting "border incidents" along the Yugoslav-Greco-Bulgarian frontier several times precipitated international

crises. And whenever the Bulgarian Government was reproached for its toleration of the Macedonian political activities, it replied by pointing out that the disarmament provisions of the peace treaty made it impossible for the authorities properly to deal with the revolutionists. Economically Bulgaria might conceivably have been better off in the early post-war years if the Allies had made any serious effort to carry out their treaty pledge to "insure the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea."

Possibilities of Treaty Revision

Other maladjustments there were, too, whose listing our space does not permit. Suffice it to add that the defeated states felt justified, on moral and legal grounds, in requesting alterations in the peace settlement. In 1929, Gustav Stresemann told the League Council: "Frankly, I do not think that we have in the present century established a condition of affairs which is eternal, and that idea is very clearly expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations." His reference was to Article 19 of the Covenant, which reads: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." This article owed its origin to the feeling among some leaders at the Peace Conference that the treaty might not be altogether just, and that means should therefore be provided for possible revision at a time when calmer spirits could prevail.

Possessing this legal opening for coping with the more serious maladjustments of the peace settlement, the great powers might well have endeavored to forestall some of the moral and material damages of the early post-Versailles years. The statesmen of the German Republic pleaded often that the League avail itself of the powers under Article 19 to reconsider the most troublesome treaty terms, but their pleas generally fell on deaf ears. Having gained their ends in 1919, the former Allies naturally wanted *no* change in the status quo. But the former enemies, and Italy—who also left the peace conference dissatisfied, were quite as eager *for* a change. To them the status quo was painful; it represented, in the words

of an unknown colored philosopher, "the mess we's in!" And it was the inability of the German Republic before 1933 to bring about wider readjustments in the international status quo by moderate appeals that helped to bring the National Socialists, advocates of direct action, to power in the Reich.

The Heritage of Versailles and the Rise of Nazism

The World War and the peace settlement of 1919 left Germany disillusioned and crushed, both materially and spiritually. The Germans, proud and warlike, would not easily forget the humiliation of defeat and the seeming injustices of what they called the "dictate of Versailles." The continuing unfriendly attitude and acts of victorious France; the ceaseless quarreling over the Ruhr, the Rhineland occupation, the Saar, and reparation; the fruitless wrangling over security and disarmament; the steadily swelling armament expenditures of Germany's neighbors; all these tended to feed the indignation and anger of many Germans.

In such circumstances, the republican government's meek acceptance of disabilities, its policy of reconciliation and treaty fulfilment, and its seeming inability or unwillingness to assert itself more strongly in international affairs rankled in the hearts of many nationalists, especially the younger war veterans and the youth which, rightly or wrongly, believed itself deprived of a secure and glorious future by the supposed "treachery" and "cowardice" of complacent republican politicians. During the period of temporary economic revival in Germany, from 1924 to 1929, these factors remained somewhat in the background. But they certainly existed, and it required only a few years of economic depression, of hard times and increasing unemployment, to bring them vividly to the fore.

Many Germans, moreover, declared themselves dissatisfied with the functioning of the democratic parliamentary system. This, in truth, had been virtually imposed upon the Reich by the Allies, who refused, through President Wilson, to make peace with a Hohenzollern Government. Those Germans who could remember the days when order and discipline had prevailed in the Reichstag, and perhaps even more of those who, being younger, had merely

heard or read about such days, were impatient with the quibbling and time-wasting that characterized the republican lower house. It seemed to some German observers that, in place of decision and accomplishment, the politicians offered words, empty promises, and glib prophecies of a brighter future. The whole situation was made more difficult by the system of proportional representation in national elections, which made possible the appearance of more than a score of parties in parliament and which evidently made impossible efficient government by any single like-minded majority. Increasingly many Germans began to express their conviction of the need for a "strong man," a leader, who, they hoped, would restore Germany's prosperity at home and Germany's prestige abroad.

Psychological factors, too, played an important part in the eventual overturn. For some reason, the Weimar Republic seemed peculiarly unable or unwilling to pay due attention to the "inner feelings" and desires of many of its nationalistic citizens. The official toleration, and sometimes even encouragement, of attempts to drag down the ideals and heroes of imperial Germany; the readiness with which the former imperial flag was abandoned and the old and colorful military uniforms were given up; and the friendly relations maintained with the Soviet Union; all these alienated the sympathies of prominent elements in the population, of aristocrats, young university people, conservative peasants, believers in *Kultur* and Germany's presumed world mission, and some of the rank-and-file war veterans who, for one reason or another, seemed to hate the parliamentary politicians. The Nazi leaders, on the other hand, understood these grievances and with their remarkable propaganda methods capitalized on them. Oratory, posters, banners, songs, uniforms, ceremonies, ritual, sentiment, discipline, historic tradition, flattering theories of race superiority, anti-Semitism, enthusiasm, the dynamic personality of Hitler, these things attracted numerous Germans, particularly at a time when the only alternatives appeared to them to offer continued depression and continued foreign rebuffs.

In their original program, drawn up as the "Twenty-five Points" by an engineer named Gottfried Feder, the Nazis "demanded" the abrogation of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. This was

essential for the achievement of their ultimate goal: the establishment of a Greater Germany wherein should be united in one so-called national comradeship *all* those of "German blood without reference to confession."⁹ Hitler elaborated on this program in his book, *Mein Kampf*, and he and the other Nazi leaders and orators rarely missed an opportunity to denounce the "war-guilt lie," to insist on the reacquisition of colonies, and to call for the end of reparation obligations. The domestic planks in the Nazi platform, moreover, were well worded to carry a many-sided appeal; and the catchwords of the movement were anti-Semitism, anti-Marxism, and anti-Versailles-ism.

The Pillars of Nazism

One of the mainstays of the early Hitlerite movement was the white-collar section of the middle class. Many of the three-and-a-half million people in this category, when judged by income and standard of living, really fell into proletarian ranks. But, unlike so many workers, they preferred not to look to the Socialists or Communists for relief. Class pride and perhaps national spirit led them to seek aid elsewhere and Hitlerism evidently seemed to offer another way out. Equally badly off from an economic point of view, equally hesitant to acknowledge a common interest with laborers, and consequently equally prepared to try Nazi suggestions, were thousands of ex-army officers, soldiers' widows, and retired tradesmen who still remembered with bitterness the period of inflation.

There were also numerous other Nazi enthusiasts. The anti-Semitic stand of the National Socialists appealed to many professionals who objected to the competition offered by Jewry in law, medicine, teaching, banking, and trade. Retail shopkeepers who believed that the growth of trusts and chain stores was endangering their livelihood welcomed the Nazi promise of government protection for small dealers. Support also came from the discouraged peasants, particularly in southern Germany. Millions of the farmers, large and small, were in debt and, since property holders could have little

⁹ This was then to be the Third Reich, as the Holy Roman Empire had been the first and the Hohenzollern Empire the second.

sympathy with the Marxist attitude towards private possessions, they tended to rally around Nazi standards.

University students and graduates added further strength to Nazism. There was a sixty percent increase in the number of university students in Germany between 1914 and 1930, but the number of professional openings failed to keep pace with this rise in employable candidates. Thousands of unemployed educated persons thus came to despair of any improvement in their lot under the existing political system. Any program of overturn seemed promising to such people and, since they frequently favored a strengthened national spirit, the revival of a large army, and the removal of the restrictive Versailles clauses, they turned to National Socialism. Finally, a number of industrialists, who apparently feared the progress of Communism more than that of Hitlerism, supported the Nazis. The latter, in official pronouncements, had given assurance that the proposed socialization of trusts was not aimed at such "real creators" of German heavy industry as the Krupps, the Thyssens, the Mannesmanns, and the Siemenses.

Only scant support was given to Hitler, before he took over control of the government, from the ranks of labor and the stronger Catholic districts. Less than fifteen percent of his following in 1932 came from among the industrial proletariat, and even of this group a sizable proportion may well have been attracted as much by the promise of jobs through Nazi influence as by political conviction.

The great opportunity of the Nazis came on January 30, 1933, when President Paul von Hindenburg appointed their leader German Chancellor. Chancellor General Kurt von Schleicher had resigned two days earlier, mainly because the president had refused to allow the dissolution of a hostile Reichstag; there already had been too many elections in recent years. But the Nazis, though they formed the largest single group in the lower house, were definitely in a minority, holding 196 of the 584 seats. Hitler therefore demanded new elections, which were set for March 5, 1933. After an exciting campaign, during the course of which the Reichstag building was nearly destroyed by a fire of apparently incendiary origin, more than 39,000,000 citizens cast their ballots. More than 17,000,000 of them voted for National Socialist candidates and an additional

3,000,000 supported the German National People's Party, which had formed a coalition with the Nazis. The Nazi-Nationalist coalition received approximately fifty-two percent of the popular vote and hence a majority in the Reichstag.¹⁰

On March 23, 1933, the new Reichstag, with more than 100 of the deputies absent, generally involuntarily, by a vote of 441 to 94, passed the Law to Combat the Misery of People and Reich. The five articles of this act in effect suspended the Constitution of 1919 and endowed the Hitler Government with dictatorial powers for four years. Within the next eighteen months the Nazis so effectively entrenched themselves in power that Hitler prophesied, in the late summer of 1934: "In the next thousand years no more revolutions will take place in Germany."

Post-War Diplomacy: Republican Germany

Having now outlined certain maladjustments of the Paris peace settlement and considered, in brief, some of the factors underlying the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany, we may complete this survey with a glance at European international relations since the close of the World War. Let us begin, for the sake of continuity, with the diplomacy of the Weimar Republic.

The chief aim of German diplomacy from 1919 to 1932 was to regain for the republic admission into the family of nations as a member in good standing. The achievement of this goal was an urgent matter, both as a protective measure for the disarmed and war-weary population and as a means of reviving the trade and commerce upon which German economic recovery largely depended. German opinion from the beginning, however, was divided on the question of whether the new orientation should look eastward or

¹⁰ In this election the Social Democrats polled about 7,000,000 votes, the two Catholic parties (Center and Bavarian People's), 5,500,000, and the Communist Party about 4,750,000. The Hitlerites blamed the Communist Party for the Reichstag fire, while the Communists accused the Nazis of having plotted the deed as a means of discrediting Communism in the eyes of the voters. In December, 1933, the German Supreme Court convicted Marinus van der Lubbe, a young Netherlands Communist, of having set the fire. The youth appeared to be in a stupor during most of the trial but he steadfastly maintained that he had committed the crime without accomplices. He was executed in January, 1934. One of the best accounts of the incident is by a correspondent of the *London Times*: D. Reed, *The Burning of the Reichstag*, 1934.

westward, toward Soviet Russia or the Allies. Those statesmen who preferred to look eastward advocated an alliance with the Bolsheviks and eventual repudiation of the oppressive treaty restrictions. Their opponents spoke for the prompt fulfilment of the treaty obligations, onerous though these might be, and full reconciliation with the erstwhile enemies.

At first it looked as though the pro-Soviet point of view might triumph. In the spring of 1922 the chief German and Russian delegates to the Genoa Economic Conference concluded and signed, at near-by Rapallo, a recognition pact and trade treaty. The two powers felt drawn together because both were still regarded as international outcasts, both were fearful of the possible designs of an Anglo-Franco-Polish coalition, and both were in need of new and immediate trade contacts. The treaty of 1922 was, fundamentally, only a trade agreement, but the sudden announcement of its secret negotiation at a time when the representatives of thirty-four nations were gathered to discuss ways and means for improving the general European economic situation greatly irritated the remaining delegations. The Genoa conference therefore broke up without settling any of the major issues which it had been called to consider.

Four years later, in April, 1926, the Soviet and German authorities signed another treaty. This document provided for mutual neutrality in the event of attack without provocation. Each signatory, moreover, agreed not to participate in any financial or economic boycott that might be organized against the other. It is worthy of note that this treaty of friendship and neutrality was never specifically renounced by either party, not even after the Nazis established their Third Reich.

Meanwhile, under the skilful and energetic leadership of Dr. Gustav Stresemann, there had come into power in Germany a group which advocated friendlier relations with Great Britain and France. Stresemann led the German People's Party, the party of big business, and though he actually favored a return to a monarchical form of government, he was ready to support the democratic republic in the interests of peace, internal unity, and economic revival. It was mainly through his efforts that Germany in 1924 accepted the Dawes Plan, in 1925 signed the Locarno Pact guaranteeing the status

quo in the Rhineland area, in 1926 became a member of the League of Nations, in 1928 renounced war as an instrument of national policy by signing the Paris or Kellogg-Briand Pact, and in 1929 agreed to the Young Plan. In this last year, too, Stresemann died, and though his immediate successors tried to continue on the path of his policies, they met only disappointment and failure.

The conduct of foreign relations now became increasingly difficult in Germany, mainly because of the hampering activities of both nationalistic and communistic groups and the unswerving diplomatic intransigence of France and her satellites in central Europe. The friends of fulfilment and conciliation had to admit, in 1932, that after years of requesting and years of pleading, they had not yet succeeded in winning from the former Allies a recognition, even in principle, of the complete equality of Germany with the other great powers. As a measure of last resort, the republican government in Berlin finally gave warning, in September, 1932, that Germany would abstain from any further participation in the Geneva Disarmament Conference until the right of the Germans to absolute equality among the nations should have been admitted.

The threat was taken seriously, where earlier requests had been disregarded, and in December, 1932, the powers assembled at Geneva gave the pledge that "one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be the grant to Germany and to the other disarmed powers of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations." Germany now agreed to cooperate once more and in February, 1933, the conference resumed its work. In the meantime, however, Adolf Hitler had become the German Chancellor.

Nazi Diplomacy

The Hitler Government inherited from its predecessors the foreign problems of Germany's eastern frontiers (which had not been finally settled at Locarno), union with Austria, reacquisition of colonies, repudiation of war guilt, practical equality with the other great powers in armaments, and further revision of the reparation schedule. And since the Hitlerites had acquired their following at least partly because the previous administrations had failed to solve these prob-

lems, it was to be expected that vigor, to say the least, would be the new order of the day in foreign relations. Inasmuch as the Nazis had referred to the relatively moderate policies of the Weimar Republic as compounded of cowardice and treachery, they themselves were bound to let actions speak, if words failed.

By the end of 1933 the Nazis, having laid the basis for the thorough co-ordination according to their own principles of all domestic life, were ready to turn to foreign affairs with equal energy. In this field they developed a technique which aroused the ire of some and the envy of other foreign observers. The method was one of taking sudden action during a temporary lull in international watchfulness, announcing a *fait accompli*, and holding a plebiscite wherein the people were asked to endorse the completed act of the government. Generally the plebiscite question was worded so that no patriot, whatever his political convictions, would be willing to vote "no." The attention of the world was then called to witness the solidarity with which the German people presumably were backing their government. Beginning in 1936 an improvement in technique was made possible through the co-operation of Italy, who now began to alternate with Germany in the performance of acts which were calculated to alter the status quo in a direction more acceptable to the totalitarian states. And, as success appeared to follow success, both powers became bolder in their demands. But here again it is noteworthy that, except for signing the anti-Comintern Pact, which in no way affected the safety of the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy did little to irritate, let alone endanger, the U.S.S.R.

The French Search for Security

While the Germans still vacillated between eastward and westward orientations, France, the Soviet Union, and Italy were all building up security systems of their own. Immediately after the World War it seemed to many Frenchmen that, as long as Germany retained a shadow of her former might, the Third Republic must seek written guarantees of protection. Disappointed in her efforts to get such guarantees from Great Britain and the United States, France in 1920 turned to Belgium. In that year the two countries signed an

alliance whose terms were secret but which presumably provided for mutual support in case of attack by Germany. The treaty remained valid until 1936, when the Belgians, in effect, repudiated it.

Next, France sought a substitute to take the place held by Russia in the old alliance system. The logical candidate was Poland who, like France, feared both Germany and the Bolsheviks. An alliance was concluded between the two states in 1922 and renewed for an additional ten years in 1932. Then, between 1924 and 1927, France negotiated pacts of varying strength with Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Thus, within nine years after the Armistice, France had built up a new armed camp of the very type that had proved so futile and so dangerous in 1914. And this time France was bound by her treaties to defend five proteges, not one of which was a first-class power and each of which had numerous enemies.

Partly because she realized the danger of this situation, partly to gain access to the Russian oil resources, and partly because of the rising tide of Nazism across her eastern border, France, in 1931, shifted her position with respect to Moscow. The latter was in a receptive mood, for it, too, was disturbed over the election gains registered by the Communist-baiting Nazis. After due preliminaries, therefore, a Franco-Soviet alliance was signed in 1935 and ratified in 1936. It promised that the signatories, for five years, would come to each other's immediate aid in case of unprovoked aggression.

Soviet Treaties

Meanwhile, in 1931, the Soviet Union had also signed a non-aggression pact with Poland. This treaty was prolonged for eleven years in 1934, a few months after Poland had signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. The Soviet-Polish agreement fitted in well with Moscow's program, dating from 1925, of negotiating non-aggression treaties with all its immediate neighbors. By 1933 the Soviet Union had similar pacts with Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Persia (Iran), Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Thereafter, feeling safer in Europe, the Bolsheviks were able to devote more attention to Japan's adventure on the Asiatic mainland.

Italian Precautions

Italy, too, was taking precautions during these busy years, for Italy had great ambitions and Italy therefore needed friends. In the early years of Fascist ascendancy it seemed to many Italians that France was especially friendly to emigres who had left Italy through dislike for, or fear of, Fascism. The Fascists, moreover, placed chief blame on France for what they regarded as Italy's shabby treatment at the Paris Peace Conference.¹¹ The two countries also competed for control of the western Mediterranean and for superiority in naval armaments. The French position, generally speaking, was that the Third Republic must have a Mediterranean fleet as large as Italy's, plus an Atlantic fleet. The Italians maintained that their fleet must be as large as the entire French fleet. And each side tried to break the stalemate by out-arming the other. Finally, there was an expressed feeling in some Italian circles that Tunisia, Corsica, Savoy, and Nice, all in the possession of France, belonged of right to Italy.

Because of her grievances against France and spurred on by her general ambitions, Italy after 1928 gradually drew closer to her former enemies, eventually endorsing their demands for a revision of the peace settlement. Soon Italy came to be regarded as the leader of a "revisionist bloc" which included Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and which was sympathetic to the claims of Germany. The rise to power of Hitler made it appear for a time that the question of *Anschluss* might estrange Rome from Berlin, but there were enough congruent elements in the Nazi and Fascist patterns so that even the unexpected liquidation of the Austrian problem in March, 1938, had relatively little outward effect on Italo-German relations. Thereafter, indeed, Italy appeared content to concede first place

¹¹ As a consequence of the World War of 1914, Italy acquired from Austria the South Tyrol, Trentino, Trieste, Istria, and some islands off Dalmatia. The area of these cessions was about 8,900 square miles and the population 1,600,000—of whom 250,000 were Tyrolese Germans and 300,000 were Yugoslavs (South Slavs). Italy also wanted Fiume and Albania on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea, but the Peace Conference gave the one to Yugoslavia and maintained the other in its independence. Mussolini then annexed Fiume by treaty in 1924 and Albania by invasion in 1939. The Near Eastern territorial bait held out to Italy by Great Britain and France in 1915 either went to Greece or was kept by Turkey. In Africa, Italy was put off with small additions to Libya and Somaliland, while Great Britain and France got most of the former German African colonies as mandates.

among the revisionists to the stronger Third Reich, and to follow where once she had led.

By this time, too, Mussolini had clearly formulated the conflict of ideologies which separated the major totalitarian states from the chief democracies. "The struggle between the two worlds," he said, "can permit no compromise. Either we or they!" Basically, the distinction between the totalitarian and democratic ideologies appeared to lie in their differing conceptions of the position of the individual in the state. Under the democratic conception, as it seemed to be generally understood among those who upheld the current forms of political organization in the "western democracies," the individual was regarded at once as the creator and the rightful beneficiary of all state activity and might be interfered with only when his doings reacted to the harm of his fellow-individuals. The totalitarian conception—in the Soviet Union as much as in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy—was definitely anti-individualistic. The latter, to quote Mussolini again, "stressed the importance of the state and accepted the individual only insofar as his interests coincided with those of the state."

The Attitude of Post-War Great Britain

It remains to survey the attitude of post-World War Great Britain in relation to these events. The British Government and people after 1919 evidently believed that there would be no future need for heavy land armaments. Assured, through the negotiation of naval-limitation agreements, that only the United States might have a fleet comparable to her own, and thus reassured of the security of her coast lines and trade lanes, Great Britain was content to use her funds for other than arms enterprises and benevolently to observe the establishment of a French continental hegemony reinforced by presumably impregnable defenses against the unlikely possibility of a German invasion.

As a further safeguard of British peace, London officialdom, throughout the post-war period, with few exceptions, consistently refused to accept the responsibility of world-wide commitments to guarantee law observance and territorial integrity. The advent of the National Socialist Government in Germany, however, combined

with such occurrences as the increasing unrest in central Europe, the approaching Mediterranean crises, the Far Eastern imbroglio, and the confusion and turmoil which characterized the domestic life of France especially after 1932, eventually led the British Government to take stock of the situation and to make a new estimate of Britannia's security. And even then several years were allowed to slip by before a record-breaking arms appropriation was voted in February, 1937—years in which international law was flouted in Spain, a Nazi delegate from Danzig thumbed his nose at the League Council, Germany repudiated the Locarno Pact and remilitarized the Rhineland, and Hitler denounced the international control set up over German rivers by the Versailles Treaty.

The Munich Agreement

The absorption of Austria into the Reich in March, 1938, placed Germany in an excellent strategic position to take the next step in its program of uniting with the fatherland those Germans who had been excluded from its borders by the peace settlement of 1919. Great Germany now reached around Czechoslovakia like a huge pincers—a condition all the more significant since there lived within Czechoslovakia, all along the extensive Reich frontier, more than three million Germans, known from their location in the Sudetes Mountains as *Sudetendeutsche*.

A provisional assembly which on November 14, 1918, had unanimously proclaimed a Czechoslovak Republic, had represented only the Czechs and Slovaks in the former Austrian lands of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia. The several minorities there had abstained from voting, the Germans in the expectation that they would be permitted to join either Austria or Germany. Hence there was bloodshed when Czech troops were sent to occupy the German-dominated areas in Bohemia and Moravia. President Masaryk, however, promised equality of treatment to Germans and Czechs and the disturbances temporarily ceased. But thus was born one of the most troublesome minority problems in post-World War Europe.

Prior to 1918 the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia had, on the

whole, comprised the upper classes. They were therefore generally disliked by the newly-liberated Czechs, who looked upon them as former oppressors, and they therefore also bitterly resented the turn of fate which had converted them into the less favored element in the population. At first the Germans boycotted all elections and ingeniously placed obstacles in the way of the administration, but as time went on, increasingly many of them seemed to feel that more might be gained by active participation in the political life of the state. In 1926 two Germans were appointed to the national cabinet and in the following year three-quarters of the Germans in the assembly voted for the re-election of President Masaryk. Naturally there remained irreconcilables among both Germans and Czechs and hardly a month passed in the ensuing years without some unpleasant incident to remind the government of its German minority problem.

The triumph of Hitlerism in Germany further complicated the situation, particularly since it paralleled the appearance of the great depression in Czechoslovakia. Nazi propaganda became active at once, but it was closely watched by the Prague authorities. In 1933 the Czechoslovak Government dissolved the German National and National German Socialist Labor parties, but these were quickly revived as the *Sudetendeutsche Partei*, headed by Konrad Henlein, the "Czechoslovak Hitler." And this group polled more votes than any other party in the parliamentary elections of May, 1935. The cabinet appointed after these elections was necessarily a coalition government, representing eight of the fourteen parties returned to parliament. The status of the large German minority was therefore the most serious concern of the Prague leaders from the spring of 1935 onward. Germany, meanwhile, making capital of the economic distress in the Sudetes region, conducted a vigorous diplomatic and press campaign against its neighbor to the south.

The Czechoslovaks were accused of mistreating their German subjects and of depriving them, in violation of the guarantees embodied in a minorities treaty of September 1919, of economic and cultural opportunities. Prague was also charged with being in league with the Soviet Union to spread the doctrines of the Comintern.

The Czechoslovak authorities strenuously denied all these charges and explained that any strong restrictive measures were made necessary by the subversive activities of the Henleinists. The situation grew steadily worse, and the demands of the *Sudetendeutsche Partei* became more insistent as Hitler's foreign policy was apparently crowned with success elsewhere. Whereas the Henleinists in the municipal elections of 1935 had polled only 67 percent of the vote in the German districts, they now (May-June, 1938) captured 90 percent thereof. The gain was owing to a number of circumstances, not least among which was the recent German absorption of Austria.

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Great Britain had made it plain as early as March 24, 1938, that he would not commit the British to the support of France in the event of a war growing out of German action against Czechoslovakia. Thereafter it evidently was only a matter of time as to when such German action would occur. The crisis became steadily more acute during the summer of 1938, as the Czechoslovaks gradually agreed to certain concessions but refused to yield to the demand for autonomy. By September 15, Henlein issued the first public statement for outright cession of the Sudetes areas to Germany. Meanwhile the Prague Government had been made to realize that it could not count on help from any great power in its effort to retain the boundaries fixed by the peace settlement. The Soviet Union would live up to its alliance obligations only on the conditions that France did so first and that the League of Nations declared Germany to be the aggressor. And France indicated that she would certainly not act without a prior commitment of British aid.

The fourth week in September found the British and French urging the Czechoslovaks to surrender certain territories to Germany, while Poland and Hungary added *their* demands for the cession of Teschen and Slovakia, respectively. Chamberlain now made several round-trip flights to Germany and was evidently upset by Hitler's increasingly drastic stand. When the Führer finally threatened to use force unless all his demands were met by October 1, a conference was hurriedly arranged among the premiers of the four leading west European states. The result of their meeting was

the so-called Munich Agreement, which was variously hailed as a great achievement in the interest of peace and denounced as a betrayal of central Europe.

Certainly the Munich Agreement kept the peace of Europe for the moment, but it did so by according to Germany without war, though at a somewhat slower rate than had at first been demanded, virtually all the things that Hitler had asked for. Nazi diplomacy had again been successful and another pillar of the Versailles structure had been undermined, all without the shedding of a drop of German blood. In this respect there was nothing epochal about the Munich accord, but it did mark the last occasion on which Great Britain and France were ready to be "caught unprepared," and the last occasion on which such persons as Mr. Chamberlain—derisively nicknamed by his opponents, *Monsieur J'aime Berlin*—were willing to accept at its face value a Nazi promise of territorial satiety.

War Again

The most recent diplomatic events, those which led directly to the outbreak of a new European war in September 1939, are discussed at some length elsewhere in this volume. Suffice it to say here that the Germans, apparently motivated by a mixture of legitimate grievances, exaggerated sentimentalism, the agitation produced by unchecked diplomatic success, a philosophy which accords rights to nations in proportion to their virility as expressed in military might, effective opportunism, and an appreciation of the unwillingness of satisfied nations to take up arms for a principle, went ahead relentlessly to take over area after area in central Europe. Eventually, in the case of Poland, resort was had to actual warfare. Thereafter, again as on previous occasions, the achievement of the immediate Nazi objective was labeled the last demand on Europe. This time, however, Great Britain and France appeared not to place much faith in the promise. And so, as in 1914, the great game of diplomatic bluff brought on war. A quarter-century had passed in the interval; a new generation had grown to military age; and humanity could register its advance chiefly in the production of more effective instruments of destruction.

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EFFECTS OF THE
FIRST
WORLD WAR

THE ECONOMIC WAR SINCE 1918

■
Benjamin Higgins

THE Treaty of Versailles did not end hostilities between the participants in the first World War. The scene of battle was merely shifted from military to economic fronts. The guns ceased to fire on November, 1918; but for two decades the war was carried on with economic weapons. Slow, subtle, and unspectacular in their action as compared with military weapons, these economic weapons are none the less deadly in the destruction of national welfare; and, as is often the case with military instruments of war, the effective use of economic instruments exposes the user to grave danger and prompts retaliation in kind.

In this chapter the main battles on the economic front after 1918 will be discussed, the principal weapons will be described. We shall see how they were expected to work and what their actual effects were. The chief economic factors in the international struggle for prosperity and power will be considered. We shall try to find out whether war is the only possible solution for this struggle. There is no denying the importance of political and personality aspects of war in the twentieth century; but some knowledge of the underlying economic issues is essential if we are to understand completely the declaration of war on Germany by Britain and France—and the

invasion of China by Japan, of Ethiopia and Albania by Italy, of Poland by Russia.

At the outset, I should like to warn the reader on two scores. First, the "facts" of this story are strangely contradictory, and "facts" can be found to support either side of most of the arguments about the economic factors in war. We must be wary of "facts," and resign ourselves to doing some hard thinking if we are to get a true picture of the war situation. Second, we must remember that when we speak of the actions of "Germany," "France," "Great Britain," and other "countries," we are really talking, not about transcendental powers, but about groups of people with human desires and human weaknesses, groups with the capabilities and limitations of human intelligence; specifically, we are talking about those groups which are powerful enough politically to influence the action of their governments. If we bear this fact constantly in mind, the true significance of the events we are about to examine will be much more easily discerned.

Issues in the Economic War

The Doctrine of "Imperialistic Wars." Whatever our general attitude towards the teachings of Karl Marx, his ability to forecast historical developments cannot be denied. As G. D. H. Cole puts it, "Marx foresaw the advent of the age of Economic Imperialism, dominated by the rivalries of the advanced countries over markets, spheres of influence, territorial expansion, and the building up of alliances and groupings designed to foster their several economic interests. He foresaw—that these rivalries would lead inevitably to wars of colonial conquest, and finally to wars between the great Imperialist Powers —." ¹

A thesis which has been so successful a basis for prognosis is worth our consideration. Briefly, the Marxian interpretation of war is as follows: "Capitalists" in highly industrialized countries, threatened with falling profits as opportunities for domestic exploitation are exhausted, cast envious eyes towards undeveloped portions of the globe. These "new" countries are potential new markets, new fields for investment, new sources of cheap raw materials. Since the

¹ *What Marx Really Meant*, Knopf, 1934, p. 57.

"capitalists" are also the dominant political group, they are able to persuade their governments to foster and protect their foreign ventures. When they clash with "capitalists" of other countries who are also in search of markets, investment opportunities, and supplies of raw materials, they can commandeer the military resources of their respective governments to oust their rivals from desired colonial territories.

This thesis seems to fit previous wars. And is not the desire of the "have-nots" to get new territories and new commercial advantages, and the conflicting desire of the "haves" to maintain their relative superiority, the real basis of the bitter economic war from 1918-1939, and of the resort to military operations in September, 1939? We must not accept "yes" as the answer too uncritically. Let us examine it more carefully, and see whether a real conflict of economic interests exists. Population pressure, need for outlets for investment, need for markets, need for access to raw materials—these are the usual arguments presented by the "have-nots" in their territorial demands. Let us study them in order.

Population pressure and demand for colonies. In April, 1939, a Berlin correspondent to *The Spectator* was able to write, "To-day, the leaders here are primarily concerned with establishing Germany's 'Lebensraum.'" Japan emphasized its need for room to live before its invasion of Manchuria and later of China. Shortly after the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy, Dr. Augusto Rosso, then Italian Ambassador to Washington, said in an American speech: "I am ready to admit that Italy wants to live, to work, to progress. In short, to expand. . . . There can be no denial of the fact that we need expansion. Our forty-four million people are compressed within an area less than half the size of your State of Texas, and not as rich in natural resources."²

It must be said at the outset that a growing population is not in itself undesirable.³ It seems clear enough that in new, undeveloped

² "Italy's Conflict with Ethiopia," *International Conciliation*, December 1935, pp. 550-551.

³ Indeed, so eminent an authority as Prof. Alvin Hansen regards the decline in the rate of population growth in this country as "overwhelmingly significant" for the explanation of our failure to attain full recovery from the crash and deflation of 1929 to 1933. ("Progress and Declining Population," *Am. Econ. Rev.*, March, 1939.)

countries, increased population is essential if the natural resources are to be exploited to the full. Even in highly industrialized countries like the United States, the prospect of a growing population provides the stimulus for investment in housing, public utilities, transportation, and other fields capable of absorbing a great deal of savings and a great many men, with consequent benefits to the whole country. On the other hand, the "law of diminishing returns" does operate with respect to population. Beyond a certain point, with given area, given technical knowledge, and given amounts of capital, an increase in the population will be accompanied by a decline in income per capita.

Thus there is, at any given time, an "optimum" population for each country. This optimum is ever changing. New inventions, discovery of new resources, accumulation of capital, increase the size of the population which maximizes per capita income. Moreover, changes outside the country change the optimum. The discovery of a new continent with abundant raw materials and lucrative markets for finished goods, improvements in transportation, reduction in tariffs by other countries—all these would make it possible to maintain a larger population in comfort at home. On the other hand, anything which restricts the volume of international trade—monopolies in other countries, tariffs and quotas, exchange control—makes more difficult the support of a given population in any country. Since in fact the tendency since 1918 has been toward increasing restriction on trade, this point is of no little importance.

Admitting, then, that overpopulation is possible, is it true that Germany, Italy, and Japan are seriously overpopulated? Here are some figures of density of population for 1934:

<i>Per square kilometre</i>		<i>Per square mile</i>	
England and Wales	267.2	Australia	2.2
Germany	139.7	Canada	3.0
Italy	134.8	United States	41.3
France	75.9	Japan	349.4
Czechoslovakia	106.3	China	104.3
Poland	84.0	Java	678.0
Austria	80.4		
Russia	7.8		

Such raw figures do not constitute a test of relative overpopulation, although they are sometimes misused in just that way. One must know, in addition to the numbers per square mile or kilometre, what those square miles and kilometres are like; what is the state of technical progress in each country; how much capital is available for investment. Indeed, as Professor Robbins has pointed out, no adequate measure of overpopulation exists; the best that economists can do is to "risk their reputations" and "make cautious guesses guided by broad views of all the available data."⁴

The most we can say is that these figures in themselves do not lend much support to the demands of the "have-nots." In the first place, England is much more densely populated than either Germany or Italy. In the second place, we see that Java has a problem very much greater than Germany's or Italy's or even Japan's; and who ever heard of Java's "need for expansion"? We see too that the territories now incorporated into the Reich are only slightly less thickly populated than Germany itself, and need for "Lebensraum" interpreted in terms of pure space would scarcely justify their acquisition. Why don't Germany and Italy make demands on Russia, least populous of all European powers? The China that Japan wants as space for excess population is nearly as densely populated as Germany and Italy, who feel themselves overcrowded! We see too that small populations are no guarantee of prosperity—witness Canada and Australia.

But, the fair-minded reader will object, if England were overpopulated in the true sense, she could send emigrants to other parts of her empire, while Germany and Italy do not have this opportunity. The mere fact that in 1934, one in which any existing "overpopulation" must have been keenly felt, 20,000 more British subjects returned to England than emigrated to overseas territory⁵ suggests that if England is overpopulated, the Empire is not providing much of a relief. The Dominions, after all, have their own immigration laws. Nor have the "have-nots" made much use of the colonial op-

⁴ "The Optimum Theory of Population," in *London Essays in Economics*, ed. by Gregory and Dalton, p. 128.

⁵ Sir Norman Angell, *Raw Materials, Population Pressure, and War*, World Peace Foundation, 1936, p. 33.

portunities they have had already. In 1914, after thirty years of occupation, Germany had only 25,000 German people, out of a total colonial population of thirteen millions, in the colonies she now considers so essential to her well-being. After some forty years in Manchuria, Japan had settled only 500,000 Japanese there, although there were 34 million people in that country.⁶ Italy was able to wrest Libya from Turkey after a two-year war in 1911-1912. Of the 25,000 odd Italians now in Libya, nearly all comprise the military garrison there. In 1914, there were more Germans and Italians in New York City than in the German and Italian colonies. It is too early to make judgments on the success of the Italian colonization of Ethiopia, when armed opposition still exists in some parts of the country. But it is significant that the Addis Ababa correspondent of *Critica Fascista* could write in the September 1, 1938, issue: "We are already in the phase of decline. The interest of Italians in the Empire is already attenuated." The number of laborers in Italian East Africa actually decreased from 115,000 in March, 1937, to 36,000 in March, 1938, and to 21,000 in July. Italy is finding that, instead of having an excess population, it cannot spare men for colonization from war and war preparation!⁷

It would not be safe to conclude from these few scattered facts that colonial possessions do not constitute under any conditions a safety valve for overcrowded countries. The great waves of emigration in the nineteenth century would belie any such hypothesis; and it must be remembered that the United States is now largely closed to European immigration by the "quota" laws of 1921 and 1926. But it does appear that in the *short run*, under present conditions, acquisition of new territory cannot be expected to give much *direct* relief to overpopulated countries. Aid must come rather in the form of opening up new markets, increasing the supplies of raw materials, etc., and so increasing the productivity of workers in the mother country and increasing the size of population which is the "optimum" there.

In any case, it is obvious that if overpopulation is a serious threat to the well-being of certain countries, and if emigration to relatively

⁶ R. F. Andrews, "Hitler and Colonies," *Labour Monthly*, March 3, 1939.

⁷ Jean Albert, *L'Europe Nouvelle*, Nov. 12, 1938, p. 1236.

underpopulated areas is the only solution, there is still no need either for peaceful redistribution of territory or for war. The problem could be partially met by freedom of immigration.⁸

New territories as outlets for investment. Of all the components of the Marxist concept of "imperialism," the need for new outlets for investment is most difficult to fit into the post-war picture. True, the "satisfied powers" have experienced difficulty in finding profitable fields for investment of savings, particularly since 1929. In the case of the "unsatisfied powers," the shoe has been on the other foot; their chief investment problem has been scarcity of capital. Not only have they had insufficient capital to finance their own domestic industries, but they have been only too glad to borrow large sums from foreign capitalists when possible. Germany, far from seeking foreign outlets for excess savings, has wanted to keep those savings at home so badly that she has made it a crime punishable by death to invest abroad. The rapid industrialization of Japan has absorbed every drop of domestic savings and more besides. Italy's foreign debt is small; but her large government expenditures since 1918 have been largely loan-financed, and have mopped up most of whatever investable funds were available. Insofar as the "field-for-investment" argument applies to the post-war situation at all, it would serve only as an explanation of why the "satisfied powers" were anxious to retain control of colonies for their own investors; it cannot explain the demands of the "have-nots."

Even if we admit that at the height of the boom of the 'twenties there may have been German, Italian, and possibly Japanese capital seeking opportunities for foreign investment, there would still be no reason for redistribution of territory by negotiation or by war. Capital moves from country to country much more easily than either

⁸ If Germany has too many people and America has too few, as economists in the two countries insist is the case, the answer is inescapable: let desirable German people come to America. One might argue that Herr Schmidt will not be happy in a country populated with Mr. Smiths, and that he must have a German colony to which to go. That there is a problem there cannot be denied; but America's success as a "melting-pot" shows that it is not insoluble. If the "satisfied powers" placed no restrictions on immigration of Germans, Italians, and Japanese, these nations could scarcely complain about difficulties of overpopulation and consequent need for colonies. Freedom of immigration brings with it problems of its own; but is it too high a price to pay for peace—and prosperity?

men or goods, virtually without restriction. A German or Italian who wants to invest abroad has only to notify his broker to buy certain foreign securities. If he prefers, he can deposit money in a foreign bank and use it to build a factory, hire men, and buy raw materials—to go into business abroad, for himself. There is more American capital invested in Canada than English. Germany, far from lacking foreign outlets for savings, was in severe financial straits in 1928-29 because of the transfer of capital from Germany to New York to take advantage of the stock-market boom there.

Need for investment outlets could cause international conflict if colonies imposed discriminatory taxation or limitations on investment of foreigners but not of citizens of the mother country; and when in addition foreigners actually want to invest in those colonies and have idle funds to use in that way. In fact, this combination of circumstances has not occurred often enough to be regarded as a serious issue.

Need for markets. The truth of the "need for markets" argument can be briefly and simply stated. When there is freedom of trade, the actual sovereignty of colonial or other territories is of little importance. If, for example, Canada has no trade restrictions whatsoever, then Germany and England can sell to Canadians on equal terms. England might have some slight advantage since there are more people of English than of German origin in Canada; and it may be easier to sell goods with "Heatheringway" on the label than with "Hanfstaengel" on the label. If so, the terms of trade with Canada will be better for the Englishman than the German, and the English will need to sacrifice fewer commodities for a given collection of Canadian goods than will the Germans. It is hard to believe, however, that Canadians will continue to buy English goods if there is a better German product available at the same price under normal conditions—the "boycott" of Japanese silk stockings by righteous American girls notwithstanding.

This discussion is in a sense "academic"; neither freedom of trade nor freedom of immigration exists. Such being the case, the demand for markets has sense. Germany cannot buy raw materials in the world market unless she can sell finished goods in the world market. As we shall see, world markets are barricaded by tariffs, quotas, and

exchange restrictions. Since 1918 the Germans, unable to sell on advantageous terms, have found raw materials expensive in terms of the amount of goods they were compelled to exchange for them. By closing markets to German goods, other countries have lowered the German standard of living (and incidentally, their own). True, the important markets for Germany, Italy, and Japan are not colonial but Continental, English, and American. One might argue, however, that failing these large markets, colonial markets would at least be better than none.

Raw materials and colonies. The need for access to raw materials is the most frequently advanced argument for acquisition of new territory by the "have-nots." Germany's case has been admirably presented by Hjalmar Schacht in an article in *Foreign Affairs* for January, 1937. "Before the war," Schacht points out, "Germany's world investments were in round figures \$12,000 millions, the profits of which could be used to buy raw materials all over the world. The markets where raw materials were procured were completely free." Supplies of basic commodities were not monopolized, international trade was lubricated by a smoothly working gold standard. Immigration was relatively unhampered. But "All these elementary principles of international trade and intercourse have now disappeared." German foreign investments have been wiped out, her colonies taken away. Germany is particularly deficient in raw materials; now that Italy has Ethiopia, "Germany remains the lone unsatisfied large Power." If peace is to be maintained (!), this raw-materials problem must be met. "I therefore wish to name two conditions essential to the solution of Germany's raw material problem. First, Germany must produce raw materials on territory under her own management. Second, this colonial territory must form part of her monetary system."

With regard to Italy, Mussolini, in a speech to the National Assembly of Corporations (March 23, 1936), has said: "Italy will not resign herself to the abused commonplace that she is poor in raw materials. It must be said instead that she does not possess certain raw materials. This is a fundamental reason for her colonial demands." Need for raw materials was given as one of the main reasons for Italy's Ethiopian campaign. Japan too, threatened by increas-

ing restriction on Japanese exports, and consequently increasing difficulty in getting raw materials, joined in the cry for colonies. Prominent citizens of "satisfied" nations—such as Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Arthur Salter, and the Archbishop of York—publicly acknowledged the existence of a grave problem; and the League of Nations appointed a committee to study it.

That there is a fundamental discrepancy between the relative abundance of basic raw materials at the disposal of different political systems cannot be denied. The British Empire, for example, produces 99.5% of the world's jute, 94% of the nickel, 58% of the rubber, 51% of the wool, 44.5% of the lead. It produces 30% of the world's copper; 25% of the world's coal; 24% of the cotton; 23% of the wheat; 20.5% of the vegetable oils. Of the six raw materials which Dr. Göbbels considers basic⁹—coal, iron, cotton, oil, rubber, and copper—the Empire is deficient in none; and the only serious shortages are petroleum and certain textiles. The United States similarly is well supplied with all "basic" raw materials but rubber; leads the world in production of coal, petroleum, cotton, lead, zinc; is deficient in textiles other than cotton. Russia stands next to the United States and the Empire in raw-materials production; is deficient in rubber, minor metals, and to some extent in copper and wool.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, in its study of "Raw Materials and Colonies," after examining the deficiencies of the three "satisfied powers" discussed in the preceding paragraph, says: "In the case of France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, the deficiencies are so numerous that it is better to examine such resources as they do possess." The inclusion of France among these "have-nots" is striking; we hear little about French colonial ambitions. But the three "unsatisfied powers" are in still worse condition than France. France has abundant iron, sufficient flax, nickel, and vegetable oils. Germany "has a surplus of coal and potash" but otherwise "she is partly or entirely deficient in every material." Italy has silk, hemp, minor metals, vegetable oils; but lacks all other basic materials, notably coal. Japan has silk and sulphur, some coal and copper. When we come to foodstuffs, we find that the British Empire, the

⁹*Völkischer Beobachter*, March 2, 1936.

United States, and the U.S.S.R. are approximately self-sufficient, while Germany, Italy, and Japan are dependent upon imports for certain important foodstuffs.

Certain additional facts must be included before the picture is complete, however, First, except for rubber and to a lesser degree copper, the essential raw materials are to an overwhelming degree produced in sovereign states. This fact is small comfort to the "have-nots" but does change the aspect of *colonial* demands. Secondly raw materials must be bought and paid for, regardless of the sovereignty of the country from which they come. Generally speaking, raw materials are sold to the highest bidder, regardless of nationality. Thus the United States, which has no rubber, nevertheless consumes one-third of the world output, although that output is largely in British hands. Similarly, the British textile industry consumes most of the American output of cotton, and Canada sells more to the United States than she does to Great Britain.

The "mother country" has not always found unlimited importation of colonial goods convenient. England does not by any means admit all Empire raw materials free. The Philippines, annexed by the United States partly because they were rich in certain tropical raw materials, were subsequently dis-annexed partly because of the "glut" of raw materials and the impossibility of excluding Philippine imports so long as the islands were part of the Union. Italy, having conquered Ethiopia "for her raw materials," found it necessary to limit imports of hides and coffee to 20% and 30% respectively of total Ethiopian exports of these commodities!¹⁰

Putting the "raw materials" argument in a nutshell, so long as free trade prevails it is of the slightest possible importance which flag floats over the territories producing raw materials. We have admitted above that colonial preference for products of the homeland may give some slight advantage in the terms of trade to the mother country, so that other countries must pay slightly more for those raw materials; but this is all. When on the other hand there is serious discrimination against the products of countries other than the motherland, in the form of tariffs, quotas, and exchange control,

¹⁰ Jean Albert, *op. cit.* Of course, desire to increase the supply of foreign exchange was at least as important as desire for protection in this legislation.

then those other countries will find it extremely difficult to buy the necessary raw materials. They can still buy them; but to get the foreign exchange with which to do so they must sell their own products to the world; and if sales are limited by trade restrictions, the price of raw materials in terms of domestic land, labor, and capital may be prohibitive. *Under these conditions*—and they are the conditions that actually exist—*the unequal distribution of raw materials among various political units is a serious handicap to the "have-nots."*

Dr. Schacht and Dr. Funk know very well that in order to get raw materials one has only to pay the price. Accordingly, they put their argument in subtle terms. Germany cannot, they say, get the necessary foreign exchange to buy raw materials because of the discrimination against German exports. They must, therefore, have colonies *in which the German currency will circulate*. This argument, which sounds plausible, serves to hide the real truth.

In the first place, it should be clearly understood that if Germany were willing to depress prices or the external value of the mark sufficiently, her raw-materials problem would be solved. For in either case, since German goods would be made cheaper to foreigners, German exports would increase and the foreign exchange needed to buy raw materials would thereby become available. The policy of reducing German prices was tried by Brüning in 1931-32, not altogether without success; but the process was too painful for the public taste. The policy of depreciating the mark was thought to be impossible for the following reasons:

(1) Currency depreciation was associated with uncontrolled inflation, because of post-war experience. Thus a policy of devaluation would be politically difficult and would lead to a "flight of capital"; that is, a conversion of the assets held by German investors into foreign holdings, such as foreign securities or deposits in foreign banks. "Flight of capital" would be likely to involve difficulties for the German banks from which deposits were being withdrawn and would tend to depress German security markets as nervous investors dumped their holdings on the markets.

(2) Substantial amounts were due in terms of foreign currencies, such as reparations; thus depreciation of the mark would increase the debt in terms of marks.

(3) Devaluation would increase the price in marks of raw materials, and decrease the amount of foreign exchange obtained *per unit* of exports.

The possession of colonies does not alter these arguments; and we must conclude that Germany would find it undesirable to depress prices or depreciate the mark even if she had colonies in which marks circulated.

Let us suppose that Britain hands over to Germany certain colonies, and that shillings are replaced with marks. The change in sovereignty will not change the tastes of the colonials. If they formerly bought English ale in preference to German beer, they will continue to do so. To pay for the English ale, they must convert their new German marks into shillings. This process of selling marks and buying shillings will lead to a fall in the value of the mark in terms of shillings (and so in terms of other currencies). But this, we have seen, is precisely what Germany could not permit. How to prevent it? There is only one way: by preventing the colonials from buying British or other non-German goods.

It is quite possible that German supervision would increase the productivity of the colonies; and with an increase in income, the colonials might be inclined to buy more German—as well as other—goods. Certainly, if Germany took over the colonies, she could remove existing restrictions on German imports. But to prevent a fall in the mark when marks were circulated in the colonies, it is not enough that the colonials buy more German goods. They must not buy *any* substantial amounts of any other kinds of goods. The increased productivity and removal of restrictions on German exports have nothing to do with circulating marks in the colonies. *The Schacht-Funk argument really boils down to this: we must have colonies, because then we can force the colonials to buy only German goods.*¹¹

¹¹ The German demand for colonies is sometimes countered by showing the small part played by the colonies in Germany's pre-war trade and investment. Here, however, we must agree with Schacht. Before the war the prevalence of free trade made development of the colonies unnecessary. Now the situation is entirely different, and it seems probable that Germany would develop any colonies she possessed as much as possible. What the possibilities of the old German colonies are is another question.

It would be fruitless to deny that the demands for colonies are tempered by fear of war. The very fact that the "have-nots" have emphasized their need for colonies rather than asking for trade concessions suggests that war was in their minds. Whatever hope there might be for free trade under normal conditions, it is fantastic to expect free trade during war.

The conclusions reached in this section can now be summarized. Population pressure and lack of outlets for investment seem to be of secondary importance in post-war international conflict. On the other hand, Germany, Italy, and Japan are relatively deficient in basic raw materials and foodstuffs. Since the period following the war has been one of increasingly severe restrictions on international trade, it seems highly probable that lack of access to markets and the accompanying inability to buy raw materials have worked real hardships on these three countries. It is against this background that the economic war since 1918 emerges in its most significant form.

Versailles and After

The truth is that we have got our way. We have got most of the things we set out to get. The German navy has been handed over, the German mercantile shipping has been handed over, and the German colonies have been given up. One of our chief trade competitors has been most seriously crippled, and our Allies are about to become her biggest creditors. That is no small achievement.—Lloyd George with respect to the Versailles Treaty, reported in Lord Riddell's *Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 1918-1923* (Reynal, 1934).

Whether or not Germany's economic welfare was seriously impaired by loss of her "Overseas Empire" is, perhaps, debatable. That her losses in general under the treaty were a crushing blow to the German economy, especially in a world of increasing restriction on international trade, can scarcely be questioned. Among the more important cessions to the Allies were the following:

- (1) All merchant vessels over 1600 tons, half of the vessels between 1000 and 1600 tons, one-quarter of her smaller vessels.
- (2) "All her rights and titles over her overseas possessions."
- (3) Areas containing about one-third of her coal, about three-

fourths of her iron ore, nearly two-thirds of her zinc, over a quarter of her lead, about one-tenth of her factories.

(4) Agricultural areas containing about 15% of her arable land, 12.4% of her oxen and cow stock, 12.5% of her pigs, 10.7% of her forests, 16.7% of her cereals.

(5) Five thousand railway locomotives and 150,000 cars; a giant crane in Kiel; certain chemical patent rights; all German investments in Allied countries, including the Dominions, and French and British colonies.

In addition, Germany agreed to deliver to France thousands of livestock animals, hundreds of thousands of tons of coal-tar, benzol, sulfate of ammonia, and to deliver *annually* for ten years 7,000,000 tons of coal to France, 8,000,000 to Belgium, and to Italy an amount increasing from 4,500,000 to 8,500,000 tons over a six-year period. Last, but not least, Germany was to pay "the entire cost of the war" in reparations. Small wonder that Germany regarded the treaty as a national disaster for her! Even if free trade had prevailed, so that the actual locale of raw materials would have been of slight importance, the German losses were heavy enough; in face of the actual restrictions placed upon German exports by the protective policies of her (former) enemies, the treaty was calamitous. And is it too much to surmise that governments capable of imposing so severe a treaty were also capable of imposing trade barriers for the precise purpose of exploiting to the full their newly won relative trade advantage over Germany?

The treaty, besides the despoliation of Germany, contained another seed of discontent which was later to bear fruit. Italy was inveigled into the war on the side of the Allies by two treaties (London and St. Jean de Maurienne) in which she was promised a substantial slice of the German colonies, which would provide population outlets and raw-materials supplies, in case of an Allied victory. In fact, Italy received only about one twenty-fifth as much territory as England and France each got, and much of that territory was desert or fever-ridden. The feeling that she was cheated at Versailles lent added vigor to the Italian colonial demands during the years following the war.¹²

¹² Cf. "Business and Financial Report of the Fascist Confederation of Industrialists," *Monthly Survey*, December 1, 1935.

Reparations. The highly debatable character of Germany's "war guilt," the gross exaggeration of actual Allied losses, the equally exaggerated estimates of "Germany's capacity to pay" in the sense of possible excess of domestic production over domestic consumption—these factors in the reparations controversy are of secondary significance. The single, all-important fact about reparations is this: Germany could pay only by means of an export surplus, and her creditors prevented her from paying by erecting barriers against German imports.

It is essential to be clear on this point. The payment of reparations involved two sets of problems, one internal and one external. First of all, the German government had to obtain a surplus of revenue over expenditures. Since its ability to borrow internally was virtually exhausted by the end of the war, the internal problem could be met only by an excess of taxation over expenditures. In this way a sum would be made available in *marks* for payment of reparations.

The Allies, naturally, would not accept payment in marks. Thus Germany was faced with the "external" problem of converting her surplus of marks into foreign currencies. She could pay in gold, the international money; but unfortunately the total German gold supply in 1918 was only a small fraction of the amount due in the first installment of reparations. She could pay by transferring foreign balances; but to have foreign balances a country must sell more than she buys. She could buy foreign currency on the open market with marks; but in the process, since the supply of marks and the demand for foreign exchange is thereby increased, the German mark would depreciate in terms of other currencies. This depreciation would almost certainly have led to a "flight of capital." Assuming all other trade relations to balance, the pouring of German marks into the world market in exchange for other currencies would result in so rapid a drop in the value of the mark that the reparations might never be paid in any case; each drop in the mark would merely increase the size of the amount due in terms of marks.

Thus the "external problem" boils down to this: Germany had to have a favorable balance of trade. By selling more than she bought in the world market, Germany could build up foreign balances to be transferred in payment of reparations. Foreign balances are the



property of private German citizens, not of the German government. Germany would use her tax revenue to buy foreign balances from her own citizens, and use the foreign balances to pay reparations.

Before the war Germany had an "unfavorable" balance of trade, made possible by income from foreign investments equal to the import surplus. We have seen that German foreign investments were wiped out by the treaty, leaving Germany's balance of payments still more unfavorable. Thus a radical revision of Germany's trade relations was necessary if she were to make any attempt to pay. Either imports had to be drastically cut, or exports had to be drastically increased, or both. Germany tried both. The problem was made more difficult by the mere fact that any increase in the supplies of German goods on the world markets would automatically reduce their price, and so increase the total amount of goods that must be sold in order to obtain a given amount of foreign exchange. Much more serious, Germany's creditors "refused" payment by refusing to admit the German goods which were the only means by which Germany could effect payment. Thus Germany was compelled to restrict her own imports still more; and right here is one of the origins of the German self-sufficiency program.

It soon became evident that Germany could not pay under the conditions that existed after 1918—unless she borrowed the money to do so. To the extent that foreign funds flowed into Germany, Germany could pay reparations without a favorable balance of trade. In fact, this is precisely what happened. Up to 1924, Germany did make an attempt to pay; and succeeded in transferring between 10,027 millions (estimate of the Reparation Commission) and 56,577 millions (estimate of the German Government) gold marks; of which only 2.3 millions were transferred in cash, (according to both). If we take a figure midway between the German and the Reparation Commission estimates—which is probably still an overestimate—we see that Germany paid up to 1924 roughly 33 billions; not an insignificant sum. The great bulk of the payments, however, was in a form that could not be repeated: ceded properties of the Reich and German private interests, railway materials, coal and coke,

etc. Once the post-war depression began, the Allies refused payment in kind.

According to the London agreement of May, 1921, Germany should have paid approximately three billions a year after that date. It was seen immediately that Germany would not be able to meet these obligations. The difficulties of transfer were enhanced by imposition of a tax of 26 per cent on all German imports by the French and British governments. In 1923 the British government was prepared to cut the German reparations in half; but the French had other ideas. In the hope of enforcing payments, French troops were sent into the Ruhr. Then came the "passive resistance," a sort of general sit-down strike by labor and capital both, with the German government providing incomes for her citizens in the Ruhr through inflation. This last wave of German inflation reached astronomical figures (prices rose to 1,261,600,000,000 times their 1913 level), and led to complete breakdown of the monetary system, and general economic chaos. France capitulated, and Germany sat down with the Allies in 1924 and 1925 to work out the "Dawes Plan."

The Dawes Plan was the first of a series of agreements by which the Allies reduced Germany's reparations obligations and at the same time made loans to the German government and to German industry in order to increase her ability to pay. Between 1924 and 1931 Germany met her obligations, paying altogether some 11,096 millions of marks. In the same period, she borrowed 18,200 millions from abroad. It would not be quite fair to say that the Allies paid their own reparations by lending Germany the money to make payments. The great bulk of foreign loans were not made directly to the German government, but to German industries and municipalities. The "internal" problem of getting a surplus of marks available for reparations payments remained. The loans helped solve this problem by making possible economic stabilization, and by increasing the German national income by expanding industry, thus increasing the Government's capacity to tax and to borrow internally. Actually, of the years between 1924 and 1931, only in 1925 was there a budget surplus in Germany; but the return of confidence in the Government's fiscal situation and the improvement in general economic conditions made it possible for the Government to borrow internally

again. Much more important, foreign loans meant that dollars, pounds, and francs were being offered in exchange for German securities, which increased the amount of foreign exchange available to the Government. The "balance of payments" of any country equals (Imports) — (Exports + Net Capital Inflow). Thus the loans from abroad solved Germany's "external" problem, and made it possible for her to transfer her available marks to her creditors in a form her creditors would accept. Since the Allies refused payment in German goods of the types also produced by Allied concerns, it seems impossible that Germany could have paid without these foreign loans.

The international financial crisis of 1931 led to a drain of gold and foreign exchange from the Reichsbank, which threatened new financial collapse in Germany. Accordingly, in July President Hoover announced his plan for a one-year debt moratorium, which was approved by the American Congress and by Germany's creditors—who were heavily in debt to the United States and so quite ready to consider a postponement of all international debt payments. In January, 1932, Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, and Japan met at Lausanne. There Germany's total reparation obligations were reduced to a mere three billion gold marks, in the form of bonds bearing 5% interest and amortized through a 1% sinking fund. Moreover, these bonds were not to be offered for sale by the Bank of International Settlements until 1935, so that Germany would have no payments to make in the meantime; and even then were not to be offered in their entirety unless the bank saw fit.

Thus, in effect, the Allies gave up trying to make Germany pay for the last war shortly before the War of 1939 began, having discovered that their own vested interests prevented them from accepting payments in the one form in which Germany could possibly hope to pay—goods. Will they prove that they have learned the lesson which this experience so clearly teaches, in the event of another victory over Germany?

Inter-Allied Debts. The problems involved in the debts of the Allies to the United States are closely related to the reparations problem, and the analysis is essentially the same. Here, too, the significant

fact is that the creditor refused payment in the only possible form—goods and services.

Altogether, the United States lent 10.4 billion dollars to the Allies. The money was raised through sale of Liberty Bonds, and used to pay American producers for supplies sold to the Allies. No "transfer" problem was involved in the contraction of the debt; the American government merely borrowed money from American businessmen and paid it back to them to cover purchases by the Allies. It is worth noting at once that unlike peacetime loans, which are used in "productive" ventures which increase the income and thus the ability to repay of the borrower, these wartime loans were used entirely for destruction. Another irony: over 3 billions of the total loans were made after the Armistice, to enable American business to complete contracts which no longer had any immediate purpose, except to protect the profits of American investors!

The problem of war-debt payment is exactly the same as that of reparations payment. It is not enough for the debtors to have budget surpluses; they must also have a way of transferring the surplus. To do so, they must ship gold, acquire foreign balances, or float new loans to pay war debts. The total amount of gold outside the United States was considerably less than the total debt; which meant that the only way in which the debt could be paid with gold would be for the debtors to use the same gold over and over again. That is, the debtors would have to have favorable balances of trade, so that the gold shipped to pay war debts would continually flow back in payment of trade balances. Similarly, in order to acquire foreign balances, the debtors must have a favorable trade balance; both means of payment come to the same thing.

Since the real loss to America was the goods and services that might have been consumed here instead of abroad, one would think that America would have been delighted to receive payment in goods and services; in other words, to permit a so-called "unfavorable" balance of trade, which means that the nation is able to consume more than it produces. Increased importation of European goods, however, would injure the business of American producers of those goods; and these domestic producers proved sufficiently powerful politically not only to prevent increased imports, but to

bring about greater restriction of imports. In 1922 tariff schedules were raised almost throughout, and in 1930 the Smoot-Hawley tariff placed still higher barriers in the way of European imports. Thus, in effect, America "refused" payment by rejecting the goods and services which were the only possible medium of payment.

About one billion of the principal was repaid; and some two billions in interest. While these sums are small in comparison with the actual debt, their transfer nevertheless placed considerable strain on the gold reserves of the debtor countries, and helped to undermine the old international gold standard. Meanwhile, some of the interest payments were defaulted. By the time the attempt to collect war debts was (virtually) abandoned in the Lausanne agreement, the war debt had actually *increased*, by virtue of unpaid interest, to 11.5 billion dollars.¹³

The moral of this lesson is obvious enough. America ought not to provide goods for foreigners to consume unless she is willing to accept payment, now or later, in goods produced by foreigners.

¹³ It is worth reiterating that the sole loss to America through the Allies' failure to repay the war debts is the goods and services which might have been produced for domestic consumption with the resources used instead to provide goods and services for the Allies; or the equivalent amount of goods and services that the Allies might have exported to the United States to get foreign exchange to pay the debt. Even if the Allies had possessed enough gold to pay the debt, and had shipped it to America, it would have benefited America only if there were unemployment there. In that case, the Government could have used the funds transferred by Allied central banks to pay interest and principal on the Liberty Loans, instead of using internal revenue as they actually did. The Government could then have spent more on public works without raising taxation, or have reduced taxes without reducing expenditure. In the first case, the United States would be ahead by the value of the new public works. In the second, lower taxes would permit increased consumption and investment, leading to increased production and employment. In either case, there would be a rise in the standard of living corresponding to the monetary repayment of the debt, even without any increase in imports. On the other hand, if the debt were repaid in this manner during a boom, when full employment prevailed, public works could be expanded only at the expense of private enterprise, and vice versa. The gold could only be buried in Treasury vaults, as is the case with the 17 billions or so now in the possession of the United States Treasury—or, as we said before, it could be used to pay for an import surplus. Another way of presenting this argument would be to show that during a period of under-employment, the inflation made possible by an increase in gold reserves could lead to expansion of production and output; but with full employment could lead only to a rise in prices. The rise in prices would automatically produce an import surplus through retraction of foreign demand for American exports.

Otherwise she merely lowers her own standard of living.¹⁴ Apart from this, the history of the war debt is significant insofar as it helps to explain the international friction following the war. The American people had an idea that somehow or other they were being cheated. The European debtor nations resented the drain of gold to America and the accompanying financial difficulties, and the inability to sell on favorable terms in the American market; both effects being the result of American foreign trade policy. These conditions led directly to the competitive currency depreciation following 1931, which will be discussed below.

The Arsenal of Economic Warfare

The effort to obtain trade advantages and to foster home industries took many forms, some of them very subtle. There were, however, five or six weapons which were of particular importance. In this section, we shall describe these more important instruments of economic war and analyse their effects upon the user and upon the rest of the world.

1. Tariffs

The tariff is the oldest and best known of the current devices for fostering domestic industry "at the expense of the foreigner." Its effect is to raise the price at which an import must be sold if it is to yield a normal profit to both the importer and the foreign producer. In this way it makes possible an increased output on the part of domestic producers of the protected goods who would otherwise find their costs too high relative to the costs of foreign producers to sell more than they now do. It therefore increases the incomes on domestic producers at the expense of domestic consumers and import firms. The real loss through tariffs, however, is in the uneconomic distribution of world resources that they make possible. To comprehend the reduction in standard of living resulting from imposition of tariffs, one has only to visualize the effects of imposing

¹⁴ This argument applies strictly only when there is full employment. Otherwise, through the operation of the "foreign trade multiplier" the expansion of the export industries may have secondary effects so important that the national income rises by more than the value of the exports.

tariff barriers between the forty-eight States in this country in an attempt to make each State self-sufficient.

It is worth emphasizing that the advantages of free importation of goods are not dependent upon tariff reductions by other countries. Clearly, it is much better for us if we can sell abroad on more favorable terms; but quite apart from that, it is always more sensible to import anything that can be bought from abroad with less expenditure of land, labor, and capital than it would take to produce it at home. One plausible excuse for retaining a tariff would be to use it as a bargaining weapon for getting trade concessions from others, a policy followed with no little success by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in recent years. Also, the case for unilateral tariff reduction is less clear when there is widespread unemployment at home.

Since 1913, the trend has been almost universally towards higher tariffs. Protectionism got its impetus during the war, and was continued for purposes of "reconstruction." From 1925 to 1929, a period of recovery in most countries, the protectionist movement continued almost without abatement, but was disguised by generally rising prices, production, and volume of international trade. Since 1931, the tariff war has taken on a new aspect. First, other forms of import restrictions, such as quotas and exchange control, have increased greatly in relative importance. Second, there has been a tendency towards formation of trade areas or units, such as the British and French Empires, within which some liberation of trade has taken place, while restrictions on trade outside the unit have been tightened. (This policy, of course, provoked still louder cries for colonies on the part of the "have-nots.") Third, the United States has embarked upon a policy of bilateral trade agreements which has been the most important single reversal of trend.

A few random figures will suffice to illustrate the marked tendency towards protectionism after 1913.

I. GERMAN DUTIES, AS % OF PRICES

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>Duty in marks per ton</i>					
	<i>1913</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1931</i>	<i>1913</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1931</i>
Wheat	38.0	29.0	212.0	55	65	250
Flour	45.0	49.0	326.0	102	145	430
Butter	8.2	7.9				

Worsted	1.5	2.4	3.6
Rolled iron	25.0-50.0	26.0-78.0	27.2-81.6
Gasoline	8.7-13.0	35.8	163.0
Shoes	6.1- 9.1	7.5-16.0	10.3-51.0
Tires	6.7	21.0-26.2	24.6-30.8
Silk stockings . .	16.6	57.0-64.0	82.0-91.0

It should be noticed that in some cases, such as wheat, the duty *as a percentage of price* shows a decline from 1913 to 1927, even though the *actual* duty was raised. The reason for the discrepancy is, of course, that prices rose strongly during the interval, chiefly during the war period itself. Similarly, part of the rise in the 1931 percentage figures is explained by the drop of prices after 1929.

II. FRENCH DUTIES, AS % OF PRICES

Commodity	1913	1927	1931
Wheat	34.5	23.0	180.0
Flour	39.0-57.0	42.0-56.0	160.0
Wine	51.1	44.0-88.0	59.0-118.0
Raw cotton yarn	3.7-83.0	4.9-130.0	6.9-185.0
Pig iron	18.3	10.2-25.5	12.0-25.0
Cellulose	11.1-22.2	11.0-22.0	11.0-22.0
Silk stockings . .	10.8-21.6	31.0-62.0	44.0-88.0
Printing paper . .	28.3	34.0	45.0
Motor cars	5.5-11.0	45.0	44.0-86.0

III. ITALIAN DUTIES, AS % OF PRICES

Commodity	1913	1927	1931
Wheat	41.5	27.0	144.0
Flour	41.0	40.0	186.0
Wine	48.0	37.0-61.0	37.4-62.0
Raw cotton yarn	4.4-15.0	3.3-34.0	5.3-54.0
Pig iron	13.2	28.0-41.0	33.0-48.0
Gasoline	57.0	115.0	360.0
Shoes	8.2	7.7-27.0	10.7-37.5
Motor cars	1.8-5.4	45.0-55.0	137.0
Tires	6.0	21.0	40.0

In the case of Britain, this sort of comparison is difficult, because

before the war Britain was essentially a free-trade country. In 1915, two sets of tariffs were introduced that have stood ever since: the McKenna duties, of 33.3% of the value of certain "luxury" goods, and the "specific industries duties" of 33.3% to 50% on goods which previously came from Germany and which it was now necessary to develop at home. The import of dyes, essentially a German product, was prohibited altogether for ten years following 1921. In 1923-25 new duties were added, ostensibly in retaliation of "unfair competition" and dumping. The Ottawa agreements of 1932 had the effect of combining the Empire into a relatively free-trade area and cutting it off more sharply from the rest of the world. It is worth noting that France followed Britain's example in this respect.

The following table will serve as a summary of our results so far:

IV. GENERAL TARIFF LEVELS IN EUROPE

<i>Country</i>	<i>1913</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1931</i>	<i>1927 as % of 1913</i>	<i>1931 as % of 1913</i>
Germany	16.7	20.4	40.7	122.0	244
France	23.6	23.0	38.0	97.5	160
Italy	24.8	27.8	48.3	112.0	195

As we have shown in the first section, rising tariffs mean reduced exports and thus increased difficulty in paying for necessary imports. Accordingly, high tariffs were particularly damaging to the "have-nots," who had no Empire with which to make agreements of the "Ottawa" type. Table IV, above, indicates that Germany's tariffs were relatively low. The discrimination against Germany and the consequent international friction are more clearly indicated by figures of tariffs on essential exports of the countries concerned:

V. TARIFF LEVELS AGAINST IMPORTANT GERMAN EXPORTS

("A" are agrarian products, "B" are semi-manufactured goods, "C" are finished goods)

<i>Country</i>	<i>A</i>			<i>B</i>		
	<i>1913</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1931</i>	<i>1913</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1931</i>
England ..						
France ..	49.5-56.0	23.3-27.7	121.0-132.0	16.3-24.6	8.7-14.5	9.0-15.5
Italy				12.8-17.3	18.9-39.0	26.8-55.0

C

<i>Country</i>	<i>1913</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1931</i>
England ..	free	32.7-35.0	31.5-39.0
France ...	12.0-18.2	20.6-42.0	22.5-50.0
Italy	12.7-14.4	22.2-31.0	29.5-45.0

VI. TARIFF LEVELS AGAINST FRENCH EXPORTS

Country	A			B		
	1913	1927	1931	1913	1927	1931
Belgium ..				7.2-8.3	9.9-13.1	9.1-14.0
Gt. Britain				free	33.3	33.3
Germany .	31.0-35.0	26.0-35.3	30.3-34.3	11.2-22.0	12.0-24.1	13.4-26.6

C		
Country	1913	1927
Belgium ..	9.1-10.4	12.6-19.2
Gt. Britain	free	42.3
Germany .		52.0

VII. TARIFF LEVELS AGAINST ENGLISH EXPORTS

B		
Country	1913	1927
Germany .	12.0-16.7	9.0-15.0
France ...	12.3-32.3	8.8-27.3
Belgium .	4.6-8.3	2.6-5.2

These figures are from Liepmann's "Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of Europe." Where there are blanks, the implication is not that there were no tariffs, but rather that it was impossible to make a satisfactory estimate.

The discrimination did not end with 1931. Quite apart from the development of Empire trade, England and France adopted tariff measures which, according to Dr. Schacht, were "specifically directed against Germany" or "calculated materially to obstruct exportation from Germany."¹⁵ Here are a few examples:

Great Britain:

December, 1931: Duty of 50% *ad valorem* on numerous finished goods

March, 1932: Duty of 10% on almost all imported goods

February, 1933: Raising of duty on iron and steel wire

April, 1934: Raising of duty on electric arc-light carbons

May, 1934: Raising of duty on glassware

France:

April, 1932: Raising of turnover tax on imports

1933: Other tariff engagements cancelled and duties on various German exports raised

Spring, 1934: More tariff engagements cancelled and duties raised on German exports

It is possible that the degree of discrimination against Germany has

¹⁵ Address before International Conference for Agrarian Science at Bad Eilsen, 1934.

been exaggerated in the German mind. So far as international friction is concerned, however, there was sufficient evidence of discrimination for the German government to make out a good case to its own people.

2. *Quotas*

The quota system originated in France in May 1931, chiefly to give protection to French agriculture. From 1927 to 1931 the French balance of trade grew increasingly unfavorable, food imports showing a marked growth. Agricultural interests began to protest that even the already high tariff wall was not adequate to protect them from the "flood of imports." Theoretically, the situation could have been met by raising tariffs still higher. However, during the 'twenties the tendency was to fix tariff rates by mutual agreements with the countries concerned. Upward revision of the rates would therefore have involved tedious negotiation of new agreements, with higher rates against French exports. Moreover, it was felt that during a period of rapidly falling prices, such as that following 1929, no politically possible tariff would keep out foreign products and maintain French prices; every time the price at which foreign goods were offered fell, the tariff would have to be raised. Better to limit imports once and for all. Finally, there is evidence that some French politicians actually believed that whereas tariffs tended to raise prices to the French consumer, a quota would not have that undesirable effect.¹⁶

By the end of 1931, the quota system had been extended to most food products which were produced in France. During 1932, it was applied also to manufactured goods. By the beginning of 1934, some 3,000 articles or classes of goods were subject to quotas. In March, 1934, certain raw materials were also brought into the system.

At first the quotas applied to the whole world, merely stating the total amount that could be imported within a given period, usually three months. With the announcement of these "global quotas," there was a rush to the French border with the commodity in ques-

¹⁶ Cf. Heinrich Heuser, *Control of International Trade*, Routledge, London, 1939, p. 53.

tion. Such a system clearly gave advantages to foreign producers who happened to be nearest to the border. It also resulted in heavy importations within a short period, leading to disorganization of the French markets, much to the disadvantage of the French producer. Because of the lag in reporting the volume of imports, the quota was usually exceeded by the time the period was over. In the last quarter of 1931 the cattle quota was exceeded by 66%, pigs by 100%. Imports of a certain type of glue in the first quarter of 1932 were 20,888 quintals, while the quota was only 4,460 quintals.¹⁷ The result of these excesses of imports over quotas was that the borders were closed completely for the succeeding period, thus cutting off altogether the business of French import firms.

To overcome these difficulties, the system of apportioning imports among the various producing countries was adopted. The division was usually based upon the share in imports over some previous period. This system may result in unfair and uneconomic distribution of import quotas because of peculiar conditions existing in certain countries during a base year. For example, one country found its share of the quota on live animals very small for the simple reason that in one of the base years its exports had been abnormally reduced by sanitary precautions of the importing country. Also, this system provides no basis for adjustment to changing conditions of demand for and supply of the commodity in question, whether the changes take place in the exporting or in the importing country. A tariff system, bad though it may be, still permits some adjustment to such dynamic changes.

The problem arises of apportioning the import rights among certain importing or exporting firms. This task has usually been left to groups of business men dealing in the commodity concerned. The possession of a licence puts the importer or exporter concerned in a monopolistic position. The French import price of Gorgonzola cheese fell from 9.50 lire per kilo when the Italian exporter held the licence, to 3.50 when the French importer held the licence. A tariff never permits a complete monopoly of domestic sales, even if domestic producers combine, since the domestic price cannot be raised

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

above the foreign price plus tariff. An import quota, however, makes the domestic price entirely independent of the foreign price—except, of course, that the importer will not sell at a price lower than that which he must pay the foreign producer to supply the amount permitted by the quota. Thus quotas greatly facilitate formation of strong producers' monopolies, which is nice for the producers but hard on the public.

The monopoly profits arising out of possession of licences are indicated by the price importers are willing to pay for licences. One Swiss fruit importer who had no licence paid the owner of a permit 4,000-6,000 francs annually for the import rights, so that the holder of the permit found that he could retire comfortably. In Italy a highly organized market for licences developed. Often the holder of a permit would hold it for higher bids, so that the licences were not fully used during the period.

The introduction of quotas in France led to reprisals by other countries. The first to retaliate was Italy, in December, 1931. Quotas were imposed on items of comparatively little importance in Italy's domestic production, but liable to affect French exports adversely: wines, liqueurs, perfumes, soaps, etc., from France. The French replied with quotas against Italian fruit and vegetables in July, 1932. In the same month, Italy added automobiles, clothing, and certain luxury goods to her list. In June, 1933, France reduced the quotas for Italian meat and cheese, and within a week Italy retaliated with restrictions on French cotton yarn, lace, machinery, and other products. Japan imposed quota restrictions in December, 1931; Great Britain in January, 1933; United States in January, 1934; Germany in January, 1934; British colonies in August, 1934. Thus any relative advantage that France may have gained by import quotas quickly disappeared.

There can be little doubt that on the whole import quotas reduced trade more than mere tariff policy could have done. It is also clear that import quotas raise prices above the level that would rule in their absence. In a period of generally falling prices, this effect shows as a relatively small decline in prices of the import-quota countries, even as compared with exchange-control countries:

PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS IN VALUE OF COST OF LIVING INDICES,
1929-1934

<i>Quota Countries</i>		<i>Exchange Control</i>	<i>"Free" Countries</i>		
France	7%	Germany . . .	21.4%	England	47%
Italy	21.5	Hungary . . .	47.0	U.S.A.	53
Belgium	20.7	Austria	25.0	Japan	68

Figures of general production do not give any clear-cut result as to the effects of import quotas on domestic output. There are some cases where the quota seems to have resulted in substantial increases in domestic production, such as French butter. French radio manufacturers added 3,000 employees in one year after the introduction of quota restrictions in January, 1932. Since that year was one of generally deepening depression, it is fair to assume that this increase resulted largely from the quota. Against these increases in output of protected commodities must be weighed the reduction in output of export goods owing to retaliatory measures by other countries. Not only the limitation of imports, but the increased uncertainty in view of the possibility of sudden change in quota allowances, tends to discourage production for export.

The effect of quotas on the balance of trade is likewise difficult to determine statistically, since the institution of quota schemes was far from being the only development of importance after 1931. France succeeded in reversing the trend in agricultural imports after 1931, but agricultural exports fell to just about the same degree. The French balance of trade in general, it is true, became much less unfavorable after 1931. In the case of Italy, the balance of trade became more and more unfavorable right up to 1935, when it was still considerably more unfavorable than in 1931.

On the whole, it seems likely that retaliatory action has prevented any one country from getting very much benefit from a system of import quotas. The chief effect of the system has been a reduction in the total volume of world trade.

3. *Exchange Control*

Isolated instances of exchange control can be found in the nineteenth century, and it became a general practice during the World War. Only since 1931, however, has it become a major weapon of

economic warfare. Germany adopted it in that year. Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Hungary followed in January, 1932, and Austria in May, 1932. Since then Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia have followed suit. With the outbreak of war, those belligerents who previously had no exchange control introduced it in some form or another.

Exchange control fixes the amount of foreign exchange made available for the purchase of foreign goods and securities. Foreign exchange is normally purchased from banks. The banks get it through transfers made by foreigners in payment for goods or securities bought from the country concerned, or by themselves transferring balances to foreign banks to buy foreign exchange. Thus exchange control involves fixing the total value of foreign bills of exchange that can be sold by the banks in a given period. Either all banks must sell their gold and foreign exchange to the central bank, or a limited number of them can deal in foreign exchange under governmental supervision and control.

In general, the purpose of exchange control is to maintain the value of the currency. It was undertaken only by countries who wanted to stay on the gold standard at the old rate. The reasons for doing so rather than devaluing have been discussed above. In some cases, such as Germany and Austria, the gold reserves were so low by 1931 that some sort of control was necessary if the currency was to remain stable. In other cases, such as Denmark, Latvia, and Finland, exchange control was introduced with gold reserves over 50% of note circulation. Here there was no danger of exhaustion of gold reserves; and exchange control seems to have been introduced to give protection to certain industries under the guise of protecting the value of the currency.

There is no need for exchange control unless the balance of payments is unfavorable; for only then will demand for foreign exchange exceed the supply at the current rate, tending to force up its value in terms of the domestic currency. An unfavorable balance of payments may result from an import surplus; or, if exports balance imports, it may result from a "flight of capital." Exchange control may be used to check either an unfavorable trade balance, as was the case with Denmark, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or it may be

used to check a flight of capital, as was originally the case with Germany. Sooner or later all countries instituting exchange control used it to check imports—if for no other reason than that it is possible to disguise capital transfers as imports by applying for more foreign exchange than is actually needed for payment.

Centralization and monopolization of the supplies of foreign exchange were not the only devices used to control purchases. The export of actual currency had also to be restricted; otherwise people wanting to convert domestic into foreign holdings would withdraw notes from the banks, send them across the border, and there exchange them for foreign currencies. Purchase of foreign securities has been absolutely forbidden by all countries introducing exchange control. The withdrawal of foreign short-term credits has also been restricted. To prevent transfers of capital by “selling” interests to foreigners against whom there were less severe restrictions, all transactions between citizens and foreigners had to be regulated. The proceeds of sales by foreigners of, say, German property were designated by the German authorities as “blocked accounts”; that is, the funds could not be transferred to the country of the seller, but had to be spent in Germany. Repayments of loans from foreigners received similar treatment in some cases. In addition to these limitations of demand for foreign exchange, there were various devices for increasing the supply of foreign exchange. Individuals as well as banks were forced to deliver all supplies of foreign exchange to the central banks. Germany and Italy even went so far as to appropriate foreign securities and otherwise to enforce “repatriation” of capital.

The general effect of exchange control is to keep the price of foreign currencies artificially low. The demand for foreign exchange persistently exceeds the supply of it at the official price. Under such conditions, evasion is inevitable. A “black bourse” where foreign exchange in excess of the amounts made available by the central bank can be bought illegally at high prices has made its appearance in every country where exchange control has played a significant part. The smuggling of notes across borders cannot be entirely prevented. Foreign securities are still being sold to exchange-control countries—although in greatly reduced proportions. Imports nearly

always exceed in value the amount of exchange officially allotted for them.

Prevention of evasion is not the only administrative difficulty. The decision as to how the available exchange shall be distributed—among commodities, among firms, and among sources of supply—is a weighty one. In most countries some attempt to rank commodities in order of “necessity” has been made. Nearly all countries also discriminate according to source of supply; exchange control is an excellent weapon for the purpose of damaging the export trade of particular countries. The problem of the “base year” in apportioning exchange among either goods or countries presents the same difficulties as in the case of the import quota.

The exchange clearing system, which Heuser calls “a limited reversion to common sense,” grew up out of such administrative difficulties. Essentially, “clearings” were a device for organizing payments for imports in such a way that funds used to pay for imports could be used immediately by foreigners to pay for exports. Sometimes sums due domestic exporters were “blocked” at the same time that domestic importers were unable to obtain enough foreign exchange to pay for goods received. Under such conditions, it seemed natural to use the amounts due domestic exporters to pay off the foreign exporters. In other cases, it was found that two countries were restricting each other’s imports because of a shortage of exchange, and arrangements were made for direct exchange of goods and cancellation of debts.

The imposition of exchange control usually led in the short run to an increase in imports. Fear of being unable to get foreign goods resulted in a rush to stock up on them as much as possible, as indicated by figures of inventories. In the long run, however, exchange control undoubtedly reduced imports. The extent to which applications for foreign exchange exceeded the amounts allowed is an indication of the degree of import restriction. In Germany, only about 20% of the demands for food and raw materials was satisfied. One Austrian egg importer applied for \$3,000 and received \$401

The influence of exchange control on prices and production is difficult to estimate statistically because in no case was it the sole factor operating. There seems little doubt that the limitations of im-

ports in general raised prices in general; reduced importations of some goods led to increased demands for substitutes and so to a rise in their prices. Where previously there was competition in the sale of imports, exchange control tended to set up monopolistic positions for importers. The table on page 164 above suggests that prices in exchange-control countries fell less on the average than in "free" countries—that is, countries relying largely on tariffs for control of international trade. Attempts at price-fixing, rationing of goods, and prohibition of trade in licenses to import did not succeed in preventing a price rise. There are a few clear cases of an increase in domestic production owing to the protection afforded by exchange control, such as Austrian textiles; but even here the original increase was not maintained. Restrictions on importation of raw materials prevented maintenance of output of finished goods. As the system was gradually extended to more and more commodities and prices of other commodities rose, the amount of income available for purchase of the protected commodities was reduced, and so demand fell off. Moreover, retaliation by other countries led to reduction of exports.

As in the case of quotas, it would seem that the net result of the system of exchange control as a whole was a further reduction in the volume of foreign trade. In the short run certain advantages may have been gained by the countries first introducing the system; but as the system spread to other countries and exports fell off these advantages disappeared. The general uncertainty which the system produced, in view of the day to day changes in allotments of foreign exchange for particular purposes, made foreign trade a risky business which few were willing to conduct on a large scale. On the whole, the system would seem to have deepened and prolonged the depression.

4. Currency Devaluation

The purpose of currency devaluation is to improve the balance of trade. If, for example, the value of the pound is reduced from \$5 to \$4, the price of a bottle of Scotch whiskey quoted at £1/0/0 falls accordingly for American buyers. At the same time, the price of a bottle of Bourbon quoted at \$3 rises from 12 shillings to 15 for

an Englishman. Thus the devaluation encourages purchases by foreigners and discourages purchases from foreigners.

When countries are on the gold standard, the relative values of their currencies are determined by the relative amounts of gold the currency units represent. The pre-war British pound represented 113. grains of pure gold, the American dollar 23.22; the exchange rate was \$4.86 for £1. Currency depreciation can be attained in two ways. One way is to depart from the gold standard, which means that gold is no longer shipped to cover foreign balances, and that the currency is allowed to fluctuate according to the demand for and supply of it. If the trade balance is unfavorable (and otherwise, why devalue?) the domestic currency will depreciate in terms of foreign currencies. Left to itself, the currency will depreciate until the trade balance is no longer unfavorable; that is, until the supply of foreign exchange equals the demand at the ruling rate. This method was adopted by all European participants in the World War, and by the "sterling bloc" after 1931.

The second method is to reduce the amount of gold which the currency unit represents. Provided other currencies continue to represent the same amount of gold, such a reduction of the gold content reduces the value of the currency in terms of other currencies. This device was employed by the United States in the spring of 1934, and by France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland in the fall of 1936.

Competitive devaluation has played so important a rôle in the economic war since 1918 that it is worth going into it in more detail and considering the reasons and effects of its use by the major countries that have tried this means of gaining trade advantages.

England. England's part in the history of currency depreciation is of especial significance. In order to conserve her gold reserves, she abandoned the gold standard immediately upon the outbreak of war in 1914, along with the other belligerent countries. When the war was over, the question of returning to the gold standard in order to lend stability to international finance came to the fore. Partly from a misguided sense of national honor, partly in order to give an impression of financial strength, partly out of consideration for bondholders, and partly from a desire to maintain the foreign exchange

value of debts owed by foreigners in terms of pounds, it was decided to return to gold at the old pre-war rate.

It is evident now that the choice of the old rate rather than a lower one was a disastrous mistake. At \$4.86 to the pound, English goods were simply too expensive for foreigners to buy; while foreign goods were relatively cheap for Englishmen to buy. The situation would have been remedied by a rise of foreign prices, especially American prices; but rapid improvement in technique prevented this development. It could have been remedied by a drop in English prices; and, indeed, English prices were under constant pressure. However, English costs proved to be extremely rigid. Wage rates could not be reduced because of strong opposition from trade unions whose leaders either did not know or did not care that lower wage rates would have made possible so great an increase in employment as to raise the total wage bill. Rents and interest tend to be fixed contractually and cannot be quickly revised. Consequently, no substantial cut in prices was possible if English businessmen were to make profits at all.

England never had a boom during the 'twenties. Unemployment continued at a high figure, trade was unfavorable, the exchange rate tended constantly towards the gold export point. Having expanded less than in other countries, domestic production contracted less than in other countries during the first year of depression. But deepening depression abroad had serious repercussions in England. Income from overseas investment fell off; exports were cut in half by 1931; shipping receipts were less than half their 1929 level in 1931. The drain on England's gold reserves imperilled the Gold Standard.

The danger was aggravated by the large amounts of "hot money" on deposit with the Bank of England by foreign central banks. A run on these deposits might threaten the very solvency of the bank. With the failure of the Credit-Anstalt and the subsequent runs on other continental banks, these deposits began to be withdrawn. When all German banks but the Reichsbank closed their doors, both Englishmen and foreigners who held assets in sterling began to fear for their safety. Could the Bank of England hold out? Would England be forced off the Gold Standard again? Uncertainty as to the answers led to a "flight from the pound," raising the rates on foreign

exchange to the gold point and leading to still further drains on gold. In September, 1931, the Bank of England rescinded its undertaking to pay gold on demand.

The pound fell rapidly. By December, 1931, it was down to \$3.37. A year later it stood at \$3.27. The pressure on England was relieved. True, the fall in the pound made raw-materials prices higher in terms of shillings; but the precipitous fall in agricultural prices and devaluation by the Dominions made prices in shillings lower than in 1929. There can be little doubt that the depreciation of the pound eased the British situation materially. With the English pound, certain allied currencies also depreciated, such as the Swedish krona and the Australian pound. There is good reason to suppose that the much-publicized recoveries of these two countries, insofar as they were owing to policy and not to extraneous factors such as rising prices of important exports, resulted largely from this depreciation in their currencies and consequent improvement of their export trade.¹⁸ The South African pound, the Canadian dollar, and the Japanese yen, also closely related to sterling, followed after short lags. Germany, while remaining officially on the gold standard, obtained much of the advantage of depreciation by setting up dozens of different kinds of marks which could be bought at varying prices below the price of the gold mark. As the devaluation spread, the relative advantage gained by England was of course wiped out.

United States. In the fall of 1932, partly owing to the action of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in making public the names of concerns to whom it was giving financial aid, a series of runs on American banks began. Before the panic was arrested by President Roosevelt's banking holiday of March 6 to 9, 1933, thousands of banks all over the country had failed, and nearly all had closed their doors at least temporarily. During the panic, the Federal Reserve Banks suffered a considerable drain on their reserves; the ratio of reserves to deposits fell from 65.6% in February to 45.1% in March. The American banking system was exposed to no serious danger so far as possible external pressure was concerned; but the President had plans for recovery which would be facilitated by departure from

¹⁸ Cf. the author's article "Planning for Recovery in Sweden and Australia," *Quar. Rev. of Commerce*, Vol. IV, Nos. 3, 4.

gold. The banking panic provided an excuse the public could accept. In June the United States went finally and completely off the gold standard. At the World Economic Conference meeting that same month, attempts at international currency stabilization were frustrated by the refusal of the President to co-operate. He was not yet ready for such stabilization.

In January, 1934, the dollar was fixed at 13.71 grains of fine gold; America had returned to the gold standard. The announced object of the devaluation was to restore the American price index to the 1926 level. This was to be accomplished in part by the improvement in foreign trade that would result from the depreciation of the dollar in terms of other currencies. In part it was to follow from the internal expansion which devaluation would permit. It is not clear that the expected internal result was obtained; it could be argued that the uncertainty resulting from devaluation and the accompanying N.R.A. codes led to an actual reduction in the flow of money income. It can scarcely be denied that the devaluation led to an improved trade balance, and to an unprecedented influx of gold.

Nor can it be seriously questioned that the American devaluation imposed new hardships on other countries, especially those still clinging hopefully to the old gold standard. The pound rose from \$3.42 in February, 1933, to \$5.04 in 1934. In the same period, the franc rose from 3.92 cents to 6.21 cents. The value of the mark also rose by nearly 100% in terms of cents. Prices of British, German, and French goods in terms of dollars rose accordingly, and exports to America were drastically reduced. True, Great Britain had a stabilization fund with which to buy dollars in an attempt to prevent an undue rise in the pound; but the United States also had a stabilization fund. In effect, Great Britain could maintain an artificially low value of the pound only with the assent of the American Treasury. In the last two years it was agreed to stabilize the pound at about \$4.90, until with the outbreak of the War of 1939 the pound was allowed to drop to \$4.00.

France. At the beginning of the first World War, the par value of the French franc was 19.3 cents. When France left the gold standard in 1914, the franc gradually fell to 16.5 cents in 1916, and then it was pegged at 17 cents with the aid of \$3,000,000,000 of loans from

the United States. When this artificial support was removed in 1919, the franc fell erratically until in 1926 it was worth only 2 cents. After the war, France had embarked upon a deluge of extravagant spending on the erroneous assumption that "Germany would pay for everything." Moreover, the wartime currency inflation was continued until at its peak in 1926, prices were over eight times their pre-war level. By 1926 it was clear that no gigantic sums were forthcoming from Germany, and in that year Poincaré succeeded in balancing the budget and calling a halt to the inflation. Consequently, the franc rose to nearly 4 cents, and remained there for two years, during which time the Treasury built up a surplus. In 1928, France returned to the gold standard with the franc at 3.92 cents.

The franc at this level was somewhat undervalued and France enjoyed two years of great prosperity. The contrast with England's situation, where the currency unit was overvalued, is striking. Even the crisis of 1929 did not immediately undermine the French economic situation. Not until well into 1931 was there any significant drop in French prices, output, or employment. But during that year the inevitable repercussions of world depression began to make themselves felt. In 1932 the French budget began to show deficits again. In itself an unbalanced budget is of no moment, and if it represents income-creating expenditures may even be a harbinger of returning prosperity; but in the French mind unbalanced budgets were associated with inflation, a falling franc, and instability. Confidence was shaken. Moreover, the Treasury's cash reserves had fallen to a very low level by 1932. As price levels in other countries dropped after 1929, French exports declined markedly and the highly important tourist trade fell off. With the wave of currency depreciation after 1931, the trade balance became still more unfavorable. Nervous investors began transferring their funds from France to other countries. The abandonment of the gold standard in 1933 by the United States gave temporary relief from this drain, since France was then the only gold-standard country still offering some degree of safety, and there was a repatriation of French capital and an inflow of foreign capital seeking some safe haven from monetary depreciation. In the long run, however, the devaluation of the dollar proved to be the death

blow to the French franc, since it meant a deterioration of the balance of trade with the United States. After the Stavisky scandal of 1934, the last shred of confidence in the French monetary stability was gone. Only the enormous gold reserves which had accumulated since 1928 enabled France to maintain the value of her currency so long. Flight of capital and drain of gold assumed serious proportions in 1934, 1935, and 1936. Finally, in September, 1936, France made the decision to devalue—a decision that had been seen to be unavoidable by economists, bankers, and investors for at least two years. The devaluation was accomplished in stages. The initial depreciation was from 6.6 to 4.6 cents. During the spring and summer of 1937 the franc was allowed to fall to 3.7 cents. Two years later it was down to 2.6 cents. The franc had succumbed to the pressure upon it; and its history bears out the thesis that measures to secure artificially favorable terms of trade on the part of one country lead inevitably to retaliation by other countries.

Italy. The history of the Italian lira conforms so closely to the pattern of the previous examples that we can dispose of it quickly. The process of stabilization was begun by Mussolini's first finance minister, Alberto de Stefani, who balanced the budget in 1923. The next step was to stop inflation and to reduce the note circulation to a level more closely aligned to the reserves behind it. The lira, which had been wavering at a level slightly over 4 cents, rose to slightly over 5 cents in 1927; and at this level it was stabilized in December, 1927—a level 27.25% of its pre-war value. Thus the depreciation was less than in the case of the French franc; like the British pound, the lira was overvalued. Consequently, exports fell off and painful internal adjustments of costs and prices were necessary. The world depression, falling foreign prices, and depreciation of other currencies led to drastic reductions in exports and a drain on reserves, particularly during 1934 and 1935. In October, 1936, Italy followed the example of France and devalued her currency. As a result of the American devaluation, the lira stood at 7.8 cents in September, 1936. It was reduced to 5.5 cents in October and to 5.2 cents in November, where it has stood since. Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland also devalued in the fall of 1936.

5. Production Control

Large-scale organization to control world output and world markets for basic commodities made its appearance before 1914. Since the war, however, such organization has become one of the most important characteristics of our economic system. Many of these monopolies and cartels are international in scope, so that at first sight they may not seem a proper topic for discussion under the heading "the arsenal of economic warfare." International distribution of control, however, does not mean that these gigantic concerns are operated for the benefit of the whole world. They are operated for the benefit of the stockholders. In general, their object has been to restrict output and competition in order to maintain monopolistic prices. High prices of raw materials are particularly damaging to countries that cannot afford to pay them; that is, countries which have relatively unfavorable markets for their finished goods. And not all these monopolies are truly international even in ownership. A complete description of all the control schemes in existence would fill a fat volume. All we can do here is mention some of the more significant schemes for control of raw materials, in order to give some picture of their rôle in economic warfare.

One of the most important of such organizations is the International Nickel Company. Operating the rich mines of northern Ontario, it controlled 92% of the world's nickel business in 1929. This percentage dropped during the depression, but is once more in the ascendant. In 1936 its board of directors consisted of 13 Americans, 7 Canadians, 5 Englishmen and Scotchmen. Shares were divided as follows: United States, 43%; Canada, 20%; Great Britain, 34%; others, 3.5%. Thus the concern is really International in name only. The nickel situation was clearly a cause for worry on the part of the "have-nots." Could there be any doubt as to what countries would get the nickel, so important for armaments, in the event of a new war?

A similar situation prevails with regard to copper. Copper is produced in four areas: United States, Canada, Chile, and Africa (Belgian Congo and Rhodesia). At the end of 1918 the first step towards world monopoly was taken; the Copper Export Association organ-

ized in the United States under the Webb-Pomerene Act, which had been passed expressly to permit combination in the export trade without running afoul of anti-trust laws. This Association formed a pool to withhold supplies from the market and so to maintain prices. By 1923 the war surplus was disposed of, and the pool broke up. In 1926 a new American combine formed, which included non-voting foreign associates and controlled 95% of the world output of refined copper. During the boom of the 'twenties this organization succeeded in virtually doubling the price of copper. After the crash, output was cut to about one-quarter of the 1929 level in order to bolster prices. The cartel was broken down by overexpansion and an American tariff which caused withdrawal of foreign producers from the scheme. In 1935 a new agreement for limiting production was reached by Chile, Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo, while exports from the United States were limited by a "Gentleman's Agreement."

Cotton is essentially an American monopoly. During the boom of the 'twenties the United States produced 57% of the world output. Government intervention in the field of cotton production began with Hoover's "Federal Farm Board," which lost \$120,000,000 in its attempt to maintain cotton prices after 1929. Under the A.A.A. the Government offered cash inducements to cotton growers to reduce cotton acreage. This method proving ineffective, output was restricted directly by fixing sales quotas for individual growers. Contracts were made with 1,300,000 growers, cultivating 94% of the cotton land. Since the A.A.A. was declared unconstitutional, the Government has tried to restrict cotton production by offering subsidies on alternative crops.

Wartime expansion of the petroleum industry resulted in excess capacity and falling prices. During the early 'twenties attempts at international restrictions failed owing to lack of co-operation by American producers. In recent years, several states have passed laws designed to make limitations of output possible. Under the N.R.A. the Federal government attempted to cartelize the industry, but this effort had to be abandoned when the N.R.A. was declared unconstitutional. However, competition outside the American market has been effectively restricted by the Export Petroleum Association

formed in 1929. Since 1931 there have been a series of world oil conferences for the purpose of reaching agreements on output.

Before the first World War, Germany enjoyed a monopoly of potash production, divided between private and public ownership. With the accession of Alsace-Lorraine, France became a serious competitor. Since 1924, there have been a series of Franco-German agreements fixing prices and dividing markets. As competition developed in Spain, Russia, Poland, and Palestine, these countries were brought into the international cartel.

These are but a few of the organizations formed to control world output of basic raw materials. The net effect is to maintain prices of these commodities above the competitive level. In other words, they increase the amounts of exports that must be sold to get enough funds to buy these raw materials. They increase economic strain, and so international tension.

6. Self-sufficiency Programs

Any measures designed to reduce imports are steps towards national "self-sufficiency." In this sense, the whole movement towards restrictions on international trade since the World War is a trend towards self-sufficiency. In two important countries, however, self-sufficiency programs have been a conscious and significant part of economic policy; efforts were made to increase domestic production directly, as well as to limit imports. In the present international situation Germany's bid for self-sufficiency has more direct bearing than Italy's, and we shall therefore begin with it and accord it more space.

Germany

The Germans were convinced in 1918 that it was no lack of manpower, military skill, inventive genius, or heroic determination which had cost them their expected victory, but a lack of essential foodstuffs and raw materials. The blockade during the Armistice, blamed for the death of 800,000 Germans, strengthened this conviction. The Versailles Treaty, with its crushing reparations clauses, made an export surplus imperative. Under such conditions, it was only natural that the idea of making Germany independent of the outside world for food and raw materials should arise. During and

after the war, steps were taken in this direction, particularly in the field of agriculture. In 1925 "Autarky" was one of the slogans of the German National Party. Schleicher's Minister of Agriculture, von Braun, announced officially that Germany had, by price legislation and extremely high tariffs, attained self-sufficiency in grains. The depletion of gold reserves to 0.5% of currency circulation during the financial crisis of 1931 made restriction of imports and expansion of domestic production imperative if Germany were to maintain the illusion of being on the gold standard. Nevertheless, the efforts for self-sufficiency were so much more intense after 1933, and the military aspects so much more noticeable, that the Nazi plan for autarky is almost different in kind from previous policies.

The first steps in the direction of self-sufficiency taken by the National Socialist government were in the field of agriculture. Indeed, the "Corporation of Peasants" was the first brick in the building of a Corporate State. It was established in the fall of 1933, and the Ministry of Agriculture was given power to fix prices, production, and profits at all stages of any agricultural process. At the head of the whole system of agricultural control is the Corporation of Agriculture, under the direction of the Ministry for Agriculture. Its subsidiaries are based to a large extent on the widespread co-operative organizations that already existed. The Milk Products Manufacturing Association controls the dairy industry, the Association of Mills controls the grain industry, and so on. Each of these groups is headed by a government appointed "Reichsstelle" or commissary. The original function of the Reichstellen was to establish monopolies for the control of price, much like the agricultural monopolies set up in this country. As monopolization spread from production to marketing, in order to "equalize demand and supply" at the fixed price it was found necessary to buy up surpluses, and to fix the amounts bought by or delivered to processors and distributors.

The German soil and climate are better suited for grains than for most other agricultural products; and self-sufficiency in this field is relatively easy. Yet there has been a serious deficiency in German grain production, as indicated by rising prices and increasing imports since 1933. Nor have efforts to increase grain production been

particularly successful. The yield per acre (or per hectare) has actually fallen. The following figures, taken from official German publications, show the situation clearly:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Rye</i>	PRICES			<i>Fodder-oats</i>
		<i>Wheat</i>	<i>Fodder-barley</i>		
1934-35 ..	159.3	199.9	159.7		158.6
1935-36	164.4	200.6	168.3		162.6
1936-37	164.2	201.2	168.8		163.0
1937-38	184.2	200.9	168.8		163.9
1938-39	185.4	201.5	169.6		170.4

	<i>Wheat</i>	<i>Rye</i>	<i>Oats</i>	<i>Barley</i>	<i>Maize</i>
Germany ...	20.55	16.55	14.88	15.45	15.45
World	10.41	6.58	5.29	8.17	5.84

YIELD IN MILLIONS OF TONS

<i>Year</i>	<i>Bread grains</i>		<i>Fodder grains</i>		
	<i>Rye</i>	<i>Wheat</i>	<i>Barley</i>	<i>Oats</i>	<i>Spelt</i>
Avg. 1929-34 ..	7.87	4.42	3.16	6.38	1.47
1934	7.61	4.53	3.21	5.45	1.43
1935	7.48	4.67	3.39	5.38	1.23
1936	7.39	4.43	3.40	5.62	1.13
1937	6.92	4.46	3.64	5.92	
1938	8.46	5.55			

YIELD PER HECTARE (Figures in double centners)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Rye</i>	<i>Wheat</i>	<i>Oats</i>	<i>Barley</i>
1933	19.4	24.3	21.8	21.0
1938	17.2	15.5	19.6	20.4

IMPORTS (in millions of Reichsmarks)

<i>Grain</i>	1938	1937	1936	1935	1934	1933
Wheat	149.1	156.2	6.9	14.7	60.9	71.8
Rye	9.2	23.2	2.8	15.4	3.9	19.2
Barley	46.3	5.5	2.5	12.3	37.1	14.2
Oats	14.9	5.2	1.3	13.1	3.3	1.3
Maize	146.5	178.0	9.9	18.6	32.8	15.3

The shortage of grains has called forth special measures in the last two years. At the beginning of 1937 an attempt was made to increase human consumption of rye and maize, in order to alleviate the particularly noticeable shortage of wheat, less easy to eliminate by

expansion of wheat production than by expansion of rye and maize production. The average price per ton of rye was raised by 20 RM., to offset the tendency for too much rye to find its way into the "pig-trough" and too little into the "kneading trough." This rise in the official price of rye cut the span between rye and wheat prices in half, and was expected to lead to substitution of rye production for wheat production. In addition, the milling grade of flour was raised to include larger percentages of bran and ash, and an admixture of 7% maize with wheat was introduced. Finally, on and after March 1, 1937, the 75% rye flour was eliminated, and the 80% rye flour became the lowest milling grade. In 1938 two more grades of flour were dropped. In August, 1938, the milling percentage of rye was reduced again; it was found that the higher percentage of rye in "rye bread" had resulted in diversion of consumers from "rye bread" to "rye-wheaten" bread, so that more instead of less wheat was being consumed. In 1938 the feeding of livestock with grain that could meet the lowest milling requirements was forbidden.

Progress towards self-sufficiency in livestock has been impeded by scarcity of fodder, scarcity of agricultural labor—and, in the last two years, hoof-and-mouth disease. Hoof-and-mouth disease is not part and parcel of German policy; but shortage of feed and agricultural labor is inherent in the program of self-sufficiency and rearmament. The following official figures show developments in the stock of animals during the Nazi regime:

NUMBER OF HEAD OF LIVESTOCK (in thousands)

<i>Kind</i>	<i>Dec. 1938</i>	<i>Dec. 1937</i>	<i>Dec. 1936</i>	<i>Dec. 1935</i>	<i>Dec. 1934</i>	<i>Dec. 1933</i>
Horses .	3,442.7	3,433.8	3,410.3	3,400.	3,742.0	3,395.1
Cattle ..	19,900.2	20,503.6	20,088.0	18,900.	19,165.4	19,713.7
Swine ..	23,481.3	23,846.9	25,891.6	22,800.	23,125.1	23,878.5
Sheep ..	4,809.0	4,692.3	4,340.8	3,927.7	3,481.7	3,381.1
Goats ..	2,508.9	2,630.1	2,633.5	2,500.	2,489.5	2,584.9

IMPORTS (in thousands of Reichsmarks)

<i>Kind</i>	<i>1938</i>	<i>1937</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>1935</i>	<i>1934</i>	<i>1933</i>
Cattle	36,689	40,413	39,125	20,808	11,747	7,803
Pigs	50,894	42,175	33,349	6,181	1,059	744
Horses	14,022	13,430	14,265	9,369	11,743	10,356
Various	12,427	11,458	9,588	8,798	8,782	11,936
Meat and meat products.	92,193	79,847	86,283	54,876	41,577	36,082

The results of the self-sufficiency program so far as livestock are concerned are more favorable than in the case of grains. The stock of horses and sheep has been increased, and the other categories are much the same as in 1933. However, prices of meats have risen; a situation in which beef costs \$.75 a pound and veal \$1.10 is not altogether satisfactory. Moreover, imports of cattle and swine have increased enormously since 1933, while imports of horses, "various livestock," and meats have increased considerably. The conclusion would seem to be that Germany is capable of self-sufficiency in livestock if an abundant fodder supply is assured. Unfortunately, the program of self-sufficiency in grains is incompatible with an abundant fodder supply except in years of exceptionally good harvests.

Although the importation of eggs has been drastically reduced, from RM. 78,821,000 in 1933 to 24,815,000 in 1937, it cannot be said that Germany is substantially more self-sufficient in eggs than before the Nazi regime. Eggs were one of the first commodities to become scarce, and they are still scarce. Early in 1936 one could hardly get eggs in Berlin at all; those who succeeded in buying them at the official price would have to buy two stale eggs with each fresh egg. In February, 1938, the Berlin correspondent of the *Economist* reports that eggs constitute the chief shortage in that city.

So far as dairy products are concerned, the following figures speak for themselves:

IMPORTS (in thousands of Reichsmarks)

<i>Product</i>	1938	1937	1936	1935	1934	1933
Milk	2,253	5,010	3,187	2,557	1,662	1,757
Butter	121,262	115,002	97,703	86,561	73,692	83,765
Cheese	31,414	36,724	27,601	26,787	31,436	33,716
Margarine and other table fats	6,369	—	3,522	4,055	2,553	7,660

Given an ample supply of fodder, some measure of self-sufficiency might be attained in dairy products. Since to some extent dairy farmers compete with livestock farmers for fodder, it seems unlikely that Germany could achieve autarky in both fields.

Almost from the beginning of the Nazi regime, the industrial expansion resulting from government spending policies was hampered by scarcity of raw materials. Increased production and decreased im-

ports proved incompatible. The first steps towards industrial self-sufficiency consisted merely of restrictions of raw materials imports, such as cotton and rubber. The Law for Trade in Industrial Raw and Half-finished Materials, passed in March, 1934, was more extensive; it provided for a Reichskommissar to regulate provision, distribution, storage, sale, and consumption of raw materials.

In the fall of 1936, two events intensified the effort to attain independence of foreign supplies of raw materials. One was the devaluation of France, Italy, and the other "gold-bloc" countries, which reduced the demand for German exports and thus necessitated further restrictions of imports. The other was the announcement of the "Four Year Plan for Raw Materials" in Hitler's Nuremberg speech. At first, this "Plan" was rather vague. The "gap between import needs and import possibilities" was to be closed by further development of domestic raw materials. What precisely was to be done to enhance production of these commodities was not made clear. Subsequently, various kinds of orders were issued. One of the first was to the effect that men's clothing must contain 15 to 25% of artificial or regenerated wool, and that cheese was not to contain more than 20% cream. (Perhaps this latter order, which involved a deterioration of domestic cheese, explains the large increase in cheese imports in 1937.) In November, 1936, it was decreed that textile fabrics designed for public service must contain up to 50% of artificial fibre, and that potato parings should be used in place of firewood. In December the Hitler Youth were instructed to devote two days to the collection of beechnuts, from which a passable table oil can be obtained. Similar more or less disconnected orders have been subsequently issued. For the most part, the program has been concerned with limitation of waste and the development of substitutes.

In the latter field, Germany has shown great ingenuity in using those raw materials of which she has an abundance, especially wood and coal. Wood "yarn" is produced by distilling wood with hydrochloric acid and forcing it through a nozzle in fine streams, producing hairs which are woven into a wool substitute called "Wollstra." Uniforms contain about 30% of this material. Men make jokes about "splintering" their suits, so high is the percentage of wood materials in them. Carpets contain a high fraction of rayon. "Jute" bags con-

tain about 25% paper yarn; "cotton" underwear is about 15% celanese. Coal provides fuels, lubricants, and soap. A "Propane" gas for internal combustion engines is made by blowing steam over hot coals; a "Leuna" gasoline is made from peat; benzine, from peat and pit-coal. A synthetic rubber called "Buna" is in use. Many of these "Ersatz" materials are technically very efficient; unfortunately for Germany, they are much more expensive in most cases than the raw materials they are designed to replace. "Buna" costs six times the world price of rubber. Artificial gasoline costs Germany about 500 million marks more per year, and domestic beet sugar 550 millions more, than if these materials were bought on the world market.

Attempts have also been made to increase domestic production of industrial raw materials, especially textiles. Flax acreage was enlarged during 1936 from 22,300 to over 44,000 hectares, and production more than doubled in that year. An enthusiastic bulletin estimates that from 1936-37, two-thirds of the German requirements could be met by domestic production. Hemp production also has been increased: during 1936 from 3600 to 5700 hectares. Despite the enlarged area—which must certainly have involved sacrifices elsewhere in the economy—imports of fibres nearly doubled from 1933 to 1937. In 1938 imports were reduced, but they are still about one-third higher than 1933. Only cotton imports show a substantial decline:

IMPORTS (in millions of Reichmarks)

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>1938</i>	<i>1937</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>1935</i>	<i>1934</i>	<i>1933</i>
Wool, animal hair.	266.7	285.2	229.4	248.1	322.6	266.2
Fibres	99.7	112.6	81.1	86.0	69.7	65.5
Cotton	219.0	275.1	257.7	329.7	260.2	307.0

The above facts and figures apply to the "old" Reich. However, inclusion of recent territorial acquisitions would not materially alter our estimate of the chances for success of the German self-sufficiency program. Austria is less self-sufficient in foodstuffs than Germany. While Austria is a net exporter of dairy products, most of these already went to Germany and the incorporation of Austria will not begin to eliminate scarcities in this field. Austria's chief contribution will be timber. Of 1.7 million tons of timber exported in 1937, only 460 thousands went to Germany. Czechoslovakia is a net importer of

cereals, fruits and vegetables, animals and dairy products, oils and fats, textile raw materials—those very things in which Germany is deficient as well. Czechoslovakia has timber, some iron and coal, and the great Skoda munitions works. Poland was approximately self-sufficient in foodstuffs, had export surpluses of coal, lead, potash, and timber, a sufficiency of petroleum and flax. However, it is not certain what share of these resources will fall to Germany, nor what conditions are since the German invasion.

Thus we see that Germany's self-sufficiency program has failed to yield substantial increases in domestic production or substantial decreases in imports of foodstuffs and raw materials. Since the import figures given above are in value terms, it may be well to support them with quantity figures, to be sure our changes in import figures do not indicate price changes alone. The following are official figures of average monthly imports in thousands of metric tons:

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Food	37	40	31	43	74	73.25
Raw materials.	244	315	355	379	320	442.5

The drive for autarky has imposed considerable hardship upon consumers. Certain goods, such as butter and lard, became scarce as early as 1934. From then until 1936 conditions grew progressively worse. Evasion of official regulations became widespread. For example, dealers who were afraid to pay more than the official prices, would induce farmers to sell by simultaneously buying from them unmarketable rubbish at fancy prices. In turn, dealers would sell scarce commodities at official prices only to customers who would buy unregulated commodities at absurdly high prices. A "Black Bourse" in food developed. Queues for rationed commodities grew longer, less patient. Public unrest became obvious. Accordingly, the Government dismissed two directors of the Reich Board of Animals and Animal Products, loudly bewailed the shortage of foreign exchange, proclaimed in one breath that "freedom is more important than food" and that the scarcity was the result of "Manchester Liberalism."

In 1936, when conditions did not improve and the rations card system had to be extended, the official explanation became more realistic. The shortage was attributed to rearmament, and was there-

fore a "sacrifice for freedom." Göbbels made his famous speech at Berlin (January 17) in which he said "We can well do without butter, but not without guns, because butter would not help us if we were to be attacked one day." The population was advised to eat more fish and urged to give up consumption of the scarce commodities. The "famine Sundays" were instituted. In December the pressure brought to bear upon the peasants was increased by the declaration that cases under the "Law vs. Economic Sabotage" would be tried by the "People's Courts," a definitely Nazi organization. Göring made a speech saying that he had lost many pounds, why couldn't all loyal Germans do likewise? The veto on price rises became ineffective. One cannot easily enforce a law which the whole population wants to break.

Since 1936 the situation does not seem to have changed significantly. Scarcities still exist but are confined to much the same commodities as in 1935. Vegetables, fruit, eggs, and butter are difficult to obtain. Housewives may wait a long time in line, and then be asked to buy things they don't want in addition to the things they do want. This device has now been declared illegal, but is clearly not a practice easy to check.

The official cost of living index shows a rise of only 6% since 1933, and the index of production of consumption goods rose from 91.8 in June, 1933, to 112.0 in March, 1938. Such estimates take no account of deterioration in quality, discrepancies between official and actual prices, or inability to get certain commodities at all at official prices. Also, it is difficult to attach meaning to a consumption index which includes textiles for army uniforms and other items of military equipment. The International Labor Office estimates that industrial money wage rates have not risen, while real wage rates have declined since 1933. The fact that payrolls have increased by 54% from 1932 to 1937 and retail turnover has increased only 32% is another indication that real wage rates have fallen. Foodstuffs constituted 8% of national income in 1928, 7% in 1932, and only 4% in 1936. Even calculated from official German figures, with incomes estimated in 1926 prices, real income per employee shows a decline from RM. 2,685.2 in 1932 to RM. 1,884.4 in 1936.

The German program for self-sufficiency has been accompanied

by the elimination of unemployment and a tremendous improvement in German military preparedness. It is not certain that these ends could not have been accomplished equally well without those measures which aimed specifically at autarky. In every other respect, the program must be accounted a failure. Yet from the point of view of other countries, who would have liked to export more to Germany than the self-sufficiency program permitted, it was distinctly damaging. The most obvious effect is the same as the effect of the other instruments of economic warfare: it reduced the volume of world trade.

Italy

Italy's first major move towards self-sufficiency was reclamation of land. A good 7% of Italy's area is swampy. About one-fifth of this land has already been reclaimed, and the rest is in the process of drainage. Roads and aqueducts are being built to facilitate cultivation. While similar projects were undertaken before the Fascist regime, Mussolini has spent nearly three times as much as all previous Italian governments.

Another front in the self-sufficiency campaign is the "Battaglio del Grano"—the battle of wheat. Agricultural research and education, prize competitions, mechanization, have succeeded in raising the yield per hectare by more than 50% over the 1920-22 average. Net imports of wheat have been cut to about 10% of the pre-war figure.

The drive for self-sufficiency was greatly intensified during the Ethiopian campaign. Under League of Nations sanctions, 52 nations closed their markets to Italian goods. Reductions of imports into Italy were therefore imperative. After November, 1935, only essential goods were admitted, and imports from sanctionist countries were virtually prohibited. So successful was the policy of import restriction that during part of the period of sanctions Italy's balance of trade actually improved.

As in Germany, efforts were made to develop raw-materials substitutes. One of the most spectacular of these was "Lanital," a textile fibre made from the casein in skimmed milk. Cellulose and paper were produced from straw. Rayon and hemp were substituted for wool, cotton, and jute. Alcohol distilled from domestic products and

mixed with gasoline proved to be a satisfactory motor fuel. Castor oil was used as a lubricant in internal-combustion engines.

Attempts to eliminate waste and conserve scarce goods were also made. Scrap iron, lead, and copper were diligently collected, remelted, and used again. Two "meatless days" per week were ordered, when no meat could be sold. Gasoline prices were raised to reduce private consumption.

The Ethiopian campaign itself, insofar as it was really directed towards procurement of markets and raw materials, might be regarded as part of the drive for autarky. With the successful termination of the Ethiopian war and the devaluation of the lira, the drive for self-sufficiency relented somewhat. In an endeavor to prevent an undue rise in cost of living, restrictions on importation of foodstuffs and raw materials were relaxed. Since increased exports followed devaluation, this course could be followed without danger to financial stability.

Italy's self-sufficiency program, then, was less rigorous and less persistent than Germany's. On the face of it, it would seem to have been more successful. But reclamation projects, increased agricultural production, development of substitutes, the Ethiopian campaign—these were expensive undertakings. As for their net effect, W. G. Welk concludes his excellent study of *Fascist Economic Policy* as follows: "While, then, the leading economic policies adopted by the Fascist regime may have served to increase the country's economic independence and political prestige, they cannot be said, so far at least, to have contributed to her economic advancement or to an increase in the economic well-being of the Italian people."¹⁹

Impasse

The foregoing discussion is hopelessly inadequate as a description of post-war economic developments. We have ignored completely the German export subsidies; the "Buy British," "Preferite il Prodotto Italiano," and similar campaigns to foster purchases in the home market; propaganda of the sort that proved so effective in achieving a boycott on Japanese goods in this country; and other more subtle instruments of economic warfare. Still, we should now

¹⁹ Harvard University Press, 1938, p. 249.

have a general picture of the post-war trend in international economic relationships.

Let us attempt to weave together the threads of our argument into a composite whole. We began by pointing out that certain countries, notably Germany, Italy, and Japan, are relatively poor in raw materials. We argued that if freedom of trade and immigration prevailed, this situation would give no real basis for international conflict; but in a protectionist world, the maldistribution of the world's wealth constitutes a real grievance for the "have-nots."

We went on to show that the Versailles Treaty aggravated this grievance, particularly for Germany, but also for Italy.

We then demonstrated that since 1918 a whole arsenal of economic devices for fostering domestic prosperity "at the expense of the foreigner" was thrown into action. We saw that in fact these devices did not succeed in promoting the economic welfare of the countries imposing them. They were successful only in injuring the foreigner. Without exception, they injured some groups within the country. Without exception, they prompted retaliatory measures from other countries. Trade restrictions are like snowballs hurtling down a hillside; they gather weight from their own momentum. Reduced imports into country A lead to reduced imports into other countries, therefore to reduced exports from country A and still further restrictions on imports into A. Economic independence breeds economic independence.

All the instruments of economic warfare that we examined exhibited two striking common characteristics: (1) They served to reduce the volume of trade. In 1937 industrial production in most of the countries of importance in international affairs was somewhere around the 1929 level; but the volume of international trade was only one-third of the 1929 level. (2) For the promotion of internal prosperity they proved to be failures.

The first result of the restrictionist movement was particularly damaging to the "have-nots," since in their case there was no empire to which to turn. Under the conditions that grew up from 1918 to 1939, the demands of the "have-nots" for markets and access to raw materials had some justification. Nor were the "have-nots" slow to

blame internal difficulties upon the malice of the other nations. The "shortage of foreign exchange" was the stock explanation of scarcities of foods and raw materials, an explanation that placed the onus in some vague way upon the foreigner. This official attitude was not calculated to foster international good will.

However, the public was not completely fooled. They were aware of the second result of the economic war. It was protests of business men within the countries imposing exchange control that led to exchange clearings and other forms of relaxation of the system. Antipathy to import quotas is typified by the resignation of the entire municipal government of Calais in 1933 as a protest against the French quota system, which ruined its business as a port directly and its lace industry indirectly through retaliation of other countries. (The French government met this protest with an order to all State schools to buy lace curtains!) In Italy there is such complete lack of freedom of thought that no serious opposition to government policy is expressed; one can detect only the murmurings heard in any country. In Germany, the duress of the self-sufficiency program seems to be borne with resignation and grim humor. To the question, "Wie geht es?" people answer, "Danke schön, besser als im nächsten Jahr!" "Ha Bu?" (Haben Sie Butter?) replaces "Heil Hitler" as a greeting. But there is evidence enough that the public would maintain this attitude only so long as they felt the end justified the sacrifice.

This, then, was the situation in 1939: a vicious circle of restrictions on foreign trade, particularly painful to the "have-nots"; and a mounting rumble of discontent over the failure of the restrictionist policy to produce an abundant and permanent prosperity. *In a word, the economic war had reached an impasse.* The various governments were faced with two alternatives. They could confess the error of their ways, turn in their tracks, and head for economic liberalism. The United States has done this; but it was possible because a new government came to power in 1933. Italy, England, and France have made half-hearted gestures indicating a willingness to consider a return to freedom. Germany has adhered rigidly to her self-sufficiency program. Germany alone has not devalued; this might be the explanation. Or it may be that Germany preferred the other alterna-

tive: to abandon a purely economic warfare for more stringent and more spectacular measures. In all fairness, we must ask: "Is it not possible that England and France also preferred the second alternative?"

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THE WORLD WAR AND THE ARTS

■
Frances Winwar

Outside it was raining that night of April 2, 1917. For many minutes President Wilson, his lean, ascetic face clearly showing the effect of the moral conflict of months, had been rehearsing the provocations which finally determined him to lead the United States into the World War, on the side of the Allies and against Germany. "We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty . . ." he was saying. "We are glad now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy."

It had been no sudden decision. As early as August of 1914 the President had expressed to Colonel House the conviction that if Germany won, it would change the course of civilization and make the United States a military nation. He was even more outspoken in December of the following year to Brand Whitlock, Minister to Belgium, who had confessed being heart and soul for the Allies.

"So am I," Wilson replied. "No decent man, knowing the situation in Germany, would be anything else. But that is only my own personal opinion . . . I am not justified in forcing my opinion upon the people of the United States and bringing them into a war which they do not understand." It was all ideals. No word was said of the economic factors that had brought the countries of Europe into a chaos out of which war seemed the only way.

But long before an expeditionary army of two million men had been transported across the Atlantic to help the Allies win the war, hundreds of American youths had made their way to the battlefield. From factories and offices they came, from athletic field and college cloister which had little to offer against the excitement of enlisting in the American ambulance service, or the Norton Harjes, or even the Red Cross sectors on the Italian side. For youth wanted adventure, and in its ardor accepted it the more eagerly when it came wrapped in the mantle of idealism.

It was a soul-hungry generation, the generation that was just coming of age—soul-hungry and a little weary, though as yet it had hardly begun to live. Born a little before or after the year of the Spanish-American War, it had no memory of the struggle except for mention of it as something long past in the school history book, or for the sight of some uniform in a museum smelling vaguely of old attics. The names of the battleship *Maine* and of Admiral Dewey came up in connection with it, but on the whole there had been little in the war-casualty list of some five hundred mariners and soldiers to fire the imagination, always most exalted by the spectacular in suffering and death. It had lured, however, one as yet inglorious poet, Carl Sandburg, a raw lad of nineteen who enlisted with the Sixth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.

The war had begun and ended within a few months in 1898. Altogether it had been well worth while in the estimation of all but those whose husbands, sons, or fathers never came home. For several years there were accusations of "imperialism" in the air; "imperialism" was even made an issue in the next presidential campaign. But soon whatever opposition there had been to the wholesale establishment of so-called protectorates died down or swelled to national pride as the country began gaining in prestige in the eyes of the

European powers that had been prone to look upon America as a formidable but not too intelligent giant.

The decade that followed saw that giant bewildered and impotent against the huge combinations of capital which were forming on every hand, seizing natural resources for private exploitation and rising as forces of dangerous potentiality. On its side, labor too united for collective bargaining, the American Federation of Labor alone counting a membership in millions by 1905. Three years earlier, notwithstanding the counter-unions encouraged by the employers to fight the growing power of organized labor, a strike led by John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers of America succeeded in paralyzing the nation, so that when President Theodore Roosevelt prevailed upon the warring parties to submit to an arbitration commission, it lost no time in acceding to the miners' demands for shorter hours and better pay. In spite of such victories, however, wealth continued to accumulate under control of the few, and while men did not decay, at least in the large industrial centers, they were far from attaining equitable returns for their labor. Those first ten years of the twentieth century are notable, among other things, for an attempt to nominate William Randolph Hearst on a radical ticket in the presidential election of 1904, for the financial panic of 1907 which was under control before the close of the year, but most of all for the enormous advances in science, industry, and the still young but amazing study of the subconscious mind begun in the dawn of the century by Sigmund Freud and soon to attain such popularization as it is seldom the lot of a science to achieve. Indeed, at the cradle of those youths later to be known as the "lost generation," there stood two godfathers with their dangerous gifts: Freud who was to diminish the ego that had thought itself the center of creation, and Einstein who was almost to annihilate it by enlarging the boundaries of the universe.

Life, however, went on, as it has a disconcerting way of doing even in the face of the most convincing argument, men pursuing their courses with no concern for the finiteness or the illimitedness of space—except when, as during the year of the comet, it threatened to prove too narrow for comfort. But the comet passed, carrying in its wake a handful of hysterical suicides, to fade altogether from

memory before the glare of the planet Mars, kindled to blood-red fury because someone whose name few now remember, was killed at Sarajevo. From all over the world millions came to the battlefield and "poured out the red sweet wine of youth"—some to save democracy and civilization, some to end war, but all, as the survivors were to learn, in vain.

The outbreak of the first World War saw the young generation in high school and college, the less privileged already at work in office, shop, or farm. The people of the United States were enjoying a moderate degree of prosperity, talked about the day when every family would be owning one of Mr. Ford's automobiles; wondered whether the flying machine would ever really amount to anything; discussed the latest news from the generous pages of the family paper, the tabloid with its pictorial journalism not yet having become popularized; went to the movies on Saturday and to church on Sunday; read the periodicals and perhaps the latest popular book not yet known as a "best seller," and on the whole lived a complacent, carpet-slipper existence; except, of course, for the unions, the I.W.W.'s already implicated in bombings in the West, the fiery oratory of the anarchist Emma Goldman, and the unlady-like advocacy of birth control by Margaret Sanger. Among the more leisured the literary and the Rotary clubs were gaining in vogue and membership.

American Literary Renaissance

Culture, since the advent of Oscar Wilde in 1882, was again "coming over" America, this time via France, in an indirect line of descent from her imagist poets about to be discovered by Amy Lowell of Brookline, Massachusetts, through her discipleship to the red-headed, expatriate Ezra Pound of Idaho. Miss Lowell had already given the world a volume of verse, whose chief distinction lay in its title from Shelley. It was as a pathfinder for the eager young, seeking direction, that she was to prove important.

Intellectual ferment was in the air. In Chicago, another spinster, Harriet Monroe, poet laureate of the World's Fair of the 'nineties, had started a little magazine that called itself, unassumingly, *Poetry*. Again Ezra Pound had given it its accolade when he allowed himself

to appear in the first issue. The white-bearded Hindoo mystic Tagore graced its pages with oriental perfume and beatitude, to be succeeded by the blare and boom of Vachel Lindsay escorting General Booth to heaven, and Carl Sandburg whose Chicago poems celebrating the "Hog Butcher for the World, Tool Maker, Stacker of Wheat" had begun to catch the ear of the nation listening for a positive, native note in the midst of the imported or imitative naysaying. Genteel poetesses from New England, emancipated Greenwich Villagers from New York, sent their effusions to the high priestess of Cass Street. Even the American colonists of the *rive gauche*, the Bohemian left bank of Paris, entrusted their "midnight (oil) darlings" to the mercies of the ocean and over one-third of the continent, in the hope that Miss Monroe would deign to cast her eyes upon their heart-wrung poesy.

Poetry, however, had a rival in the *Little Review*, bursting upon the artistic quarter of Chicago as the war had broken upon Europe. Margaret Anderson was no high priestess but rather a torchbearer, ready to start an intellectual burning of Rome just to see the pretty poets roasting. An ardent admirer of Emma Goldman, she too had not a little of the anarchist in her contempt for the tame and the conventional, the smug, the established, and the commonplace. Withal she had an almost angelic tolerance, the obverse of her pyromania, which made her take to her bosom, as the years went by, imagists and erotics, Surrealists and unintelligibles, whom she made to feel at home in Chicago as in New York to which she eventually removed her review for a change of fortune.

New York, however, already had its *Masses*, a grown man of three (as magazines go) when the fatal shots were fired at Sarajevo. It was born in the basement of the Rand School on Fifteenth Street, fathered by Piet Vlag, an exponent of the Co-operative movement, mothered by the Revolution in all the abstract dignity of a capital R, and smiled upon by the ghost of Karl Marx. Thomas Seltzer who christened it was also its first mentor. The proletariat, for whose enlightenment the magazine had been created, read Vlag's exhortations, nodded over the poetry, chuckled at the pictures and cartoons, and obediently awaited the coming of the Great Day. But even with Eugene Debs's assurance that the *Masses* was a splendid instrument

of propaganda, they knew that it would be many a long year before the barricades were set up in Union Square.

Nevertheless the *Masses* began exerting a telling influence, especially after Max Eastman and Floyd Dell became its editors. While still keeping it left-Socialist in policy, they made it as well a literary, artistic, and humorous magazine, not above poking fun at itself and fearless in its editorial outspokenness—"a revolutionary, not a reform magazine," as John Reed announced, "frank, arrogant, impertinent, searching for the true causes . . . printing what is too naked or true for a money-making press." The challenge of nakedness and truth startled the censor who was not altogether reassured by such criticism from the right as

They draw nude women for the *Masses*,
Thick, fat, ungainly lasses—
How does that help the working classes?

For the present, however, the censor did nothing, allowing the writers to publish their sedition—John Reed, for instance, to report the Paterson, New Jersey, silk strike—and the artists John Sloan, George Bellows, Charles A. Winter, K. R. Chamberlain, Art Young, and others to smuggle dynamite into their drawings. It was said that John D. Rockefeller, Jr., never allowed his subscription to lapse, not through any admiration of *Masses* literature and art, but that he might not miss the warning signal of the Revolution.

Radical and artistic life centered at that time about Greenwich Village and extended as far north as Gramercy Square, the original home of the Liberal Club when it was still under the aegis of Lincoln Steffens and Rev. Percy Stickney Grant. Revolt, however, a revolt of youth that found the urbane radical and the reverend too staid for their pace, divided the club, whose wide-eyed cohorts pitched their tent in the more vital air of the Village. Anything might happen in the club rooms on Macdougall Street. Poets and anarchists, artists and Utopians, split dialectical hairs or came to fisticuffs on the merits of the latest abstract painting, only to make their peace over a cup of Polly Holladay's tea in the restaurant below. Sooner or later, everyone came to the Village—the notorious I.W.W. chief, Bill Haywood, one-eyed and mountainous; Alexander Berkman, hero and martyr, whom the comrades blamed not for shooting H. C.

Frick but for not having made a thorough job of it; Mabel Dodge, nurturer of genius, who was just discovering John Reed as if with an uncanny foreknowledge that he would some day lie alongside the mausoleum that shined the prophet of a new society in the vast Red Square of Moscow; Mary Heaton Vorse, George Cram Cook, Edna St. Vincent Millay, who held aloft the lovely light of the candle burning at both ends to emancipated youth, Eugene O'Neill, and countless others.

Prelude to War

By the time the conflict in Europe had entered its third year and the sentiment of non-intervention in America had been converted to war fever by the subtle arts of propaganda, there were flourishing all over the States countless Greenwich Villages where men and women, feeling the once secure basis of their world shaking under their feet, endeavored through self-expression, revolution, art, and Freud to maintain a deceptive balance. But the world continued shaking and meanwhile the new generation had come knocking at the door that opened into—what?

At home and abroad they were finding out, though what they learned varied with their experience and the point of view. In the warring countries the people who remained behind knew the horrors of the air raid, the constant dread of receiving the official notice with the laconic "killed in battle," the rationing of food and necessities, then hunger, despair, disease, demoralization. They experienced the repression of civil liberties, censorship, the fear of uttering their thoughts aloud, the anguish of not knowing from day to day what added horror the next would bring. At the front life, if it could be called that, reduced itself to brutal simplicities. The older men were upheld by the words duty, honor, glory, patriotism, until they too learned the reality that underlay etymology. To the young, most of all to those who had volunteered, it was the danger, the adventure, that counted. Whether at Oxford, the Sorbonne, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, whether in London, New York, Oak Park, or Paris, youth, restive in a too smug and limited society that reckoned success by the plumpness of the money bag and achievement by popularity,

sought something beyond them, beyond the deadly monotony of safe, everyday living.

In many ways America's war generation offers striking parallels to the one which came of age in the 1890's in England. After more than half a century of Victoria's reign, Great Britain emerged as the empire on which the sun never set. Material prosperity made for arrogance and self-sufficiency. Mammon was enthroned in the market place—and the young needed something less gross to worship. They did not find it in life as Victoria had fashioned it; they looked for it in vain in the Christian revival, the Oxford movement of Newman, though many were to seek it in the Catholic Church. Most of them found it in danger that periled the soul rather than the body. Today we are accustomed to look upon their leader Wilde, upon Beardsley, Lionel Johnson, Ernest Dowson, and all those tragic youths who while finding, lost themselves, as so many highly colored figures in a literary pageant. But they were as much the representatives of a "lost generation," as much the survivors of a contest, the more deadly because it was spiritual, as those young men to whom Gertrude Stein gave so accurate a designation. They too sought values that were lacking in the surrounding materialism which had already tainted their young lives with world-weariness and disenchantment. They too sought it in adventure rationalized to a struggle for an idealistic cause. It was noteworthy that this lust for danger seized most strongly upon the imaginative and the sensitive.

Many a name among those who went to war is now part of literary history. William Faulkner of Mississippi joined the Canadian Flying Corps and achieved the rank of lieutenant. Malcolm Cowley of Pennsylvania was active in the American Ambulance Service. Louis Bromfield, William Seabrook, Harry Crosby, and Sidney Howard drove camions and ambulances, like John Dos Passos and Ernest Hemingway, who later found the more brutal thrills of war in the Arditi, the Italian shock troops whose terrible defeat he shared at Caporetto. More fortunate than many of his fellows to whom that disaster of October proved the last, he escaped with his life, two medals for bravery from the Italian government, and a silver plate in his shoulder, a permanent reminder of the imme-

diacy of death. Laurence Stallings returned even more grievously wounded. For a time E. E. Cummings drove a camion for the Norton Harjes ambulance division; but his was to be an experience different from the rest, not near the actual front, but in a dull, insignificant pinpoint on the map of France, Macé, which because of his stay there attained an unlooked-for immortality. All these survived, and many more, some who brought home medals and scars like Hemingway, some outwardly unscathed, who carried their wounds within. There was not one among them who returned the man he had been.

They came back, strangers in a changed world, men for whom the date of November 11, 1918, despite the frenzied outbursts with which it was celebrated, marked not an armistice but the beginning of a more bitter war. For them, as for all who had outlived the actual conflict, whether on the battlefield or behind the lines, the real struggle was just beginning. In vain, inspired by an outdated political idealism, elaborate plans were being drawn for a League of Nations that should make other wars impossible. The ink was scarcely dry on its impracticable covenants when each war-torn country adopted a fanatical policy of economic nationalism, accompanied by a paradoxical armed peace. The consequences were not far to seek, as succeeding years revealed.

War Fever

Culturally the war bore fruit long before its close as a result of the effective propaganda of hate and misrepresentation on which the people of all countries were fed. Atrocity stories shrieked in headlines from the press and found credence with hitherto sane people who, forgetting the purported noble motives for which the war was being fought, shouted for the extermination of the enemy. In Germany, in England, in France, in America, it was unpatriotic—and unsafe—not to agree with the majority. A prominent political figure of proved integrity, the father of Charles A. Lindbergh, Lone Eagle of 1927, was ostracized for opposing America's war mania and died a broken man in consequence of his courage. People dared not speak their minds even before friends and found it the better part of valor not only to be discreet, but to echo the accepted lie. "Taisez-vous!

Méfiez-vous! Les oreilles ennemies vous écoutent!" exhorted the warning tacked on the doors of trains, hotels, and public buildings in France. Faithfully people kept their mouths shut and mistrusted everyone for fear of the listening ears of the enemy.

With few exceptions, writers and artists either howled with the crowd, submerging their individuality in the multitude, or sought safe havens of escape in the past, in fantasy, in the future—anywhere, anywhere out of reality. In Italy D'Annunzio, once the archangel of revolt, not only glorified war but took part in it. Others, more or less great, followed his example, pouring out rabid novels and verses that heightened the war fever till intellect became delirium. With Coningsby Dawson scores of otherwise pacific writers produced volumes of inciting fiction, or like Robert W. Service, beat the war drums in rhythms that even the illiterate could understand. Painters who had hitherto found their greatest joy in pure art forsook it for propaganda, doing their bit by daubing patriotic posters appealing to the emotions of the mob. Everything was sacrificed to feed the war god whose first victim was the white-clad figure of truth.

Nevertheless an infinitesimal minority in each country carried on the battle of the one against the many. "The children of a new generation," said Stefan Zweig many years after the armistice, "will scarcely find it possible to realize what those who belonged to this minority had to suffer." Because he had felt the need of expressing himself and others like him—the unheard, the outcast, the despised—he chose as his symbol the Biblical Jeremiah, through whose mouth, in his play of that name, he said the things he could not otherwise have uttered. Thus his allegorical protest against war reached an audience in spite of the stringency of the censorship.

In France Romain Rolland, while also adopting symbolism in his drama *Liluli* to show the futility and the folly of war, nevertheless voiced his condemnation of its barbarity in terms so unmistakable that he fell foul of the authorities. His prosecution became a *cause célèbre*, but few gave him moral support in his unpopular and risky crusade. Self-righteous patriots accused him of defeatism; *embusqué* heroes, well ambushed in safe posts, taunted him with cowardice. Out of his experience came one of the noblest works indirectly produced by the war, *Clerambault*, the bitter Odyssey of

an independent spirit in a time of herd hysteria. The book is not a novel, though it has some elements of fiction; neither is it autobiography, in spite of Clerambault's resemblances to Rolland himself; the study is too objective, too universal for that. It might be taken rather as the searching soul-portrait of an individualist in the cataclysm, as he gropes toward the light of truth when all about him are denying its existence. In his strength as in his weakness, Rolland portrays him to that final moment when at the cry of his murderer, "I have killed the enemy," the words flash through his darkening brain: "My poor friend, it is within you yourself that the enemy lies."

Rolland wrote an explanatory note to an instalment of *Clerambault* that appeared in the Swiss press in 1917. Better than anything one can say, he delivers his message, a daring one even for less fanatical days: "He who makes himself the servant of a blind or blinded nation . . . does not truly serve it but lowers both it and himself . . . Sincere thought, even if it does run counter to that of others, is still a service to mankind."

The experiences of Zweig and Rolland were common to independent spirits everywhere. The moment a country plunged into the war, the whole process of repression and censorship began. Newspapers either conformed or were ruthlessly suppressed. Periodicals remained organs of opinion only so long as that opinion followed the policies of the government. As a result many of them went out of existence or became vapid, pseudo-literary magazines whose closest contact with life took place in some safe Cloudcuckooland.

The working of the repressive method in America was perhaps best shown in the case of the *Masses*. For some time, since the veering of public opinion toward the side of the Allies, the Department of Justice had been watching each issue of the magazine as it came off the press. There was plenty of matter both in the drawings and in the editorial comment to worry the censor who, however, found nothing on which to build a case until, several months after President Wilson's war-entry speech, the troublesome little magazine boldly published a number of anti-militarist cartoons. Immediately the *Masses* was forbidden the mails. Notwithstanding, the magazine continued to appear, more openly anti-war than ever, even

though the editors were aware of a very slaughter of the innocents among radical publications throughout the country. Defiantly they declared in the issue of August, 1917: "The *Masses* is the only one which has challenged the censorship in the courts and put the Government on the defensive. Each month we have something vitally important to say on the war. We are going to say it and continue to say it. We are going to fight any attempt to prevent us from saying it."

The government, however, had other views on the subject, which it conclusively demonstrated by suppressing the *Masses*. By the close of the year, with the December issue, the *Masses* ceased to exist. Worse, its editors, Max Eastman, Floyd Dell, Art Young, Merrill Rogers, the business manager, and later John Reed, who was given time to return from Russia, were brought to trial for sedition and for interfering with enlistment. At first the outcome seemed none too bright, for it was no trifling offense during the war to challenge the government's policies. Finally, after a lengthy procedure, the jury disagreed and the stage was set for a second trial in September. For weeks the process went on, the oratory of the defense and prosecution proving so soporific on one occasion that Art Young, forgetting the nightmare of Atlanta Prison hanging over him, fell asleep. Again the jury disagreed, but as the war was by then almost over the matter was dropped on what amounted to a verdict of acquittal.

The *Masses*, however, had a successor in the *Liberator* which Max Eastman and Art Young had launched in the very beard of the Department of Justice while they were awaiting trial. They intended it to be the *Masses* under another name, but there were too many forces against it. All that the *Liberator* could do at most was to imitate the best features of the original yet try to keep on the safe side. John Reed would have none of such backsliding, and promptly resigned from the editorial staff, while Eastman and the faithful handful carried on the work, sighing after "the glamor of the abstract moral principle" that had died with the *Masses*. In 1922 when Eastman, like many another idealist, went to Russia to see the workings of the "glorious experiment" the *Liberator* was taken over as one of the organs of the American Communist Party.

Trench Literature

Whatever the preoccupations of the government with seditious writing might be, the people had to have something to read, and the soldiers in the trenches must be supplied with books—books that should at once sustain their morale and hold the door open to human hope. David Garnett, looking back upon the war years, recalled in a recent article that of all literature the soldiers at the front liked nothing better than sentimental stories. The trenches in France, he says, were littered with copies of Gene Stratton Porter's *Freckles* which sold in the tens of thousands. What was its attraction? Simply its memories of home and peace and innocence, and those simple values which the war had suddenly overturned. The soldiers wanted life as they remembered it before they entered No Man's Land. "I was kept warm by the ardor of life within me," wrote Wilfred Owen. "I forgot hunger in the hunger for life." The actualities of the front, death, the barbarity, the suffering, the needless human waste were the last things the men wished to be reminded of. If the war had to be written about, they preferred it in such versions as Smith's *Dere Mabel* and Empey's *Over the Top*.

Next to sentimental fiction the soldiers liked poetry which could compress a wealth of emotional content in a brief space. Anthologies, therefore, were favorites with the men. Hence recently, to meet the present need, the English house of Routledge brought out two such collections designed for the soldiers at the front, *The Knapsack* and *The English Vision*, the one to remind them of the blessings of home, the other to keep before them the heritage of England.

From 1914 to 1918 books of war verse, the inspirational variety written comfortably from the depths of an armchair, and the vivid, poignant poems of the trenches flooded the market. In their patriotism the reviewers hailed a new genius with every edition of the literary supplements, sentimentalized over each week's crop of fighting Byrons, and praised the war that had produced them.

From a distance of twenty-five years, however, the poetry of the war seems hardly to have justified the critical acclaim. There were individual poems that achieved a certain fame for meeting the emotional need of the time: some of Rupert Brooke's stirring 1914 son-

nets, for instance; Alan Seeger's "Rendezvous with Death" and a half-dozen others. But the only poets of any stature produced by the war were the two Englishmen, Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon.

Owen enlisted in the beginning of the war and saw two years of service. Then for more than a year he was invalided. In October, 1918, he returned to the front, only to be killed, shortly before the armistice, while leading his men, the Artists' Rifles, across the Lambre Canal. He was twenty-five when he died. A dreamy, imaginative youth of wonderful sensibility, he had hated war as much as he had loved humanity in those grim, brave semblances of men who were his companions. It was at the hospital that he produced the greater part of his poetry under the guidance and encouragement of Sassoon, whom he met there. He wrote of the things he himself had known, but although he drew from the horror and gruesomeness of war, he endeavored to raise the mind to the ultimate values that could survive such a test.

I, too, saw God through mud—

he wrote in "Apologia pro Poemate Meo,"

The mud that cracked on cheeks when wretches smiled.
War brought more glory to their eyes than blood,
And gave their laughs more glee than shakes a child.

Merry it was to laugh there—

Where death becomes absurd and life absurder.
For power was on us as we slashed bones bare
Not to feel sickness or remorse of murder. . . .

Raids, bombings, the torturing asphyxiation of gas shells, all found their place in poetry that had gone far in its passionate indictment since those early days when everyone was drunkenly proclaiming the sweetness of sacrifice. He had seen how sweet such sacrifice could be, and from the agony of his anger he wrote it in letters of blood before he died:

If in some smothering dreams, you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin,
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gurgling from the froth-corrupted lungs . . .

My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: *Dulce et decorum est*
Pro patria mori.¹

Siegfried Sassoon, slightly older than Owen whose poems he edited in 1920, was in active service through the duration of the war except for several months on two occasions when he was severely wounded. He came out of it a violent pacifist. Indeed, before the war ended, and after he had been awarded a Military Cross for bravery, he enacted a rebellion of his own, threw down his arms, and refused to go on fighting. His was such unheard-of behavior, especially when he emphasized his resolution by flinging his Cross into the sea, that he was pronounced insane and sent away for a change of air. On his return he suffered his second wound. But the war was soon over and he no longer had need for personal protest. In the books of prose and verse which he began publishing after the war, he continued, however, to carry on his fight against the ordeal that had shattered him and the best youth of his generation. His message is clear and forceful though with less of the emotional intensity of Owen's. Today he is the gadfly of English society whose snobbery and chauvinism he mercilessly punctures.

The Protest

War's disillusionment, however, had made itself felt among the actual participants at the front long before the orators at home had exhausted their vocabulary on the grandeur and glory of death on the field of battle. On both sides feeling men were revolted by the cruel illogicality of it all. They had entered the war, most of them, inspired by the highest motives, on the Allied side sustained by the conviction that they were battling the Antichrist in the hated Kaiser; on the German, that they were carrying on God's fight. "*Gott mit uns*," the slogan rang; and because God was with them, they were against the forces of evil, the loathed imperialists who were encircling Germany and preventing her from achieving the expansion that divine right had decreed. Church and state combined on both sides to keep the myths alive, but they reckoned without a force

¹ "A gratifying and seemly thing it is to die for one's country."

more potent than propaganda: common humanity which succeeded at last in piercing through the smoke screen of lies and prejudice. There is an eloquent bit of dialogue in R. C. Sherriff's *Journey's End*, laid at the time of the German offensive in 1918, which has its counterpart in almost every work that deals directly with the war.

It occurs during the scene wherein Osborne, representative of the best in the British army, tries to make young Raleigh understand what war is. "The Germans are really quite decent, aren't they?" the boy remarks, catching himself quickly. "I mean, outside the newspapers?" "Yes," Osborne answers, continuing after a pause: "I remember up at Wipers we had a man shot when he was out on patrol. Just at dawn. We couldn't get him in that night. He lay out there groaning all day. Next night three of our men crawled out to get him in. It was so near the German trenches that they could have shot our fellows one by one. But, when our men began dragging the wounded man back over the rough ground, a big German officer stood up in the trenches and called out: 'Carry him!'—and our fellows stood up and carried the man back, and the German fired some lights for them to see by. . . . Next day we blew each other's trenches to blazes."²

Sherriff, it is true, was writing in 1928, from the perspective of distance that had helped to give facts their just proportion; but as early as 1917, Bernard Shaw, assuming an allegorical style, had striven to waken the conscience of thinking men in his so-called fantasia in the Russian manner, *Heartbreak House*, a play which unmasked the Europe which made the World War possible. In a preface which later accompanied the published work he tells some wholesome truths, not the less important for coming after the evil they sought to correct: "Not only were Shakespeares and Platos being killed outright, but many of the best harvests of the survivors had to be sown in the barren soil of the trenches. And this was no mere British consideration. To a truly civilized man, to the good European, the slaughter of the German youth was as disastrous as the English. Fools exulted in 'German losses.' They were our losses as well. Imagine exulting in the death of Beethoven because Bill Sykes dealt him his death blow!"

² Editor's Note: The sympathy of percussion. See above, p. 29.—W. W.

Almost continuously for the next ten years and more, other writers were dramatizing the gigantic catastrophe. Somerset Maugham in 1920 wrote *The Unknown*; Ernst Toller, imprisoned as a dangerous revolutionist, produced in 1919 *Die Wandlung* in the white heat of his fury against the war machine, following it four years later with his expressionist drama, *Hinkemann*, which traces so harrowing a picture of one man's calvary in the aftermath that only the chaotic unreality of the dramatic form makes it possible to bear.³

In France H. R. Lenormand, a master of the new psychology, explored in his play of the coward, *Le Lâche*, the mind and emotions of an artist who, physically weak, abhorred every form of violence and went through agonies of spiritual torture to avoid being sent to the front. It is the inner tragedy of the condemned, those who "die many times before their death" for a fault chargeable to nature and a necessity imposed by man. The subject, antipathetic to most writers, found an able exponent in Lenormand who in his almost medieval belief in the active power of evil, revealed its influence, through the medium of war, upon one of the darker aspects of the human psyche.

These, with Zweig's and Rolland's allegorical dramas, are but a few chosen from the hundreds, to indicate the various directions taken by the creative mind. In the United States the first and at the same time the best war play exploded with the shock of a powerful shell at the Plymouth Theatre, New York, during the season of 1924. Laurence Stallings, co-author of *What Price Glory?* had fought in the war. He had been in it at the worst period, and had returned maimed and, like the rest, emotionally shattered. He had seen men brutalized by trench life; he had watched, day by day, the disintegration, physical and moral, of pitiful wretches who could no longer be recognized as human beings. His resentment cried for expression, but it was only after his experiences had crystallized into the material for art that, with Maxwell Anderson as collaborator, he wrote his tremendous indictment.

"*What Price Glory?* is a play of war as it is," the program warned the audience, "not as it has been presented theatrically for hundreds

³ Toller committed suicide in the United States in 1939.

of years. The soldiers talk and act much as soldiers the world over. The speech of men under arms is universally and constantly interlarded with profanity . . .”

Wilfred Owen had commented upon the fact in one of his poems:

I have perceived much beauty

In the hoarse oaths that kept our courage straight.

Barbusse in *Le Feu* had made it the subject of a pathetically amusing scene when, while he is writing in the trenches, one of his men expresses the suspicion that he will make them talk like proper folk—the way the people back there, at home, would have them talk, all the *gros mots* chastely indicated by asterisks.

What Price Glory? shook New York out of all complacency. Here the evils of war were no longer wrapped in sentimental glamor, but shown naked for what they were, in the convincing art of the theatre. For two breathless hours the audience lived with the men in the French farmhouse behind the lines, followed them in their wine-cellar dug-out, and groaned with desperation when, returning spent and wounded from their terrific battle, the soldiers were ordered back to fight. People sat tense through revolting scenes, not knowing whether to admire or shudder at those creatures, impervious now to everything but death. Pious souls, missing the burning message of the play, tried to have it closed on moral grounds. But the public now wanted the truth and *What Price Glory?* remained for the rest of a successful run.

In the novel the protest against war was heard even earlier, coming, as was to be expected, from men who had been thrown into the fray in its initial stages. *Men in War* by Andreas Latzko, an Austrian army officer, was perhaps the first of the hundreds of war books to receive universal attention. Its vivid sketches, compacted in their fidelity of the mud and blood of the trenches, appeared in America in 1918, just in time to make the nation reflect whether it had done wisely to send the flower of her youth to so futile a carnage. Two years later Latzko published a novel, *The Judgment of Peace*. A powerful arraignment, it was still too close to the facts for the author to write without bias. Full of hate though it was for war, the makers of war and the cruelties of a vindictive peace, it showed little

of that brotherhood of man which it advocated, and differed only in its honest attempt at fairness from such partisan accounts as *My Memoirs* by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, and *Ludendorff's Own Story*, both published the same year.

But by that time Henri Barbusse had written *Le Feu*, his searing document of the war, which, as if the picture he painted were too black for mortal eyes, he alleviated with the light of hope in *Clarté*. Both novels were the outcome of the early years of the war. In *Le Feu* he used the simple device of a journal recording the vicissitudes of his squad. With uncanny visual lucidity he sought out the least detail, omitting nothing, however degrading, to reveal the unmitigated horror of the thing he condemned. Never, before or since, has such a picture been drawn of war, from the physical misery of trench life, to the soul-killing effect of the profession of murder. There are scenes which even in the distance of years lose none of their power: the shooting of the young soldier for running back from the line of fire; the finding of Eudoxie's rotting body by the man who had loved her, hopelessly. But it is in the scenes of actual battle, toward the end of *Le Feu*, that the author dares to look into the very depths of the abyss.

Perhaps because of his despair at the futility of it all Barbusse sought to persuade himself that it had not been in vain, and that out of the fearful devastation some great truth might arise for humanity. With renewed faith in society, he announced his message of hope in *Clarté*, out of which grew the international group of that name, preaching peace, the solidarity of nations, and the social equality of all citizens—to which high aims time has made sardonic commentary in the wars which have since spilled blood in Ethiopia, in Asia Minor, in China, in Africa, in Spain—in Europe!

More realistic because earlier disenchanted in their life, American writers saw no ray in the blackness. "War is hell," they agreed, and as hell they wrote of it, some well, some not so well, a few superbly. The first two notable war books, *One Man's Initiation* and *Three Soldiers* brought John Dos Passos to the fore as a realist of the first importance though as yet he had not discovered the swift, cinema technique of his social novels. Both books stripped war of all

romance, and certainly *Three Soldiers* will hold its place as a valuable human record. It is in the later novels of Dos Passos, however, most particularly in his trilogy published as *U.S.A.*, that he has made the most effective use of his assimilation of world events. In the largeness of its scope *U.S.A.* is in itself a history of the war and its effects on America.

For the present generation, and probably for generations to come, it is *A Farewell to Arms* that will remain the book of the war for its tragic love story and the still starker tragedy of Caporetto. When Ernest Hemingway wrote his novel he was some ten years removed from the events he described. He had come back from his self-imposed exile in France and from his tutelage to Gertrude Stein; and he had a considerable amount of work behind him in published novels and short stories. In *A Farewell to Arms*, however, he realized to the full the strength of which he had so far given only intimations. In the rushing narrative it is not so much Lieutenant Frederick Henry who is the protagonist as the army of which he is a part, not alone the army, but the whole, unholy complex of war, which one entered for the fun of the thing but which in the end when love, friendship, body, and spirit had been crushed by it, wrung out the wormwood wisdom: "I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain . . . I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it."

Hemingway has been called the American Byron; but Byron had had no such real causes to be obsessed by violence and death. If Hemingway is Byronic it is because he has wished to be an active participant in life, seeking out by preference its stronger passions whether of love or of war. Again, Hemingway has been accused of having no political or social convictions, of being attracted, for example, by the spectacle of war instead of searching into the causes that make it. But then, is there not conviction enough in the manner of a novelist's treatment of his subject? Hemingway could have glorified Caporetto—as no doubt it has been done—into a lofty sacrifice, appropriately epitaphed with *Dulce et decorum* . . . In-

stead he has us see it as a huge Golgotha, one of the many sky-reaching mounds which mankind has been fond of raising only to find at their summit a grinning skull. It was Hemingway whom Gertrude Stein had in mind when for a moment uncryptic she evolved the meaningful phrase of the "lost generation"; and him it best suited perhaps, until recently, when from his barren research of death in the bullring and in the green hills of Africa, he saw it for the first time ennobled among the fighters for freedom in Spain.

Edward Estling Cummings it was, however, who, before he became the poet e. e. cummings, produced the most unique, and some would have it, the best, book of the war when his connection with a letter-writing friend brought him to a concentration camp on suspicion of espionage. There was no evidence against him except that he knew Mr. B. It was enough, nevertheless, for the French government to take him from the Norton Harjes Division for which he had been driving an ambulance, and send him off under guard to Macé, a virtual prisoner "for the duration of the war." *The Enormous Room* was the outcome. Though only indirectly an arraignment of the war, its implications reaching as deep and as far as the perceptions of an extraordinarily keen artist, it conveys a more annihilating sense of the debasement of the individual under the conditions produced by war than any description of the shambles of the battlefield. For here it is human dignity that is every day degraded, and the human spirit that is done to death.

It remained for an Englishwoman to write the heart-wrung testament of war's youth. Vera Brittain's personal record of the war did not appear until 1933; even after such lapse of time it must still have taken great courage to recall and set down scenes so harrowing, and to reckon again losses so cruel. *Testament of Youth* is a narrative of the war as deceived young idealists saw it at the front, and as their sisters and sweethearts lived it in the war hospitals and at home during the anguished years of the actual fighting and the disheartening period of reconstruction when post-war Europe was struggling to rise out of the wreckage of civilization. More than all that, it is the story of another lost generation, one that never found its way back to the world of the living.

The Jazz Age and Other Hysteria

Meanwhile another period had long set in as one more of the varied manifestations of the post-war era. For the effect of the war itself was not to be found alone in the expression of creative writers, but in the changing aspect of the life of the people. As every year brought different developments, it was gradually becoming evident that the war had not only succeeded in undermining, and in some cases overthrowing, the social and political structures of nations, making way for entirely new forms of society, but it had shaken the faith in the once secure assumptions of progressive civilization. By 1925 there was no longer any doubt that the world of the day was centuries removed—some thought centuries behind—the world of 1914.

Yet materially the people were better off during the period of readjustment, at least in England and America. The pre-war dream of a car in every garage was coming nearer realization in the march of unparalleled prosperity, and few cared to give much thought to the probity of ways and means provided the end were profitable. For the war had also shattered moral values. People were unsure of themselves. Tottering, as they had been, on the very crater of hell, with death as a constant companion, they challenged in the precariousness of their living the rules of conduct by which they had been constrained to abide. A short life but a merry one, became their motto. If they had doubts of their mental or physical health, there was the wonder-worker Coué who promised miraculous cures by the simple repetition of the charm, "Every day in every way I am getting better and better." If they had moments of backward-looking regret for the dear ones they had lost, there was the handy consolation of the Ouija board which brought them into communication with the departed, and a plentiful supply of handbooks on spiritualism, volumes advertised in the book review sections under such titles as *Life After Death*, *On the Threshold of the Unknown*, *How to Speak with the Dead*. Since such otherwise unimpeachable sages as Sir Oliver Lodge and James Barrie believed in the unknown, surely there must be something in it. The more skeptical found easy forgetfulness in the newly-established speak-easy, offspring of what

was ridiculed as the "blue-nose law," the Prohibition Amendment which went into effect on the 16th of January, 1920, after a prolonged debate.

As with every reform instituted during President Wilson's administration, it was founded on the sincerest idealism. As early as 1917 Congress had submitted to the States the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which made illegal the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages—as a war measure, to conserve grain as food supply for the maintenance of the war machine that was soon going into action. The result was such as its supporters would not have imagined in their wildest dreams. Instead of the expected sobriety, moral recklessness followed; the country went on a drunken spree. True, the saloons were outlawed, but in their place came illicit resorts where bootleg liquor flowed freely—at a price—and drunkenness was made attractive by a sense of daring. From the first, gangs set themselves up in the liquor traffic, arranging for contraband from Europe, Canada, Bermuda, the West Indies. Crime flourished, causing whole cities to be terrorized by a new rule, the rule of violence and intimidation. Worst of all, America became a nation of law-breakers with a reputation for crime that made the name of one of its greatest cities a byword for vice.

But Wilson, in the meantime, had been succeeded by a man who might well have stood as the symbol for the dawning era, Warren Harding, handsome, easygoing, unscrupulous, a pagan against the Christian idealist whom his followers saw sinking into private life, a broken, tragic figure whose most cherished aim, the Covenant of the League of Nations, his vision of a practical internationalism, he had to recognize as chimera.

Indeed, from 1920 on, the nation revealed itself strongly isolationist, with a growing mistrust of foreign elements which it proceeded to keep out by severe restrictions in immigration. Whatever was not American was suspect, especially since the Russian Revolution in 1917 which gave a resurgence of hope to radical and labor groups everywhere. In spite of the fact that the war was over, measures that had been found necessary during those trying times were still being enforced. Strikes were ruthlessly crushed and censorship under Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer reached a peak of terror

in what was accurately described as his "war on the Reds." Under his direction, suspected radicals were rounded up, imprisoned, and made to confess incredible plots under the persuasion of the third degree. It was therefore scarcely surprising that the post-office officials often intercepted bombs neatly packaged and addressed to the Attorney General. But there was going to be no Red agitation in the United States if the authorities could help it, and it must be said they did their best.

Ole Hanson, "the fighting mayor," turned literary for the emergency and early in 1920 issued a handbook, *Americanism Versus Bolshevism*, in which he demonstrated how he had nipped the I.W.W. revolution in the bud, established the connection between Bolshevism and the I.W.W.'s of America, and outlined a method for exterminating such subversive activities.

The climax of the Red scare came, however, when two Italians were arrested after a payroll robbery in South Braintree, Massachusetts (April, 1920), which resulted in the death of two men. There was nothing against the suspects, Niccolo Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, except that they were poor, foreign, and active in the working-class movement; but from the beginning, although the robbery pointed to the Morelli gang, theirs was a lost cause, tried in the neighborhood and in the fever of intolerance of the Salem of 1692. For seven years groups of radicals and intellectuals kept the case before the conscience of the nation; but the rest of the people were too busy watching their rising stocks to give any thought to the fate of a fish peddler and a poor cobbler who were executed in August, 1927, their only obituaries, besides the screaming headlines, their own moving protestations of innocence and the play, *Gods of the Lightning*, written in 1928 by Maxwell Anderson and Harold Hickerson. For years the fate of the two victims of a fanatical justice kept haunting the mind of Anderson who made it again the underlying theme of one of his finest poetic dramas, *Winterset*.

It is not the least of history's little ironies that so dark a tragedy should have been enacted during what has now come to be known as the Jazz Age. It was, however, only one of the incongruities of a period rich in neuroses, sensational crimes, and transvalued values. Perhaps it was F. Scott Fitzgerald who gave the era its name. At

any rate he, more vividly than any other writer, captured it in his novels and short stories which followed one another with the speed that characterized the age itself. *This Side of Paradise*, published in 1920, came as a self-revealing flash to the demoralized post-war generation. Avidly everyone read it, finding compensation in its honesty for the unpleasantness of its truths. Soon afterward Fitzgerald issued a volume of short stories, *The Jazz Age*, and then another novel, *The Beautiful and Damned*, epitomizing in its title the tragic quality and spiritual stagnation of those who had come to maturity during the years of transition, before old standards had quite died and new ones taken their place.

The Waste Land

However, the evangel of the writers who were to express the darker and deeper values of their era was contained in T. S. Eliot's poem, *The Waste Land*, which delivered its disheartening prophecy in 1923. Eliot is the modern Prometheus in verse, with the difference that whereas the Prometheus of legend plucked his fire from the gods, Eliot kindles his own to show his generation where true poetry lies: if anywhere, certainly not in the passive imitation of past achievement. "It is exactly as wasteful for a poet to do what has been done already, as for a biologist to rediscover Mendel's discoveries." Accordingly he lighted his own way to new goals, leaving it to others to follow in his tracks, too often through obscurity but never without reward. *The Waste Land* came on the waiting moment, giving a name both to a condition in the external world and to the aridity he found in the soul of man. The individual of the past was dead; a race of mechanical puppets had taken his place. Love, that spiritual resurrection which in nature wrought its miracle with every spring, has lost all meaning as passion has been degraded or slain. Religion has become a form of crystal gazing. No longer do beauty and art exist as sufficient unto themselves, but to serve some debasing, practical need. In vain will the modern Galahad seek the chalice of the Resurrection; at the end of his half-hearted pilgrimage he will find the temple dark.

The Waste Land has had an enormous influence, for like the romantic revolt of Byron after Europe had been bled white by the

Napoleonic wars, Eliot's spiritual pessimism found its followers among the weary and disenchanted, the futilitarians who looked on life, found it not good, and made a cult of their despair, instead of hurling their revolt in the world's face as their predecessors had done. Despising their times, they either withdrew into themselves or lived in the past and the future. Some strove by changing their locale to break the curse of a loathed civilization.

Thus for nearly a decade after the armistice, poets and novelists picked up their typewriters and climbed the nearest gangplank in quest of those fresh fields and pastures new which, unfortunately, never succeeded in reviving the spirits of their dejected Pegasus. Tahiti, Provence, Southern Italy, Majorca, Mexico, the Pacific coast—somehow, wherever they went, the grass shrivelled under their feet to the vast, arid stretches of the Waste Land. Of the poets one only, Robinson Jeffers, made that wilderness bloom again, but with bitter and violent fruit, the dragon's teeth he sowed from his worship of the primitive past bringing forth no spiritual nourishment but only the harvest of death. For a long time, well into the 1930's, many writers lingered in the Waste Land, some penetrating more deeply into the desert of pessimism and despair, a few, like Archibald MacLeish, finding their way out in the revolutionary movement.

For still another post-war group, no spot on the face of the earth, not even the Waste Land, offered foothold. They were the intransigently disillusioned, those who after overcoming their sense of furious impotence against the nightmare and shell shock of an effete civilization, determined to take revenge upon it. Chaos was everywhere; even the reality in which they had been taught to believe had broken down. Some, like the German Remarque in his *All Quiet on the Western Front* and the still sadder *Three Comrades*, turned that fury of impotence against war which he blamed as the cause for the surrounding gloom. Others rationalized it into a recurrent malady of the century which threw off its ills for those recoveries that make for progress. One thing was definite. The world had to be built anew and life lived so that every moment counted—to atone, it may be, for the millions of lives to which the war had given only the supreme moment of death.

The Surrealist Revolution

In the cult of the Futurists, Dadaists, Surrealists, or whatever other names they gave themselves, the moment was raised to what they thought an absolute, although in the previous century, when passion and ecstasy had been smothered in the plush of Victorianism, Walter Pater had already announced that gospel to the waiting young: "Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive for us—for that moment only."

To the post-war worshippers it was the phrase, "for that moment only" that was all significant. Accordingly, they took the cinema with its rapidly shifting scenes and its break-up of time as the technique to follow, and the savage beat of American jazz as the rhythm of their living. Einstein, much talked about and little understood, gave them sanction with his new philosophy of space to believe in the destruction of reality, and Freud further encouraged it by his extension of the dream.

Although most of the modernist schools, both in literature and in art, had originated in the early years of the war—Marinetti's Futurism in 1914, and Dadaism in 1916 at Zurich—they developed and died in the 1920's, except for Surrealism, whose manifesto André Breton issued in 1924 and whose practitioners, in art especially, are still making progress, perhaps because form, better than sense, can lend itself more easily to the requisite break-up.

Tristan Tzara, a Rumanian Jew who wrote in France, is said to have been the father of DADA, later adopted by Louis Aragon, André Breton, Jean Cocteau, Philippe Soupault, and many others. Tzara it was, at any rate, who issued the manifestoes from time to time. "DADA is our intensity," Samuel Putnam translates. "DADA is life without slippers or parallel; which is against and for unity and decidedly against the future; we know wisely that our brains will become down cushions. . . . We are circus masters and go whistling among the winds of fairs among the convents prostitutions theatres realities sentiments restaurants

HoHiHoHo Bang Bang

We declare that the auto is a feeling that has coddled us sufficiently in the sluggishness of its abstractions and the transatlantics and the voices and the ideas. . . .

DADA is not madness—nor wisdom—nor irony look at me pretty bourgeois”

DADA was, what it called itself elsewhere, a demolition enterprise to wipe out all traces of the war. People wanted to feel themselves alive, and if in order to do so they had to go mad—why blessed madness! Certainly no aberration could be worse than the insanity of war. However it was, DADA grew by leaps and bounds, spreading over Europe and crossing the ocean to America. DADA clubs were founded in Berlin and Cologne. Moscow boasted its exponents who like Andrei Biely declared that static forms as man knew them would be broken, that established literary mediums would give way to “syncretic panoramas,” and life itself be lived on a plane of multiple, contrasting apprehensions. In Germany DADA had such influence that Tzara credited it with bringing about the German revolution. Then DADA died and Surrealism took its place.

The first number of *La Révolution Surréaliste*, issued by its leaders, André Breton, Louis Aragon, and Philippe Soupault, posed the startling question, “Is suicide a way out?” It was no mere shocker to faze the long-suffering bourgeois. For some years Breton and Soupault, students of Freud, Jastrow, and Myers, had been delving into the mysteries of the subconscious, and from the subconscious veered to the investigation of spiritualism and automatic writing—researches which long before them had waylaid Gertrude Stein in her effort “to get to the very core of the communication of the intuition.” Hers was more or less the aim of the Surrealists. “The old view of art is ruled out,” writes Samuel Putnam, their able apologist. “The constructive intelligence is banished and what we have is, rather . . . poetic *incantation*. . . . Art now becomes a tampering with the powers of darkness, as focussed by the modern subconscious; and literary, or rather, poetic, composition . . . becomes an automatic process.”

With the revolution of the conscious or reasoning mind, it was but a step to the revolution of language, a revolution which derived

primarily from the work of James Joyce whose stream-of-consciousness novel, *Ulysses*, had begun to appear as early as 1918 in Margaret Anderson's *Little Review* in America.

The Surrealists, however, named as their parent the French poet Arthur Rimbaud, who, doubtless, had claim to the title in his scorn of the limited language of idea and his striving to create a strange and wonderful idiom that should reveal soul to soul and, demolishing the barriers of the known, reach out toward the unknown where alone wonder dwelt.

Unhappily, in their attempt to arrive at the communication of intuition, the Surrealists ultimately became unintelligible, although in the sphere of painting the mind can still manage to extract some recognizable perceptions from Chirico's tombstones, bananas, temples, and horses, and Dali's Dutch Temptation of St. Anthony monstrosities and repeated portrayals of his (so he says) paternal grasshopper.

Together with the French Surrealists both Gertrude Stein and James Joyce have persevered in their fourth-dimensional non-communicative word-spinning. It is unfair to quote from Joyce's latest *Finnegans Wake* without resorting to lengthy explanations from the glossaries of his interpreters. But to illustrate the workings of that "free association" which underlies his creative process as well as that of less successful, because less etymologically erudite, imitators, we shall cite a characteristic passage and then forever hold our peace: "For if the lingo gasped between kicksheets were to be preached from the mouths of wickerchurchwardens and metaphysicians in the row and advokaatoes, allvoyous, demivoyelles, languoaths, lesbiels, dentelles, gutterhowls and furtz, where would their practice be or where the human race itself were the Pythagorean sesquipedalia of the panepistemion, grunted and gromwelled, ichabod, habakuk, opanoff, uggamyg, hapaxle, gomenon, ppppfff, over country stiles, behind slated dwellinghouses, down blind lanes, or, when all fruit fails, under some sacking left on a coarse cart?"

No doubt to the few who like Joyce have a knowledge of seventeen languages the passage will come with the impact of some supernal revelation. To the uninitiate it remains, even with the notes meticulously compiled like the paper of instructions accom-

panying a difficult puzzle, something this side of sense. None will deny the importance of Joyce in the expansion of the novel as the twentieth century inherited it, of his researches into the subliminal, and his experiments with language. In each instance he has gone as far as it is possible for one to go. Nevertheless, even to the intelligent reader many parts of *Ulysses* and much of *Finnegans Wake* remain far away and forbidding, a dark cabala, to be transmitted with the gift of languages and the thaumaturgy to render them intelligible to the elect of every generation. The rabbinate has already been founded; the ages, if the second World War will not destroy life itself, will provide the succession.

With the establishment of the various literary, aesthetic, and psychopathic cults, there came a flurry of magazines, more or less short-lived. Most of them were published by expatriates in Italy, France, Germany, and later Majorca. Exclusiveness marked them all, and snobbishness not a few. One of the earliest, *Broom* (to sweep away the past?), was printed by Americans in Rome where the dollar had phenomenal purchasing power. In 1922, in Vienna, Gorham Munson issued its rival, *Secession*; both were dead within a few years. In Paris, the Englishman Ford Madox Ford initiated the *Transatlantic Review*, where Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, E. E. Cummings and Gertrude Stein rubbed shoulders with Wells, Hardy, and Conrad. Brancusi, who had yet to puzzle the New York port authorities on the delicate question as to whether to tax his sculptures as raw material or let them in duty free as art, appeared in photograph with that other bugbear of the bourgeois, the sculptor Jacob Epstein.

Then came *This Quarter*, *transition*, and Ezra Pound's *Exile*, which, following the linguistic trend, arrogantly warned: "Anybody attempting to contribute to this periodical ought to know at least two languages." Until the close of the 'twenties the influence of the so-called "pure art" magazines made itself felt, as ivory towers were busily constructed and the artist removed himself from contaminating realities. But an unknown and portentous reality had in the meantime come upon the world, threatening not only the dwellers of the ivory tower but civilization as well.

Culture under Fascism

In 1923, during Ludendorff's white *putsch* in Germany, a nervous little man whose presence no one was particularly noticing, leapt upon a table in a Munich beer hall and fired a revolver in the air. Adolf Hitler was arrested and imprisoned for two years, but the shot from his revolver was the waking alarum of Nazism and the death of German, perhaps of European, culture. The biggest-selling book of Nazi Germany came out of that event, for in the prison, not yet improved by the sadistic refinements of the Nazi mind, Hitler began his autobiographical *Mein Kampf*. In Munich, he said, he had experienced revelation and he became a fanatical anti-Semite; for, he explained, the Jews had inaugurated capitalism, and then plotted the war that had defeated Germany. "Anti-Semitism," he declared, "is the key to world history." And he accordingly dedicated himself to make it.

At that time Germany, like the rest of Europe, was suffering the demoralization of the war's aftermath. Berlin was a capital of vice. The working and the middle classes were depressed; the professional class was disinherited. The people at large had sunk into despair, listening for a voice that should lead them out of darkness. As usual the loudest voice was the one they followed, and the Führer showed them the way. "For our liberation," he shouted to a famished people, "we need more than economic policies; what we need are pride, spite, hatred and once more, hatred."

Pride of race became the watchword, and hatred, the method. The world must be saved for the Aryans, incarnate in the German race. Spokesmen for the racist cult sprang up on every hand, and the Nazi era was inaugurated, with a bow, on the political side, to Italy which had digressed from a frustrate proletarian revolution after the war, to a successful, middle-class counter-revolution that had placed Mussolini and his Fascists in power and converted the country to a totalitarian state.

In Germany, as well, totalitarianism was established, and everyone now was made to toe the line. Artists and writers, if not exactly forced into the brown Nazi uniforms, goose-stepped to the tune of the Horst Wessel song. Banners, parades, brass buttons, and mili-

tarism were the order of the day. Less learning and more military drill were urged. "The German," cried Göring, "thinks with blood"—and so, to keep that blood pure, German life underwent a complete catharsis of what were considered the corrupting elements. Powerful Jews, and Jews not so powerful, were exiled, and their property and money confiscated. Literature was subjected to examination by a special board for the detection of such pernicious doctrines as liberty and the right of self-assertion.

Soon the National Chamber of Culture was formed, to which all writers had to belong before they were permitted to write. There were some courageous spirits who refused to put their intellects in a straight-jacket. For them there was no room in Germany. Those who were not exiled were placed in concentration camps. Ludwig Renn, the poet, was among the rebels, and was therefore imprisoned. Erich Mühsam was tortured to death; Erich Baron was murdered. Von Ossietzky, the Nobel Prize winner, languished for years in a cell that was by courtesy called a hospital ward. Many others vanished without a trace. A few, too old to fight, compromised; others did away with themselves.

Of the old school Gerhardt Hauptmann, once a pleader for socialism in *The Weavers*, became a Social Democrat. Then, in *The Golden Harp*, he struck the chords for the Nazis.

It was Horst Wessel, a leader of the Storm Troopers and a maker of fighting songs, who became the national saint. He sang:

When Jewish blood spills from the knife
Things go well again.

The ceremonial of the death of German culture, however, was not celebrated until May 10, 1933. For weeks all of Berlin was in a fever of exaltation. Libraries and bookshops were raided with the sanction of the government, and the plunder was brought to Franz Joseph Platz. More than twenty thousand volumes guilty of containing "the seeping poison of liberalism" were piled up in a mound, and like another Alexandria, were set afire. Spinoza, Lessing, Freud, Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, had their works burned. The books of Heinrich Heine and Remarque, Wasserman and Franz Werfel, dead poets and living men, went up in smoke. "Jewish intellectual-

ism is dead!" rejoiced Göbbels at the ceremony. "The German folk can express itself again."

Stefan George, now dead, was the favorite writer of the Nazis and by them extolled above Goethe. Before the war he had been an aesthete who paid more attention to bindings and margins than to the contents of his books. After the war he appointed himself the inspirer of patriotic youth and produced *Das Neue Reich* celebrating a Germany born out of blood and spirit. Man he exalted; woman he degraded. The new Germany was a place for heroes and force. Too late for peace; too late for liberalism. As he himself put it in one of his poems:

Too late for patience and the cure.
Ten thousand must the holy madness seize;
Ten thousand must the holy pestilence slay,
Ten thousand the holy war.

In the light of present events he grossly underestimated his figures.

As with the higher voices, so with the lesser who took up the chorus. Paul Ernst, Hans Johst, Gottfried Benn, all sang in the same strain. Even the children's books shrilled a falsetto of violence and militarism. From *Our Army*, a picture book for the babes of the Third Reich, comes the nursery rhyme:

What puffs and patters?
What clicks and clatters?
I know what, oh, what fun!
It's a lovely Gatling gun!

The novel, the theatre, the radio, the films were imbued with the Nazi spirit. Intellect was despised, culture taboo. In Hans Johst's play, *Schlageter*, which was produced with great success, a professor shouts amid acclaim: "Away with the whole mess of philosophy! When I hear the word culture, I pull out my revolver!"

In Italy, on the other hand, Mussolini was loud in his praise of culture, making large boasts that under Fascism art would flourish and literature have a rebirth. It is true that under his direction whole acres of ancient Rome have been uncovered, showing to millions of wistful men and women the baths and the plumbing that are lacking in their own houses. It is true that every post of vantage is occupied by a new trousered hero in marble. It is true that the arias of

Rossini and Verdi have been almost superseded by the intolerably cheap strains of "Giovinezza" and "Faccetta Nera," fruit of the Ethiopian campaign, and that Toscanini, perhaps the greatest conductor the world has ever known, is a willing exile from his native land. And it is true that many books are published in Italy today.

But what literature is being produced? D'Annunzio, the hero of Fiume, is dead; but as most of his works belonged to the past, posthumous fame can neither add nor detract from his accomplishment. Pirandello, recipient of the Nobel Prize, had preceded D'Annunzio to the grave by a few years. In spite of the many honors heaped upon him by the Fascist government, he died a disappointed old man, weighed down by the knowledge that in the end he had failed the youth who worshipped him. In one of his last plays, *When One is Someone*, he made thinly veiled allusions to his apostasy—for surely the aging poet, the Someone who is not even given a name, is Pirandello himself, a ghost surrounded by those who still come to him, for the sake of his past. The same hopelessness, the same weariness of having lived too long, informed his last short stories, whose characters, if they are to be taken as true to the society in which they lived, reveal a picture of such decay and spiritual stagnation that utter extinction seems preferable.

Grazia Deledda, the Nobel Prize winner for 1926, had never in her long life been troubled by large issues. She had no difficulty, therefore, in making the transition to Fascism. For a decade she continued to write complacently of safe things in a shaky world. One of her last novels, *L'Argine*, was so negative in quality that it disappointed even the partial press.

Hundreds of books, despite a strict censorship made effective in 1934, still come flooding the market; some of them, popular novels by second-rate writers, even become best sellers. Among the younger novelists Alberto Moravia, an Italian Aldous Huxley, has managed to shock the public with *The Indifferent Ones* and *Wheel of Fortune*, both novels of unusual talent, but so corrupt and so far removed from life as one knows it, that they might almost have been written in a nightmare.

Besides works approved by the official Argus, there are published numerous scholarly volumes. One author, for example, will devote

a tome to the women of Ariosto; another will do the same service for Dante's, while still another will try to establish once again the relation between a matron with many children and the sonnets of Petrarch.

As for poetry, it is hardly alive. Not even the hothouse breath of Marinetti, from whom Mussolini learned so much, animates it any longer, now that he has become the mummy of the Futurism he created. Nevertheless books of poetry do appear, praising the Duce and his works or singing nostalgically of "far-off things, and battles long ago." The younger poets have nothing to recommend them because they have nothing to say. They dare not sing, as Leopardi and Carducci had done, of aspirations beyond the present moment.

Culturally Fascism is like a swamp lush with many growths but where none may find solid ground for the feet, or wholesome nurture for the soul. If the literature of present-day Italy will be remembered, it is thanks to the work of writers like Ignazio Silone—an exile.

From Coolidge to Roosevelt

While such changes were taking place in Europe as inevitable outgrowths of the first World War, the stringent peace, and the demagogic playing on mass emotion for some real or imagined nationalist ideal, America was experiencing transitions of her own. The Harding administration, terminated by the President's death under mysterious circumstances, brought to light such shocking political corruption involving officials in the highest places, that prosecution was the only way out. The Teapot Dome scandal alone jailed Albert B. Fall, Secretary of the Interior, while scores of others in positions of equal trust, were implicated in transactions of the shadiest character.

Under President Coolidge confidence in the government was to a certain extent restored, but the harm had been done; spiritually the people looked for nothing and found nothing. Those were the years of *Flaming Youth* and the Elinor Glyn novels; of sex emancipation and alcohol which because it was forbidden had the added zest of sin; of stock-market gambling and belief in the crystal gazer, religiously consulted to propitiate the goddess Fortuna; of the sordid

Hall-Mills and Snyder-Gray murder trials; of the Gilbert-and-Sullivan absurdity of the Scopes case involving the right to teach the theory of evolution in southern schools; of extravagant spending, of materialism, and moral disintegration.

Never before, however, had the nation enjoyed such prosperity. Present and future looked so fair that everyone believed another golden age had come where unemployment was unheard of and the poor-house obsolete. Indeed, when Herbert Hoover made his acceptance speech for the presidency after defeating Alfred E. Smith, he declared: "We in America today are nearer to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of any land. We have not yet reached the goal, but, given a chance to go forward with the policies of the last eight years, we shall soon, with the help of God, be in sight of the day when poverty shall be banished from the nation."

The echo of his words had hardly died when the bright prophecy was engulfed in the reality of October 24, 1929, that "Black Thursday" which saw the market collapse and with it the paper fortunes of the people. The years of depression had come, the ten lean kine whose shadow none had seen looming over the fat pastures. The Reckless 'Twenties had given way to the Sober 'Thirties.

When, in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected by an overwhelming majority which thought that by defeating the party in power it would also put an end to the causes of the depression, there was a general expectancy everywhere, like that attending the advent of a wonder worker. Indeed, it would have taken nothing less than a miracle to restore the nation to a sound financial basis after the wild speculation of the Coolidge era, and the still more fundamental insecurity created the world over by the debts and obligations of the war, combined with the intensive resort to economic nationalism on the part of every country that had been involved in it.

Now came the period of the National Recovery Administration in an effort to bring capital and labor together on the amicable basis of fair competition; of the Public Works Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Federal Theatre and the Writers Projects, that discovered new talents which not only benefited the nation but also brought enjoyment and enlightenment to backward sec-

tions of the country, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and other well-meaning attempts to reform conditions which, as time showed, required radical cures rather than temporary alleviation.

Class-conscious Art

For the more ardent young the solution seemed to lie, until recently, in the direction of Moscow with its practical Five-Year Plans and its striving for a classless society. John Strachey's *The Coming Struggle for Power* gave capitalism not much longer to live and predicted that the Marxist philosophy would eventually triumph. Idealized by the enchantment of distance, the Soviet Union appeared the realization of the perfect state where every man stood tall in human dignity, knowing there was a place for him in the scheme of things. Revolution as a means to end war by placing nations and individuals on a basis of equality, gained adherents not only among those who had experience of the 1914 debacle, but among the new generation to whom it came as textbook history.

In 1933 the French writer André Malraux won the Prix Goncourt with his stirring revolutionary novel, *Man's Fate*, which came out of the uprising of 1924-27 in China when that mammoth country was torn asunder in the still-birth of a new social order. In it revolution itself is the hero, a terrific force that like another, more wonderful religion, inspired man to courage, grandeur, sacrifice. Here there was no longer the bitterness of Hemingway's Lieutenant Henry to whom sacrifice summoned the picture of the Chicago stockyards; for revolution in *Man's Fate* sowed death that from the blood of the victims might spring the seeds of a better life on earth. The same fervor burned through the Russian section of Vincent Sheean's *Personal History*, illuminated like some glorious old manuscript by the martyr-like devotion of its young revolutionary heroine, Rayna Prohme. Hundreds of books—novels, biographies, first-hand travel narratives extolling the fruits of revolution and the nobility of the cause—awoke a depressed humanity which again began turning toward hope.

Stirred by reports from abroad, American writers started to look about them and, finding home no Utopia, set about exposing social

injustices as a first step toward the building of the classless society. Strike novels and novels on the conditions of the sharecroppers, novels of protest and books of frank propaganda filled the publishers' lists. In the sociological field penetrating critics like Matthew Josephson with *The Robber Barons* and *The Politicos* and Ferdinand Lundberg with his *America's Sixty Families* revealed with passionate zeal the evils that pedestalled the idols of the American market place. Nothing was too sacred to be examined in the light of truth.

Out-Zola-ing Zola in realistic fiction, William Faulkner and Erskine Caldwell busily uncovered the decay of the South, Faulkner with the artistry of a magician in words if also with something of the black art; just as busily Stark Young and other lovers of the romantic tradition came forward piously to cover it again with lilac and magnolia. But the mischief had been done, for though the earth was smoothed and strewn with flowers, the smell of death still lingered. Even *Gone with the Wind* could not waft it away.

Most wonderful of all, the Negro found his champion, the poor white his defender. The class-conscious Negro lifted his voice to speak for his race, Angelo Herndon in his eloquent *Let Me Live* and Richard Wright in proud and beautiful short stories that raised Uncle Tom's children from their knees to their powerful feet.

It was now that the proletarian novel came to the fore, reaching its peak in John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*, beyond which in human sympathy and truth it is not possible to go. In it Steinbeck reached full stature not only as artist but as man—high praise indeed, for the novel had had as precursors dozens of excellent social documents, ranging from Millen Brand's sympathetically limned etching, *The Outward Room*, Jack Conroy's vigorous painting, *The Disinherited*, and the mechanistic canvases of Albert Halper's *The Foundry* and *The Chute*. Women as well as men treated the social scene, producing such books as Grace Lumpkin's *To Make My Bread*, Leane Zugsmith's *A Time to Remember*, and Ruth McKenney's feat of reportage, *Industrial Valley*.

Of a higher order because treated with the universality that transcends geographic boundaries, was James T. Farrell's *Studs*

Lonigan trilogy: *Studs Lonigan*, *The Young Manhood of Studs Lonigan*, and *Judgment Day*, comprising the life and death of a maladjusted youth in a society that had nothing but defeat to offer. The background of the novels is that part of Chicago in which live, procreate, and die the "lace-curtain" Irish, several degrees above the "shanty" Irish of America. But the locale is incidental in the social scheme, for Studs Lonigan was a potential *Child of Our Time*, the juvenile storm trooper whose story was told by Odon von Horvath, and own blood brother to Farrell's Tommy Gallagher of Brooklyn, selling Father Moylan's "Christian Justice" on street corners, hating the Jews, and consoling himself, when he is taunted by his hard-working family for his fanatical crusade, with the thought, "Hitler had known days like this, too!"

This brings us to the year 1939, and much had come to pass, during the decade, what with revolutions, wars, and more wars. Following the rise of Mussolini and Hitler, the Versailles dove of peace had quit forever its perch of bayonets, to find scarcely a spot in the whole eastern hemisphere to rest its weary wings. The sounds of marching boots echoed over Europe, Asia, and Africa; wars of conquest were fought and won in a glorification of bloodshed that made Mussolini's son, bombing a troop of Ethiopians, liken the flying, mangled bodies to the opening corolla of a rose! Had not Mussolini himself defined the Fascist state as "an embodiment of the will to power . . . which believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace"?

Throughout the 1930's, therefore, the shadow of death has hung over the children of the war generation, children who are now of the age of their parents in 1914-18, in a far more terrible, because a far more desperate, world.

Thus it is not to be wondered at that a profound consciousness of war and of the economic and social causes of war marks the work of contemporary writers as exemplified in the poems of Wystan H. Auden, Stephen Spender, Cecil Day Lewis and Louis MacNeice in England, Paul Green's satirical war fantasy *Johnny Johnson* and Irwin Shaw's *Bury the Dead* in America, and the poems of MacLeish, Kenneth Fearing and their juniors Muriel Rukeyser and Ben

Belitt. More than its elders, the younger generation is struggling to break with the past, the sower of desolation.

A world behind us, the west, is in flames,
writes Cecil Lewis,—

Devastated areas, works at a standstill;
No seed awakes, wary is no hunter,
The tame are ruined and the wild have fled.

For them, however, the world will not end with a whimper as with T. S. Eliot's despairing crew.

For years voices of warning continued to be raised after the Versailles Treaty, pointing out the dangers of a vindictive peace; but the nations, busy with self-defense, had no ear for prophets, not even when General Smuts cried out from his experience of two wars, a generation apart. "Unless a real measure of disarmament puts an end to the armed peace," he said in 1931, "we are making for another cataclysm which will be infinitely worse than the horrors of the Great War. . . . There will be no escape, not even for the statesmen and the war-makers, and the pall of death will rest over all. Even now the laboratories of three continents are busy with their deadly researches. And in due course some lunatic or criminal will press the button and the flower of the human race will be trapped and destroyed."

The button was pressed on the 1st of September, 1939. The second World War has begun.

How long will it last? What will it gain mankind? These are questions for the future to answer, though the record of the years between wars has been written in blood and with unexampled courage. Each returned soldier who forced himself to suffer again the death he had survived gave his answer to the second question, and the answer was: Nothing. To the first, civilization, mortally wounded, had replied: As long as it could bleed and yet live. Incredibly it lived and made a painful recovery, through heartbreak and despair, to renewal of hope that managed to wring from the dread purgation some comforting spiritual truth.

All these phases literature recorded in a few books that will live and in many others that served their day and are already forgotten.

We are yet too near to gauge as enduring literature the value of any work of the period between wars. It may be that a Thomas Wolfe whose titanic ego was touched but lightly by the cataclysm, a Eugene O'Neill whose powerful explosions were of the spirit within him, or a Robert Frost with his ingrained conviction that the poet's function is to observe and comment, rather than to participate in history, will be chosen for immortality above any of their contemporaries. It may be also, that nearsighted fame will not for a long time draw from obscurity the true genius of the age.

One thing alone is certain. The day of the ivory tower is over. Wherever one may be, whatever one's place in life, one can no longer be a spectator only in the war behind the war. On the intellectual front as on the field of the conflict the barricades have been set up. One has no choice but to take sides for or against humanity's survival.

THE RISE OF THE SOVIET STATE

■
David Krinkin

Soviet commentators on world affairs, as people familiar with their writings may have observed, rarely mention war without making some pointed reference to social change. Is there any significance in this apparently inevitable coupling of war and revolution in the Soviet mind? To explain it in terms of Marxian or Leninist political theory alone, would be reasonable enough, but inadequate; for this would omit any consideration of the experience of the Russians as a nation. Is this coupling of war and revolution also peculiarly Russian?

The history of the people in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics exhibits this conjuncture of war and social upheaval. The military insurrection of December, 1825—usually referred to as the “Decembrist Movement”—flowed directly out of the Napoleonic Wars, when the army officers of the Tsar stumbled upon the currents of French liberal thought. The Crimean War left far more in its wake than purely military disaster for the Russias: it ushered in the emancipation of the serfs and the other social reforms of 1861. At the turn of the century the War with Japan brought not only defeat to the Tsar, but the popular Revolution of 1905. And a dozen years later, while the allies of Nicholas II were still fighting the Central Powers,

Russia's autocracy had collapsed in the greatest social upheaval of all. Before December, 1917, the Revolution had instituted an entirely new regime, which announced itself to the world as a "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Clearly, "war" to the Soviet mind means both "war and revolution," for reasons of Soviet ideology as well as Russian national experience. Little wonder, therefore, that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been increasingly active during the past twenty years of gathering European tension. Little wonder, moreover, that so many of her interpreters have made false predictions and irrelevant explanations. For it is impossible to understand the course of Soviet international relations without at least an elementary conception of Soviet political theory as well as practice. In this chapter, then, we must investigate both the history of the new regime and the ideas that govern its actions. In the course of our study we shall encounter a variety of conditions apparently new in Western civilization as we have known it. We shall, at least, be in a better position to understand the international impact of the new social system whose immense population comprises one hundred and sixty-odd nationalities and one-sixth of the surface of the earth.

For all practical purposes, the history of Russia is outside the field of Western civilization, for the open plain which constitutes European Russia fell under other influences. From the northwest came the Norsemen, the first dynasts of the Russian Slavs; from the south, the Byzantine missionary, to proselytize for the Greek Orthodox church; and from the east, the Asiatic despots whose antipathy to liberty in any Western form was proverbial. We might well describe the culture fostered by the Muscovite princes as a synthesis of Teutonic militancy, Tartar despotism, and Byzantine sanctimoniousness, for only occasionally and superficially did Western culture enter into the civilization of autocratic Russia. Russia's rulers were content to concentrate on their internal domination of the political, ecclesiastical, and economic life of their people.

If, however, as the poet Pushkin remarked, Peter the Great (1686-1725) cut a window through to Europe, Catherine II (1762-96) widened this window and permitted the light of French and English liberal thought to shine in upon the emerging Russian intellectual

class. Inevitably, of course, Voltaire, Adam Smith, and the French "Encyclopedists" became known; and another European current as well: German mystic idealism, which proved particularly congenial to the Russian nobility. But no sooner did the implications of enlightenment threaten her rule—rumors of the French Revolution abroad, popular uprisings at home—than Catherine reverted to arbitrary despotism. And she justified her action in noble terms, theorizing over the "psychic characteristics" of her subjects who, because of Russia's peculiar geography and climate, were unfit for self-government and could prosper only under absolute autocracy.

The military insurrection of the Decembrists, in 1825, however, punctured this absolutism, even though its leaders (chiefly army officers) were either exiled or executed. Nicholas I determined to eradicate liberalism in every form. To prevent any further infection of Westernism, he established rigid press censorship, iron discipline in the army, and equally firm control of the entire bureaucracy—even of university scholars.

Following the Crimean War, with Russia's withering defeat at the hands of Turkey, France, and England, it became clear that autocratic absolutism was outmoded. The new tsar, Alexander II, relaxed the repression; and under his "era of reforms," the serfs were "liberated" (though left helpless economically), and certain ameliorations instituted (among them the Western system of civil procedure).

But the revolutionary movement increased—and reaction inevitably followed under Alexander III. The press was stifled; Jews, dissenting sects, Lutherans, and others were systematically persecuted; efforts were made to stifle revolutionary movements. Fearful of revolutionaries, Alexander III was virtually a prisoner of his police protectors when he died in 1894.

The last of the Romanovs, Nicholas II, inherited problems hopelessly beyond his powers. Less than two years after his accession to power, 30,000 workers went on strike in St. Petersburg. Underground movements gained in numbers and influence. And when Japan defeated Russia in 1904, conditions crystallized into a revolutionary situation. Lenin remarked that the fall of Port Arthur spelled the beginning of the fall of the autocracy. Although Nicholas

ruthlessly crushed the Revolution of 1905, he merely postponed the inevitable.

The World War and "Soviet Power"

Less than two years after the outbreak of the first World War, the Germans had seized Poland and part of the Tsar's Baltic provinces. Russia's military situation was desperate. Her army suffered defeat after defeat. German artillery deluged the tsarist troops, who often enough lacked the munitions for a reply. Three soldiers sometimes had to share a single rifle.

Millions of Russians had been killed by guns or wounds or epidemics. Russia's economy, deprived of fourteen million able-bodied men conscripted into the army, was hopelessly incapable of its part in the war. Mills and factories were closing down. Labor shortage had reduced the harvest. People at home and soldiers at the front went hungry and often barefoot. The war was eating up the resources of the nation. The situation could not go on.

While workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals bitterly raged at the Tsarist Government for their sufferings, they were not alone in their cry for a change. The "bourgeoisie"¹ also desired action—but for quite different purposes. Finding the war profitable, despite the slowed-down economy, they wanted to ensure its continuation; and there were rumors that Nicholas was preparing a separate peace. With a view to replacing the Tsar with his brother Mikhail Romanov, the bourgeoisie decided to engineer a palace coup. Such a move would not only assure continued war; it would also forestall a popular revolution, whose adherents were daily increasing. The coup, however, was never attempted.

In January-February, 1917, Russia's economic situation grew desperate. Arrangements for supplying food, raw materials, and fuel had fallen into acute disorganization. The supply of foodstuffs to Petro-

¹ To discuss the Soviet State without recourse to such terms as "proletarian," "bourgeois," etc., is well-nigh impossible. In a footnote to the opening passage of the Communist Manifesto, Emile Burns says: "By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live." *A Handbook of Marxism, International, 1935*, p. 22.

grad and Moscow had virtually stopped. Unemployment was aggravated as more factories closed down.

The Tsar was at the front when he received word of a workers' strike of vast proportions in Petrograd. Apprised of the amazing news that on February 27 the Petrograd soldiers had refused to fire upon the strikers, he sent detachments from the front to "quell the riots." Revolutionary workers and soldiers, however, greeted the arriving detachments and explained the aims of their revolutionary program. The detachments joined the workers. Swiftly the news spread from city to city and to men in the trenches. From that day on the rule of tsardom was doomed.

In the ensuing period from March 11 to November 7, 1917—the "February Revolution"²—Russia was under a dual rule. A "Provisional Government" and a "Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" competed for control. Not until November 7, when the second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets³ opened, was the issue settled.

The Provisional Government, directed by Kerensky, Prince Lvov, Miliukov, and others, declared itself in favor of prosecuting the war to a victorious end.

Lenin was still abroad when the February Revolution began. But he addressed letters to the revolutionists in which he accused the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary members of the Provisional Government as "traitors to the working class." Through the good offices of the German Kaiser, who was eager to contribute to the demoralization of the Russian army, Lenin was permitted to travel from Switzerland through Germany in a sealed train. No sooner

² According to the Russian calendar, thirteen days earlier than ours, the period began February 27 (our March 11). Hence it is called the "February Revolution." The Soviets abolished the old calendar shortly after they came to power.

³ "Soviet" in Russian carries the double meaning of "council" and "counsel." The All-Russian Congress of the Soviets represented the various parts of Russian territory and population. Needless to say, this first congress was not attended by representatives of all the national groups who participated in the later congresses. The Soviet was largely the work of Bolsheviks. Fourteen years before, the Social-Democratic Labor Party had split over various questions of policy. Lenin demanded that the Central Committee of the party be composed of staunch and consistent revolutionaries. The majority of the congress supported him, and since that time the majority have been known as Bolsheviks (*bolshinstvo*—majority), the minority as Mensheviks.

was he met at the Petrograd railroad station by a host of his followers on April 16, than he delivered a speech in which he declared the time was ripe for a "world socialist revolution." He called upon the masses to overthrow the Provisional Government, to establish working-class control, to put an end to the "imperialist war," and to begin the building of socialism. *Down with the war! Down with the capitalist ministers! All power to the Soviets!* were the Bolshevik slogans.

The next weeks were tense with struggle. A new Coalition Government, formed on May 17 under Kerensky sent troops to the front in the beginning of June. Not only was the army defeated; the soldiers refused to fight "for the interests of the bourgeoisie" and demanded *All power to the Soviets!*

At home the Kerensky government grew steadily weaker, as economic and social conditions went from bad to worse. As the Bolsheviks became ever more insistent on their program, the bourgeoisie countered with a plan for its own dictatorship. In July, General Kornilov started a march on Petrograd. Not only was he quickly defeated but workers and peasants exerted such pressure that Kerensky was compelled to imprison him.

Bolshevik influence gained in the wake of the Kornilov conspiracy. By autumn the majority of the deputies in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets were Bolshevik party members; and Lenin declared the time ripe for an armed upheaval: "the victory of the workingman is assured." The upheaval itself followed on November 7, in Petrograd. The Kerensky Government fell; the "proletarian revolution" declared itself triumphant; and control passed into the hands of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The Evolution of the U.S.S.R.

On November 7, the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets opened in Petrograd, and immediately adopted the first three decrees submitted by Lenin. (1) The Soviets offered to conclude an immediate peace among all the nations at war, on the basis of equality. (2) The Soviets abolished private property and transferred the use of the land to the peasants. (3) All power was given to the Soviets. The Congress elected an All-Russian Central Executive Committee and a Soviet of Peoples' Commissars, with Lenin at the head.

The first of the three decrees called forth no reply from either England or France, but on December 3 the Soviets started negotiations with Germany and Austria, and an armistice was signed two days later. The terms put forth by the Central Powers were severe in the extreme, and there was some disagreement as to their acceptance. Lenin, however, regarding the peace as an opportunity for consolidating Soviet power and for creating a Red Army, immediately favored acceptance. Negotiations collapsed at Brest-Litovsk on February 10, 1918, and the Germans advanced toward Petrograd. Upon Lenin's insistence, the Soviet Government (on February 22, 1918) telegraphed the German Government that it was ready to sign peace. The following day the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed by both powers. The final terms, even more onerous than those originally demanded, turned Poland, Latvia, and Estonia over to Germany; severed the Ukraine and subjected it to German control; and compelled the Soviets to agree to pay an indemnity. Shortly thereafter Lenin wrote an article in which he said:

Intolerably severe are the terms of peace. Nevertheless, history will claim its own. . . . Let us set to work to organize, organize, and organize. In spite of all trials, the future is ours.

The trials were many and severe. England, France, and Japan undertook campaigns of military intervention and gave aid of all kinds to the White Russian⁴ counter-revolutionists who battled the Red Army in a desperate effort to overthrow the Soviet Government. It was not until two years had passed that these external threats were crushed. Only then were the Soviets able to turn their full energies to the economic rehabilitation of the country.

It was an immense task, complicated by every imaginable difficulty. Fundamentally, the Soviets were faced with the almost insuperable problem of industrializing a country which was primarily agrarian. Civil war and revolution had shattered industry; factories and plants lay in ruin; and the new ones were working poorly. Signs of discontent appeared among the workers.

⁴ The Bolsheviks regarded all anti-Soviet elements as "Whites" or "counter-revolutionists." The "White Russians" when used thus as a political term has no connection with the territorial meaning of White Russia. One often speaks of Great Russia (the central territory), Little Russia (Ukraine), and White or Byelo Russia (northwestern part bordering on Poland).

On the "agricultural front" the problem was no easier. The relationship between the city and village had been settled during the civil war in the form of an alliance between the peasants and the workers. The peasants had been given land as well as protection against the landlords and wealthy peasantry (*kulaks*); and in return the workers received foodstuffs under the so-called "surplus-appropriation" system. While this arrangement worked satisfactorily during the civil war, it soon proved inadequate. The peasants had to surrender all their surpluses; they demanded a sufficient supply of commodities in exchange.

To cope with the situation, Lenin worked out a New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) as a method of temporary adjustment. Instead of surrendering all their surpluses, the peasants paid a tax in kind (fixed each year before spring sowing). Whatever was left over and above the tax could be sold by the peasants. This temporary return to the methods of the profit system helped to restore the economic life of Russia. Meanwhile Lenin continued to work out plans for co-operative agricultural societies as a transitional means from small individual farms to large-scale producing units, or collective farms.

Lenin died, January 21, 1924. In the name of the Communist Party, his successor, Stalin vowed "to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . to strengthen the alliance of workers and peasants . . . to maintain the voluntary alliance of the nations⁵ of our country . . . and to strengthen the Red Army."

The year 1925 saw the inauguration of a new period of economy, "Socialist industrialization." Russia needed up-to-date machinery for its old mills and factories; Russia needed plants for building machinery. In December, 1927, the Communist Party began the collectivization of agriculture: ". . . to unite the small and tiny peasant farms gradually but steadily, *not by pressure but by example and persuasion*, into large farms based on common co-operative collective cultivation of the soil with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture. *There is no other way out,*" said Stalin.

The following year saw the first of several Five-Year Plans for the development of Soviet economy. Its program was accomplished

⁵ Eleven autonomous republics now constitute the U.S.S.R.

in four years. Encouraged by the results of this effort, by which the proportion of industrial output to the total production had risen to 70 percent, the Soviets declared that Russia had been converted from an agrarian to an industrial country.

The Second Five-Year Plan, begun in 1933, was intended to complete the mechanization of agriculture; to install adequate means of transport and communication; and to raise the material and cultural level of the peasantry. Like its predecessor, the Second Five-Year Plan was said to be completed ahead of schedule. By the end of 1937, industry had attained 428 percent of the output of 1929, over 700 percent of the pre-war figure. Agricultural gains proved enormous. Eighty percent of the industrial output flowed from plants either built or reconstructed since 1928, including such new branches of manufacture as aircraft, chemicals, tractors, automobiles, machinery.

By 1939, Russia emerged as the largest industrial producer in Europe. "Socialist industrialization" had become a fact. The Soviets were able to concentrate on the enormous economic task of improving the quality, quantity, variety, and distribution of products for their 170,000,000 consumers.

Currents of Soviet Ideology

"Without theory there can be no practice," said Lenin; and there has surely been no dearth of commentaries, analyses, and disquisitions of all kinds on the subject of Marxian philosophy. Merely to touch on the outstanding works would require more space than this entire essay; and the interpretations of certain aspects alone might well require volumes. Let us content ourselves, therefore, with an examination of some of the underlying ideas in our effort to understand Soviet practice.

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." This frequently quoted line is the first sentence of the *Communist Manifesto*, drafted by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and published in 1848. Marx had learned much from the German philosopher, Hegel, whose system of "dialectics" he had studied with avidity. But whereas Hegel had finally arrived at a philosophy of *idealism*, Marx's study of history led him to an opposite conclusion: a materialist conception, which he embodied in the

philosophy of *dialectical materialism*. Life is motion, according to dialectics; and if everything moves, everything changes. "Every phenomenon sooner or later is inevitably transformed into its very opposite by the very forces which condition its existence."⁶ Thus, if every phenomenon negates itself, no institution can be absolute or of permanent value. Dialectical thinking excludes every utopia. Social forms constantly change, because they contain within them the seed of a higher growth. Motion may be reduced to three elements: the thing itself (thesis), its opposite (antithesis), and the product of their interaction (synthesis).

Marx held that all social change arises from economic causes. Ethical movements, cultural phenomena, folkways, religion, and the like may eventually be traced to the economic relations. "The psychology of society adapts itself to its economy. Upon a given economic basis, there inevitably develops a corresponding ideological superstructure." In a word, a basic change in the economy spells a corresponding change in the life of the nation in every particular. Thus, while Marxian philosophy is fundamentally economic, its implications and ramifications are as wide as life itself.

To the Marxian, therefore, modern history is relatively easy to understand, despite its complexities. Capitalism, insofar as it freed man from the stultifying effects of feudal life and fostered the growth of technology, commerce, and the material goods, was a distinctly progressive force. It was a struggle of classes—as was every other period of history—but insofar as capitalism liberated man from feudalism, it was a revolutionary movement. But "every phenomenon sooner or later is transformed into its very opposite by the very forces which condition its existence"—and capitalism has not only outlived its usefulness; it is an obstacle to human progress, according to Marx. For capitalism has bred a host of contradictions; and it cannot solve these without sacrificing its own existence; or, as Lenin put it years later, capitalism is its own gravedigger. Why? Because competition and the struggle for markets eventually leads to exploitation of colonials, imperialist conflict, and war abroad; and to waste of goods and to exploitation of men and women at home. In a word,

⁶ The sentences in quotation marks in this section are from Plekhanov, one of the first Russian expositors of Marxism.

capitalism has developed to such a stage that it no longer can permit production for the universal use of humanity. To maintain itself, it must continue to exploit the masses of working people. This is an unreasonable state of affairs, say the Marxians. The working people are the real producers of the world's goods; but they are deprived of the fruit of their labor because of a system of economic relations that has no justification. The majority of the world suffers; an infinitesimal minority of capitalists prospers. So long as this minority owns the means of production, it can keep itself in power by means of the state—which is merely its “executive committee.” The way out is thus clear to the masses of the world: dethrone capitalism and substitute for the outmoded system of profit, the collective ownership of the means of production. Institute a dictatorship of the proletariat—of those who actually produce the world's goods—in place of the present dictatorship of the exploiters. “Workers of the world unite. You have nothing to lose but your chains”—so ends the *Communist Manifesto*.

The first step towards achieving this socialization of the means of production is through the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the transformation of the proletariat into the ruling class. In his *State and Revolution*, Lenin concluded that “the doctrine of the class struggle, as applied by Marx to the question of state and of the socialist revolution leads inevitably to the recognition of the *political rule* of the proletariat, of its dictatorship, i.e., of power shared with none and relying directly upon the armed force of the masses.”

We noted above that Marxian philosophy excludes no phase of life from its sphere; that it regards the culture of a nation as the ideological superstructure raised upon the existing economic system. When the Soviets abolished private property and instituted collective ownership of the means of production, therefore, the whole of Russian life was transformed. Governmental agencies, based upon representation through electoral processes,⁷ served to centralize the control of the nation in the Communist Party (official name of the Bolshevik group). Industry and agriculture, likewise, were centralized and co-ordinated with a planned economic program. Agencies

⁷ The real freedom of Soviet elections is a matter of continued dispute between pro- and anti-Soviet observers.

of education, information, and art were organized in a similar manner. In a word, every Russian institution became subordinate to the proletarian dictatorship, vested in the Communist Party.

Marked changes appeared on the countenance of the Russian nation. Woman, having become man's "equal," and therefore a producing unit in Soviet economy, no longer was limited to child-bearing and the home. Vast changes in the family, the home, divorce, the relations between parents and children, etc., inevitably followed; (though sociologists have observed a "swinging of the pendulum" from extreme experimentation to stability along Western lines). The effect upon art, literature, music, and the theatre has been enormous; for the Soviet view of all cultural expressions as propagandist in effect has inevitably brought questions of ideology, class prejudice, etc., etc., into fields that had hitherto been largely exempt from the forums of politics. "Socialist realism," a new kind of artistic orientation, promulgated its tenets. Industry likewise developed cultural discussion. Such ideas as "socialist emulation" and "stakhanovism" appeared.⁸ One could multiply the list, for it is as numerous as the institutions of Soviet life. But the net result would be what we have already observed: the subjugation of all divisions of existence to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

For the U.S.S.R. is a monolithic state in that the life of the nation converges to the central purpose of collective economy. As such, it controls civil liberties, education, art, literature, industry—every agency of civil and economic life in order to promote the proletarian dictatorship. Not with concealment but with the frankest avowal does it set to work to eradicate everything and anything counter to the basic purpose. The techniques of control vary with the problem; but essentially the difference is secondary between the "political guidance" of the theatre and music and the "purging" of army gen-

⁸ The Soviets define *socialist realism* as an artistic presentation of life in a system governed by socialist principles. In an effort to avoid any implication of competition, the Soviets have coined the term *socialist emulation*. *Stakhanovism* originated from the name of a worker who made an unusual record in production; it may be defined as "voluntary speed-up." The Russians consider stakhanovism as a morally elevating factor, insisting upon its difference from speed-up in capitalist production. Stakhanovists, however, are materially rewarded for their superiority. A Russian "worker" is any "producing person," whether factory manager, hod carrier, housewife, street cleaner, or professor.

erals charged with treasonous plotting on behalf of enemy nations. While the "political guidance" of the arts was bitterly denounced in America as "repressing creative arts" and the "stifling of the free imagination," the Soviets scorned this criticism of their actions as "weak-kneed liberalism," and insisted that all art is censored—that in "bourgeois democracies" the dictates of the market are no less repressing and stifling than the frank political guidance of Soviet policy. To the horrified outcries from "bourgeois democracies" which greeted the purge of the Russian generals, the Soviets replied that the proletarian dictatorship must crush every threat to its existence; that treason deserves to be punished by death. We could expand the list of Soviet actions which have evoked every variety of indignation from other nations, but they would merely confirm the implications of the above cases: namely, that a moral code utterly different from Western morality has arisen from the new economic base. The gulf between Soviet morality and Western morality is not only responsible for the frequent failure of the Russians and Americans, for example, to approve or even to accept the rightness of the other country's actions. In times of crisis, in which the ways of life of each society are involved, this difference in morality deepens, and misunderstanding or disapproval harden into a sense of outrage and, finally, into animosity.⁹

Of particular relevance is the matter of individual freedom. The Westerner considers the existence of a one-party democracy incompatible with political liberty. "How can you call Russia a democracy when the Communist Party controls the country? This isn't liberty: it's political despotism," etc., etc. The first reply of the Soviets

⁹ *Editor's Note:* Some will argue against this application of the doctrine of cultural relativity. To say that Russia's internal institutions and foreign policy rest upon a morality different from American morality helps to explain them but does not justify them in terms of American morality. A similar justification could be advanced for any conceivable aberration of behavior. Thus the discussion which follows, while it may help to explain the international relations of the U.S.S.R., cannot serve to eradicate certain judgments about the Soviets, which grow out of the American mores. Such judgments have frequently been expressed in magazine articles and books about the Soviets:—that Russia is, as regards internal organization, a tyranny of the totalitarian type; that it contains the defects characteristic of the totalitarian states, lack of liberty, bloody repression, and inefficiency; and that it is, as regards foreign policy, intensely and objectionably nationalistic.—W. W.

would doubtless be an insistence on *economic democracy* as the element of greatest import to the individual. They might quote Stalin:

It is difficult for me to imagine what "personal liberty" is enjoyed by an unemployed person who goes hungry and cannot find employment. Real liberty can exist only where exploitation has been abolished, where there is no oppression of some by others, where there is no unemployment and poverty, where a man is not haunted by the fear of tomorrow being deprived of work, home, and bread. Only in such a society is real, and not paper, personal, and every other liberty possible.

This, of course, does not satisfy the Westerner because he sees no reason why one cannot have economic and all other kinds of democracy at the same time. To which the Russians might reply by insisting that Americans enjoy political but not economic freedom, since unemployment and its demoralizing effects are rampant in America.

The argument does not end, however, for Americans treasure their right to criticize the political party in power. They are less concerned with the relative substantiality of their freedom of opportunity—economic as well as political—than with the fact that they have it. To those who value civil liberties under the American system, therefore, the privileged position of the Communist Party in Russia is both incomprehensible and inadmissible. Soviet foreign policy in connection with the Nazi-Soviet Pact showed beyond any doubt that under the Soviet system, the Communist Party leadership initiates government policy. American critics of the U.S.S.R. point to the manner in which the Supreme Soviet ratified the pact—according to American newspapers, without any discussion from the floor. Critics of the U.S.S.R., therefore, insist that Russia is not a dictatorship of the proletariat but of the Communist Party. And thus the Soviet system, to them, is not only not the "Soviet fatherland" but a "totalitarian dictatorship," an "oriental despotism," and even "Red fascism." The controversy has furnished endless material for magazine articles, newspaper stories, and even books; and the end is by no means in sight. In view of the increasing activity of Russia in world diplomacy, the controversy is growing ever most hostile.

Soviet International Relations

We are now in a position to examine the course of Soviet international relations. As was the case above, we do not attempt to judge these actions but to try to understand their motives and methods. Just as we have not been concerned with considering the rightness or wrongness of the Russian Communist Party, the Soviet system, or the validity of Marxian social philosophy or Marxian economic analysis, we are not now engaged in passing judgment upon the wisdom or the techniques of Soviet diplomacy.

The experience of the U.S.S.R. from 1918 to 1920, when the campaigns of Allied intervention and White Guard attacks threatened the country, naturally conditioned Russia to view its neighbors with distrust. The onerous terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, of course, aggravated their already cynical view of international "bourgeois" diplomacy; and never has the U.S.S.R. given anyone grounds for believing that it put stock in the friendliness of certain powers any more than in the animosity of others. In the Marxian view, a proletarian dictatorship is by definition the object of attack; for it is a potential threat to the political systems in capitalist nations. If the U.S.S.R. is a success, the working classes throughout the world may wish to emulate its example. The stronger it grows, therefore, the more it becomes necessary for rival nations to destroy it, according to the Marxian view. Against this background the Soviets have attempted to maintain a peaceful course, occasionally taking advantage of the rivalries among capitalist nations to make an alliance, only to have to abandon it when these rivalries shift. Or, in Marxian terms, the Soviet policy must take advantage of the "contradictions among the capitalist nations."

That the U.S.S.R. desired peace is obvious from the fact that peace was essential to the rehabilitation of the economy and the "building of socialism" within the borders of its vast territory. But while working for peace, Russia prepared for the possibility of war. Industrial preparations required such vast programs for self-sufficiency and armament, that some have thought these preparations constituted a virtual wartime economy. An ingenious redivision of Soviet territory into economically autonomous units was one of the marked

features of the strategic plan; for it attempted to solve the grave Russian problem of long lines of communication. No effort was spared in creating a vast Red Army. And certainly the whole of the country's propaganda apparatus was used to prepare the people for possible war. Propaganda not merely "educated" the population; it aimed to make politicians of the Red Army members. All in all, it would not be an exaggeration to say that throughout its existence, the U.S.S.R. has been preparing for a war which it hoped would not arrive.

It is always dangerous to use such a word as "hope" in this connection, and yet the term is justified in this case. Since the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Soviets have concentrated on the internal problem; to use their terminology, "on the building of socialism." While Marxism advocates world revolution, historic Soviet policy has unquestionably been concentrated on the task of "building socialism" in Russia only. The intra-Communist Party disputes on this question need not detain us; for we are not concerned with the question as to whether or not the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has "betrayed the working class of the world" by failing to march into capitalist countries to install additional proletarian dictatorships; or whether the Soviets are contributing to world revolution by building a "socialist fatherland" whose very existence would be propaganda of the "Go thou and do likewise" variety. The facts that concern us are: (1) the Soviets needed peace for their own purposes of strengthening their country; (2) they have declared to the world time and again that they do not desire one inch of territory belonging to others.¹⁰

Their activity falls roughly into three stages: (1) 1917-1934: the period of internal stabilization; (2) 1934-1939: the period of collective security; and (3) the period of "neutrality" in the War of 1939.

¹⁰ *Editor's Note:* Dr. Krinkin, of course, refers to the Soviet foreign policy prior to the War of 1939. After the outbreak of hostilities in Poland, the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. became practically indistinguishable from that of Nazi Germany. The Communist Parties in various countries had much difficulty reconciling the "new" from the "old" line of the "socialist fatherland"; and many comic statements emerged in the course of their attempt to explain the impossible. But if the Communists had difficulty in justifying the Soviet *partition* of Poland, that was as nothing compared with their task of justifying the bombing of Finland by the Red Army heroes.—W. W.

1917-1934: In the course of explaining the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Lenin stated, January 21, 1918: "Germany, you see, is only pregnant with revolution; but here in Russia, a perfectly healthy child—the socialist republic—has already been born. We may kill it if we start a war." Peace was indeed necessary for the emergency task of stabilizing the country and of building a preparedness program. The Soviets therefore set about immediately to obtain both peace and *de jure* (legal) recognition.

The task was complicated by the fact that the Communist International was housed within Russian borders. How could a country that gives aid and comfort to an organization committed to world revolution, itself a member of this organization, attempt in good faith to maintain peaceful relations with the governments which this organization is committed to overthrow? The Soviets insist that this Comintern, being composed of member Communist Parties of various countries, operates independently of the U.S.S.R., and vice versa. While this explanation has never been quite satisfactory to the average American, it has nevertheless proved no obstacle to the acquisition of *de jure* recognition. In 1920, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland established diplomatic relations with the Soviets. Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia, and Mongolia followed in 1921, and Germany in 1922. In 1924 most of the European powers had granted recognition;¹¹ Japan followed in 1925 and the United States eight years later.

Collective Security: 1934-1939: The U.S.S.R. joined the League of Nations in 1934. Stalin observed that "despite its weakness, the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors can be exposed and as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that might hinder the outbreak of war." Advocating the principle of collective security against aggressor nations, Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov, declared "War is indivisible and peace is indivisible." During the ensuing five years Russia assumed a vigorous rôle in European affairs.

The Soviets insisted on stopping the aggressions of the Fascist powers, who by this time had formed the Rome-Berlin-Tokio axis.

¹¹ Fascist Italy, Great Britain (broken off in 1927, resumed in 1929), France, Greece, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Danzig. Mexico and Hedjaz also the same year.

Through the League of Nations Covenant, the U.S.S.R. called for the application of military and economic sanctions against Italy (Ethiopia, Albania, and Spain) and Germany (Spain, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Memel, Danzig). That instead the aggressors were appeased is well known from the records of the Non-Intervention Committee in regard to Spain, and Munich in regard to Czechoslovakia.

Meanwhile the Soviets pursued an additional course for peace. In 1935, France signed a pact of mutual assistance. Shortly thereafter mutual non-aggression and mutual assistance pacts were concluded with Czechoslovakia, the Chinese Republic, and the Mongolian People's Republic. But such offers were not made to "friendly democratic nations" alone. Stalin had declared in 1934:

Our foreign policy is one of preserving peace and strengthening commercial relations with all countries. . . . Those who are striving for business intercourse with us will always receive our support.

And two years later Litvinov stated before the League of Nations:

We by no means object to attempts at an agreement with the most aggressive countries. On the contrary, we consider it necessary to invite them to take part in every international step. But we are against their dictating terms of the negotiations or paying them premiums for being so kind as to negotiate.

And this same policy of peace with all countries, Fascist as well as democratic, was recorded in the protocol of the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Treaty.¹² No such pacts, however, materialized during this period.

In April, 1939, negotiations began with Britain and France for a treaty of mutual assistance against a prospective aggressor (Germany). On May 31, Litvinov was succeeded by V. M. Molotov, who published the following announcement:

¹² "The two governments place on record the fact that the negotiations which have resulted in the signing of the present treaty were originally undertaken with a view to supplementing a security agreement embracing the countries of northwestern Europe, namely the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic states which are neighbors of the U.S.S.R. In addition to that agreement, there was to have been a treaty of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R., France, and Germany, by which each of these three states was to have undertaken to come to the assistance of any one of them which might be the object of aggression on the part of any other of these three states."

While conducting negotiations with Great Britain and France, we by no means consider it necessary to renounce business relations with countries like Germany and Italy. At the beginning of last year, on the initiative of the German Government, negotiations were started for a trade agreement and new credits. Germany offered us a new credit of 200,000,000 marks. Since at that time we did not reach unanimity on the terms of this new economic agreement, the matter was dropped. At the end of 1938 the German Government again proposed economic negotiations and a credit of 200,000,000 marks, the German side expressing readiness to make a number of concessions. At the beginning of 1939 the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was informed that a special German representative, Herr Schnure, was leaving for Moscow for the purpose of these negotiations. Subsequently, the negotiations were entrusted to Herr Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, instead of Herr Schnure, but they were discontinued on account of disagreement. To judge by certain signs, it is not precluded that the negotiations may be resumed.

This public statement could hardly have escaped the notice of the British and French representatives in Moscow. Negotiations with Britain, France, and Germany continued simultaneously for some months.

Neutrality: 1939: While the Soviets were advocating collective security, the parties belonging to the Comintern vigorously campaigned in their behalf. The political "line" of the Communist Parties provided for the organization of united-front movements to preserve democracy and peace. They sought the collaboration of non-revolutionary citizens from all classes, in a campaign against the common enemy: Fascism. Judging from the enrollment figures, the united-front groupings served to crystallize the growing anti-Fascist sentiment in democratic countries. When the War of 1939 broke out, however, the Communist Parties modified their "line" in accordance with the analysis of the war as promulgated by the Comintern—an analysis based upon its "agreement" with the action of the U.S.S.R.

On August 19, the Soviet Union and Germany concluded the trade agreement which had been under consideration since June. Four days later, a non-aggression pact was signed between the two powers. The efforts in behalf of a Franco-British-Russian agreement

had failed. However, the Soviets insisted that the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pacts in no wise precluded the possibility of concluding a Franco-British-Russian pact.

During the early stages of the war, the U.S.S.R. declared its position. It was not only neutral; it advocated cessation of hostilities. To Americans familiar with the unrelenting anti-Hitler policy of the Communists, the Russian position appeared as a complete reversal of policy if not objective collaboration with Fascism against the British and French democracies. The Soviets, however, explained the international situation in the following terms:

The actions of Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich, they reason, did more than appease Hitler in permitting him to acquire Czechoslovakia: they were collaborations in Fascist aggression. What reason, then, is there to believe that the Chamberlain-Daladier governments really intended to save Poland? What preparations had they made for aiding the Poles? Had they shipped supplies, soldiers, munitions? A few months earlier Britain had been considering a loan of five billion dollars to Hitler. How can these actions of Chamberlain and Daladier be reconciled with their protestations in regard to the fate of Poland? Did they hope to shift the burden of defense to the U.S.S.R.? If they did, they were misled, for the Soviets are not interested in pulling other peoples' "chestnuts out of the fire." Furthermore, why if they were in earnest, did the British and French make it "impossible" to conclude a Franco-British-Russian pact, say the Soviets, charging the representatives of Chamberlain and Daladier with the failure of the negotiations.

From these statements, the Soviets proceed to deny that the War of 1939 is a battle for democracy against Hitlerism. As between Hitler on the one hand, and Chamberlain and Daladier on the other, there is no real choice, they insist; for haven't these British and French governments actually fostered the growth of Fascism? Don't the records of their action in regard to Ethiopia, Spain, Czechoslovakia, etc., prove that in effect they helped the Fascists?

Out of all these circumstances, say the Russians, there can be but one course of action for the U.S.S.R.: neutrality in a conflict between "two imperialistic rivals for the redivision of the world and spheres of influence."

We began our discussion of international relations by observing

the cynicism with which the Russians have viewed the machinations of "bourgeois" diplomacy. We pointed out that the Soviets have never put stock in the friendliness of certain powers or in the animosity of others. Thus, whatever course history will show the U.S.S.R. to have followed during the War of 1939, one fundamental fact will emerge: every effort will have been made to avoid entanglements of any kind which do not advance the aims of the Russian state, Fascism and "bourgeois democracy" notwithstanding. That this may involve shifts in tactics and diplomatic surprises goes without saying, for the U.S.S.R. predicates its international action upon the certain conviction that the land of proletarian dictatorship is the potential—if not eventual—object of attack by the governments of capitalism. The governments of capitalism, however, regard themselves as the potential—if not eventual—objects of attack by the "homeland of world revolution."

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THE RISE OF FASCISM



Clifford Kirkpatrick

Few words are heard more frequently in present-day America than the word "Fascism." In common with other words, it performs several functions. As an epithet it is applied by an extraordinary variety of political groups. Roosevelt and Father Coughlin, Earl Browder and Gerald Smith, Herbert Hoover and Leon Trotsky, find it a forceful mouthful of air with which to jolt the ears of their listeners. Since contrast and conflict are dramatic, the monstrous force of Fascism, formless as a thundercloud, is presented in opposition to some force or entity shining with virtue and glowing with approval conferred upon it by the speaker in question. The cosmic dualism of light and darkness is no longer confined to theology; it is Fascism against Democracy, Dictatorship against our cherished institutions, black against white.

The simplicity of a personal devil is similarly congenial to the man in the street. Why should the mind wrestle with the problem of evil in its plural aspects when Hitler and Mussolini can be blamed for everything unpleasant, from unemployment to crop failures, from the arrogance of officials to the catastrophe of war? A sharp mental picture distilled from a dozen cartoons of a scowling Hitler reaching with lustful hands for world domination, saves much intellectual effort when one is harassed by the problems of a troubled world.

The word "Fascism," too, may stand for a contaminating miasma with power to taint and defile. It floats in gaseous waves across the Atlantic and supposedly is hurled back by the equally gaseous outpourings of politicians and other saviors of democracy. In spite of all effort, however, its taint may fall upon a speech, a person, a book, a law, or a program of social action which threatens some immediate interests.

Admittedly, this picture of mental processes concerned with Fascism is extreme. Not all purveyors of stereotypes deceive themselves. It is by no means certain that President Roosevelt really thinks of the western hemisphere as the natural abode of democratic sweetness and light. He realizes, no doubt, that scores of dictators more tyrannical than Hitler have flourished in South American countries. While properly concerned about Jewish persecution, he may not have forgotten that Trujillo, the dictator of Santo Domingo, recently caused thousands of poverty-stricken Haitians to be cut to pieces in a bloody massacre. Confusion notwithstanding, certain things seem clear. The majority of Americans seem to disapprove of Fascism, however defined. Sinclair Lewis, drawing upon events in Germany, frightened America with the thought that "It might happen here." The regime of Buzz Windrip, whether dictatorship or genuine Fascism, did not appeal to the American individualist desirous of civil liberties, at least for himself. The conclusion would seem to be that Americans, not bent on deceiving themselves or others, need to know more about the movements which brought Fascism into the vocabulary of every literate American.

The Rise of Italian Fascism

No account of the bewildering phenomenon of Italian Fascism can ignore the historical setting in which it was nourished. Its roots go down to the Roman Empire, whose ghost haunted Dante when he dreamed of a universal state. The Holy Roman Empire, itself semi-legendary, fostered the myth that Italy and Rome might rise again. Machiavelli taught Italians and the world to avoid squeamishness in attaining political ends. Force and fraud were recommended as sharp tools to one who wished to rule. Yet with all the dreams of primacy and empire, Italians harbored inferiority feelings concern-

ing military prowess. They suffered repeated invasion and as citizens of petty states sullenly or indifferently endured Austrian rule. National unity came later. In spite of the gallantry of Garibaldi and the political genius of Cavour, no single-handed triumph was attained. The power of the Church was not broken with the attack on Rome in 1870. Ecclesiastical loyalty continued to interfere with political loyalty. The house of Savoy brought no tradition of grandeur to the flimsy structure patched together by compromise and intrigue and supported by the alien powers of France and Prussia.

While tremendous progress was made from 1870 to 1914, Italy never developed into a healthy, vigorous democracy. The country remained relatively poor; the large rural population politically indifferent, and almost a fifth of the people illiterate. There was no responsible ruling class such as that in England. The Socialists came near to organizing a national party of gradualistic amelioration, but were weakened by rival Catholic organizations among the working class. There was nothing dramatic in the petty political activities of men like Crispi, Orlando, Giolitti, and Nitti. Their foreign policy brought little balm to the inferiority feelings which gnawed at the citizens of a second-rate power. True enough, the war with Turkey in 1911 won the Italian Kingdom the barren wastes of Libya, but there was nothing graceful or polished about the aggression. It could not erase the memory of the 15,000 Italians massacred by the Ethiopians at Aduwa in 1896.

It was natural that in course of time a colorful nationalistic movement should emerge against this drab background. D'Annunzio wrote flaming poems and plays calling upon Italy to sail toward the world. Later his grandiose mantle was to descend upon the more burly shoulders of Benito Mussolini.

With the outbreak of the World War Italy, despite her alliance with the Central Powers, remained neutral. For some time she stood wavering and uncertain. Nationalists, however, began to scream for expansion across the Adriatic. Liberals recalled the struggle of the Risorgimento and thrilled to the slogans of democracy and war to end war. Even some Socialists, including Mussolini, demanded participation. Increasing pressure was exerted upon a predominantly neutral parliament. D'Annunzio returned from France to inflame

the people, and following a "radiant week" of war hysteria, Italy declared war on May 24, 1915. This action was to release forces which enabled Mussolini to ride the Fascist wave and be carried to dictatorship.

The Leader

What manner of man was destined to meet his opportunity in post-war Italy and to lead a movement which has changed the modern world? Benito Mussolini, born in 1883 to a blacksmith and a village school teacher, was heir to a revolutionary tradition through his volubly rebellious socialistic father. Radicals were vigorously suppressed at the time of Mussolini's boyhood; in 1898, for example, hundreds were killed in bread riots in Italian cities. In later years, Mussolini wrote somewhat sentimentally of his childhood poverty and of humiliations he suffered from class distinctions. As a youth he taught school for a short time; and then from 1902 to 1904 he lived in Switzerland, doing manual labor when he could find it and declaiming against the Church and State. He appears to have been partly dependent upon Socialist friends and to have come in conflict with the law.

The active rebellious mind of young Mussolini was nourished from many sources, according to accounts by himself and friends. Nietzsche, Sorel, Blanqui, Machiavelli, James, Bergson, and D'Annunzio left their marks upon his mind. During his stay in Switzerland he came under the influence of Pareto, who talked of amoral politics and the circulation of the elite. In 1909 he went to Trento as organizer and journalist, there coming into conflict with the Austrian government. He returned to Italy and acquired increasing prominence in the Socialist movement, later becoming editor of the *Avanti*. He wrote violent anti-militaristic articles and was briefly imprisoned. With flaming violence he opposed the war of 1911 and organized anarchistic and revolutionary demonstrations. For this activity he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment—but he served only five months. In the fall of 1914 the Socialist Party declared against war. Mussolini wavered. Enemies whom he had helped expel for supporting the Turkish War obtained their revenge. He resigned his editorship and was expelled from the party. Profoundly affected

by this experience, he denounced his erstwhile comrades in an eloquent speech, promising that he would bring a real revolution. It is not easy to explain Mussolini's rightabout-face from pacifism. Several clues seem to be helpful. His tremendous ego imperatives always grasped any means to an end. By nature and teaching he was a disciple of violence. A more sordid consideration is the likelihood that he was financed in 1914 by the French in order to establish his paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*. He became active in urging participation in the war against Austria. Finer writes: "All over the country Fasci di azione rivoluzionaria, or Groups for Revolutionary Action, sprang up to agitate for entry into the war. (They were Mussolini's creation.) Mussolini, Battisti, Corridini, D'Annunzio, Nationalists, Irredentists, university youths, moved from place to place encouraging new groups, speaking at meetings."¹

Mussolini himself did not enter the army until November, 1915. In February, 1917, he received a painful, but not especially dignified, wound from an exploding trench mortar. He left the army to play a turbulent rôle in the chaotic post-war years.

It is not easy to evaluate the personality and character of Benito Mussolini. To an American journalist, he is a "Sawdust Caesar"; by loyal followers he is ecstatically described as a demigod. To Finer, the British scholar with an incomparable knowledge of Fascism, Mussolini is a political genius gone astray. Finer lists his qualities as including a profound knowledge of men, a wide knowledge of science and philosophy, indifference to material rewards, strength of will, courage, devotion to duty, industry, personal fascination, and a stomach for ruthless decisions.² For Borgese, Mussolini is an egocentric anarchist. His very nationalism is held to put the State and Mussolini above law and order.³

Post-War Confusion

More difficult than the evaluation of a world figure is the relating of a man to his time. Did Mussolini inspire, motivate, and shape a political movement or did he ride the waves? Would there have been Fascism had the steel fragments of an exploding mortar pene-

¹ Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy*, Holt, 1935, p. 104.

² Finer, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-308.

³ G. A. Borgese, *Goliath, The March of Fascism*, Viking, 1937.

trated the other extremity of Mussolini's body? Did he focus the energies of the post-war years because Janus-like he faced in two directions, to the Right and to the Left?

In exchange for war participation the Allies, by the Treaty of London, agreed on certain concessions to Italy. The Tyrol, Trieste, Sebenico, and the little town of Zara were promised, and the vague prospect of African colonies was held forth. The financial assistance which was furnished did not begin to cover the cost of the war to Italy. The war burden is implicit in the fact that 600,000 Italians were killed before the war ended. Italy got little reward in glory; the defeat at Caporetto blackened the triumph of ultimate victory. The Italian inferiority complex was increased rather than decreased by a victorious war. While liberals and veteran Socialists like Bisolati wanted peace and democratic reconstruction within the natural boundaries of Italy, the Nationalists cried to high heaven for symbols of glory. If the war was a failure, they wanted not peace but more war. At the Peace Congress they demanded all Dalmatia and a slice of Asia Minor. Sympathy and solidarity with the newly freed minorities of Austria-Hungary were ridiculed. Wilson was not particularly sympathetic even to the claims granted by the Treaty of London. In protest against the rejection of Italian demands for Fiume and other areas across the Adriatic, Orlando withdrew from the Peace Conference to the tune of patriotic cries from Italian Nationalists. The delegation was forced, however, to slink quietly back to the conference table to accept the few crumbs which were granted them. Fiume and Smyrna were denied.

The seething Italian Nationalism exploded into a strange episode. D'Annunzio, with a little band of adventurers, marched on Fiume, September 12, 1919. For fifteen months he ruled this city by oratory. There he laid down the pattern of Fascism. He caused his ecstatic followers to signify assent by the raising of the right arm. This became the Roman, and later the German, salute. From the cries of his audience developed the Fascist chant. Black shirts appeared which had been first worn by Italian shock troops. Statutes were drafted in romantic remembrance of medieval guilds. The hint was given for a later Corporative State. In November, 1920, the friendly treaty of Rapallo was signed between Italy and Yugoslavia. Zara,

but not Sebenico, went to Italy; Fiume became a free city. Shortly before Christmas the Italian Government, with a few exploding shells, toppled the comic-opera regime of D'Annunzio. Mussolini had collected money for D'Annunzio but was more interested in borrowing ideas than in relinquishing funds.

Back in Italy confusion reigned. Soldiers, trained to legalized murder and accustomed to excitement, resented the drabness of civil life. An academic proletariat rebelled against the frustration of unemployment. The lower middle class, from which Mussolini came, felt itself ground between the upper and nether millstones. The workers were somewhat comforted by their trade unions, the Italian Confederation of Labor having risen in 1920 to over 2,000,000 members. The Socialist Party had won 32 percent of the total vote in 1919. Disorders were common. The people resorted to direct action against high prices. In the spring of 1919 there were widespread strikes accompanied by violence. In 1920 some 600,000 workers seized the factories, principally in Lombardy and Piedmont. A futile cabinet rose and fell. The Socialist Party was weakening through internal dissension.

Meanwhile the Fascist movement began to organize the forces of hatred, fear, frustration, and discontent. On March 23, 1919, after a Socialist demonstration, Mussolini called a meeting with an attendance variously reported as from 50 to 150. There the *Fasci di Combattimento* were founded, literally bundles for combat. The Fascists were positively in favor of half a dozen irreconcilable objectives and negatively against things as they were. Mussolini was still vaguely socialistic. Overwhelmingly defeated in 1919 as an independent candidate in Milan, he had at that time only about 17,000 followers.⁴ The early program betrayed Mussolini's past, calling as it did for partial expropriation of wealth. There seems little evidence that he experienced a religious conversion from Socialism to Nationalism. Rather he chose what seemed the stronger horse. The horse carried him to the fulfillment of personal ambitions, perhaps running away with him in the process. By December, 1920, he felt strong enough to break with D'Annunzio. By February, 1921, he had perhaps 100,000 followers. The number had increased to 300,000

⁴ Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

by the time of the March on Rome.⁵ Meanwhile a savage attack was unleashed against workers and their leftist groups. At the end of 1920 the Fascists began systematically to smash the trade unions. Castor oil, savage beatings, and brutal murders were implements of the Fascist ruffians. Local authorities were intimidated. Police who had trouble with workers were inclined to wink at violence. The Army gave support. The Bolshevik peril, if any ever existed, had faded before an indifferent *laissez-faire* policy of the Government. Nevertheless the Fascists hailed themselves as the country's saviors. Frightened vested interests gave financial support to Fascism as an implement of revenge. According to Finer, "In the first six months of 1921 the destruction amounted to 25 Peoples Houses, 59 Chambers of Labour, 85 Cooperative Societies, 43 Agricultural Labourers' Unions, 51 Political Clubs, 10 Printing Works, 6 Newspaper Offices."⁶ Giolitti began slyly to climb on the Fascist bandwagon. In 1921, with 35 seats in Parliament, Fascism began to falter. Mussolini sought to curb and discipline his ferocious, planless followers. A pact was made with leftist groups, which aroused resentment in Balbo, Farinacci and other fire-eaters. Mussolini even resigned, although perhaps assured that the Central Committee of the Party would refuse his resignation. The movement now took on more of the character of an anti-Socialist party although perhaps two-thirds of its members were proletarians.

In spite of all efforts of discipline, Mussolini was carried forward by his unruly steed. Terrorism continued. Added to violence against labor unions was the subtler method of organizing Fascist unions or syndicates. The first of these syndicates was formed on February 28, 1921. By January, 1922, the members numbered 250,000.⁷ Rossoni, an ex-radical from America, attempted to combine both workers and employers into corporations. In spite of continued disorder and violence, the Fascist unions were welcomed by many employers. Mussolini loomed more clearly through the smoke of battle as a defender of wealth and property. Many thought that the Fascist movement would run its course. If the earlier red revolutionary

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁷ Gaetano Salvemini, *Under the Axe of Fascism*, Viking, 1936, p. 4.

movement had simmered down, would not the same fate overtake the black?

The March on Rome

Such attitudes furthered the famous "March on Rome." On the Fascist side, demands for power were backed up by dramatic mobilizations of blackshirted youths and further violence against which the mildness of liberals was a poor defence. The Army doubtless could have dispersed the black hordes but its officers had a brotherly respect for violence and perhaps dreamed of advancement in a militarized state. Mussolini had laid plans for a march on Rome early in October. He apparently had another brief experience of arrest but was released at once by a kindred spirit who happened to be in a position of authority. For a time it seemed that the country would be put into a state of siege under the leadership of Premier Facta. The King, however, did not support the decree. Sensitive to the will of the people, he assumed it was expressed by those who clamored loudest. Doubtless there was some fear that the crown might be transferred to the Aosta branch of the house of Savoy. A group of political leaders meeting in Milan recommended that the King take the easy way.

After some consideration of a Socialist leader as Premier, Mussolini's demand for this office was granted. His March on Rome was a ride in a sleeping car. A few thousand Blackshirts celebrated in the Eternal City. This peaceful *coup d'état* by connivance was expanded into the glamorous Fascist myth of a dramatic March on Rome. Many Italians looked forward to a somewhat rough-and-ready but fairly liberal regime which would be tamed by responsibility.

True enough the skies did not fall after the March on Rome. A few non-Fascists were ejected from the Cabinet, after which the Fascist gangs were dissolved and merged into the Fascist Militia. The Nationalist Party was likewise dissolved and combined with the Fascist Party. This action brought a group of intellectuals into the fold including Rocco, the grim jurist who was to make legal anything the Fascists chose to do. While the destruction of the unions continued after October, 1922, Mussolini deigned to make friendly gestures toward the Socialist and Catholic Parties.

The election of April, 1924, brought an overwhelming majority to the Fascists, owing in part to their somewhat vigorous methods of campaigning. There was opposition, however, in the Chamber of Deputies, led by the gallant, outspoken Socialist, Matteotti. This man, a thorn in the Fascist side, was kidnapped and murdered at the behest of high Fascist officials, perhaps of Mussolini himself. The country was profoundly shocked and, as investigations brought responsibility for the crime closer and closer to the Fascist hierarchy, a plot developed for the gradual undermining of the regime. To the system of interlocking fears that possessed Italians was added a lively fear on the part of the Duce that he might die a criminal rather than a political genius. The choice lay clear before him: either real dictatorship or disaster. He chose the former and on January 3, 1925, publicly accepted responsibility for acts that had been committed. He challenged the opposition to bring charges against him. There was no reply and thus Fascism was fastened upon Italy and perhaps upon the world.

The way was now open for vigorous action. Enemies of the regime were hunted down. The murder of the Rosselli brothers in France followed the Matteotti affair. The attack on labor unions was carried to its logical conclusion. Organization after organization was dissolved and, according to a law of 1926, it became a serious crime to attempt revival under another name. The law of April 3, 1926, provided for the voluntary organization of free *de facto* unions in addition to the official Fascist unions. (This provision was a means of admission to the International Labor Office.) Salvemini vividly describes the brutal treatment of a group of workers who took the law seriously.⁸ The associations of Catholic workers were likewise dissolved and on January 4, 1927, the ghost of the General Confederation of Labor faded away after an act of self-dissolution.

The Fascist unions grew apace. These company unions were recognized by the confederations of employers and were dominated by centrally nominated or appointed government officials. Real or faked attempts on the life of the Duce gave the excuse for repression. The pretense of electing officers was for the most part given up by

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

1934. The trend of events strengthened the hand of the dictatorship working through the Fascist oligarchy.

The Fascist Party and Its Ideology

There is virtue in vagueness. So felt the Fascists during the early years of their movement. Behind the bursts of oratory lay the simple creed, "Get in power and stay in power!" Mussolini has been regarded as a frustrated poet and philosopher. He turned promptly to oratory and later to the task of forging a philosophy for his movement. The Charter of Labor which appeared in 1927 laid down a score or more of propositions concerning solidarity, national unity, the glory of service, and, in essence, the totalitarian conception of a social order. The gospel of Fascism was expressed by Mussolini in an article on *Fascismo* which appeared in the Italian Encyclopedia in 1932. The article presents the totalitarian conception of the state which binds men into an organic whole. The will of the individual is to find its highest expression in the national destiny. Men are to be bound together by an essentially religious conception of national greatness. War is glorified as putting the seal of nobility upon those who dare to face it. Italians are called upon to live dangerously and to submit themselves to a chronic state of "high moral tension." It is interesting to note that the concept of race, often shaped into a myth useful for the furtherance of solidarity, seems to have been rejected. Ashton⁹ condenses the creed effectively into a trilogy of ideals—hierarchy, obedience, discipline.

The Fascist Party had a constitution as early as 1921. In 1923 a separate one was prepared for the militia. Naturally there was much dissension in the early days, which gave Mussolini plenty of opportunity to divide and rule. The trend of development was toward centralization, appointment rather than election, and closer identification of Party and civil Government. The Grand Council, for example, was incorporated into the Government in 1928. Mussolini strengthened the hand of the prefects when they were good Party members. The constitution of the Party was occasionally modified by the Grand Council until by 1932 Party and Government were interwoven and power centralized even more in the hands of Mus-

⁹ E. B. Ashton, *The Fascist, His State and His Mind*, Morrow, 1937, p. 257.

solini. Even succession to the throne became a Party matter; Mussolini claimed the right to determine the successor.

Naturally with the triumph of Fascism many Italians were eager to climb on the bandwagon, acquire Party membership cards, and share in the spoils of victory. There was much dispute as to an open versus a closed party policy. After 1925 it was more difficult to obtain membership. Recruiting was primarily from the youth organizations. Since 1930 acceptable young Fascists automatically become Party members at the age of twenty-two. In 1934 there were about 1,850,000 adult male members of the Party—about one half of these had been recruited from the youth organizations. The rising generation will doubtless contain more members from the working class, and thus dilute an essentially middle-class organization. Training for leadership, however, is bestowed almost exclusively upon middle- and upper-class youths. The Fascist pattern includes a glorification of youth, but the rising generation often feels that the old guard is a bit jealous in the matter of retaining jobs. The Party is obviously an oligarchy with a semi-governmental function of leading, permeating the population with its ideals, carrying on propaganda, carrying out the spirit of the laws, and nipping heresy in the bud.

At the top of the Party hierarchy stands the Duce, around him the Grand Council, and just below the national directorate consisting of the Party secretary and a handful of Fascist officials and leaders. Each province has a Party secretary and a provincial directorate. The provincial secretaries constitute the National Council. Farther down the hierarchy are the local groups, the *Fasci*, with appointed secretaries. Since 1934 there has been a further subdivision into *Sectros*, again divided into *Nuclei*. Parallel with each *Fascio* is a group of woman Fascists who concern themselves with youth organizations and charity work. Party members pay dues and from these plus subscriptions a political philanthropy is carried on similar to that practiced by Tammany Hall. The militia is made up of a selected group of some 400,000 men who receive special favors. Periodically Party leaders assemble to hear the Grand Report from Mussolini. They are loud in their acclamation, are thrilled by the performance, and return to their home towns, there to strut like

miniature Mussolinis. It should be noted that Party officials guided by past experience show great tact in causing Mussolini to steal the show whether or not present in the flesh. In totalitarian states self-seeking hypocrisy, political intrigue, and flattery are the rule rather than the exception.

The Social Organization of Fascist Italy

Perhaps no aspect of Fascist Italy has attracted more attention than its alleged innovations in the economic sphere. The common belief that the "corporate state" is a new, drastic, and significant invention does not seem to be borne out by the facts. The early Fascist unions or syndicates have already been mentioned. They had about half a million members in 1922, including a large proportion from agriculture. With the growth of the Fascist syndicates and confederations came the demand that they be recognized exclusively by the employers. The Vidoni Pact was worked out in October, 1926, between the Fascist Party, leaders of Fascist workers, and the Confederation of Industrial Employers. In exchange for the exclusive recognition by the employers of the Fascist unions, strikes were prohibited. According to the law of this period strikers could be punished with penalties up to seven years' imprisonment. In spite of this law about 8,000 workers were guilty of strikes during the second half of 1926.¹⁰ During this period the Fascist party sold the workers to the employers and the employers to the workers, acquiring in the process increased control over both groups. There was somewhat greater reluctance to tolerate a nation-wide organization of workers as compared with employers. The Confederation of Industrialists merely became the Fascist Confederation of Industrialists. The laws and decrees of 1926 likewise provided for seventeen Fascist professional organizations. The principle was clearly established that all organizations, but especially those of workers, should be under Fascist control. While the laws originally provided for the election of union officials, in practice candidates selected by the Party were acclaimed. In essence labor leaders were Fascist appointees. Theoretically this was also true of officials of employers'

¹⁰ Salvemini, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

associations, but the Fascist Party was open to suggestions from prominent industrialists.

Agreements as to wages, hours, and conditions of work were worked out by the respective officials of employers and employees. The officials representing workers tended to be middle-class Party appointees, hence none too zealous for the workers' interests. Once arrived at, agreements were binding regardless of membership in the legally recognized organizations. By no means did all of the workers, for example, belong to the Fascist Unions. Salvemini points out that the Italian worker has about as much influence as the animals dealt with by a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.¹¹ If the officials representing employers and workers fail to agree, the Minister of Corporations provides arbitration. If agreement is still not forthcoming, the Labor Courts hand down decisions that are binding. Since the judges are required to have university degrees, there is no reason to think that the labor point of view receives much consideration.

As early as 1926 there was mention of co-ordinating and planning agencies which, in accordance with the idea of Rossoni, would bring together the syndicates and their confederations into corporations. The Charter of Labor in 1927 contained a score or more of aphorisms stressing productivity and unity within the state. Still the Corporate State had no corporation. According to an Act of March 20, 1930, however, a National Council of Corporations was established, including officials and representatives of the confederations. In the following year it was divided into seven sections covering various phases of economic life. Its function was largely advisory and its meetings infrequent. In 1930 a Corporation of the Stage was established. There was still more oratory than reality to the Corporate State. On January 13, 1934, the advent of Corporations was joyously acclaimed by the Chamber of Deputies. Twenty-two of these Corporations, made up of delegates, experts, and officials, were established. They were supposed to give advice, settle disputes, and formulate plans for production. Big business was heavily represented and even the alleged representatives of the working class tended to be of upper-class origin. Important decisions, for example, those con-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

cerned with the Ethiopian War, continued to be made by Mussolini and the Grand Council. The Corporate State is largely a myth, even though the Chamber of Deputies has been replaced by the General Assembly of the National Corporative Council.

There is a political as well as an economic side to the social organization of Fascist Italy. In one sense everything is political, but the politics is not that of representative government. At the center of the interwoven pattern of party and civil government is Mussolini. He is head of the Fascist Party, Leader of the Grand Council of Fascism, and Premier of the civil Government. The Grand Council, which received definite constitutional status in 1928, will see to it that they are locked together at the top of the hierarchy. Mussolini keeps prepared a list of possible successors to his joint office. In the case of his death the Grand Council would induce the king to appoint a successor from the list. It is generally assumed that Mussolini has designated his son-in-law, Count Ciano, to take his place at the helm. Mussolini is unquestionably the supreme power in Fascist Italy, although the Grand Council carries great weight, especially in constitutional matters. Mussolini's power is perhaps best demonstrated by the rapidity with which he reduces the stature of any associate who offers a threat of rivalry. Even the leaders of the March on Rome may be pushed to obscurity by the Duce's heavy hand. There is little security in the Fascist hierarchy in view of the avowed policy of rotating office, of changing the guard that watches over the Fascist idea. In 1935 most of the ministers and under-secretaries in Mussolini's cabinet resigned at the command of the dictator.¹²

The Chamber of Deputies promptly became a cross between a gentlemen's club and a cheering section. Since 1928 the deputies have been hand-picked by the Grand Council. While theoretically a rival list might be prepared, no Italian is naïve enough to take this privilege seriously. Under steady Party pressure, the overwhelming proportion of "Yes" votes tended to increase. During the later years of its existence, the Parliament did a little committee work and provided loud and sugary approval of governmental decrees. With the tightening of the Fascist grip on Italy following the Matteotti af-

¹² *Finer, op. cit.*, p. 253.

fair, almost without exception only Party members hold office. Political heresy is naturally a ground for prompt discharge. The king remains, heaped with honor but shorn of authority. His son, Umberto, might conceivably be the nucleus for an ultimate shift in power.

The Fascist State must find a new leader when Mussolini goes and prepare another generation for faithful followership. Every effort is made to capture early the hearts and minds of Italian children and to retain that hold. Soon after the March on Rome groups of *Avanguardisti* were established and then in 1926 the *Balilla* Institute. This young-people's organization finally came under the Ministry of Education. Boys, while still children from six to eight, join the *Sons of the Wolf*; then the *Balilla*, from eight to twelve; the *Avanguardisti*, from twelve to eighteen; and the *Young Fascists*, from eighteen to twenty-one. As a rule at twenty-one they are admitted to the Fascist Party. The corresponding age groups for girls are the *Piccole Italiane*, *Giovani Italiane*, *Giovani Fasciste*. At twenty-one the girls become *Fasciste*. On May 24, the young people ceremonially enter the next higher age group. Membership in the youth organizations is voluntary. Only about half of the young people, generally those of the middle and upper classes, are included in these groups. The activities include sports, hikes, ceremonial activities, first-aid drill, first-aid instruction and military drill, even with the use of guns. On the plastic minds of these children is imprinted a solemn oath. The Ten Commandments of the Fascist Fighter are repeated endlessly to the Fascist lads. They are admonished day after day by teacher, book, placard, movie, and the radio to believe, obey, and fight. Attempts are made in Italy, as in Germany, to provide numerous centers (*Casa Balilla*) as meeting places for the young people.

Naturally the family institution felt the impact of Fascism. The family was both weakened and pampered by the State—weakened in that many functions, including that of training the young, were taken over by the State. Certainly significant attempts were made to reduce infant mortality, to give assistance to mothers, and to give family relief. Fascism made vigorous attempts to boost the birth rate—the teaching of birth control was ruled a crime. Taxation was modified to favor large families, special privileges were granted to

their male heads and decorations bestowed upon mothers displaying unusual fecundity. But despite incentives and coercion, the birth rate declined rather than mounted in response to an imperialistic population policy.

To the average American, Fascism is almost identical with repression. Although there are plenty of loyal Fascists, the very continuance of agencies of repression implies the lack of totalitarian unanimity of opinion. While some pretense is made that freedom of teaching exists, it is essentially freedom to agree and to obey. The first step to a professional career is Party membership. Teachers were forced to take the Fascist oath: only about a dozen independent spirits refused. Those who took the oath were logically bound to simulate loyalty by dress and public declarations. As an escape from painful and conscious hypocrisy, some doubtless came to accept the Fascist point of view to preserve their own self-respect.

Journalists must of necessity be listed on the accepted professional roll. A talent for flattery is one of the best means to journalistic success. Books are effectively censored, not by clear-cut decrees but through fear of consequences which might follow overstepping an ill-defined margin of safety. No printing establishment can be opened without permission. The intellectuals, never close to the Italian people, were given ample chance to work out their own humiliation. A few bold spirits paid the price for their personal integrity. Apparently Mussolini always retained some awe of the intellectual world and foreign opinion. When the beating received by Arturo Toscanini for refusing to play the Fascist hymn attracted attention, it was made possible for him to leave the country.

Radio broadcasting is administered by a private company under government supervision. It is the voice of Fascism, of course, which is heard on every program. The Government regulates and promotes the film industry and produces numerous propaganda films, many of which the theatres are obliged to show. Lawyers and judges must, of course, be Fascists and must administer decrees violating civil liberties. Correspondence may be censored and spying becomes a virtue. A whisper may lead to imprisonment. There is scant tolerance for indirect opposition as expressed through jokes or cynical remarks. The repressive agencies include not only the militia, but

the prefects and the thousands of mayors appointed by central authority. In addition to the state and municipal police there is a secret police organization, the "Voluntary Organization for the Repression of Anti-Fascism."¹³ Even Fascist officials questioning the need for repressive machinery suddenly found that they had volunteered for service in Ethiopia!

Zeal to demonstrate conformity may take the form of urging conformity upon others. Finer quotes the warning of a Fascist official in regard to mode of salutation:

Those who raise their arms in a languid manner and only half-way, as though suffering from rheumatism, are requested to recover speedily from their infirmity, so that I shall not have to subject them to an energetic and salutary massage. By way of friendly warning I would remind those who make a point of not giving the salute in the Roman fashion, that there descend from above, not only rain, snow, and roast stuffed larks, but also first-rate clouts on the head, warranted to restore memory, even in the most obstinate cases.¹⁴

The death penalty seems to have been inflicted less frequently in Italy than in Germany. Nevertheless, an execution on October 28, the anniversary of the March on Rome, is assumed to indicate that the Fascist spirit is still strong.

It is all-important but impossible to know the real attitudes of Italians toward the Fascist regime. According to Salvemini, during 1924 and 1925 elections were carried out in 24 factories. There were only 605 Fascist votes as compared with 8,887 anti-Fascist votes.¹⁵ Have these workers since become converted? No one knows.

No account of a totalitarian state should ignore the fact that propaganda as well as repression upholds the social order. Force alone without its partner fraud could never maintain the Fascist state. Protected by repression, from unwelcome competition, the Fascist propaganda machine skillfully shapes the Italian mind. There are many exhibitions, such, for example, as the one which opened in 1932 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the revolution. Visitors to New York's World's Fair can judge the probable high quality of the performance. Ceremonial reverence is paid to the memory of fallen

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

¹⁵ Salvemini, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

Fascist gangsters who have become martyrs of the Fascist faith. A new calendar has been introduced. Anniversaries are celebrated with pomp and circumstance. For example, on the alleged anniversary of the founding of Rome, the young people pass to a higher level in the youth organization. A Blackshirt gives a Young Fascist a rifle while a lad in the Avanguardista receives a scarf from a Young Fascist. Parades, fireworks, distribution of medals, awarding of titles, laying of wreaths, display of uniforms, community singing, dedication of buildings, and waving of banners characterize the never-ending sequence of public spectacles with which the Italian is rewarded for his loss of freedom.

Education and propaganda become one. Children in the schools compete to light the flame of remembrance for the Fascist heroes. Mussolini stares down from every wall, the symbol and center of the nation that leads the world. Textbooks are filled with tales of loyalty, courage, and devotion. A boy hero puts out a fire, saves a flag, or perhaps dies gallantly with the Duce's name upon his lips. Little verses are recited which extol the virtue of unquestioning loyal obedience. In proportion as propaganda works there will be less necessity for penal colonies. A myth that is believed acquires social reality.

The Internal Balance of Power

There is no such thing as an absolute dictatorship nor is there a complete identity of interests in any social group. Always there is some sort of balance of power between individuals and sub-groups seeking to protect their separate interests. It is important but difficult to know who in Italy is strong and who is weak, who has gained and who has lost.

Certainly the workers have gained little materially from Fascism. Their officials have at times competed in accepting wage cuts to reward the business men who in turn had to swallow the revaluation of the lira in 1926 and 1927. In a country with a per capita income of about \$150 a year it was not easy for workers to face reduction in real wages variously estimated as from 10 to 15 percent.¹⁶ Naturally the economic losses of workers were offset a bit by the improvement

¹⁶ Max Ascoli and A. Feiler, *Fascism for Whom?* Norton, 1938, p. 99.

of social-insurance arrangements, relief organization, and the recreational organization, the Dopolavoro.

The small business man has hardly been strengthened by Fascism. It is not so easy for him to get permits for his activities, especially if they threaten competition for the big fellows. Small insurance companies have been dissolved by regulations requiring a minimum of capital. Other enterprises have been forcibly consolidated. Big business on the other hand has enjoyed many favors, but at a price. Institutes were formed by the Government to serve as economic hospitals for the care of sick industries in danger of bankruptcy. But regulation, control, and even partial government ownership was the price that had to be paid. Since 1936 the Government has taken over banking, and capital levies are not uncommon. While the economic system is still Fascist Capitalism or perhaps Capitalistic Collectivism, the days of *laissez faire* are gone forever.

Five pressure groups may be distinguished in Fascist Italy: (1) the Party leaders, (2) the Government bureaucracy, (3) the Army officers, (4) the capitalists, and (5) the Church. Among these groups Mussolini maintains a balance of power. The Party leaders with an itch for glory fully shared by Mussolini drew the country into the Ethiopian War in spite of opposition from other groups. The civil bureaucracy, on fixed salaries, favored deflation through the revaluation of the lira. The Army got expansion and military equipment. The capitalists obtained wage cuts for their workers and a destruction of unions and the prohibition of strikes.

The fifth group, the Catholic Church, inevitably came into conflict with the Fascist Party with its worship of the State and its fondness for force. An agreement was worked out in 1929, but further difficulty arose concerning the education of youth. A reconciliation was effected in 1931 according to which the political sphere of the state received a broader interpretation. The Church was conceded authority over family matters. Perhaps a strain of nationalism in a very *Roman* Catholic Church contributed to the ultimate understanding.

The balance of power in Italy will doubtless be a moving equilibrium. Certain imperatives of the situation point to a socialistic trend. War would give strength to the military group. With the passing of

Mussolini almost anything might happen except a prompt transformation of Italy into a democracy.

The Implications of Italian Fascism for the World

Little needs to be said at this point concerning the impact of Fascism on other countries since this is a matter of familiar current history. The first grasp at glory came in September, 1923, when the Greek island of Corfu was bombarded by Italian guns on the pretext of Greek responsibility for the murder of an Italian general. England took a hand. The result was a little gold, scant glory, and no territorial expansion for Italy. Hostile eyes were cast toward Asia Minor but the Locarno Pact hampered warlike activities. It was not easy for the proletarian nation to launch a new version of the class war. Time grew pressing—it had to be Ethiopia if Mussolini were to have his war. Heedless of economic costs and encouraged by Premier Laval, Mussolini rejected England's offers and launched the war. Then came sanctions and the supreme test of the collective-security principle. Civilization failed the test. English Tories offered their reward to aggression. Ruthlessly, Fascism blasted its way with bombs, flame, and gas. The spring of 1936 brought victory crowned not with glory but with shame. Members of the League of Nations felt shame for themselves as well as for Mussolini when they lifted sanctions on July 15, 1936, and when they heard the Fascist cat-calls directed against the beaten foe. Thus was the Lion of Judah thrown to the Christians.

Within a few days Fascist planes were off for Spain to renew on a grander scale the type of internal interference that had been started in Austria. It was soon demonstrated that Fascism might be spread not only through example and propaganda but by the sword. Then Albania was gobbled at a single bite in Mussolini's haste not to be outdone by his overly apt German pupil. Italy demonstrated clearly to the world that Fascism breeds Fascism, that bluff and lies sharpened by a little extra ruthlessness are effective diplomatic tools, that being a nuisance commands a price, that aggression is rewarded, and that successful aggression prompts new aggression. Above all, it demonstrated that the slyness, chicanery, procrastination, and weakness of democratic countries are chickens that come home to roost.

The Rise of German Fascism

The historical setting in which National Socialism arose has features in common with that of Italian Fascism. Germany, like Italy, had been part of the Holy Roman Empire. The dream, or perhaps myth, of a former unity haunted the Germany of the nineteenth century, as yet unforged into a strong national state. A recent but incomplete unity together with a remembered glory may produce a social stress not found in other countries. There was discrepancy, too, between the bureaucratic collectivism of conquering Prussia and the localism of the other portions of the German state as finally shaped by Bismarck. Collectivism and separatism were to clash when the common effort of the World War led not to national victory but to grim defeat. Perhaps contrasts in the war experience itself may have been significant. Rarely did a nation win such spectacular victories against great odds. Having known overwhelming national power, and having tasted victory, the ultimate defeat was the more bitter to the German people.

There is no way of disentangling or objectively evaluating historical factors. Yet certainly the philosophical and esthetic tradition in the German culture must bear some relation to recent events. A defeated German people once heard the call of Fichte. Hegel prepared the way for a glorification of the state. Nietzsche, Houston Stuart Chamberlain, and others nourished the idea of individual and racial superiority. Romanticism flourished in an atmosphere enriched by medieval legends and a folk art deeply imbued with a simple love of all things German. A country which came to love Wagner could in turn come to love Adolf Hitler whose adoration of Wagner is well known. Italy is the other country most strikingly responsive to grand opera. Germany with its romantic heritage lay spent and broken in 1919, exhausted by its superhuman military effort. It was destined to have a leader whose life is more strange, romantic, and terrible than that of any operatic figure.

The future ruler of Germany first saw the light of day, not in Germany, but in Braunau, Austria, on April 20, 1889. His father was a petty Austrian official who, at middle age, had changed his name from Alois Schicklgruber to Alois Hitler. There is consid-

erable mystery concerning Hitler's ancestry. His father was an illegitimate child who may have taken the name of his alleged father, Johann Hiedler. There may be some significance too in the fact that his third wife's mother was named Hitler. This third wife, Klara Poelzl, was the mother of Adolf. She seems to have been a person of ability, and deep affection existed between herself and her son. A psychoanalyst could make much of Hitler's mother complex and his constant friction with his domineering elderly father. Certainly Adolf came to rebel against authority, or perhaps merely desired to have it in his own hands. In spite of the antagonism between father and son, young Hitler may have taken over his father's ambition to achieve and maintain middle-class status. Young Hitler was a dreamy, rather indolent lad who did not do particularly well in school. He tells in *Mein Kampf*, however, of the stimulation which he received from a fiery history teacher of German Nationalist views. We gather that his dream of German unity was early established. Hitler did not pass his examination, perhaps owing in part to a lung ailment; and after his father's death lounged about home, something of a failure before his life began. At eighteen he journeyed to Vienna and applied for admission to the Academy of Art. He was rejected, however, and, following his mother's death in 1908, he was thrust into a hostile world.

The account in his autobiography of the misery experienced during the Vienna years was probably not exaggerated. He worked at odd jobs and hungered when he could not find them. For a long period he lived in a men's hostel, practically a flophouse. There he formed an unfavorable impression of foreigners, especially of Jews. He worked for a time in the building trade as assistant and hod carrier. Clinging to his middle-class status, he argued with fellow workers until, according to his own account, he was threatened with violence. He experienced all of the antagonism of a marginal class against a lower class with which it refuses to be identified. Anti-Semitism was common among the upper classes in Vienna, and Hitler learned much from one Lueger, a Viennese official, concerning both anti-Semitism and the technique of manipulating existing institution's to one's own advantage. There is an unconfirmed rumor that an unhappy love affair with a Jewish girl contributed to

his hatred of the Jewish race. During his three years at the men's hostel he painted little picture postcards which he peddled with the aid of a friend. There is some evidence that he was none too honest in these business transactions. Mussolini may have been a frustrated poet; certainly Hitler was a frustrated artist.

In 1912, Hitler moved to Munich where he made a living as a painter of cheap pictures and occasionally of houses. When the war came he was filled with enthusiasm and enlisted almost at once in a Bavarian regiment. He served four years as a staff messenger. He seems to have been a good soldier and to have earned his Iron Cross honestly. His later story of a single-handed capture of a group of French soldiers seems to be without foundation. He was regarded as a queer stick by his comrades; moody, withdrawn, isolated, but intensely patriotic. He learned something of human nature during the war years, developing a disdain for crude German propaganda efforts and for the qualities of men which make them victims of their illusions. He began to realize the effectiveness of a simple lie against complex truth. He was wounded and, toward the end of the war, was severely gassed. Blinded, perhaps physically, perhaps hysterically, he was unable to see his country defeated. Filled with rage and sorrow, he left the hospital to meet his destiny in the post-war confusion of a defeated Germany.

The Post-War Sources of Nazism

Before sketching the rise of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist movement which he created, it seems desirable to analyze the conditions in post-war Germany which made German Fascism possible. In many respects German democracy got off to a good start. A provisional Government was established which restored some semblance of order. There was enough resolution to crush the Spartakist uprising. This tendency to turn to the Right rather than to the Left in a crisis might be regarded from subsequent events as evidence of a fatal weakness. A well constructed constitution was adopted in 1919. With the aid of a general strike the Kapp uprising was subdued in 1920. Somehow the young republic withstood the humiliation of Versailles, the Ruhr invasion, inflation, and the burden of reparations. Shortly before the crisis of 1929 and following

reparation adjustments, the future began to look a little brighter. Nevertheless, within four years the brief experiment of German democracy was doomed to an untimely end. Numerous causes were at work which made for ultimate decay and collapse.

(1) The continuation of the economic blockade against Germany, in violation of the understanding leading to the Armistice, probably cost the lives of untold thousands of men, women, and children. Only a few Americans like Oswald Garrison Villard ever realized the depths of German misery. The Germans felt betrayed and their resurgent idealism in support of Wilson and a new world was followed by disillusionment.

(2) The Treaty of Versailles was imposed upon helpless Germany in the spirit of vengeance. Clemenceau and his associates sought to humiliate Germany and to crush her beyond the possibility of recovery for decades. The German delegates were treated with the utmost lack of courtesy or consideration. The Social Democrats were as bitter as any other Germans concerning the terms but resistance was useless. The blind fury of resentment against the treaty was turned against the early leaders of the German Republic.

(3) Added to the blockade and the treaty was the occupation of the Ruhr in January, 1923, which brought further humiliation and was associated with the inflation that all but wiped out the German middle class.

(4) Underlying these events was the unsympathetic attitude of democratic countries toward a struggling sister democracy. Nationalism vastly outweighed any ideological fellow-feeling. Shortly before Hitler's rise to power a customs union with Austria was denied. Brüning begged in vain for assistance to a sorely oppressed democracy. The stage was set to demonstrate that it is not a democratic, pacifistic internationalism which obtains concessions but rather a heavily armed nationalism.

(5) The German Republic was strangely tolerant of reactionary enemies from within. Numerous nationalistic armed bands were permitted to flourish. The Reichswehr, black and white, under its old military leaders constituted a state within a state. Judges and other officials remained in office in spite of obvious disloyalty to the government which they served.

(6) No satisfactory equilibrium was worked out between conflicting groups and classes. The powerful Junker class remained as a heritage from pre-capitalistic Germany. The small tradesmen, also rooted in the past, were unable to compete with the leaders of large-scale capitalistic industries. The labor unions were also anti-capitalistic in the sense of opposing employers, although organized as a result of the capitalistic economic system. Nationalistic groups came sometimes in opposition, sometimes into co-operation, with pre-capitalistic, capitalistic, and anti-capitalistic interest groups. Especially significant was the plight of the lower middle class of small entrepreneurs which sought the security of salaried positions in industry or government.¹⁷ There was a rush to the universities regarded as social ladders leading to a higher status. From 1925 to 1931, university enrollment increased about 75 percent. Thousands of graduates were unable to find jobs; an academic proletarian lacks docility.

(7) The organization and activities of German political parties were unfavorable to the survival of democracy. Numerous, contentious, often lacking the gift of compromise, these parties attempted to use each other for ulterior motives and were consistently outplayed at that game by the even less scrupulous Nazis. Especially favorable to the rising Nazi movement was the status of German socialism. The Social Democrats recoiled from any decisions which might really menace private property. Social Democrats and Communists belabored each other even while being carried off to Nazi concentration camps. On the other hand, the pacifism, tolerance, and general mildness of center and liberal parties prevented the application of force while the Nazi party was still weak enough to be crushed.

(8) German democracy was not dramatic. The aura of the war failure hung about her. It failed to develop flags, uniforms, rituals, and songs which would give the inferiority-ridden Germans the sense of belonging to no mean state. Dramatic leadership was lacking for Germans who were used to obedience and to being led. With the breakdown of family life during the war, the conflict of genera-

¹⁷ Svend Riemer, "Zur Soziologie des Nationalsozialismus," *Die Arbeit*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1932, pp. 101-118.

tions, the confusion of conflicting creeds, the Germans wanted leaders, father substitutes. They wanted to believe in a leader and, through him, in themselves and in their nation. Such were the conditions which, added to the heritage of pre-war days, furthered the revolt against reason embodied in the rise of National Socialism.

The Rise of the Nazi Movement

After his recovery, Hitler returned to his regiment stationed in Munich. Munich was the scene of a Communist uprising. The Bavarian Socialist Soviet Republic had been brutally crushed in the spring of 1919 by the Reichswehr, acting under the command of the Berlin Social Democratic Government. The result was that the Reichswehr remained the force behind the civil government. Colonel von Epp was a power in the Munich Reichswehr. Röhm, a fellow officer, was active in collecting weapons for one of the many illegal volunteer corps.

Hitler was employed by the Reichswehr as speaker, organizer, and spy. He soon came into contact with a little group led by Anton Drexler called the German Workers' Party. He also came into contact with Dietrich Eckart, who was concerned with imparting the national ideal to the dispossessed and frustrated intellectual class. Hitler made a speech before the German Workers' Party and was invited to become a member. The group contained only a few score members. Hitler was elected to the central committee and received the membership number seven. (At the present time a picture is popular in Germany which shows Hitler addressing an earnest little group. It is entitled "In the Beginning Was the Word.")

Then came a round of speeches in which Hitler unleashed his newly discovered powers of oratory. Further contacts were made. Hitler met Röhm who was to play a momentous part and meet a tragic end. He also met Gottfried Feder, an engineer with crack-pot economic theories. The founder of the little party, Drexler, was driven gradually into the background. A program was worked out which later on was to be ignored. Hitler began to speak to larger crowds with perfected showmanship. Party thugs threw out hecklers and thus furthered a fervent atmosphere of unanimity. Hitler designed the flag and the Party emblem and to these symbols was

added the greeting, "Heil," long used by Austrian anti-Semites. He bellowed to ever larger audiences his love of country and hatred of national enemies. While still a creature of the Reichswehr, he acquired as friends and supporters Ernst Hanfstaengl, Frau Hofmann, the Becksteins, Alfred Rosenberg, and Chamberlain, the exponent of the Aryan myth. In spite of the Kapp uprising in March, 1920, carried out by sections of the Reichswehr, the Social Democratic Government still relied upon reactionaries with machine guns. The rightist sympathies of civil and military authorities gave partial immunity to Hitler's followers when they committed acts of violence. In 1920 the German Workers' Party merged with a similar nationalistic party and the movement was now identified with the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei). Contraction of the German title gives the familiar word, Nazi.

Further progress was made when Hitler acquired the *Völkischer Beobachter*, which ultimately became the most important paper in Germany. The Reichswehr grew more active on the military front and sought to draw in the Storm Troopers under the leadership of Captain Röhm. Hitler's warriors were not very amenable to discipline, however; once they had to be surrounded to force the return of stolen weapons. In the fall of 1923, the various military organizations were greatly excited by the capitulation of the Government in regard to the Ruhr occupation. The leaders of a so-called fighting alliance assembled in Munich. Hitler swept them away by a burst of oratory and got himself made head of the entire organization. Rebellion was in the air. Forces of both the Left and Right prepared for action.

Three men—Kahr, Lossow, and von Seisser—ruled Bavaria, and apparently themselves toyed with the idea of revolution. It was commonly assumed that General Ludendorff would become dictator. Hitler was afraid that the uprising would take place before he was in a position to take full advantage of the upheaval. The result was the famous Beer Hall Putsch of November 9, 1923. Hitler rushed into the great hall where Kahr had been speaking and, with drawn pistol, dramatically announced the revolution, and himself as head of the national government. Hitler then frantically argued with the

triumvirate and with Ludendorff to force them to accept the plan. They rather sullenly assented, each with unspoken reservations. The moment Hitler departed, however, his colleagues promptly left the beer hall. The Reichswehr officers were furious and effectively brought pressure on Lossow to oppose the putsch. The next day Hitler, Ludendorff, and other Nazi leaders, followed by a strong detachment of the fighting alliance, marched through the town, confident that they would not be fired on by police or Reichswehr. In front of the Feldherrnhalle, however, the police opened fire. Numerous Nazis fell, killed and wounded. Hitler fell to the ground and somehow suffered a dislocated arm. He then fled the field of battle while Ludendorff marched straight ahead between the menacing guns. Later Hitler told a fantastic story about leaving to carry a child to safety.

The collapse of the putsch was significant in that it freed the Nazi Party from the Reichswehr and started a long series of interactions between party and army, oppositional and co-operative, which have continued down to the present day. Hitler had promised suicide if his putsch failed; arrested, he planned to starve himself to death. Neither resolution was fulfilled. At the trial lenient judges permitted Hitler to attack Kahr, Lossow, and Seisser and to gain publicity. On April 1, 1924, Hitler was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in a comfortable fortress. He had been aided at every turn by the Minister of Justice, Gürtner, later to become Minister of Justice in the Nazi regime. With Hitler in prison, Ludendorff and Gregor Strasser took charge of the movement, but it slipped out from under them with reviving prosperity and a strengthened national government. The Reichswehr retired temporarily from politics and Röhm, after further attempts to build up the S.A. (*Sturmabteilung*—Storm Troopers) went to South America. During his imprisonment, Hitler aided by his faithful secretary, Hess, wrote his book, *Mein Kampf*.

Upon his release from prison, Hitler faced a difficult situation. It was a hard struggle for him to restore his position as Führer (leader). In North Germany the political activity was carried on by Gregor Strasser, aided by Göbbels. They were none too loyal, nor was Pfeffer, the new leader of the Storm Troopers. Furthermore, the moral atmosphere among certain of the Party leaders was not

such as to command respect from the public. Strasser persisted in making socialistic appeals to workers, while Hitler became increasingly eager to attract contributions from industrialists by rightist pronouncements. The great strength of National Socialism, however, lay in the fact that it had something for everybody. Above all it had appeal for the unclassed—those who had lost status through economic dislocations. Nevertheless, in 1928 the Nazis were weak, having only twelve seats in the Reichstag as compared with the thirty-two they had had in 1924.

During this period Göring became more active in the movement and Otto Dietrich began to bring Hitler into contact with industrialists of the Rhineland. Hitler had obtained some money during the early days from Bavarian industrialists, some from White Russians, probably some from an American industrialist, and possibly some from France.¹⁸ Further financial support was obtained by an alliance with Hugenberg, financier, owner of numerous papers, master of the film industry, and head of the German Nationalist Party. Together with other powerful figures, he was opposing the Young Plan. Hitler joined forces in exchange for financial assistance. Regardless of the failure of the opposition to the reparations plan, Hitler gained financial support and stole political supporters from Hugenberg. Given financial backing by the industrialists, Hitler was not greatly worried by the withdrawal of Strasser. Nazi Party squabbles, however, were numerous. At one time payments to Berlin Nazis were stopped by headquarters and this nearly provoked an open mutiny.

Following the electoral defeat of 1928, the star of National Socialism began to rise rapidly. The business depression, the fight against reparations, and the deflationary policy of Brüning, who came to power in 1930, brought misery to millions of Germans and sent unemployment skyrocketing to the undreamed of figure of 3,000,000 in 1930. In that year Hitler acquired 6,406,400 votes and 107 seats in the Reichstag. The S.A. grew by leaps and bounds, thanks to Röhm's genius for organization. By 1932 it included some 600,000 men. The Party had about 800,000 members. Schacht, who had sensed a change in the political weather, opened up new supplies of money. A united

¹⁸ Konrad Heiden, *Hitler*, Knopf, 1936, pp. 221-3.

front was established with Hugenberg and the Stahlhelm (a veterans' organization) led by Franz Seldte.

The Seizure of Power

The year 1932 was a fateful one for the German people. Brüning of the Catholic Center party was still Chancellor, but he was beset on every side with difficulties. Unemployment soared to 6,000,000. Agriculture was in a sorry plight. The small landowner was haunted by foreclosure. On the other hand the great Junker landholders of East Prussia were dipping into the public treasury to obtain *Osthilfe* (help for the East). Millions of marks were spent in this way, the money going frequently to those least in need. The venerable President Hindenburg was identified with this class, especially after he was presented with Neudeck, a handsome estate which, incidentally, was turned over to his son Oskar to avoid the inheritance tax upon his death.

The balance of party power in the Reichstag gave no majority to Brüning. He was forced to govern with the aid of emergency decrees, which, according to the Weimar Constitution, the President was privileged to issue in case of a national emergency. The lack of any bridge to the people threatened democracy and opened the way to subsequent dictatorship. The real power lay in the hands of Hindenburg and a group of aristocratic reactionaries who had his confidence, notably his son Oskar, von Papen, and General von Schleicher of the Reichswehr. The latter was a gifted politician who worked behind the scenes.

Through Röhm, Hitler made contact with Schleicher and indicated his willingness to co-operate with von Papen who had been picked by Schleicher to succeed Brüning as Chancellor. The rumor was whispered that Brüning was an agrarian Bolshevik; in other words, opposed to state subsidies for wealthy Prussian landowners. That was enough for Hindenburg, whose growing senility enabled him to be controlled by his advisers. A cynical story of the period had it that once a man was eating a sandwich at a conference where Hindenburg was present. He was cautioned by a bystander not to leave the sandwich wrapping on the President's desk, for he would be sure to sign it.

Whether senile or no, Hindenburg was quick to sense a menace to the economic interests of his beloved Junkers. On May 30, 1932, Brüning was dismissed despite his services to the State and to Hindenburg himself. Meanwhile, the Junkers began to give financial and political support to Hitler in gratitude for his action in dropping one point of the Nazi program calling for a division of large estates.

When the suave Papen took office as Chancellor, he had no more popular support than his predecessor, Brüning. He took one important action which opened a wide breach in the crumbling defenses of German democracy. In collaboration with other members of the inner circle (the *Herrenklub*), he brought pressure upon Hindenburg for a decree abolishing the Socialist Government of Prussia. The old trick of identifying enemies as foes of vested agricultural interests worked once more. Braun, the Premier, and Severing, the Prussian Minister of the Interior, were in a strong position. They had thousands of police at their command, and doubtless the trade unions would have struck in defense of this stronghold of liberal Socialism. The leaders lacked courage to make a strong stand, preferring to have an issue for another futile and verbal political controversy. They did refuse to give up office—except to force. A handful of soldiers met this requirement and another opportunity to stem the tide of reaction was lost.

During the critical months of 1932, Nazi leaders considered various ways of getting into power. Röhm favored working through the Reichswehr and Hindenburg; Göring and others called for revolutionary action. While no mobilization of the Storm Troopers took place until the fall of 1932, murder, terrorism, and bloody street-fighting continued. The Nazi gangs fought both the Communists and members of the Iron Front, the militant Republican group. The Storm Troopers had been outlawed under the Brüning government but retained their fighting organization. Hitler was inclined to cultivate political supporters and to strive for overwhelming political strength. As a presidential candidate in March, he had obtained over 11,000,000 votes and in April over 13,000,000 votes. The elections of July 31 brought the high tide of National Socialism as a political party operating under free elections. The Nazis obtained nearly 14,000,000 votes and 230 seats in the Reichstag. Flushed with political

victory, Hitler demanded the Chancellorship from Hindenburg. Hindenburg, annoyed by the ranting corporal, is reported to have told Papen, "Let Hitler mend his manners or I will appoint him postmaster some place where he can lick my backside on postage stamps."¹⁹ Hitler and Göring attempted to overthrow Papen in the Reichstag, but the wily Chancellor had obtained an order of dissolution just in time. Papen had grown steadily in the favor of the venerable President and had no intention of giving up power in spite of his general unpopularity.

In his baffled fury Hitler began to make mistakes. He had asked for power such as Mussolini had first possessed as Premier. That did not augur well for his intentions. A mobilization of Storm Troopers around Berlin was ordered which served no purpose but to arouse opposition. Hitler defended brutal Nazi murderers: as a result the Nazis lost 2,000,000 votes in the elections of November 6. Finances were in a bad state. The Nazi leaders were in despair. Schleicher took over the Chancellorship in December and sought the support of Gregor Strasser. Hitler feared the loss of support, but nevertheless denounced Strasser. The situation now developed into a duel between Schleicher and Papen. It appeared that Hindenburg would have to choose between Papen-Hitler or Schleicher-Strasser. Papen forgot all loyalty to his friend Schleicher who first brought him to power. At a secret meeting with Hitler in January an understanding was worked out which led to a renewed flow of funds to Hitler's coffers from Junkers and industrialists. This brought a local political triumph to the Nazis which apparently caused Schleicher to hesitate and finally renounce his alliance with Strasser who had commanded some forty votes in the Reichstag. Schleicher's statesmanlike plan for opposing the *Osthilfe* and forming an alliance with the trade unions weakened his political position with the President. Papen and Hitler came to terms with Hugenberg. The Nazis were to have three seats in the Cabinet as compared with eight for Papen and Hugenberg. Schleicher at this fateful moment in German history contemplated calling out the Reichswehr and with the aid of trade unions snatching a victory from Hitler's grasp. He lacked the resolution to do so and unwittingly signed his own death

¹⁹ John Gunther, *Inside Europe*, Harper, 1938, p. 37.

warrant. On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler, a German citizen of only a year, became Chancellor of the German Reich. The Nazis, delirious with delight, marched with their torches forming a serpent of fire through the Brandenburg gate. The spirit of Potsdam seemed to hover over Germany—the spirit of national reunion, of order, discipline, and national glory.

But the Nazi seizure of power was not yet complete. There was desperate need to obtain a majority in the Reichstag at the elections of March 5. The mysterious fire of February 27 proved a godsend to the Nazi movement. This fire which consumed the Reichstag building was promptly attributed to Communists and led to the decree of February 28, which abolished civil liberties and provided Storm Troopers an open season for the hunting down of Communists. At the trial of the Communists accused of the crime, it became clear that Nazi leaders were equally likely to have been responsible. A simple-minded Dutchman captured on the premises was executed. Gunther's theory, which seems quite plausible, holds that Nazis learned of Lubbe's intention to set the fire and, unknown to him, set the large-scale blaze which was responsible for the damage.²⁰ There is in existence a written confession attributed to a Nazi killed in the blood purge which may or may not be genuine. By terroristic methods, the Nazis were able to obtain 288 Reichstag seats in the March elections. For a majority they needed support of the 52 deputies of Hugenberg's German National Party. German democracy was staggered by the decree of February 28 abolishing civil liberties. Its final collapse was assured by an enabling act passed by the Reichstag on March 24. This act permitted government by decree and could, of course, be renewed by a dummy Reichstag to give a continued pretense of legality.

The Nazis were now in the saddle and with lightning speed proceeded to bring all Germany into line with their conception of a totalitarian state. Hugenberg was ruthlessly discarded by June, 1933. Civil Service laws ousted non-Nazis, especially Jews, from government positions. Labor unions were dissolved, professional organizations brought into line. By July 14, 1933, the Nazi Party became the one legal party in the Reich.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-9.

One action remained for Hitler to perform; namely, to kick over backwards the ladder by which he had risen to power. This ladder was the Storm Troop organization led by Röhm. It had grown to a huge army of job-hungry men, a rival of the Reichswehr. Hitler, fearful of discontent, buttressed by his own S.S. organization, and inclined to side with the Reichswehr, launched the famous Blood Purge of June 30, 1934. Hundreds of Storm Troopers and more obvious political enemies were brutally shot down. Röhm, Schleicher, Strasser, and Kahr—the enemy of Munich days—were among the leading victims. Upon the death of Hindenburg in August, Hitler combined the offices of Chancellor and President and obtained an oath of loyalty from officers and men in the Reichswehr. His blood-stained triumph was complete.

The Nazi Party and Its Ideology

After the seizure of power the Nazi Party had a closed membership of about 2,000,000. Distinctions are now made as to the period in which membership was acquired: membership cards with lower numbers imply prestige, even economic advantage. One reason for the success of National Socialism was its efficient hierarchical organization. Leaders for these units of increasing size are appointed from above and function on the leadership principle. In the early days of party history members of the local groups did effective missionary work, often at their own expense. There is not only a geographical but a functional organization within the Party. Special units are provided, for example, to deal with finances, propaganda, or foreign policy. It is the policy to penetrate and lead all other organizations by means of Party members. For example, a few Party members under the leadership of Frau Gertrud Scholtz-Klink (*Reichsfrauenführerin*) dominate the select women's organization (*Frauenschaft*), which in turn controls a larger organization (*Frauenwerk*), with some 8,000,000 members. The Nazi party is supposed to embody the will of the German people.

National Socialism, like Fascism, owed part of its success to the lack of a rigid and specific ideology. The Nazi creed has been a kaleidoscopic hodgepodge, containing contributions from Eckart, Feder, Rosenberg, Darré, Strasser, Chamberlain, and earlier anti-

Semitic writers. Hitler very naturally contributed the leadership principle. The first attempt at formulation was the twenty-five point program presented on February 24, 1920.²¹ This program called for overthrow of foreign domination, discrimination against Jews, agricultural reform, breaking the "thralldom to interest," and the affirmation, still reiterated, "the common interest before individual interest." Hitler's autobiography, *Mein Kampf*, might be regarded as the chief ideological compilation of National Socialism. The book has sold by the millions and it is a sign of political good manners for loyal Germans to have a copy conspicuously displayed. Its anti-Jewish, anti-Bolshevik, and anti-Democratic doctrines are well known. Its value as a means of predicting Nazi activities was of course weakened by the German-Russian Pact. A distillation of recent Nazi literature was made by the writer, which, disregarding family doctrine, runs somewhat as follows:

Biologically the good Nazi is to believe in the all-importance of race, the survival of the fittest, the need for a national eugenic policy, the sacred duty of maintaining race purity, the soundness of racial instincts, and the responsibility for breeding a strong generation of youth. Ethically he accepts the principle of leadership, the placing of common interests before individual interests, the obligation to obedience, the sacred bonds of comradeship, the virtues of hard work, perseverance, thrift, loyalty, hardihood, and military courage. He is taught to be idealistic, to prize the unity of his people, to cherish the Germanic tradition, to maintain contact with nature and to reverence the soil of his native land. In the sphere of aesthetics, he is taught to respect an art rooted in the German folk, to place stress upon faith and emotion, to reject cold intellectualism, to respond to pagan ritual and to give himself up to pageantry dramatizing the power and the glory of his people.

The political creed is especially important. He is made to believe in the justice of Germany's demand for colonies, the persecution of his land by foreign powers, the evil influence of the Jews, the loss of the war due to Jewish-Bolshevik traitors, the intrigues of Freemasons, the Bolshevik conspiracy for world domination, the crusade of lying propaganda directed against Germany, the folly of internationalism, the all-importance of national honor, the need for a totalitarian culture, the supremacy of the state, the spiritual unity of all Germans

²¹ Gottfried Feder, *Das Program des N.S.D.A.P.*, Munich, Eher, 1936, p. 19.

and the worship of national heroes. Above all he must accept the dogma that National Socialism is the salvation of Germany.²²

Social Organization of Nazi Germany

The economic changes brought by National Socialism are numerous and drastic. In the spring of 1933 the Nazis appropriated May Day as their own holiday and pointed out the distinction by smashing the labor unions and brutally dragging away their leaders to concentration camps. The Nazi theory of industrial relations held that employers and employees were comrades, carrying on the production process to serve the German people. It was contended, however, that the leadership principle should apply. The employer should be a responsible Führer directing his loyal followers in performing a national service. Strikes were forbidden, but the labor law provided for a factory council, elected by employees from a list prepared by Party officials. For a time workers were able to express their true attitudes by voting down Nazi candidates. Since the advisory councils had little power, the only protection for workers was provided by Labor Trustees centrally appointed for certain regions to adjust disagreements concerning wages, hours, and conditions of work. These labor trustees were given power to enforce decisions, but since many of them were former corporation lawyers, they were not likely to be too indulgent to German workers. Furthermore, courts of social honor were set up to handle grievances.

Another feature of the new socio-economic organization was the Labor Front established under the direction of Dr. Ley. This was intended to include practically all German employers and employees in a spirit of patriotic fellowship. One branch of the Labor Front is known as Beauty of Work (*Schönheit der Arbeit*). With the aid of propaganda and promotional techniques an attempt was made to encourage economic Führers and their followers jointly to clean up the factories, plant flowers, build swimming pools, and improve working conditions. Obviously many of the innovations were extensions of the old paternalistic morale-boosting in turn prompted by the rise of scientific management. Another significant branch of

²² Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany, Its Women and Family Life*, Bobbs Merrill, 1938, pp. 34-5.

the Labor Front is the Strength Through Joy (*Kraft durch Freude*) organization. Recreation is organized and entertainment provided, trips, excursions, and hikes arranged. It is community recreation on a far grander scale than anything contemplated in America. Millions of Germans are provided with recreation strongly flavored with propaganda. In 1937 much was made of excursion ships which were built with dues collected from members. More recently it was planned to build a factory for the mass production of low-priced motor cars. The Labor Front works in close co-operation with the Winter Help, which collects several hundred million marks each year and distributes them very ostentatiously to the needy. Nazi organizations take turns in sending out members to shake painted collection cans under the noses of passers-by.

As might be expected in a totalitarian state, business and professional life is thoroughly organized on the geographical and functional basis. There are some eighteen economic chambers in fourteen economic districts subordinated to the Reich Economic Chamber. The whole complex structure comes under the control of the Minister for Economic Affairs. There are professional organizations, as, for example, those including lawyers and doctors.

Agricultural activities were organized by Darré into the so-called Food Estate. Here was most completely realized the theory of national organization in terms of *Stände* (functional groups). Farmers stand high in Nazi esteem by virtue of the doctrine of *Blut und Boden*. As racially pure citizens rooted in the German soil they are assumed to insure national survival through fecundity and the production of food necessary for economic independence. Nevertheless, their activities are vigorously regulated. The Nazi bureaucracy establishes quotas and fixes prices. Another interesting development was the establishment of hereditary peasant estates. Some 700,000 of these were established.

The financial policy of the new Nazi Government was inflationary. It expended huge sums for government projects such as roads, buildings, and above all, rearmament. Because gold reserves were lacking, ingenious barter arrangements were worked out by Dr. Schacht. With the reduction of unemployment by a spending policy and a tremendous increase in production, the income from taxation

also increased. Retention of the old and high rates of taxation, despite increased production, reduced the amount of internal borrowing which otherwise would have been necessary to meet gigantic expenditures. In 1936 the second four-year plan was announced with the avowed purpose of furthering Germany's economic independence as a feature of military preparedness. Long before the outbreak of the War of 1939 tremendous efforts had been made to gear the economy into the military machine. Wages were kept at their old low levels to reduce consumption. While an attempt was made to control prices, real wages dropped. This was offset in part by the elimination of unemployment and increased hours of labor. Scientists were commandeered to find synthetic substitutes for natural products. Workers were commandeered to work as directed regardless of family or personal interest. Even capital was recruited through forced loans and taxation. The German economy had been placed on a wartime basis long before the outbreak of war.

The political organization of Nazi Germany is, of course, under the domination of the Nazi Party. An elaborate Party organization is maintained parallel to the governmental organization, but Party members also hold government positions, thus making certain that governmental actions express the will of the Party. Governors have replaced the local political authorities. Citizenship is a national rather than local matter. According to the leadership principle, authority is exercised through appointments downwards from the top of the hierarchy. An occasional plebiscite is taken on important issues which, thanks to Nazi political methods, invariably expresses overwhelming approval. The Reichstag is retained as a sounding board for Hitler's political speeches, but does not interfere with government by decree.

In Germany as well as Italy it is realized that the destiny of a country lies with its youth. The Nazis began to organize young people as early as 1926; in fact, about 20 young boys were killed in the street fighting. The greatest growth in numbers occurred just before the seizure of power when Baldur von Schirach became youth leader. By 1934, there were about 6,000,000 young people enrolled of whom about a third were girls. According to a law of December 1, 1936, all German young people were theoretically brought into the

youth organizations. Boys from 10 to 14 belong to the Youngfolk while those 15 to 18 belong to the Hitler Youth (*Hitlerjugend*) proper. The younger girls belong to the *Jungmädels* and the older girls to the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (League of German Girls). Numerous schools for leaders give further training to especially promising youngsters. For both boys and girls there is a vast amount of hiking, singing, sports, first aid, political education, and participation in ceremonies. In the case of boys the training more nearly approaches formal military training.

Young people are also brought together in comradeship, disciplined, and indoctrinated by means of Labor Camps. The law of July 26, 1935, established compulsory labor service for both sexes. The young men carry on work very similar to that of the C. C. C. camps in the United States. For six months the German lads work, drill with shovels, and contemplate the camp motto (*Treu leben, trotzend kämpfen, lachend sterben*).

The Nazi influence on the family institution has not been so marked as might be expected from the patriarchal Nazi ideology, which, of course, stressed improvement of reproduction in quantity and quality. An attempt was made to boost the birth rate by subsidies, modified taxation, marriage loans, and propaganda, together with restriction of abortion and birth control. The crude birth rate rose from 14.7 in 1933 to 19.1 in 1936. A naïve attempt was made to improve the quality of offspring by the Nuremberg laws of 1935 which prohibited marriage and sex relations between Jews and Aryans. More realistic was the sterilization law of July 14, 1933, which provided for the sterilization of nine types of defectives. Numerous eugenic clinics have been established which, among other activities, issue health certificates prior to marriage.²³

An attempt to restore women to womanly work was not particularly successful. While some good jobs were taken over by men, the number of women gainfully employed rose steadily during the Hitler administration. In spite of all the glorification of motherhood, mothers still remain at the machines. This has become increasingly

²³ The extent of the program is shown by the fact that down to 1937 some 700,000 couples had received marriage loans. At least 100,000 persons have been sterilized. The total may be 200,000 or perhaps more.

true because of military necessity. While much concern was expressed for strengthening family life, the divorce rate increased, children were drawn away from their parents into youth organizations, and family functions were weakened through increased activity on part of the State.²⁴

Propaganda is a conspicuous feature of Nazi life. All agencies of communication are under the control of Propaganda Minister Göbbels. All of the activities pertaining to literature, the press, radio, the theatre, music, the arts, and the film industry are organized in the Reich Chamber of Culture. From the beginning the Nazi leaders, notably Hitler and Göbbels, demonstrated a flair for propaganda activity. At mass meeting and Party congress old and new devices were used with great effect. Uniforms, parades, songs, banners, party symbols, salutes, ceremonial rituals, and volcanic oratory served to arouse, inspire, and indoctrinate the German people. Myths were employed to good effect. For example: the stab in the back which lost the war; the heroism of Horst Wessel; the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy; and the like. The essential techniques are repetition, the lie so big that it seems true, the defense by attack, simplicity, sharp black-and-white contrasts, and above all, a constant appeal to love and hate. Recurrent themes are love, comradeship, and unity with your own kind, and hate for alien inferior and menacing enemies, real or imaginary. In order to simplify the business of hating, enemies may be strangely mixed. Jews, Bolsheviks, Catholics, Freemasons, and traitors may be jumbled together.

No atrocity or scandal is too fantastic for exploitation. Headlines from Berlin papers during 1936 and 1937 include the following:

"They were Freemasons"; "Lodge brothers break their pledge of secrecy"; "Ernst Toller sends Austrian workers a bill" (Communist portrayed as avaricious); "Kaplan Rossaint as Agent of Communists Ready for any Favor"; "Unchastity with Churchly Blessing" (accusations of sex perversion); "Prison for a Cathedral Official, Unbelievable Bestiality on the Part of a Priest Discovered"; "Unbelievable Rascality of a Cloister Leader"; "Unbelievable Insult to God"; "Pastor carries on Seduction with a Sign of the Cross"; "Store of Liquor in Bedroom of the Clergy." "The German Ambassador protests energetically against the foolish and crude insult to Chancellor

²⁴ Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*

Hitler by Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago." "Church Officials Protect Perverts."

Yet on the other hand, headlines concerning the Spanish War included "Crucified Priest"; "Sadistic Attack on Nuns" and the like. Repetition can conceal any inconsistency in the Nazi propaganda campaign.

Propaganda for full effectiveness needs its ally, repression. According to Nazi laws any criticism written or verbal, of Party or Government may be severely punished. Special courts ironically called People's Courts have been established for dealing with political criminals. Spying and tale-bearing became virtues. Not only the Gestapo, but friends, neighbors, even members of one's own family, may make dangerous accusations. The brutalities occurring in concentration camps are well established. Lest doubt should exist in the minds of foreigners, outrages were perpetrated in newly conquered Austria which clearly established the nature of Nazi repression. The persecution of Jews is well known throughout the world. It is less generally known that economic sanctions are brought to bear on all Germans, whether Jewish or Aryan, to hold them in line. Job, promotion, professional opportunities, customers, access to credit and materials, all depend upon simulated loyalty. Repression is all the more effective because the limits of personal freedom are not clearly defined. It seems desirable to be on the safe side. This idea is cumulative and contagious.

The Inner Balance of Power

In Germany Adolf Hitler, like Mussolini, must maintain an equilibrium of forces between contending interest groups. There are innumerable rivalries among Hitler's lieutenants which must somehow be adjusted. The Army, the Party, the governmental bureaucracy, the capitalists, the workers, and the church all represent conflicting and overlapping interests. Certain clashes are especially significant. On June 30, 1934, the Army won out over a section of the Party represented by the S.A. In the early part of 1938 Hitler adjusted a clash between Army officers and Blomberg, a Party man, by strengthening his personal hold over the Army. Göring, as representative of the Party, won a victory over Schacht

the expert bureaucrat. The capitalists like other economic classes have failed to receive what they hoped to attain with the coming of National Socialism, though the big industrialists have probably been favored in many ways as compared to their smaller competitors.²⁵ On the other hand government regulation, forced loans, limited profits, and capital levies have reduced private property and private enterprise to mere names. Certainly the distinction between German and Russian totalitarianism is being steadily reduced.

The church has offered the most vigorous opposition which the Nazi movement has yet faced. Shortly after coming to power, the Nazis worked out an agreement with the Catholic Church, but this broke down because of the Nazi demand for supreme loyalty to the state and for control of German youth. Nazi paganism, especially as found in the S.S. (the black-uniformed Elite Corps) and portions of the Hitler Youth, is especially hostile to Catholicism. An attempt was made to bring the Protestant Church into line as a unified State Church under the control of Bishop Müller, the Nazi army chaplain, who converted Blomberg to National Socialism. This attempt failed and hundreds of ministers are still waging the fight for freedom of conscience in spite of vigorous repression. That the resistance is religious rather than political is dramatically illustrated by the offer of Pastor Niemöller, while confined in a concentration camp. As a good German he proposed that he again undertake activity as a submarine commander. While a submarine may be more comfortable than a concentration camp, the offer was probably genuinely patriotic. As to the effect of the war upon the inner balance of power, no one can say. The Army alone has power to take action against Himmler, head of the S.S. and the secret police. Time is on Hitler's side, for every year indoctrinated lads constitute a larger proportion of the German Army.

Implications for the World of German Fascism

The impact of Hitlerism upon the world at large has been tremendous. From the beginning it operated at a more rapid tempo and on a grander scale than Italian Fascism. Behind a cloud of

²⁵ *Editor's Note:* Note, however, in the early part of the War of 1939 the self-exile of Fritz Thyssen, one of Germany's most powerful capitalists, because of his supposed disagreement with Nazi policy.—W. W.

protest and rationalization there has been a consistent and ruthless policy. Withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference revealed a purely nationalistic purpose. Then rearmament and general conscription in March, 1935, followed a year later by the occupation of the Rhineland. Then the Rome-Berlin Axis and the annexation of Austria in March, 1938. Then came Munich and the violation of that agreement by a complete annexation of Czechoslovakia. Finally Poland and the War of 1939.

More significant than the diplomatic and military triumphs is the method by which they were accomplished. All the world loves a success story. Nothing succeeds like success. Certain methods have been indelibly associated with success. To succeed you must lie, loudly, unctuously, and if possible with self-deception. Accuse your intended victims and kick them when they are down for resisting aggression. Claim sovereignty over alleged racial brethren, regardless of locality or nationality. Bore from within, create dissension, proclaim yourself the guardian of the weak and oppressed. Precede ruthless application of force by fraudulent protestation of peaceful intent. Divide your enemies. At the first sign of dissension or weakness, increase your demands. Such methods are not new to the world nor unfamiliar to Hitler's enemies. The point is that more ruthless application of these methods has led to extraordinary success. There is inevitably a temptation to match or to contest this success by the same weapons. Fascism breeds Fascism.

German and Italian Fascisms Compared

A comparison of Italian and German Fascisms raises many intriguing questions. Are the two systems identical? Are they two examples of a culture pattern which appears with uniform characteristics in different countries and is but little affected by special historical circumstances? Did Germany merely borrow from Italy or did two independent paths of development converge? Is there a distinction between Fascism and dictatorship? What are the most constant elements in the Fascist pattern? Are there certain causes which make a Fascist movement as inevitable as the explosion which results from the mixture of certain chemicals? What interpretations

of Fascism connect the strange with the familiar and facilitate inference and prediction?

There is certainly a striking resemblance between Italian and German Fascism. It should further be noted that both bear a close resemblance to Russian Communism. Perhaps there is a compensatory quality in the assertions of Fascists and Communists that fundamental differences exist.²⁶ Let us confine ourselves, however, to a comparison of Italian and German Fascist patterns. Points of resemblance include: (1) Dictatorship; (2) Closely regulated State-Capitalism (a collectivistic capitalism); (3) A one-party political organization; (4) An organic theory of social organization, according to which the individual is merely a cell in the body politic; (5) The leadership principle operating through a hierarchy pledged to obedience and discipline; (6) Intense nationalism; (7) Militarism; (8) Suppression of civil liberties for the social good as seen by dictator and party; (9) Repressive machinery, including spies, secret police, and a party militia; (10) Reliance upon propaganda and censorship to create uniform Fascist attitudes; (11) A legal system based not on contract or individual rights but rather indicating the minimum which must be done in service of the state; (12) The identification of education and propaganda; (13) The indoctrination and discipline of young people through youth organizations; (14) The maintenance of emotional excitement ("high moral tension") by frequent public spectacles and ceremonies; (15) Acceptance of violence and imprisonment as political weapons (penal islands and concentration camps); (16) The inciting of hatred against real or alleged political enemies; (17) A striving for economic and cultural autarky or self-sufficiency; (18) A mystical, semi-religious reverence for the leader; (19) A patriarchal theory of family life which lays stress upon reproduction; (20) Purely nationalistic ethics.

²⁶ *Editor's Note:* Since the signing of the Nazi-Soviet trade and non-aggression pacts incidental to the commencement of the War of 1939, the two political systems have made some amusing efforts at soft-pedaling their previous denunciations of each other. Less than a month before the signing of the pacts, the official Soviet papers still referred to the Nazis as the "fascist wolves of aggression." Not more than two months later the same Soviet press referred to the difference between National Socialism and Communism as "a matter of taste."—W. W.

Points of difference include (1) Greater stress in Germany upon community of interest in the welfare of the German people as served by the leadership principle; (2) The Italian corporations seem to imply greater awareness of specific functional interest groups, notably the distinction between employer and employee; (3) Italian Fascism seems to lay stress upon "folksy" comradeship as served by the sending of children to the country, the temporary replacement of factory workers by students, and community meals (the *Eintopf*); (4) Italian Fascism has worked out a more pacific adjustment with the Church; (5) Italy retains royalty as a symbol of national unity; (6) Germany has worked out arrangements for compulsory labor service more completely than Italy has done.

(7) By far the sharpest distinction between Italian and German Fascism lies in the stress placed by Nazis on anti-Semitism in particular and hereditary factors in general. The concept of *Blut*, or, more accurately, germ plasm, has entered into various Nazi policies. They have been able to sharpen and dramatize their enmities by treating Jews as though they were members of a different and inferior breed. They have justified the leadership principle as based on individual differences. Their eugenics policy has become a dramatic crusade for healing, purifying, and strengthening the folk-organism. Above all, their useful myth of common blood has added to the tie of nationality another bond making for unity and solidarity. This distinction between Italian and German Fascism has recently become blurred with the development of an anti-Semitic policy in Italy and a strict prohibition upon race mixture in Ethiopia.

It is impossible to determine exactly how much cultural borrowing took place back and forth across the Alps. Contact occurred of course. Mussolini invited Hitler for a visit long before the Nazis came to power. Hitler obviously thought of dictatorship after the Italian manner. Göring doubtless imported certain ideas from Italy to which he fled after the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. The Nazi borrowing of the Roman salute seems clearly established, and perhaps the use of colored shirts. The idea of obtaining political advantage from the Reichstag fire came perhaps from observing the effect of a bomb explosion in Milan during the spring of 1921. The Nazis may have borrowed some of their effective ritualistic martyrology

from the Fascists. In songs, roll calls, and in memorial ceremonies the fiction is maintained that dead comrades are present in spirit among the surviving heroes of the Fascist movement. The borrowing, in turn, of racial doctrines by Mussolini from his pupil has just been noted.

What of the Fascist pattern is essence and what is accident? Was the late Huey Long really a Fascist leader? Do the Silver Shirts constitute an exact counterpart of Nazi storm troopers? Is Japan a Fascist country? Do events in Brazil constitute a repulse of a Fascist movement by a government itself fascistic? Is vigilantism in the United States fascistic or merely an American technique for breaking strikes? Has France gone fascistic with the assumption of dictatorial powers on the part of Daladier? Are modern Fascisms sociologically identical with the tyrannies of Greece and the dictatorships of Rome? It would seem that the most sensible way out of these problems and difficulties is to assume that the systems of Italy, and perhaps Germany, constitute Fascism. Identical systems are also Fascist. When characteristics drop out or differ as to degree or amount then these systems are fascistic but are not *simon-pure* Fascisms.

Ashton, throughout his penetrating book, defines Fascism as collectivistic capitalism.²⁷ Collectivism might be identified with an organic theory of society incorporated in a genuine mass movement and reinforced by propaganda and repression. Characteristics such as these are lacking in monarchical or military dictatorships and in individualistic vigilantism or terrorism. It is not very illuminating, however, to explain the rise of Fascism by assuming that it develops inevitably when a people are prone to collectivism, but cannot develop when a people, as in the United States, are individualistic.

Interpretations of Fascism

There are numerous interpretations of Fascism. Like blind men, describing an elephant, writers frequently merely emphasize the component of the Fascist pattern with which they happen to be in the closest intellectual and emotional contact. For example, it may be a matter of Jewish persecution or a violation of civil liberties.

²⁷ Ashton, *op. cit.*

Again, interpretation may be in terms of comparison or analogy. A novel and disturbing phenomenon is related to something more familiar. This procedure is quite legitimate if some insight, inference, or prediction is forthcoming. Another approach is to interpret Fascism in terms of origins and genesis. There may be a particularistic historical description or perhaps a general formula assuming developmental stages. The clash of social forces and a recurrent historical drama are assumed to be uniformly staged regardless of local conditions and the historical antecedents. A few possible or suggested interpretations of Fascism may be mentioned.

Common in the United States is the gangster-terror interpretation of Fascism. It is held that a relatively small group of political gangsters and racketeers grasp power largely by force. They are assumed to seize economic advantages for themselves and friends and to carry the spoils system beyond the achievements of Huey Long or Tammany Hall. Foreign policy is assumed to be merely an extension of the terrorism, exploitation, and racketeering practiced within the Fascist country itself. This simple interpretation obviously ignores the tremendous popular support enjoyed by Fascist governments and the romantic idealism which attracted such support.

Another simple interpretation is in terms of leadership. Fascism becomes the biography of a great man or a great villain. Superhuman qualities, benevolent or malign, are attributed to the Fascist leaders. Obviously Hitlers and Mussolinis have died unsung in jail and persons of lesser stature, clad with the wishes and dreams of their followers, have been made great by their times.

Intermediate between personal and historical interpretations lie psychological ones. These may be gossipy, anecdotal accounts of Fascist leaders. We gather that Germany is air-minded because of Göring's frustrated career as a war ace. He may persecute Socialists because his insignia was once torn off by a Socialist mob. Hitler may or may not be making good to justify himself with reference to his mother image. Germany may or may not be a mother-symbol for a parent-fixated neurotic. It is hard to prove that Mussolini is trying to outdo his father in revolutionary activity.²⁸ It is unquestionably interesting to note that numerous Nazi leaders were of

²⁸ Gunther, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-83, 107-228.

foreign origin. Hitler has repeatedly expressed his personal interest in the annexation of Austria. It does make sense to regard leaders as father-substitutes made desirable to Europeans by the breakdown of family life during the war and post-war years. Analyses of crowd psychology made before Mussolini or Hitler came to power are still helpful in seeking to understand the Fascist movement. Everett Dean Martin, for example, published a penetrating book in 1920 called *The Behavior of Crowds*. He showed how repressed and unconscious motives might find expression through the release of inhibition in the crowd situation. He showed the tendency to absolute belief, to rationalization, to paranoid egotism, to hatred, and the need of a crowd for an enemy.²⁹ History has provided appropriate illustrations for his book.

One of the most interesting attempts at a psychological interpretation of Fascism is that of Frederick Schuman.³⁰ His psychological concepts are those provided by psychoanalysis. We learn of a neurosis afflicting the German lower middle class, of guilt and inferiority feelings, of sadism aroused by the war and inadequately repressed by peace, of a castration complex experienced by Germany through loss of territory at Versailles. There is much concerning a weakened superego, need of punishment of selves and others, of paranoid delusions of persecution, and of pathological regressions to infantilism on part of the *Kleinbürgertum*. Abel has effectively criticized Schuman's reasoning by analogy, his verbal substitutions, his ignoring of common-sense interpretations, and his assumption that millions of Germans were neurotic.³¹

Historical and cultural interpretations of Fascism can be made in abundance. Some of these have been touched upon in preceding pages. Certainly it is difficult to find any general formula which explains aptly the rise of Fascism in certain countries but not in others. Germany experienced both defeat and economic difficulties in 1923 but Fascism did not come at that time. Agricultural and feudal Russia knew both defeat and economic chaos but went communistic rather than fascistic. It is very plausible to explain Nazi

²⁹ E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, Harper, 1920.

³⁰ F. L. Schuman, *The Nazi Dictatorship*, Knopf, 1936.

³¹ Theodore Fred Abel, *Why Hitler Came to Power*, Prentice-Hall, 1938, pp. 186-194.

Germany as owing to the revival of Prussian militarism. Perhaps the World War never ended. There merely followed a latent phase of passive and diplomatic resistance. Frantic rearmament began under the Nazi regime. Germany developed into an armed camp. Industry, social organization and education became means to military efficiency in a warrior state. Then came skirmishes and, finally, a second active phase of one long-drawn-out European War.

One of the best examples of a historical interpretation, in the narrower sense of explaining why Hitler came to power, is provided by Theodore Abel. He explains the rise of National Socialism by four inter-related causes. (1) One cause was discontent owing to war humiliation, loss of economic and social status, political ineptitude of republican leaders, and counter-revolutionary aspirations. The discontent was continuous and was focussed on a common object, the republican regime. (2) A second cause was Nazi ideology with its happy combination of nationalistic and socialistic appeals, its ideal of *Gemeinschaft* (solidarity), its leadership principle, and its appeal to pre-existing anti-Semitism. (3) A third cause was the Nazi organizational and promotional technique involving devoted missionary work in small localities, a revival of military comradeship, and dramatic demonstrations. (4) A fourth cause, according to Abel, was charismatic (mystic) leadership on the part of Hitler who was both executive and prophet. In view of existing needs he appeared a man of destiny, and with the aid of personal fascination became for millions of Germans a legendary figure.³² The writer has little quarrel with Abel's admirable analysis illustrated and buttressed as it is by hundreds of case histories of Nazi followers. It does not, however, relate National Socialism to other Fascist movements, nor does it point out all of the possible inferences and implications. He grasps one horn of a dilemma and sacrifices the implications and applications of a general formulation for the precision and cogency of a specific analysis.

Interpretations of Fascism in terms of class relationships have been advanced which attempt to state a general formula. A notable example is John Strachey's book, *The Menace of Fascism*. According to this Marxian analysis progressive social trends are incompatible

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 180 ff.

with capitalistic organization of machine production. Finance and monopoly capitalism especially lead to war and economic depression. Menaced with expropriation of private property in a crisis situation the capitalists subsidize a Fascist movement to be used as a weapon against a revolutionary working class. According to the simplest formulation, then, Fascism is the last refuge of a decadent capitalism. He does include in his book a brilliant analysis of the failures of liberal socialism. Again and again moderate socialists have played into the hands of reaction rather than take a drastic step toward the abolition of private property which is ultimately called for by their own program. In Germany, at least, in spite of evasion and defensive alliances with conservative groups against Fascism, the Social Democrats were ultimately overwhelmed and extinguished. A more recent Marxian interpretation stressing class relationships is that of Robert Brady in *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*.³³ He argues that National Socialism was essentially a device of the employer class for imposing upon workers the enthusiastic docility established as a goal by the scientific-management movement.

Unquestionably Fascist movements have been heavily subsidized by big business.³⁴ However, this fact does not explain how a Fascist movement worth subsidizing came into existence, or the attraction of such a movement for the larger public. Evidence of subsidies does not permit prediction of the ultimate status of the capitalist class in a Fascist society. Suppose that the Association of Italian Bankers did give the Fascists 20,000,000 lira in 1922. Suppose that Italian industrialists furnished financial backing during the election of 1924. Suppose that German industrialists poured funds into Hitler's coffers. Does it follow that they got their money's worth in view of the regulation and restriction imposed upon business enterprise by Fascist policy? It is strange, too, to find both Fascists and Communists agreeing that Fascism prevented a Bolshevik revolution. In Italy, Fascism came after the Red peril had passed and in Germany the most violent Communist uprisings in Berlin and Bavaria were repressed by Social Democrats themselves.

³³ Robert A. Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, Viking, 1937.

³⁴ Daniel Guérin, *Fascism and Big Business*, Pioneer, 1939.

A somewhat more general Marxist formula has been proposed by a social psychologist. According to J. F. Brown, Fascism arises when, in a parliamentary state, liberal democracy ceases to increase social freedom; the petty bourgeoisie suffer under monopoly capitalism; an increasing number of workers are driven to Communism; attempts at reform remain unsatisfactory to both proletariat and middle class; and, finally, when a Fascist party gets support of industrialists who are afraid of a liberal democratic government.³⁵ This formula is somewhat more specific than that of Strachey, yet leaves many questions unanswered as to who leads the movement and how, why, and when it comes to power. It overemphasizes internal class war and underemphasizes the influence of external conflict. However, it is an unquestionably admirable attempt at sociological generalization.

One is left to ponder the sociological significance of marginal social classes. An insecure lower middle class, particularly one containing an educated proletariat, tends to fight desperately against identification with the working class, which may actually be better off in terms of organization and income. There may be a blind compensatory identification with the upper class. A half-starved clerk copies the airs and attitudes of his boss. An unsatisfactory insecure status may be bolstered up by derogatory and hostile attitudes toward the next lower class. To put the process in its larger setting, one should note similar reactions of poor whites toward Negroes, of marginal shopkeepers and employed workers toward people on W.P.A., of mulattos toward full-blooded Negroes, of Americanized Jews toward those not Americanized, and of respectable women toward fallen women.

A religious interpretation of Fascism may be based upon an analogy but it does permit some additional insight, certain inferences, and perhaps predictions. If, for example, a Fascist movement resembles a religious movement one might predict that it would thrive on persecution. Certainly a very detailed analogy can be worked out between National Socialism and, say, the Christian religion. God is (the German people); The Messiah (Hitler); The Holy Ghost

³⁵ J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order*, McGraw-Hill, 1936, pp. 387-392.

(the Nazi spirit); theology (the Nazi world outlook); The Bible (*Mein Kampf*); salvation (the attainment of national destiny); immortality (children and deeds which strengthen the German social organism); martyrs (Horst Wessel and other fallen warriors); the devil (the Jew); virtue (loyal service to the Nazi regime); sin (disloyalty); the church (the Nazi party); The Inquisition (the secret police); The Cross (the Swastika); Sunday schools (the Hitler homes); church attendance (participation in Nazi meetings); Church holidays (Nazi holidays); The Eucharistic Congress (a Nuremberg Party Congress); saints (leaders of the Nazi party); hymns (Nazi songs); Confirmation (oath of loyalty); *Grüssgott* (Heil Hitler); Sign of the Cross (the Nazi salute). This is an analogy, to be sure, but one that promotes understanding.

A Sociological Interpretation

A synthetic sociological interpretation may be suggested not to replace but to supplement other interpretations. This is based on a theory of regression to tribal group intimacy. The analysis will proceed from the general to the specific. It may be argued that animals, including humans, tend to regress to simpler levels of adjustment when faced with a complex and frustrating situation. It is assumed that strong imperatives to action exist, but that choice and mastery are difficult. A child slams down an arithmetic book. A man gives up looking for a job and goes home to his parents. It is further assumed that historically man has lived for hundreds of thousands of years in simple face-to-face tribal groups. Culturally, perhaps biologically, he became adapted to this way of life. Certainly most persons, even in a complex secondary society, spend their plastic years of childhood in primary groups, especially the family. In the family group most persons have the experience of intimate dependence upon parents. In exchange for some degree of obedience they receive aid and comfort when situations become complex and frustrating.

Adult life in Western civilization has become more complex and frustrating. Contacts are more superficial in a secondary society. Segments of personality rather than total personalities engage in social interaction. Associates become functionaries. Unseen social influences become more significant and potentially disastrous, as,

for example, anonymous conditions making for unemployment. Personal responsibility is increased by individualism. A temporary increase in social mobility gives increased incentive to gain or to maintain the highest possible social status. Modern means of communication lead to culture conflict and individuation of personality. The social atmosphere is filled with conflicting ideas, cults, and creeds. Competing ideologies replace an age of universal simple faith. The modern agencies of communication which have helped render the world complex are available, however, to lead men back to simplicity of faith. Means of communication and transportation have already promoted nationalism as an incomplete and sporadic attempt to work out a group identification and group unity on a larger geographical scale. Such is the general situation which may further a regression to a simpler personal and social adjustment.

Given these general conditions, certain specific circumstances may predispose to the rise of Fascism: (1) A frustration of the awakened nationalist sentiment; (2) loss of achieved or expected social status; (3) a sharpening of class tensions; (4) the breakdown of democratic machinery for the adjustment of conflicting interests and maintaining of security; (5) a confusing multiplicity of ineffective programs and ideologies and a growing conviction that force must decide since words fail; (6) an attempt on the part of an interest group to use another group as a weapon or defense against some enemy group; (7) finally, a willingness on the part of powerful vested interests to fight and to pay others to fight for the protection of these interests. To this situation must be added a leader of ability with a simple creed which fits the hates and loves of a large number of confused and bewildered people. He must shape a fighting in-group organization, the nucleus of a tribal society. A tribal creed must be then preached, offering love, intimacy, comradeship, and greatness to members of the in-group. They are then welded together by common hatred of a real or imaginary out-group. Propaganda tools must be taken over to shape the tribal mind. There must be boring from within, missionary organizations, the division of enemies, and the capture of allies through fear and greed.

Finally there emerges a tribal society on a national scale which, thanks to modern agencies of communication, can bring men widely

separated into the intimacy of a primary group. A chief can harangue an entire nation. His picture is on every wall. Government by pep-talk can become an actuality. Fictions concerning common blood may acquire force through common belief and common ego-motives. "I am wonderful: you are like me, hence, you are wonderful too. We all say we are wonderful. It must be true."

The satisfaction apparently experienced by millions of devoted Fascists seems to support this theory as to the nature and rise of Fascism. They are serenely content to be absolved from the agony of making difficult political decisions. The leader is really for many a father, a hero, a savior, even a God. There is comforting simplicity. Though a person's status be humble, he has a share in collective greatness. Pride in loyal service can, for many, outweigh material rewards. A simple creed gives serenity, freedom from conflict, and integration of personality to the humblest tribesmen. There are prisoners, hostages, and heretics, of course, within a Fascist society, but they can be repressed and segregated; ultimately they die off to be replaced by a younger generation that has known only the tribal creed.

It is important for the outside world to realize the full significance of the Fascist attempt to maintain mental and cultural isolation with the aid of modern techniques of propaganda and censorship. Amazing success has been attained in maintaining entire populations in a state of chronic war hysteria. That which is black to the outside world is really white to the Fascist mind. By very definition things Fascist are right and good. Foreign broadcasts will be dismissed as Jewish propaganda. British leaflets will be regarded as a clumsy and dishonest attempt to repeat Wilson's success in separating the German people from their leaders. Many Germans need only to be reminded of the blockade and of Versailles to reject even truth dropping from the skies.

Above all, it should be remembered that a tribal society implies a moral dualism: an in-group morality and an out-group morality. For most Germans it was not immoral for Hitler to steal Czechoslovakia. Their attitude would be quite comparable to that of Crow Indians toward a chief who had stolen horses from a neighboring tribe. Even internal enemies may be relegated to the out-group and

dealt with accordingly. A young son of Gregor Strasser, the Nazi leader killed in the blood purge, is reported to have said of Hitler, "Well, he is our Führer." The Fascist code simply does not recognize any ethical obligation to persons or groups outside the tribe.

The Dilemmas of Democracy

The rise of ruthless Fascist powers in the modern world has accentuated certain dilemmas of Democracy.

1. Freedom versus efficiency is an old dilemma now taking on new significance when alleged democracies are actually at war with a Fascist country. In the very nature of things it is difficult for a democracy based upon discussion, compromise, legal safeguards, and majority rule to compete with the efficiency of Fascist dictatorships. Thanks to the leadership principle and the concentration of power in the hands of an oligarchy, in such countries, prompt, binding decisions can be made and integrated, consistent long-time programs can be worked out.

2. The dilemma of educational futility versus propaganda is attracting increasing attention. It is possible that factual education, stressing critical rationalism and the training for personal success, may be socially futile, especially if applied at the lower educational levels. If education avoids emotional appeals to youthful idealism, millions of students incapable of abstract intellectual curiosity may remain indifferent, selfishly individualistic, and resentful of economic return from education which falls below that which they naïvely expect.

3. Another dilemma, dramatically experienced by England in particular, is that of pacifism versus national weakness. It is difficult for a rich democracy to retain its pacifism without also displaying a national weakness which is a temptation to aggression on the part of militaristic Fascist countries.

4. A fourth dilemma operates internally. It is the dilemma of tolerance versus internal Fascist subversive activity. Thousands of Bund members meeting recently in Madison Square Garden were protected by the police. But suppose that there were five million Storm Troopers in the United States, avowedly bent upon overthrowing democratic institutions by force! Should the organization

be permitted to grow beyond control or should democracies be saved by repressive measures contrary to democratic principles? There is danger, of course, in cutting off a person's head to cure a cold. Democracy can be killed by measures calculated to defend democracy.


5. A fifth problem to be faced in the United States is the more subtle dilemma between gradualistic compromise versus the all-or-none principle. It is conceivable that a gradualistic reform movement like the New Deal, shot through with inconsistencies owing to compromise between conflicting interest groups, may completely fail. The parts of two different watches cannot be combined to form a mechanism which runs. A mixture of *laissez-faire* capitalism, government regulation, and state socialism may violate an all-or-none principle which calls for an organic unity. Half-way measures may bring merely the disadvantages of two opposing, yet equally feasible, systems. According to the all-or-none principle, either a whole-hearted and well-integrated program of collective security should be adopted or a program of isolation which is an organic whole. Yet by its very nature, a democracy such as that of the United States tends to steer a wobbly course somewhere between the two programs with considerable likelihood of suffering the disadvantages of both and enjoying the advantages of neither.

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HISTORICAL
INTERLUDE



-
TREATY
DIPLOMACY
SINCE THE FIRST
WORLD WAR
■

Lamar Middleton

Historians will agree that the hostilities that began with the advance of Reichswehr patrols over the Polish frontier, early on the morning of September 1, 1939, were in large degree caused by the absence of sufficient treaty revision since the first World War. And this is likely to be their only point of agreement. In time, conflicting schools will arise among historians, and some will argue to posterity—assuming that there will be a posterity to listen—that Germany was exclusively at fault, or that the real villains in the piece were the statesmen of Britain and France who, afflicted with an inexplicable myopia, refused to deal honestly with the facts of life, economic, social and geopolitical, as they were in pre-war Nazi Germany; and in addition, there will doubtless be a literature of appalling dimensions from the pens of other war-genesis scholars that both these views, whatever the supporting facts, are unadulterated nonsense and that underlying the surface causes of the war was the subtle chicanery of Josef Stalin of the Kremlin.

But whatever point of view is argued, and is buttressed by the greater quantity of evidence, one cardinal fact cannot be dismissed.

That fact is this absence of enough treaty revision, or of the right kind. Without it, the world saw the violation of most of the fundamental post-war treaties one after the other. Today the pace of the world is much accelerated since 1914, and more often than not there has not been time (or patience) to "denounce" these treaties, which is the polite method by which one party to a treaty serves notice on the other that it will no longer abide by the terms of an agreement. One of the minor consequences of these violations and broken promises has been the creation of a point of view throughout much of the world that statesmen in post-war times signed treaties with tongue-in-cheek, that the signatories to the Versailles, Washington, Locarno, Briand-Kellogg, Nine-Power, Munich, and other treaties were indulging invariably in a cynical performance, for entertainment purposes only, and that no one of mature intelligence may believe that the agreements they solemnly signed were worth even the expensive paper on which they were written. (Germany is subjected to most of the opprobrium, because one by one she spectacularly violated the cardinal provisions and restrictions of Versailles; even today much of the world still believes that most of Versailles was an enforceable instrument, and that in its harsh terms the Reich got her just deserts.) Cynical or not, the evident fact is diplomats would or could not look up to the horizon-line of the immediate future; obvious though it now appears, they could not see the forest for the trees. Virtually all of them suffered from detailism, which is one way of saying that, if they were not ignorant men, at least they were not excessively endowed with intelligence.

If it is agreed that the major cause of the War of 1939 was the aforesaid lack of treaty revision, it may be enlightening to examine several of these fundamental agreements among the nations since the World War, to review why they were drawn, and to reduce their sometimes fearful language into intelligible English. Treaty drafters often partake of the obscurantism of lawyers, which is the chief reason for the disinclination of the laity to read their works, and to attempt to understand them.

To understand the disrepute into which treaties and conferences for treaty making have fallen, it is necessary first to take a passing glance at the Covenant of the Versailles Treaty, that preliminary

section in which the League of Nations had its origin. This Covenant contains a specific and "solemn" pledge by the Allies and Associated Powers to confer immediately over disarmament; the war-weary peoples of the universe recognized the necessity of curbing continued manufacture of the terrible weapons with which the last war had destroyed some twelve million human beings at an estimated cost of \$186,000,000,000 (or approximately \$15,500 per corpse).

That agreement was signed at Versailles, with great diplomatic punctilio, on June 28, 1919, by all the conferees, including the Germans who, however, were permitted to do very little except sign on the dotted line when so instructed. A little more than twenty years after that "solemn" signing in the fabled palace of Louis XIV (which cost the French people some \$200,000,000), hostilities among Germany, much of the British Empire, and France broke out anew, and the size and calibre of their respective armaments at that time (September 3, 1939) made their first World War weapons appear, in comparison, as so many toys.

The inability or refusal of the Allies and Associated Powers to achieve any degree of disarmament in a period of more than twenty years after their pledge at Versailles is a very powerful argument in the Nazis' extenuation of their behavior, of their successive violations of that fundamental treaty. (Incidentally, Versailles has other connotations than defeat for the German people: here the capitulation of Paris in the Franco-Prussian War was conceded, and here also William I of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor in 1871.) The Germany of the Weimar Republic could, and the Germany of Adolf Hitler did, ask Britain and France with some measure of justified sarcasm, "What of your own broken promises at Versailles? In Article 8 of that Covenant, you pledged yourself severally to 'the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety.' Moreover, one of the conditions upon which President Wilson insisted, and on the basis of which we Germans undertook peace negotiations, was a promise of 'adequate guarantees that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.' Now, isn't it the plain truth that none of you has effected any degree of military disarmament, that precisely the opposite prevailed in the years 1919-39?"

Moreover, Germans in those twenty years have been in a position to say, without any fear of contradiction, that the only power to disarm was the Reich, even though such disarmament was effected by compulsion—her military force was cut down to 100,000 men and to a limited quantity of armaments by the Versailles Treaty, and Britain and France saw to it (until the advent of Hitler) that this figure was not exceeded.

Certainly among the major reasons for German violation of treaties, for the indifferent regard in which she has held all such formal agreements, is the cynicism of German leaders toward the word of European statesmen, chiefly those of Britain and France. The latter cannot argue away the fact that they have done little in the way of disarmament but, on the contrary, have progressively and substantially added to their land, sea, and air forces. British and French leaders, intellectual and political, may write impressive tomes to demonstrate that in the modern world disarmament is not feasible, that the vision of a society without war is only an absurd dream advanced by the old Hebrew prophets who, in the small and simple world of their day, could call upon men to beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruninghooks. Or they may devise countless other briefs: that at bottom the human animal craves war, that armament expenditures foster economic growth, that disarmament in the modern world can be no more than a whimsical ideal. But in the German view, no argument can be ingenious enough to wash away the original sin that the Allies and Associated Powers made no serious attempt, at any disarmament conference, toward Wilson's "reduction of national armaments" in conformity with their pledges in their own "Diktat" of Versailles.

The student of modern history should not minimize the force of this present contempt for treaties engendered in the German mind by this Allied refusal to disarm and their arming to the hilt, or to the extent that their taxpayers could pay. But that sin of omission is not all that explains the cynicism of German leaders toward treaty commitments.

Obviously, the terms of the Versailles Treaty, a full discussion of which is not within the province of this article, were not calculated to arouse tender sentiments in German hearts toward the Allies.

Mindful of the post-Armistice food blockade of six months, by virtue of which thousands of German men, women, and children starved to death, the head of the first German delegation to Versailles, Count von Breckdorff-Rantzau, threw the treaty on the floor when instructed to sign in 1919, and shouted, "We know the power of the hatred we encounter here." (Eventually it was signed by another.) But there was something more iniquitous, in the German view, in a set of treaties that preceded Versailles and that were to exercise a considerable influence upon the Versailles Pact. Not alone was German public opinion disgusted, but the revelation of these special agreements insulted the minds of men and women in other lands.

The Secret Treaties

These were the so-called "secret treaties" of 1915-17 among Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Rumania, and Japan. Now the treaties themselves, negotiated during the World War, were not so appalling as the fact that their existence was kept a secret throughout the Versailles negotiations. Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Premier Georges Clemenceau were fully aware of them, and indeed their moves at Versailles were largely dictated by their terms. But the man who symbolized for the entire war-weary world the "new order," a world in which peace was to be preserved by men of good will acting within a League of Nations, was kept in complete ignorance of these secret treaties. Woodrow Wilson, returning to the United States with the almost certain knowledge that the Senate would not ratify Versailles, was unaware why he had been defeated at almost every turn by the Allied treaty-drafters at the Versailles conference.¹

Here it should be recalled that first among Wilson's Fourteen Points was the provision for "open covenants openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed frankly and in the public view." For this he was universally hailed.

¹ Mr. Wilson put on record his assertion that he did not know of the existence of the secret treaties while he was at Versailles. That has been somewhat easier for historians to believe than that their existence was unknown to the late Col. Edward M. House, the President's closest adviser.

The German people laid great reliance on the Fourteen Points. And today the Nazi command refers to them with sometimes effective irony. In relation to the foregoing stipulation in these Points, the student might now consider the "secret treaties," as revealed to the world by the Bolshevik War Commissar, Leon Trotsky. It may safely be said that today most people have forgotten the existence of these treaties, and a brief look at the provisions of these interesting documents is instructive, since they have contributed to the post-war cynicism toward treaties in general.

There are six of these secret understandings, although it has been assumed that there were several other wartime treaties among the Allies which have still to be disclosed. The six may be summarized as follows:²

1. At the close of the war, Britain pledged herself to do nothing to prevent the annexation by Russia of the Dardanelles Straits and of Constantinople by Russia. In return for this obliging compliance, Russia agreed to look the other way at any acquisitive moves by the British in the Near East. The treaty is dated March 20, 1915, or less than eight months after the outbreak of war. (Britain correctly assumed that the Allies would win, but did not foresee the revolution of 1917 which eliminated Tsarist Russia.)

2. Britain and France consented, as an inducement to bring Italy into the World War, that Italy should get the Austrian Trentino and the southern Tyrol, together with exclusive rights to a "sphere of influence in Albania." That was not all in this secret Pact of London, signed April 26, 1915, twenty-seven days after which Italy declared war. "In the event of an extension of the French and British colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany," this agreement provided, "France and Britain recognize to Italy in principle the right to demand for herself certain compensations in the form of an extension of her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland [French and British], Libya, and the colonial districts bordering on French and British colonies." (Lloyd George and Clemenceau conveniently dismissed this pledge at Versailles, which remains to this day one of the reasons for the sustained Italian howls for more colo-

² For full text, see F. Seymour Cocks, *The Secret Treaties and Understandings*, London, 1918.

nies.) When the British and French envoys to the League of Nations, in 1935, condemned the Italian invasion of Ethiopia as a violation of the League Covenant and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (of which more later), Mussolini could afford an unpleasant laugh, remembering the rude treatment of Italy by those countries at Versailles, only a few years before.

3. An agreement among Britain, France, and Russia (signed in the spring of 1916) under the terms of which Britain was to acquire southern Mesopotamia, Bagdad, and parts of Syria; France to get most of Syria; and Russia to be allotted southern Kurdistan. This was a variation of the ancient profession of horse trading with stolen horses.

4. As an inducement to bring Rumania into the war (which succeeded on August 27, 1916, nine days after the understanding was signed), the Bucharest Government was to receive Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat belonging to Austria-Hungary.

5. A secret convention between Russia and Japan pledging them to take common action against the efforts of any third power to achieve political domination in China (signed in 1916).

6. A treaty between France and Russia by the terms of which the latter would give unlimited support to the return of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar Valley to France, and would also advocate the creation of a neutral Rhineland state along the left bank of the river; in return, France would leave Russia free to establish her western frontier in Germany along any line desired by the Tsar's government (Polish claims were to be ignored). This agreement was signed on March 11, 1917—incidentally, only five days before Nicholas II was forced to abdicate.

Some of these secret understandings were the basis of certain partitions in the redrawn map of Europe at Versailles, where diplomacy was to "proceed frankly and in the public view" and where there were to "be no private understandings of any kind." German leaders, particularly those among the Nazis, have not permitted the Reich population to forget this double-dealing, and at every opportunity have reminded peoples abroad of it. It is not the least awkward piece of duplicity for the French and British to argue away.

One more word, in further explanation of the almost universal

cynicism toward treaties, before dealing with some of these post-War agreements. With a good deal of reason, the belligerents and neutrals believed that the proposed League of Nations was an American idea. Some such international society had been steadily advocated by President Wilson for months before our neutrality ended. Repeatedly before and during our participation in the World War, the President called for "such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself free." Leadership toward the realization of this ideal was distinctly, though not exclusively, American leadership. For that leadership, Wilson was greeted in Europe as a second Messiah. But when the United States Senate, on November 19, 1919, failed to ratify the Versailles Treaty (to which the League of Nations was tied in the Covenant) by a vote of 39 to 55, world opinion outside of this country was appalled at what appeared—and does still to many people—a line of conduct bordering upon treachery. In an oversimplified way, the peoples of other lands reasoned in this manner: the United States aroused world support for a League of Nations, preached its abiding virtues for mankind but, once its machinery was established, left it to its fate. The most powerful and the richest nation on earth, comparatively untouched by the four-year conflict, the country that in all logic might have been expected to be the keystone of Wilson's "concert of free peoples," deserted its own creature at its most critical stage of infancy.

Thus the direction of much post-Armistice thought. What did Wilson's fine phrases mean? Evidently they were just so much felicitous prose. What was the meaning of the Covenant—an integral part of the treaty—if not that all the nations, and most especially all the great powers, should join to protect the lesser ones? The United States Senate's repudiation of Mr. Wilson's League provoked a vast amount of disillusionment throughout the world. And it certainly contributed in great measure to the world's bilious view thereafter of treaties. The fact that the United States Congress remained similarly adamant against participation in another international body also largely of American conception—the World Court, to which Elihu Root devoted a life-long labor—did nothing to change that view. Nor did the merciless flail of Woodrow Wilson who, speaking

with difficulty just before his death, declared that "the triumphs of the war are forever marred and embittered for us by the shameful fact that when the victory was won we turned our backs upon our associates and refused to bear any responsible part in the administration of peace, or the firm and permanent establishment of the results of the war—won at so terrible a cost of life and treasure—and withdrew into a sudden and selfish isolation which is deeply ignoble because manifestly cowardly and dishonorable."⁸

The Washington Conference

The first major meeting of the powers after Versailles was the Washington Peace Conference of 1921-22. Here the United States, after repudiating the peace treaty authored in part by its former President, and declining a share at Versailles in the preservation of world peace, wanted to come to some agreement with Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. It should be recalled that Britain and Japan had an alliance between themselves dating from 1911, and the possibility was envisaged of a time when, conspiring together, Britain and Japan could exclude America from trade with China. There was also a less selfish interest in the call for the Washington Conference by President Harding. A large body of public opinion felt guilty over the scuttling of the League and desired to make some contribution toward world peace. The setting of a limit to naval construction by the major powers—Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States—seemed a practical answer.

The results of the Washington Conference were seven treaties, of which three were of primary importance, the Four-Power Treaty, the Naval Treaty, and the Nine-Power Treaty. The United States delegates proceeded cautiously with the first and, before it was approved by Congress, a resolution was adopted that gave us a convenient means of escape if at any time it appeared the treaty might embroil us in hostilities with any of the other three signatories, the British Empire, France, or Japan. The fundamental provisions of this Four-Power Treaty were as follows:

⁸ See Denna Frank Fleming, *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933*, Columbia University Press, 1938, p. 277 *et seq.*

1. The parties agree to respect their several rights in relation to their insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific Ocean;

2. If there should develop a controversy out of any Pacific question involving the parties' rights, all the contracting powers shall be invited to a conference for adjustment of the dispute.

3. If the rights of the parties are threatened by aggressive action of any other power, the parties shall communicate with one another to determine the most efficient measures to meet the realities of the particular situation.

The foregoing reduces the Four-Power Treaty to intelligible language. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate was quick to see a trap and it insisted on the "escape" reservation that "the United States understands that, under the terms of this treatment, there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense." So far as this country was concerned, it reduced the Four-Power Treaty to so much gibberish, save for the one accomplishment of cancelling out of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty previously cited. The Senate adopted the Treaty, March 4, 1922, by a vote of 67 to 22.

The Washington Naval Treaty, or the Five-Power Naval Treaty, made somewhat more sense, and its drafters got their teeth into definite provisions regarding armament limitation. This treaty, signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, restricted British and American total battleship tonnage to 525,000 tons, Japan to 315,000 tons, and France and Italy to 175,000 tons each. No dreadnought was to exceed 35,000 tons or be armed with guns of more than 16-inch calibre. The treaty was to remain in force until December 31, 1936. Eventually, Japan, Italy, and Germany announced they would no longer be bound by the terms of the London Naval Treaty of 1936, which supplanted the Washington agreement; and similar action followed by Britain, France, and the United States.

The Nine-Power Treaty was a restatement of the Open Door policy in China, an agreement which Japan later was quick to dismiss as the proverbial scrap of paper although she signed it in company with the United States, Britain, France, Italy, China, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium. Its cardinal provisions were these:

1. Excepting of course China, the signatories agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

2. The Powers agree to provide the fullest and "most unembarrassed opportunity" to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

3. The Powers agree to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

4. The Powers will refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

5. "The contracting parties agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned."

There was one absurd aspect to this product of the Washington Conference. In the foregoing treaty, the Nine-Power Agreement or, to use its more flowery label, the Treaty of Chinese Integrity, Japan in effect was called on the carpet by the other Pacific Powers, Soviet Russia excepted, and warned not to become over-ambitious in China or attempt a new order of "Asia for the Asiatics." But after giving this pledge of good behavior, Japan in the Washington Naval Treaty was permitted a naval ratio that gave her command of the Orient.

Here arises the inevitable question, are treaties of any value that depend on moral force alone? There exists a vast literature on the subject of the efficacy of moral force, or the lack of it, in treaties. The acid test of any treaty is, manifestly, is it enforceable? Will it work? That is obvious to any child. Yet individuals whom the world accepts as statesmen have continued to draft treaties that on their face are preposterously impractical and impossible of enforcement. The burden of post-War experience has been that treaties are observed only where it is to the self-interest of the parties to observe them, and this category most often excludes all but commercial treaties,

and not always these. The League made a serious attempt to provide enforcement machinery through provisions for sanctions, or penalty embargoes, and even for military measures in the celebrated and controversial Article 16 of the Covenant ("it shall be the duty of the Council in the event of aggression to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League [and] . . . the Members of the League agree . . . that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League"). As it became progressively more evident that the gears of this enforcement machinery would not mesh, the League became progressively more of an anachronism, not a system for the present-day world but conceivably practical in a society of the future where men possess none of their present vices.

A parenthetical example may be suitable here to illustrate the foregoing statement that almost the only category of treaties that are observed are commercial pacts, or generally those where self-interest dictates observance. For example, the United States and Japan abide scrupulously to an agreement over bird-manure rights on scattered Pacific islands—France and Italy are thoroughly *en rapport* with respect to the importation of silk-worm eggs, while Poland and Sweden abide faithfully by mutual promises to warn each other of "nationals of unsound mind." These agreements may sound ludicrous, but they are good examples of strictly enforceable treaties between nations. Again, in 1936, when at last the League of Nations succeeded in imposing economic sanctions on Italy for her invasion of the territory of another League member—Ethiopia—that body only succeeded in depriving the Italian people of various cheeses and brands of chocolate drops; the perspiring Sanctions Committee felt itself unable to do anything restrictive about oil, coal, iron, cotton, and other materials vital in war. The reason was that Britain and France took at face value Mussolini's bluff that he would make war if sanctions were literally applied. Inevitably, under those circumstances the key articles in the Covenant of the League were shown to be meaningless. And inevitably the Geneva body suffered

greater discredit than ever before—and it had been dealt some severe blows by Germany and Japan. That men look askance at the League, and at post-War treaties generally, is easy to understand after a glance at the record.

The Locarno Conference

The next great conference was held at Locarno, which opened in that Swiss town on October 4, 1925, with delegates on hand of seven nations, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. The story of the inception of Locarno is interesting, and in the light of events today it seems centuries ago. The idea was born in the mind of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning of Germany in 1922, in an effort to stave off the impending invasion of the Ruhr by the French. He conveyed the idea first to Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes, who passed it on to Raymond Poincaré of France. The latter suspected a political trick, in which he may not have been wrong, disregarded it, and ordered the Ruhr invasion. But three years later Sir Austen Chamberlain, then British Foreign Secretary, hinted to the German Government that the time might be propitious in France for a reconsideration of the proposed alliance (the Radical-Socialist Edouard Herriot headed the French Cabinet). The obstacles to be surmounted were many before the seven powers could be brought together, and one of them was the Germans' futile insistence that there be stricken from Versailles the war-guilt admission.

The Locarno Treaties consisted of nine agreements, and brought Germany into the League of Nations, although not for long. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium (eventually the last begged off) signed agreements mutually guaranteeing their respective frontiers (the Rhineland Pact). The most tangible result of Locarno was the formal undertaking by Germany to maintain the Versailles demilitarization of the Rhineland west of a line drawn thirty miles east of the river. The various treaties overflowed with commitments not to resort to arms, and were heavily encrusted with the customary *décors* of "peaceful settlement of all disputes," avoidance of the "scourge of war," *et cetera*. Yet less than ten years later Hitler had moved troops into the Rhineland, disavowing German pledges at Locarno, and had moved out of Geneva. The Nazis had come to

power and, if the German Führer has been guilty of some staggering inconsistencies and contradictions since 1933, he has never wavered in his demand that Germany must repudiate all the clauses of Versailles and all its works, of which Locarno indirectly was one.

Read in the light of the events of 1939, the "final Protocol" of Locarno does not make the pleasantest reading. Therein the signatories proclaimed their resolve "to establish through common accord the means for preserving their respective nations from the scourge of war, and for providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes of every nature which might eventually arise between them." France and Belgium on one side, and Germany on the other, pledged never to attack one another "except in the exercise of legitimate defense." Unhappily, experience has demonstrated that "legitimate defense" is a phrase capable of the most elastic interpretation. For a good many years Japan has been acquiring new areas in China under the ostensible compulsion of "legitimate defense," Italy has defended herself from the "scourge of war" in Ethiopia and Albania, and Hitler had assured the "legitimate defense" of the Reich by the invasion and annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the western half of Poland. The Soviet Union, long a leader at Geneva in demanding collective action against aggression, more recently has found it wise, in the pursuit of legitimate defense, to pre-empt the other half of Poland.

The virtual repudiation by World War belligerents and neutrals of their enormous debts to the United States, contracted during and after the conflict, has not heightened respect in this country for the promises of European nations as clearly stated in treaties. The repudiation, or "default" as the debtors insist upon calling it, remains a powerful brake in the United States against placing any excessive faith in the debtors' word—or against lending them additional credits, now forbidden by the Johnson Act. With the exception of the small credit for goods extended to Finland (\$8,434,521) for post-War rehabilitation, one by one all the wartime and post-War debtors of the United States have professed to find it impossible to pay either upon interest or principal, although in recent months Hungary and Rumania have reopened negotiations with Washington for repayment. The World War ravaged vast areas, pulverizing factories and

farms and other sources of wealth and taxes with which to repay obligations. Had the United States, in the dreadful winters of 1919 and 1920, not come to the rescue with unlimited quantities of commodities there is no doubt that additional tens of thousands would have died. There is another side to the war-debt controversy that the interested reader can find in a considerable literature on the subject—the refusal of the United States to permit repayments in kind, the very real impracticalities of procuring foreign exchange for deposit at Washington, in some instances the fatal disturbance to trade balances that repayment would incur. But however persuasive and relevant some of this argumentation may be, the fact remains that war-debt repayment trickles ceased in 1933. The American taxpayer, upon whom the burden of repudiation falls, has an irrefutable argument in the obvious truth that the debtor nations could have paid to the United States, certainly Britain, France and Italy, some part of the enormous sums they diverted to armaments. The funded debts total nearly \$13,000,000,000; repayments are far under \$3,000,000,000. Moreover, it cannot fairly be argued that the treaties or agreements covering these obligations have, unlike Versailles, not been revised. Repeatedly in the last twenty years interest rates have been slashed or altogether eliminated and the principal reduced. Nevertheless, fifteen nations remain in default or in arrears on these obligations.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact

Less than three years after the signing of the Locarno Treaties, sixteen nations affixed their names to the Pact of Paris, sometimes known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the General Pact for the Renunciation of War. Viewed in retrospect, it appears today incredible that men of mature intelligence could believe that nations would be bound by such an illusive pledge as that originally conceived by Samuel O. Levinson, a Chicago attorney. After many months of correspondence between Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, and overtures to Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Pact was signed at Paris in the Salle d'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay. Its one virtue was its simplicity. The fundamental provisions:

Article I. The parties solemnly declare that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce war as an instrument of policy.

Article II. The parties agree that the settlement of all disputes among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.

The signatories to the Pact of Paris now total sixty-three. For three reasons the pact is valueless. The first is that it does not specifically renounce "war in self-defense," which any signatory may plead—and has; second, it provides no enforcement machinery, not even the feeble mechanism of the League Covenant; and third, by indirection it upholds the territorial *status quo* of the Versailles Treaty.

A few weeks after the signing of the pact renouncing war, Bolivia and Paraguay were in a dispute over the Gran Chaco, which was to lead to a three years' war. After less than a decade, Italy (one of the signatories) was conducting a "war of defense" in Ethiopia, and Japan (also a signatory) had launched another invasion of China, the end of which is not yet; Japan's aggression, incidentally, was not only a violation of the Pact of Paris, but also of the Nine-Power Pact of 1922. Also in less than a decade after the signing of the Pact of Paris, hailed everywhere as the augury of genuine peace on earth, Hitler had denounced the Locarno Treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, while Germany, Italy, and the U.S.S.R. (another signatory) were unofficially at war in Spain (a signatory); in slightly more than a decade after the august ceremonies on the second floor of the Foreign Ministry in Paris, Germany, Britain, France, and Poland—all signatories, again—were engaged in a second World War, while Japan continued her northern and westward invasion into China.

It should not be concluded from this depressing history of feckless conferences and broken treaties that the one effective remedy for war—disarmament—was overlooked by statesmen in various countries. The limitation of armaments had powerful and influential advocates in the United States, although their influence was somewhat limited by our non-membership at Geneva. But during 1926-31, the League's Preparatory Commission on Disarmament had held six sessions, and American delegates had participated in a sort of consultative rôle.

The Disarmament Conference

The Disarmament Conference, opening on the day (Feb. 2, 1932) that Japan (a League member) was reducing sections of Shanghai to dust and in the north pursuing her conquest of Manchuria, immediately stumbled on three obstacles that were to prove insurmountable. That they did so prove had a disastrous effect on world hopes that peace was a practicable objective; never since has sentiment and support for peace by disarmament reached the proportions of 1932. The three obstacles were the British disinclination to limit their naval strength further than they had in the 1922 agreement at Washington; the French refusal to disarm in any degree unless there were compensating alliances to give her security from attack by Germany; and the German insistence on equality treatment in the Conference and cancellation of the Versailles terms limiting the Reich army to 100,000. An eleventh-hour proposal by President Hoover, seeking to salvage something from the Conference, for a flat one-third reduction in all land armies, was fruitless. The Conference dragged through the months of 1932 and into the next year, by which time Hitler had come to power. He withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League. Thereafter, rearmament became the world's preoccupation, and the disarmament pledge of Versailles and the moral principle activating the Pact of Paris were regarded as scarcely more than pious fables.

It was at this abortive conference that the United States, through Ambassador-at-Large Norman H. Davis, went farthest in voluntarily compromising its freedom of action and in moving in concert with other interested nations. As a forlorn gesture to salvage something from the Conference, which was held under League auspices, Ambassador Davis announced the United States "will refrain from any action, and withhold protection from its citizens if engaged in activities which would tend to defeat the collective effort which the States in consultation might have decided upon against the aggressor." For the United States, whose Senate had demonstrated consistently its antipathy to any definite commitments in Europe, even those of a negative character, this was saying a good deal. But since the American "concession" was dependent upon the

adoption of a disarmament treaty, and since none was forthcoming, the Davis declaration came to nothing.

The United States in 1932 received a chilly reception from Britain when, at the time Shanghai was in flames and thousands dead from Japanese incendiary bombs, that nation refused to join Washington in invoking the Nine-Power Treaty of the year before, although (in the words of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson) "no human language in any treaty could have been more explicitly applicable to the situation at Shanghai and in Manchuria." Moreover, the other signatories to the treaty (France and Italy) also refused to join in the United States' declaration (Jan. 7, 1932) not to recognize the fruits of the Japanese invasion of China. Confronted with this picture of inspiring team-work, the public on this side of the Atlantic very naturally concluded that the Nine-Power Treaty, that famous "Treaty of Chinese Integrity," was no more than a scrap of paper. Finally, after months of prolonged consideration of the report of its Lytton Commission of Inquiry in the Far East, the League accepted it and thereby provoked the withdrawal of Japan from the Geneva organization (Dec. 8, 1932). Mention has been made in the foregoing of the resignation of Italy from the League in 1935, because of sanctions enforced as a reprisal for the Ethiopian adventure, sanctions that in practice meant nothing since their original form had been emasculated.

The London Non-Intervention Committee

In light of the sorry history of post-War treaties, it could scarcely be expected that much optimism would prevail over the labors of the London Non-Intervention Committee, established in the hope of localizing the conflict in Spain during 1937-39. As the halting and manifestly dishonest labors of this Committee, originally representing twenty-seven nations of Europe, became known, the blackest pessimism was justified. The effect of the work of the Committee, created "to carry out a concerted policy of non-intervention in the conflict," was to keep war and other supplies away from Loyalist ports by means of a joint naval patrol; but it could do nothing to prevent Germany and Italy from lending the strongest support to the Nationalist forces of General Francisco Franco. Various mem-

ber-nations resigned from the Non-Intervention Committee in disgust, stating unequivocally that the London Committee's chief concerns were (1) to permit British merchantmen to penetrate the sea patrol to Loyalist ports when carrying general merchandise but to prevent passage of all carriers when loaded with arms and munitions; and (2) to lend support indirectly to Franco. The prestige of the Council of the League of Nations, at its meeting in May 1938, was not enhanced when it rejected the appeal of the *de jure* Government of Spain to approve the cessation of "the farcical and criminal policy of non-intervention that operated to the exclusive benefit of the insurgents." Before the vote rejecting the appeal, Foreign Minister Lord Halifax argued that the Spanish conflict was a civil war and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the League, which could concern itself only with disputes between States. It is not too much to say that this was a flawless example of diplomatic buffoonery, since it could not be plainer that the war involved not Spain alone, but Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.

The Pact of Munich

Nothing better illustrates the scant respect today for treaties than the drafting and the fate of the Pact of Munich, dated September 30, 1938. No sooner was it signed and war averted momentarily than the four signatories—Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Daladier—hastened to their homes to redouble their preparations for hostilities, certain that the document, rather than lessening the likelihood of war, greatly increased the danger.⁴ But more cynical than the mental reservations of the Munich signatories were some of the treaty stipulations themselves, and those of an annex attached to the document.

The main body of the Pact of Munich, after delimiting the Sudetenland which was to be annexed by the Reich, provided for the establishment of an international commission to determine what other regions of Czechoslovakia, if any, might be justly called "predominantly German territory." Plebiscites were to be held in sec-

⁴ See paraphrases of Prime Minister Chamberlain's post-Munich speeches in *The World Over: 1938*, New York, 1939; also Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *When There Is No Peace*, New York, 1939.

tions where doubt existed. Signatures to the Munich Pact had still to be blotted when Germany made it plain she had no intention of holding any plebiscites, but instead would rely on the old Austrian census of 1910, which necessarily would reflect a far greater Germanic population than one taken in 1930, when the Czech Republic had been in existence for twelve years. Britain, France, and Italy, sick of the whole business and interested only that war had been averted for the present, made no protest on behalf of the Prague Government.

That was not all. In the Annex to the Pact of Munich, Britain and France state that they had "entered into the above treaty on the basis that they stand by the offer . . . of the Anglo-French proposals relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression."

Once this explicit phrase was written, pledging the powers to come to some agreement guaranteeing the shrunken Czech frontiers, it was forgotten. When Hitler decided, on March 17, 1939, to seize the two Czech provinces (Bohemia and Moravia), Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was asked in Parliament what had come of this pledge. He answered that inquiries made by His Majesty's Government revealed that the Munich signatories had unfortunately made no progress in arriving at a suitable draft for this guarantee. The full truth was that no steps of any kind had been taken toward drafting that guarantee. Apologists for the British prime minister contend that Mr. Chamberlain's imperative concern was to give Britain more time to rearm; probably that is true, but it is scarcely an answer.

Little in this post-War review will suggest that there are broad grounds for optimism, for any belief that in time men will abide by the pledges they write for their countries. But it is also self-evident that any prolonged disregard for treaties, in a world that has devoted enormous ingenuity to the design of instruments of wholesale death, must lead on some imminent day to the swift disappearance of civilized society as we know it.

The one cheering aspect in the post-War history of treaties is that, in the main, trade agreements among nations have been observed.

That is, obviously, because it frequently is expensive, economically, to violate their terms. Moreover, unlike such documents as the Pact of Paris or much of the League Covenant, commercial treaties deal in tangibilities, not in such abstractions as "the parties solemnly renounce war as an instrument of policy." Inevitably, then, the question always arises, cannot treaties of national policy among nations be so drawn that their infraction is costly and damaging in some direction more ponderable than the loss of moral prestige?

Inept as the League of Nations proved to be in crises, awareness is unquestionably growing that if civilization is to survive it must guarantee peace by some adaptation and elaboration of Article XVI of the Covenant. "Federation" or "Union" or whatever label may be used, is a proposal for a United States of the World that could, among men of good will, make war so one-sided that in self-interest no nation could afford it: it would mean instant suicide, not a nation's slow death by attrition.

"Federation" is a subject over which many millions of words will be written and spoken in the next few years. In *Union Now*, Clarence K. Streit has given a blueprint of democratic federation that at least can serve to start men thinking again of a conceivably practical way of forcing nations to abide by treaties and covenants that, in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, would be "openly arrived at." For centuries man has been told that his first instinct is self-preservation. That instinct must be revived, if he is to endure even for another decade.

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HOW
THE WAR OF 1939
BEGAN

■
Quincy Howe

There is excellent reason to regard the War of 1939 as primarily a continuance of the War of 1914 after a truce of twenty years. For the history of 1914 was not repeating itself in 1939; it was going on where it left off. It is true that Hitler applied the match to the Polish tinder-box and set off the explosion, but the historic importance of what he did can be understood only in relation to events that go back long before the outbreak even of the World War in 1914.

Whereas the World War of 1914 at once involved large-scale military action in the Balkans, in Central and Eastern Europe, and on the Western Front, the War of 1939 began with a lightning attack on Poland only. Hitler concentrated half his army and two-thirds of his air force on the Eastern Front because of the importance he attached to his program of eastward expansion. Actually, this was no new thing under the German sun. As long as a thousand years ago, the Teutonic Knights brought Christianity from Germany to the Baltic and Slavic countries to the north and east. Then, while the Portuguese, Spaniards, French, and British were building overseas empires and colonizing the New World, Germany continued to concentrate its attention on eastern Europe. These efforts did not

gain Germany an empire. On the contrary. About all the Germans could do was settle and colonize various empty stretches of territory that remained under Slavic rule. But these colonizing expeditions which brought German-speaking communities as far east as the banks of the Volga River established close relationships between Germans and various East Europeans, especially the Russians.

It was not until Germany became industrialized in the late nineteenth century that this *Drang Nach Osten* (drive to the east) assumed what might be called an imperialistic character. For it was not until the late nineteenth century that Germany began to develop the industries and technical experts that have made it the foremost industrial nation in modern Europe. The result was that under the last of the Romanovs Russia came to depend more and more upon German engineers, German scientists, and even, to some extent, on German capital for the development of the country. The last Tsarina was herself of German origin and throughout the World War of 1914 a powerful pro-German clique in high court circles hampered Russia's prosecution of the fighting.

Of course, at the same time that some of the energies of Germany were going into the exploitation and development of Russia, other powerful groups in Germany were trying, late in the day, to emulate Britain and France and to acquire an overseas colonial empire. It was this belated effort to become a great naval power; it was this tendency to turn away from eastern Europe and to devote a considerable amount of its energies to overseas expansion that brought Germany into conflict with England in 1914. And after the World War of 1914 wrecked the Kaiser's expansionist program, Adolf Hitler, then an obscure political prisoner, wrote in *Mein Kampf* that he would never repeat the Kaiser's mistake of antagonizing England. He planned to restore German greatness by reverting to the old policy of eastward expansion.

Hitler was not alone in his desire to make Germany the mightiest power in Eastern Europe. When the Russian Revolution led to a complete collapse on the eastern front, the German generals and diplomats followed up Russia's defeat by dictating the peace of Brest Litovsk (March 3, 1918) whereby Germany gained control of large sections of former Russian territory in Poland, the Ukraine,

and along the Baltic Coast. The dream of a vast eastern empire was realized overnight.

But it was too good to be true. The Germans had taken over territory that they could not hope to police and exploit while they were at the same time fighting for their existence on the Western Front and trying to survive the British blockade. As a result some of these areas reverted to Russia, others became part of the new Polish state, and still others set themselves up as independent Baltic Republics.

Nevertheless, the Germans did not give up trying. The head of the German delegation to the Versailles Conference was a proud Prussian aristocrat named Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau who enraged the French and delighted his own people by refusing to sign the treaty that the Allied Powers laid before him. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau belonged to the eastward-expansion school and was appointed German Ambassador to the newly created Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although an aristocrat of the aristocrats, he believed that Germany and Russia, the two outcasts of Versailles, could do business, and he became so friendly with the authorities in Moscow that he presently earned the title of the "Red Count."

Another remarkable German then took up Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau's work. In 1922, Germany and Russia were invited to their first international conference with the victorious powers. The meeting took place at Rapallo, where Germany was represented by her brilliant new foreign minister, Walther Rathenau, who had been head of the German General Electric Company and had done a superhuman job of conserving German resources during the war. He was a combination of Owen D. Young, Herbert Hoover, and Bernard Baruch.

Because Rathenau believed in eastward expansion, he seized the opportunity that presented itself at Rapallo to sign a far-reaching treaty with Moscow. This led to increased trade between the two countries, exchanges of military secrets, and close political co-operation. But shortly after this master stroke of diplomacy, Rathenau was assassinated.

Other men took up the work where he left off and even after Hitler came into power with his anti-Jewish, anti-Communist, anti-Russian slogans, Russo-German relations remained friendly. For

Rathenau had collected a group of disciples who carried on his work, both under the Weimar Republic and under Hitler. The guiding principle of the Rathenau school was economic, not political. It did not interest itself in what sort of government might exist in either Russia or Germany. It saw great possibilities for co-operation and exchange of goods between Germany, the most highly industrialized country in Europe, and Russia with its immense untapped store of raw materials and its enormous need for industrial goods.

Because the disciples of Walther Rathenau emphasized the importance of close economic ties between Germany and Russia, they broke sharply with the pre-war German tendency which flourished only from the fall of Bismarck until the end of the World War of 1914. Bismarck had always insisted on good relations with Russia because he feared simultaneous war on two fronts, east and west. But Kaiser Wilhelm II, driven on by the big-navy men and by his jealousy of England, was determined to try to beat the British at their own game only to discover that it was a game Germany could not play. Rathenau therefore brought Germany back to its historic policy as a land power, not a sea power. His principal aim was to make Germany the economic if not the political leader of a great self-sustaining continental block of nations including not only Russia but all of eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Enter Adolf Hitler

Hitler's arrival in power in March, 1933, scrapped so many of the policies and institutions of the Weimar Republic that the outside world almost entirely lost sight of Walther Rathenau's disciples. But insofar as the outside world paid any attention to Russo-German relations, it assumed that under Hitler they would of course go from bad to worse. It is true that Hitler repeatedly expressed a desire to be on good terms with England; he never made much of an issue about getting back colonies; he, too, wanted to make Germany a continental power. But his anti-Russian, anti-Communist, anti-Semitic propaganda created a general impression that he planned to expand eastward by fighting the Soviet Union instead of by co-operating with it.

The Russians themselves seem to have shared this fear. Within

a year after Hitler became Chancellor, the Russians were preparing to join the League of Nations. Foreign Commissar Litvinov was preaching "collective security" instead of world revolution. Communist Parties everywhere were proclaiming their eagerness to join with Socialists, liberals, and even conservatives to defend "Democracy" against "Fascism." And, most important of all, Russo-German trade shrank from year to year until it had dwindled in 1938 to only one-tenth of the 1930 figure. Hitler thundered against Communism. At the Nuremberg Nazi Party Congress of 1936 he announced that Germany wanted the Russian Ukraine and the Ural Mountains. A year later, Stalin shot most of his best generals, including Field Marshal Tukhachevsky, for alleged plotting with Germany.

While relations between Russia and Germany went from bad to worse under Hitler, relations between Poland and Germany took a turn for the better. Poland had not only acquired large sections of former Russian territory which Germany had controlled for a short time after the Brest Litovsk Treaty; it had also taken over territory that belonged to Germany before the war, notably the famous "Corridor" connecting Warsaw with the sea. Even under the Weimar Republic, the Corridor had been a sore spot, and Polish atrocities against the large minority of six million Ukrainians had scandalized the League of Nations. No other nation in Europe treated its minorities—which included more than half the total population—as badly as had Poland, and even Hitler's opponents at home and abroad admitted that his attacks on the Polish state had a certain validity.

But no sooner did Hitler come into power than he signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with Marshal Pilsudski, who bluntly threatened to invade Germany if Hitler would not guarantee the Corridor and promise to keep hands off the Free City of Danzig, which was predominantly German but which the League of Nations administered as a free port for the Poles. Thus, the long-anticipated war between Germany and Poland did not come off, and Hitler devoted his energies to denouncing Bolshevist Russia. When the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, Hitler sent troops, airplanes, tanks, and battleships to General Franco's aid while the Russians shipped equipment to the Loyalists. Russian and German aviators engaged in "dog-fights" over Spanish soil and the two countries lived in a state

of undeclared war as long as the fighting in Spain lasted, which was more than two years.

Then came the crisis of 1938 over Czechoslovakia and Hitler's triumph at Munich. Here the Russians gave every indication of being willing to fight for Czechoslovak independence and announced that they would honor their treaty to defend the Czechs if the French would do the same. The French and British, however, declared that the Russians were bluffing because the Russian army had been "demoralized by the purge" and the Russian air force was "below par." To this, former President Beneš of Czechoslovakia replied that the Russians had given him positive assurances they would fight against Germany if the French and British would do the same.

This is not the place to assign praise or blame for what happened at Munich. Three things only concern us here. First, the Munich Conference did not promote good relations between Germany and Russia. Indeed, never since the World War of 1914 had these two nations seemed further apart. Second, by capitulating to Hitler's demands at Munich, the British and French surrendered the strongest existing bastion against further German expansion to the east. Third, the Poles took advantage of the partition of Czechoslovakia to take the city of Teschen.

The Munich Conference thus shifted the balance of power in Europe. The four nations that participated in that Conference—Britain, France, Italy, and Germany—pushed Russia into a position of isolation. The initiative here came from the British and French who had little confidence in Russia's military power or even in Russia's good faith. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the British and French not only hoped Hitler would attack Russia but urged him to do so in so many words. Responsible Conservative leaders in England had frequently urged such an attack, and when Hitler came into power even the Liberal leader, Lloyd George, who subsequently turned against Hitler, praised him as the only alternative to communism.

By trying to isolate Russia and by giving Hitler Czechoslovakia, the French and the British at once made Germany the dominant power in eastern Europe. For Czechoslovakia not only had the best

army and the best defense system east of the Rhine; it also possessed the only large-scale munitions factory in non-German Central Europe. From 1939 on it became physically impossible for any small nation in eastern Europe to defend itself from German aggression without Russian aid. But in view of the fact that the British and French had deliberately cold-shouldered Russia at Munich, they gave Hitler every reason to believe that he could henceforth do as he pleased in eastern Europe. Not only had they shown no apparent desire to stop him. They had surrendered all the strategic and diplomatic positions they needed if they ever intended to change their minds.

The Munich Conference gave Hitler the Sudetenland; it gave Slovakia virtual autonomy; it turned over other sections of the country to Hungary and Poland. By early March (1939), however, Hitler launched a propaganda campaign against the Czechs. He accused them of oppressing the Slovaks, and set up a puppet government in Slovakia. On March 15, German troops occupied Prague. The provinces of Bohemia and Moravia were added to the German Reich as a protectorate and the settlement reached at Munich went to pieces.

Spring, 1939, Crises

Too late in the day, the British and French woke up to the consequences of the Munich Conference. Whether they could have followed a different course at Munich is beside the point. Perhaps they had no choice in the matter. Certainly public opinion in both countries was sharply divided at the time and it may be that Germany's superior air force gave Hitler the whip hand. But having capitulated at Munich, the British and French suddenly reversed themselves and struck out on a new line.

Hitler's seizure of Bohemia and Moravia gave the British Government its first jolt. After waiting a few days, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain delivered a speech denouncing Hitler as a treaty-breaker and expressing Britain's determination to block any more attempts to change the map of Europe by force or threats of force. Immediately Hitler gave him a chance to prove his sincerity. He announced that the Danzig question had become acute and demanded the return of Danzig to the Reich and a readjustment of the Polish Corridor. The Poles refused to negotiate on this basis and

the British supported them. Hitler then said that the action of the Poles had nullified the ten-year non-aggression agreement he had signed with the late Marshal Pilsudski and that Britain's offer to aid Poland had nullified the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 whereby the Germans agreed not to build a Navy more than 35 per cent as large as the British fleet. And to show that he was in earnest, Hitler followed up his absorption of Bohemia and Moravia by demanding and getting the Lithuanian port of Memel returned to the Reich.

All this happened within a month and by early April Hitler made a trade agreement with Rumania which gave him a virtual monopoly of that country's oil and food supplies. The French then signed another treaty with Rumania giving them first call on petroleum exports. Britain began offering to extend its protection not only to Poland but to Greece, Rumania, and Turkey and in each case the offer was accepted. Meanwhile, Mussolini took advantage of the confusion in Central Europe to occupy Albania on Good Friday, April 7. Having put himself in a position to blockade the Adriatic and to attack Yugoslavia, he announced that there was no outstanding problem in Europe important enough to justify a war, especially not Danzig.

The war in Albania and the rumors of war elsewhere moved President Roosevelt to intervene. Convinced that Europe was on the brink of a general conflict, he addressed identical letters to Hitler and Mussolini asking them to promise not to attack thirty-one specific countries that he listed by name. Mussolini delivered a quick and noncommittal reply suggesting that Mr. Roosevelt contain himself. Hitler, however, waited several weeks but at once sent notes to all the countries whose independence Roosevelt had asked him to guarantee and from some of them, especially those in the Baltic regions, he received assurances that they did not fear German aggression. He then made these replies the basis of a mocking answer to Roosevelt, delivered before the Reichstag and broadcast to the world.

Whether President Roosevelt's initiative prevented the outbreak of war at that moment we do not yet know. Certainly war looked as close as it had during the Czechoslovak crisis. But Roosevelt's initia-

tive did have one unexpected result. It made more difficult the negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet pact.

Bear That Walks Like a Man

Shortly after Britain began extending its guarantees to Rumania, Poland, Greece, and Turkey, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain began to sound out Moscow on a military alliance. He had hoped that Russia should also underwrite Polish independence, but the Russians replied by suggesting staff conversations immediately. Sir William Seeds, the British ambassador at Moscow, conferred with the Russian Foreign Office. Ivan Maisky, the Russian ambassador at London, began to confer with Foreign Minister Halifax and even attended a tea party with Mr. Chamberlain. As a result of these discussions, the British sent one of their experts from the Foreign Office, Mr. Strang, to Moscow to try to work out some kind of agreement between the two countries. The French were already bound to Russia by a non-aggression and a military alliance, but they took part in the negotiations too in the hope of creating a close Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact.

It did not seem to have occurred to any responsible British statesman that Russia would refuse to come into some kind of alliance, probably on Britain's terms, and nobody in England paid the slightest attention to an important speech that Josef Stalin delivered on the subject of foreign policy in the middle of March, 1939, immediately after the Nazis had occupied Prague and before the British had made any protest at all. In this speech, Stalin repeated his desire to base Soviet foreign policy on the principles of collective security which Litvinov had been preaching for the past several years, but he devoted far more space to criticizing British foreign policy. He announced in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union had no intention of pulling other nations' "chestnuts out of the fire," especially after the exhibition which the British and French had given at Munich.

Two months later, in the middle of May, Litvinov suddenly resigned his post as Foreign Commissar and was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov who also held the position of Soviet Prime Minister. Immediately thereafter, Vice Commissar Potemkin, who had been

making a tour of the European capitals preparatory to a meeting of the League of Nations at Geneva, returned to Moscow and his place at Geneva was taken by Ivan Maisky, the Russian ambassador to Great Britain. The British expressed some chagrin at these two developments. The sudden resignation of Litvinov had evidently occurred under pressure and the substitution of Maisky for Potemkin was an unmistakable discourtesy, since the British delegation to Geneva had been able to consult Maisky at will in London. A few independent journalists began to suggest that the departure of Litvinov meant that Russia had abandoned collective security and was reverting to precisely that policy of isolation to which British diplomacy had attempted to consign Russia at Munich.

Nevertheless, the negotiations at Moscow went forward and Chamberlain began dropping hints that a definite agreement might be expected at any moment. But every time the two countries appeared to have reached an agreement, first in respect to Poland, then to eastern Europe, then to the Baltic states, and finally to resistance to aggression anywhere in Europe, the Russians would keep raising their terms. At one point they demanded guarantees in the Far East. At another point they insisted that a threat of aggression meant an internal as well as an external threat, especially in the Baltic region. The British complained that the Russians were demanding, in effect, the right to interfere at their own discretion in the internal affairs of various countries.

It was at this point that President Roosevelt's letter to Hitler proved a boomerang to the British. For the Baltic nations that Russia wanted to guarantee against aggression had just notified Hitler that they did not fear any attack from Germany. They also informed the British of their firm opposition to a Soviet guarantee. As for the Poles, although they lived in constant fear of German invasion, they also refused categorically to let Russian troops set foot on their soil. Thus, even if the British had been willing—as they were not at the outset—to meet Russia's demands, the Baltic countries and the Poles spurned the only guarantee that could have offered them protection against Germany. For Britain was too far away to be able to offer any military assistance or even to deliver supplies.

Nevertheless, the Anglo-Russian negotiations dragged on. At the

end of June the Kremlin released another warning. Stalin had already declared himself on the subject of England's "chestnuts." He had also shown his impatience with collective security by dropping Litvinov. He now permitted one of his close personal friends to write a long editorial in the official government organ, expressing the opinion that Great Britain had no serious intention or desire of concluding a pact. As in the case of the two previous warnings, this was interpreted in England as another instance of Russia's bargaining tactics. Indeed, by now the British negotiators decided that they had made all the concessions they could and that Russia would have no choice but to sign on their terms. These terms went much further than the ones that the British had originally proposed. They did not, however, include the Far East nor did they give Russia the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Baltic countries. They simply called for joint action against aggression in eastern Europe.

While the British kept raising their offer to Moscow and while the Russians kept raising their demands, the British were stiffening their attitude toward Germany. On June 29, Lord Halifax warned Germany that Britain was ready for war. The next day the Polish Government announced that any acts of aggression in Danzig, whether they came from within or without, would be considered a cause of war, and on July 1 the French notified the Germans that any unilateral change in the status of Danzig would not be tolerated. Finally, on July 3, the Russians rejected the best terms they were ever to receive from the British and the French.

But the negotiations still continued. On July 10, Chamberlain further defined Britain's determination to defend Poland by joining France in forbidding any unilateral change in the status of Danzig. The Russian alliance was still taken for granted. On July 21, Moscow announced that trade negotiations with Germany had begun, but ten days later Chamberlain told the House of Commons that an Anglo-French military mission was setting out for Moscow to engage in staff talks with the Soviet high command. Clearly the mutual assistance pact was assured. In fact, negotiations had progressed so far that Mr. Strang returned to London. After all, great nations do not share their military secrets until they have ironed out all their political differences and agreed on a common program.

Russia had perhaps been naïve in suggesting staff talks in March when Hitler violated the Munich agreement, but after so many months of negotiation with the British and French experts, the foundations of a common foreign policy appeared—at least to the French and the British—to be securely laid.

These negotiations, culminating in the visit of the military mission to Moscow, were naturally supposed to frighten Hitler into backing down. And, for a while, it looked as if the maneuver might succeed. After his occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March, his seizure of Memel, and his threats against Poland in April, he seemed to be quieting down. Something evidently went wrong when he delivered a speech at the launching of a German battleship at the end of May and the broadcast to the world was abruptly cut off. Several shootings occurred in the neighborhood of Danzig and large numbers of German troops, disguised as "tourists," were pouring into the Free City. But Hitler did not choose to make war, although he had helped to create plenty of incidents that he might have used as an excuse for war.

Since April, furthermore, his propaganda had taken a new tone. He railed against the Poles just as he had railed against the Czechs before the Munich crisis, but this time he also railed against the British and accused them of goading the Poles into war. But the propaganda that made the greatest impression of all was the old cry of "Encirclement" that he raised in connection with the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. If the British thought that this move would make the German people see that Hitler was leading them into a disastrous war, they certainly miscalculated, for most Germans were still convinced that Britain had encircled them with a hostile ring of alliances in 1914; and these new guarantees to Poland, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey, coupled with the Russian negotiations, made it look as if history were repeating itself. And instead of destroying confidence in the Führer, this policy served only to rally the Germans around him more enthusiastically than ever. In consequence, British propagandists had their hands full trying to convince the German people that they were not the victims of a sinister "encirclement" plot but were being led to destruction by a blind and arrogant leader.

By the summer of 1939, German propaganda and German foreign policy were entering a new phase. During his first years in power, Hitler had directed most of his fire against the Jews and the Communists. Then, after he began militarizing the Rhineland in 1936, he turned his propaganda against his smaller neighbors—first the Czechs and then the Poles. Of course he always railed against the Versailles Treaty and the “pluto-democracies,” but it was not until the spring and summer of 1939 that he began to single out England as Germany’s chief enemy. And Britain returned the compliment.

At this point in our story, as the hour of the final showdown draws near, it becomes necessary to pause a moment, not to retrace our steps, but to define the fundamental, the irrepressible, conflict that broke loose in Europe between September 1 and September 3, 1939. We have followed some of the most important events up to the eve of the conflict; but before we pursue the story to its bloody conclusion, let us see if we can discover what caused the rival groups to resort finally to war as an instrument of national policy.

Straight imperialist rivalry certainly played a considerable rôle. By the summer of 1939 Hitler controlled more of Europe than the Kaiser did in 1914. If the British and French had permitted him to take over Poland as he had taken over Czechoslovakia, nothing could have prevented him from controlling all of Europe beyond the Rhine. His alliance with Italy would then give him control of the eastern Mediterranean; his connection with Spain would seriously threaten the French position in North Africa and would make Gibraltar completely useless to Great Britain. Although Hitler may have sincerely believed that he did not threaten the overseas empires of either Britain or France, he could not have failed to come into conflict with them in the Near East and in North Africa sooner or later.

Considerations of sheer power politics and imperial dominion therefore forced the British and the French to take a stand against further German encroachments. But there were other factors at work. Ever since the World War of 1914, the rulers of the British Empire wisely perceived that their power had passed its zenith at the turn of the century. Although they emerged in 1919 with more territories than they possessed five years before, they read the hand-

writing on the wall and believed that from then on their principal task was not one of further aggrandizement but one of concession, compromise, and even of retreat. By 1939, therefore, their principal concern was to see that this retreat did not degenerate into a rout.

What complicates their problem is that they face several enemies on several fronts. In their colonial possessions, in India, Egypt, and the Near East, they must cope with a national independence movement. As the colonial peoples have slowly adopted western ways and western civilization, they have developed a native middle class which wants more economic and political power and which is in a position to make good its claims. Roughly speaking, it is the story of the American Revolution all over again and the British have learned from that experience the wisdom of making concessions to the inevitable. They have done it in their Dominions. They are beginning to do it in India and Egypt; but it took a Gandhi with his threat of virtual revolution to force the British to give India at least the rudiments of a new constitution and the beginnings of home rule.

If this were the only threat to the British Empire, if all that the rulers of England had to do was make gradual concessions to the four hundred million subject peoples over whom they rule, the transition process might be a peaceful and even a profitable one because the standard of living of these colonial regions has risen steadily. But there are other forces abroad in the world. In the Far East there is the Empire of Japan which is pursuing in the twentieth century the same policies of imperial expansion that Great Britain pursued in the eighteenth and nineteenth and which is invading various British preserves. Just as Britain used to be able to undersell competitors in the world markets, so Japan with its rationalized factories and low labor costs is getting a larger and larger share of trade in the Far East and is following up its economic conquests with a program of military expansion.

Britain has tried to play off the Japanese imperialists against the Chinese nationalists, supporting first one and then the other in the hope that they would wear themselves out fighting. It has also encouraged the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union. These efforts, however, have met with only indifferent success, with the result that during the 1920's the British had to retreat in the face of the ad-

vancing wave of nationalist revolution from China while during the 1930's they had to retreat in the face of the advancing wave of Japan's imperial expansion.

But Britain's chief enemy for the past twenty years has not been colonial revolution, Japanese imperialism, or Chinese nationalism. It has been the spectre of social revolution. From the time of the Russian revolution until after the rise of Hitler, the Soviet Union embodied this force, and British diplomacy opposed Russia more consistently than it opposed any other nation. For Russia represented a double threat. In the Far East, the Russians supported the most extreme revolutionary parties in China and India, while the most powerful revolutionary movement in Europe drew its inspiration from the Communist International, which maintained headquarters at Moscow.

Just as the British tried to play off the Chinese nationalists against the Japanese imperialists in Asia, so it tried to play off the Russian Communists against the German Nazis in Europe. The British oil magnate, the late Sir Henri Deterding, contributed to Hitler's campaign funds because he saw in the Nazi movement an instrument to attack the Soviet Union and to regain his petroleum wells that the Russians had confiscated. Even Lloyd George greeted Hitler as a welcome alternative to Communism, and after the Munich Agreement, Lord Lothian, the British ambassador to the United States, gave Hitler his blessing. A large section of British conservative opinion, popularly known as the Cliveden set because they used to foregather at Lady Astor's country estate of that name, constantly urged the government—with no small success—to support Hitler in the hope of turning him against Russia. A group of influential bankers and industrialists—Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England; Lord McGowan, Chairman of the Board of Imperial Chemicals Industries; Lord Stamp, President of the Midland Railway—organized the Anglo-German Fellowship to work toward better relations with the Nazis.

It was not that they loved Hitler much; it was that they hated Stalin more. And they hated Stalin not because he was a Russian but because to them he embodied the supreme enemy of the British Empire—social revolution. Hitler, of course, had revolutionary at-

tributes too. He had shown scant respect for private property and as time went on he discriminated more and more against the privileged classes in Germany.

The efforts of the British Conservatives to play off the German Nazis against the Russian Communists reached its peak at the Munich Conference. Already, of course, the British National Government had refused to apply oil sanctions against Mussolini during his Ethiopian campaign and had withheld arms from the legal government of Loyalist Spain while the Germans and Italians rushed men and munitions to Franco. But Russia was helping the Loyalists and the British Conservatives therefore preserved the kind of neutrality that enabled the Rebels to win. For whatever the shortcomings of the Nazis, they were the sworn enemies of Communism and therefore, by definition, were fighting Britain's battle.

It was not until Hitler violated the Munich Agreement that German Nazism suddenly became the greater evil and Russian Communism the lesser evil. Hitler, not Stalin, became the chief bogey-man of the British Conservatives, as he had long been the chief bogey-man of the Liberals and Laborites; and on that issue Chamberlain quickly achieved national unity. At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis, British public opinion had not quite solidified against Hitler. The Cliveden set still spoke for a considerable section of the propertied classes, but the total destruction of Czechoslovakia six months after Hitler had guaranteed its independence for twenty-five years proved a rude shock.

At this point British diplomacy therefore set about spinning the same web of alliances around Germany that King Edward VII had spun around the Kaiser. But where Edward VII had devoted several years to the task of encircling Germany, Chamberlain tried to improvise a similar network of alliances in several weeks—and that immediately after seven years of trying to pit the Germans against the Russians.

During these years, English people of all classes had the same difficulty that everybody else had in understanding the Nazi movement. The dominant faction in the Conservative Party comforted itself with the wishful thought that Fascism was simply capitalism

with the gloves off—a delusion that the Communists encouraged. Therefore the National Government cheerfully surrendered Britain's imperial interests in Spain and in Czechoslovakia on the theory that they were promoting the interests of private property and checking Communism. Other Conservatives—notably Winston Churchill—simply regarded Hitler as a bigger and better imperialist than the Kaiser, and placed the defense of their imperial interests ahead of the defense of their class interests. To the Liberals and Laborites, Hitler was the fiend of hell, and though this theory did not explain very much, it provided a comfortable outlet for moral indignation.

There was, however, a minority in all parties who recognized more and more clearly that Hitler had started a revolution of a kind. "Every nation has its own form of Bolshevism," remarked a correspondent of the London *Economist* in the early days of the Hitler regime, and this opinion gradually gained ground. By the spring of 1939 the translation of such books as Dr. Hermann Rauschning's *The Revolution of Nihilism* and the complete version of *Mein Kampf* presented the Hitler movement in all its details. But almost everyone in England—certainly everyone in a position of power—still assumed that Hitler's revolution and Stalin's revolution could never make common cause. Indeed, Communism became almost respectable with its collective security and popular-front slogans, whereas the Nazis looked more and more like revolutionaries.

After all, consider what the Nazi movement had done in Germany and Central Europe. It had completely expropriated all Jewish capitalists in Germany and in what used to be Austria. It had tried to drive the Evangelical Churches underground by setting up a new version of Christianity. It had persecuted and expropriated the Catholics. It had taken complete control of all schools, colleges, newspapers, publishing houses, radio stations, and every other channel of communication. It had outlawed all political opposition and suppressed all individual liberty. It had set up a system of taxation and "voluntary" contributions that destroyed all the smaller fortunes in the country and that had made the acquisition of wealth virtually impossible. It set up such control over currency and foreign exchange that it was impossible for any German to get his money out

of the country or even to spend it as he chose inside Germany. It had placed virtually supreme power in the hands of a new class which was certainly not the proletariat but which contained no big landowners, bankers, or industrialists either. Operating largely with middle-class support, a tightly organized group of adventurers seized complete power and what is more important—held it. This might not be revolution on the Russian model, but it certainly transformed the life of the country and shook the rest of Europe as no other event since the Russian Revolution had shaken it.

Confronted with this mighty movement, the British Conservatives did everything except face it. Sometimes they pretended that the Nazi movement did not exist. Sometimes they tried to pass it off as a fit of madness that had seized the German people. Sometimes they looked upon Hitler as their best friend. Sometimes they thought he was the reincarnation of Attila—or of the poor old Kaiser. It took more than seven years for the Nazi revolution to become recognized for what it really was: a mass movement—perverted and misbegotten, it is true—that was destined nevertheless to change the face of Europe.

The Showdown

This recognition first made itself felt in the form of rumors about a possible alliance between Russia and Germany. Leon Trotsky had been prophesying something of the sort for years and then, a week after Munich, Walter Duranty of the *New York Times*, who has stood closer to Stalin than any other foreign newspaperman in Russia, dropped the hint that the Nazis and the Communists might work together. More and more journalists took up the refrain, but articles on the subject remained pure speculation, mere "think-pieces," that would appear from time to time to fill space and lend a touch of variety to the news. It seemed too fantastic to enter into the calculations of serious statesmen.

And then, over the next-to-last weekend in August, the news broke. On Saturday, the 19th, Viscount Halifax not only cut short his vacation; he returned unexpectedly to the Foreign Office on the ground that Germany's war of nerves over Danzig seemed to be heading for a crisis. President Lebrun of France spent the day in-

specting the Maginot Line. The Pope renewed his appeals for peace. Slovakia announced that its army was mobilizing and that its troops were joining German troops already established on the Polish-Slovak frontier.

The next day the world at large began to get an inkling of what was actually happening. While the Anglo-French military mission was still trying to swing the Soviet Union into the "peace front" against Germany, the Russians and Germans announced that they had signed a trade agreement whereby the Nazis agreed to extend credits totalling 200,000,000 marks for the purchase of Russian raw materials. Foreign observers in Moscow, however, insisted that the arrangement had no political significance and would simply revive the exchange of German manufactured products for Russian wheat and oil. During the six years since Hitler had come into power, Russo-German trade had declined 90 percent, and even this large credit was not sufficient to restore it to the pre-Hitler level.

The following day, however, the Germans and Russians "implemented," as the expression goes, their economic agreement with a ten-year non-aggression pact. This made the 21st of August "blue Monday" not only for the British, the French, and the Poles, but for all the smaller nations from the Baltic Sea down through the Balkan peninsula. For twenty-four hours the Communist press outside Russia made no comment whatever on this sensational about-face because it was the foreign Communists who had been loudest in their denunciations of Fascism and most belligerent in their attitude toward Hitler. Indeed, several self-appointed "friends of the Soviet Union" in various countries rushed into print with premature assurances that the pact, which had not yet been made public, contained an escape clause whereby Russia would not be compelled to honor it if Germany embarked on a war of aggression. On August 22, Germany's Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, flew to Moscow. The next day he affixed his signature; and on August 24, the text of the pact revealed that the two countries had bound themselves not to associate "with any other grouping of powers which directly or indirectly is aimed at the other party." Far from providing a basis for purely peacetime collaboration, the pact did not go into full effect until one of the parties actually engaged in war.

Meanwhile the rest of the world made desperate efforts to adjust itself to the new political situation. Japan felt the effects of the pact more immediately and vitally than any other country. Although not officially allied to the Germans, the Japanese had signed the anti-Comintern Pact with Hitler which the Russo-German Pact made a dead letter over night. The Russians, furthermore, took advantage of this new state of affairs to increase their activities on the Outer Mongolian frontier where they had been waging an unofficial war against the Japanese for several months.

Hostilities increased rapidly and the Japanese soon took alarm. Premier Hiranuma, who had been pushing the war against China to the limit and who had not hesitated to throw Japanese troops against the Soviet-trained and Soviet-equipped troops of Outer Mongolia, consulted other leaders, all of whom agreed that the Russo-German pact would force a sudden change in Japanese foreign policy. On August 28, the Emperor of Japan accepted the resignation of the entire Hiranuma Cabinet and ordered the more moderate General Abe to form a new government. The next day the Japanese rushed more troops to the Outer Mongolian frontier, and for the first time admitted they had suffered reverses in that part of the world. They said the Russians had concentrated 300,000 men against them, but the Russians insisted that they had not sent any new troops to the Far East because they were reinforcing their western frontiers.

It subsequently developed, of course, that the Russo-German pact did not lead to a substantial Russian drive in the Far East, for on September 15, the Russians and Japanese signed an armistice. But even that armistice did not rule out of consideration the eventual prospect of increased Russian activity in Asia. The moment the Russo-German non-aggression pact was announced, a good many observers said it meant that the Soviet Union was withdrawing from Europe and concentrating all its energies on Asia. Hitler was said to have sacrificed the friendship of Japan in Asia in order to win the benevolent neutrality of Russia in Europe. Indeed, it was prophesied in some quarters that the Germans might ultimately help the Russians industrialize China after the Japanese invader had been driven out.

But the immediate crisis in Europe soon overshadowed the long-

range possibilities in Asia. On August 22, a four-hour meeting of the British Cabinet summoned a special session of Parliament for August 24. Premier Daladier of France conferred with General Gamelin, Chief of Staff of the French Army, and it was announced that a million and a half Frenchmen were already under arms. On August 23, the British and French warned Hitler that they were calling up a combined army of 2,500,000 men and that the British Navy was ready to blockade Germany. At the same time, Hitler received Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador, who handed him what the Führer called Britain's "aggressive demands" to preserve peace. These demands simply repeated the point that the British had made time and again: that they were prepared to help negotiate a settlement of the Polish situation, but that the negotiations must not be held under a threat of force, and that the Poles could not be presented with an ultimatum. If any such attempt were made, the British would fight.

The British emphasized this point repeatedly because they did not want the history of 1914 to repeat itself. At that time British diplomacy was held responsible in some quarters for having brought on the war because it did not convince the Germans that Britain would fight in the event of an invasion of Belgium. Whether that charge is true or false does not concern us here; the point is that the British were making every effort in 1939 to prevent the same charge from being raised again. And to make assurance doubly sure, the British on August 25 placed on record a new and even more binding treaty to defend Poland against direct or indirect aggression. The Chamberlain Government left no stone unturned in its effort to convince Hitler that it was not bluffing and that this time Britain would fight.

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt took a hand in the crisis. On August 24, he appealed to King Victor Emmanuel of Italy to use his good offices to settle the European crisis without war. The House of Savoy was known to disapprove of the alliance with Germany, and even Mussolini appeared to have been taken by surprise when Hitler signed up with Stalin. Throughout all these agitated days, Mussolini kept a strange silence, and even Roosevelt's letter to King Victor Emmanuel did not change matters. The King agreed to do

what he could to keep the peace, but the Roosevelt letter did not produce a break between Mussolini and the King or between Mussolini and Hitler.

At the same time that Roosevelt wrote to the King of Italy he dispatched identical messages to Hitler and to President Moscicki of Poland, suggesting various methods by which they might avoid war. Moscicki replied the next day that he would be glad to negotiate in line with one of the proposals which Roosevelt had put forward, and the American President forwarded this message to Hitler who had had not yet made a reply of his own. On August 28, Hitler signified that he would be willing to have some friend, such as Mussolini (who had meanwhile given his belated approval to the German demands on Poland) arbitrate a settlement, but that he could go no further than that. By this time the Italians had a million and a half men under arms, and Mussolini's star was rising in the European firmament. Was the history of the 1938 crisis which reached its climax at Munich repeating itself?

Events in the three chief European capitals—London, Paris, and Berlin—gave little encouragement to that view. On August 24, the day after Hitler received the British government's "aggressive" proposals from Ambassador Henderson, he talked to the British envoy for fifteen minutes. Henderson emerged speechless. At the same time, the Danzig Senate voted to make Albert Förster, the Nazi Party leader in the city, chief of state, and the Polish Government announced that it would not tolerate the annexation of Danzig by Germany. It was also on August 24 that the Polish army completed occupation of its places of combat. The French rushed hundreds of thousands of reservists to the frontier and the evacuation of Paris began.

On August 25, the Nazis brought the war of nerves to a new height of tension by suddenly cutting all telephone and cable services between Berlin and the outside world. They also called off the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Battle of Tannenberg (at which Russian troops had been driven off German soil in the opening month of the first World War). Hitler had been expected to use this date—August 28—to make an important announce-

ment; but perhaps his new treaty with Russia would have made the occasion an embarrassing one.

On August 26, the British Cabinet failed to reach any agreement on a reply to Hitler's terms as conveyed by Sir Neville Henderson who had flown with them from Berlin. The French ambassador, however, delivered his government's reply. He told the Germans that France did not want to fight but would keep her word to Warsaw, and that if Germany wanted a peaceful solution she would have to negotiate with Poland as an equal. The next day Hitler wrote a seven-page personal letter to Daladier, rejecting the French proposals but begging the French Premier not to fight for Poland. Hitler revealed that his demands on Poland included the return of Danzig and the Corridor as well as other "adjustments" at Poland's expense.

Not until Monday, August 28, did Hitler receive Britain's reply to the proposals he had laid before Henderson on August 24; and after three solid days of discussion the British Cabinet reaffirmed its intention to support Poland. Hitler and his advisers at once went to work on a reply which was received in London the same night. Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax stayed up until almost dawn studying it. This time, however, the British acted more rapidly than they had the week before. It took them only twenty-four hours to reject Hitler's proposals—the same that he had made to Daladier—and to decline his suggestion that they persuade the Poles to send an "emissary" to Berlin for the purpose of "ratifying" the return of Danzig and the Corridor. The Poles found Hitler's proposals insulting and called an additional million men to the colors.

On August 31 came the showdown. For the better part of a week, the Supreme Soviet, which had been summoned in special session to consider, among other things, the non-aggression treaty with Germany, had been postponing final ratification. Actually, the pact did not require this ratification to go into effect, but the gesture had at least symbolic significance and the delay looked more than symbolic. Perhaps Stalin was preparing to give Hitler the "double double-cross" that some of the more skeptical observers of the sudden love-feast between the Communists and the Nazis had been prophesying

right along. But the skeptics had to stifle their doubts when the Supreme Soviet unanimously ratified the agreement and Premier and Foreign Minister Molotov made a speech in its defense. And simultaneously with this move on the part of Russia, the German Government published the sixteen-point proposal it had made to Poland. It had refused to submit this proposal in writing to the British ambassador and the Poles claim they never saw the terms until after the ultimatum they contained had expired.

The final ratification of the Russo-German Pact and the publication of Germany's sixteen-point ultimatum to Poland set off the explosion. At 5:11 A.M. on Friday, September 1, Hitler issued a proclamation to the German army and at 5:45 A.M. the German high command announced that German troops were rapidly advancing into Polish territory. German airplanes bombarded Polish cities, concentrating in all cases except Warsaw on military objectives. The attack was not accompanied by a declaration of war. In fact, the Polish ambassador to Berlin protested Germany's invasion of his country's territory and then quit his post, severing diplomatic relations. As for Hitler, he told a cheering Reichstag, whose members were dressed, like himself, in field-gray uniforms, "I will lead you to victory, and if not to victory, then to my own death. For I shall not live in defeat."

But the war had not yet irrevocably begun. Prime Minister Chamberlain told the British Parliament that unless Germany suspended military operations against Poland, Britain would fight. The French declared a state of siege and decreed general mobilization. On September 2, the British and French sent a new ultimatum to Hitler giving him until noon on Sunday, September 3 to stop the war. Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, conferred with the French ambassador to Rome, thus giving added strength to the rumor that had begun to circulate before the crisis came to a head that the Rome-Berlin Axis had collapsed. What happened was this. Shortly before Hitler presented his demands to Poland, he had conferred with the Italian Foreign Minister at Berchtesgaden. Edgar Ansel Mowrer and H. R. Knickerbocker, two of the most reliable American newspapermen in Europe, reported afterward that it had been a stormy interview during which Hitler had ranted and raved

because Ciano had refused to support him against Poland. After all, only a few months before Mussolini had declared that there was no problem in Europe worth a war that year.

But when the showdown came, the men in responsible positions thought otherwise. Hitler paid no more heed to Britain's warning of September 2 than he had to previous warnings. The British and French had left no possible room for doubt that they would go to war if Hitler invaded Poland. They had taken a stand on this issue so firmly, so frequently, and with such increasing emphasis that they could not back down without surrendering not only all their moral pretensions but much of their worldly power as well. That even Hitler understood this is clear, for his case against the British and the French all along rested not on their final decision to fight but on their original decision to make Poland the issue on which they took their stand. Indeed, if anybody expected any backing down, it was the British and French, who expected Hitler to moderate his demands, rather than Hitler, who expected the British and French to make a last-minute retreat. The final declaration of war therefore came as no surprise to any of the chief actors in the drama. At eleven fifteen on Sunday morning, September 3, fifteen minutes after their ultimatum to Germany had expired, the British declared war on Germany. Six hours later, under the terms of the ultimatum, France entered the war automatically on Britain's side.

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SOCIETY
IN WAR TIME

ECONOMY IN WAR TIME

Franz B. Wolf

Raymond Prince Montecuccoli, an Austrian generalissimo of the war-torn seventeenth century, is reported to have remarked that three things are essential for warfare: first, money; second, money; and, third, money. The dependence of successful warfare on economic and, more particularly, on financial strength has rarely been expressed more clearly, but it has been recognized since ancient times. Only the most primitive of societies did not know such a problem; wandering tribes of hunters and herdsmen could maintain themselves when at war in the same way that they did in peace time. When agricultural settlement was followed by some division of labor, men could no longer leave their work without being compensated for the loss of their livelihood. They also had to be provisioned with food, clothing, and weapons: war had to be financed. Gradually the state of industrial art changed, military equipment was influenced, and war became more costly.

As time went on, the economic problems of warfare increased in size, but their nature did not change greatly. Up to and through the nineteenth century, no more than a small part of the population participated in war. Without mechanical means of transportation, large armies could not be assembled. Nor would it have been possible

to provision them. Furthermore, their cost would have been prohibitive because the financial system was not flexible enough to mobilize large sums on short notice. Moderate stores of war material could be prepared in peace time. And this was sometimes done. Governments, notably that of the Kings of Prussia, also set aside sums of money to meet the cost of a campaign. For the most part, however, money was raised by whatever means possible during the course of hostilities, and food, equipment, and ammunition were procured as need arose. Merchants and manufacturers who could sell supplies would often reap extraordinary profits. Taxpayers might have to carry a heavy burden and the people of a conquered territory an even heavier one. Economic life was subject to numerous disturbances and unusual strains, but for the bulk of the population there was no essential change in their pursuit of business.

It is characteristic that the first traces of a basic change are connected with the French Revolution. The *levée en masse* created the first army drawn from the masses rather than from a group of professional soldiers. The supply of food, arms, and ammunition involved a correspondingly larger task than had hitherto been necessary in warfare. It stimulated the development of the iron industry in France which had up to that time been dependent on England for iron and steel. Even greater economic changes occurred in connection with the Napoleonic wars in the wake of the Revolution. For the first time economic policy itself became an instrument of warfare on a substantial scale. Napoleon tried to close the Continent to all British trade in order to subdue Britain by economic frustration. One result of this self-imposed blockade was the creation of the first modern substitute industry: beet sugar mills sprang up to replace the cane sugar which could no longer be imported from overseas. However, Napoleon's great scheme eventually failed. The Continental system could not be fully enforced. Even a complete interruption of her trade with the Continent might not have subdued Britain, who was not yet dependent on international trade for existence, though far ahead of any other country in developing it. Not until the twentieth century was economic warfare to be revived, this time by Britain herself, and successfully.

During the nineteenth century, the spiritual and intellectual forces

unleashed by the American and French Revolutions brought about the most radical and rapid changes in technology and economy throughout the civilized world. The elements of modern warfare were developed. Industries grew up and multiplied; banking and credit systems developed on a large scale; modern transportation made swift movements of men and materials possible; nations became economically and socially integrated; conscription was introduced in important countries and well-equipped standing armies were created in others. Yet the wars that followed the Napoleonic period up to and including the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 failed to reflect the sweeping economic and social changes to any great extent. The nations were slow in adopting for war purposes the possibilities inherent in the industrial revolution. Economy for the most part retained its peacetime characteristics during war.

How War Economy Developed

The swiftest changes of industrial life, of course, did not materialize until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The armament race which resulted from growing political tension during the first decade of the twentieth century caused the major armies to take greater advantage of scientific and industrial progress. More effective rifles, rapid-fire machine guns, long-range artillery, and high explosives were developed. Warships were equipped with numerous technological devices and such a typical product of modern engineering as the submarine appeared. Armies and navies also grew steadily larger. Thus, they became ever more dependent on modern industry. However, the full implication of these changes was not realized. The general staffs prepared mobilization plans down to the most minute detail. Every member of the reserve forces knew in advance that he had to appear at an appointed place a given number of days and hours after the proclamation of a state of war. Clothing, equipment, and arms were always kept ready for him. Railroad schedules for the transportation of the troops to the border were fully prepared. The strategic plan for the attack on each potential enemy was completely laid out. Yet economic and industrial preparation was scanty indeed.

In 1914 Germany was more systematically prepared for war than

any other country. Important sections of her railroad system had been built in accordance with the strategic plans of the general staff. Some reserve capacity for the manufacture of arms and munitions was available. After the withdrawal of French credits during the Morocco incident in 1911, the Germans carefully strengthened their banking system and planned a system of special small loan banks for the outbreak of war. Larger amounts of gold and silver were set aside for the Imperial War Chest. An extraordinary capital tax for armament purposes was levied in 1913. Despite all these preparations and although the military plans were based on the assumption of a war against Russia, France, and possibly England, no consideration had been given to Germany's dependence on international commerce for a large part of her foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. No arrangements had been made for adapting industry to war purposes excepting some quite inadequate provisions for extending work in the government arsenals. Food rationing, price fixing, exchange control, and numerous other government regulations of business that were to emerge, had not even been thought of.

Nor had any other country made any economic war preparations to speak of. Of course, in every country there were a few clear-sighted men who realized that a war between highly industrialized nations would inevitably present entirely new problems. Still, most of them were only afraid of the shock to business that would result from the outbreak of war and did not foresee the enormous demand for goods that was to follow. It was also recognized that the disruption of international commerce would be a great strain to the national economies; yet this recognition led only to doubting that a war was still possible. Such doubt was expressed by no lesser authority than Alfred Graf von Schlieffen¹ who for many years had been Chief of the German General Staff and had decisively influenced Germany's strategy. Despite his uncertainty as to whether war could break out between nations so interdependent economically, he made all the war preparations he considered feasible and based them on the aforementioned assumption of a simultaneous war

¹ See Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, "Der Krieg in der Gegenwart," first published anonymously in *Deutsche Revue*, vol. 34, Stuttgart, 1909, p. 13; reprinted in Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, *Cannae*, edited by Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, Berlin, 1925.

against Russia, France, and England. In the event of such a war, Germany would be in a dangerous position economically. Schlieffen realized this, but his only conclusion was that it was all the more urgent for Germany to follow her classical strategic doctrine of concentrating all efforts on forcing an early decision by a swift and strong attack. Not only did he want a short war; he was convinced that modern means of transportation and modern arms would make a long war very unlikely.

The Improvisations of 1914

The expectation of a short war was shared in every other country, and it was probably the most important reason for the general neglect of economic preparation. However, soon after the actual outbreak in August 1914, it became evident that further economic measures were indispensable, regardless of the duration of hostilities. Gradually war economy emerged, step by step, quite incidentally and without any preconceived plan.

It started in Germany because, being shut off from so many of her normal sources of supply, she had to cope with the problem earlier than other belligerents. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, the Minister of the Interior grew concerned over a possible shortage of grain and other foodstuffs. He turned for advice to Albert Ballin, creator of the German merchant marine, who with the help of his own involuntarily idle staff established a semi-official company for importing foodstuffs through neutral countries, one which competed with private commerce though operating on behalf and for the sole benefit of the government. At about the same time, Walther Rathenau, president of the German General Electric Company, persuaded the Minister of War to establish a department of control over those industrial raw materials in danger of depletion. Rathenau himself was put in charge of the department and he started by regulating the supply of metals and rubber.

Thus, government interference with business began. A few months later, maximum prices were prescribed for certain goods. January, 1915, saw the issue of ration cards for bread. Foreign trade was under some control almost from the beginning of the war, but the regulations gradually intensified. Numerous special government agencies

were created to control materials that had become scarce, and to regulate industries that were in difficulties. The ordnance departments of the armed forces, of course, were also influential factors as were other military and civil authorities who expanded their sphere of control. Eventually the government's domination of business was fully established and, in 1916, its command was made fully effective by the creation of two central agencies: the first, controlling the food supply and the second, directing all other phases of economic activity.

Other belligerent countries experienced a similar haphazard growth of government interference with all phases of business. And everywhere the complete control of business by the government emerged as the final result of the period of improvisations. France was in a more difficult situation than any other country. She had suffered from the same disruption of her economy as did other belligerents; but in addition, she was crippled by the German invasion of her important industrial areas, with consequently severe reductions of her munitions output. Government activity had to be directed towards reintegrating economic activities and increasing production in the rest of the country. The artillery ordnance department was mobilized for this work and subsequently became the nucleus of the Ministry of Armament formed a few months later. Its actual influence on the national economy reached far beyond the sphere indicated by its title, and this earlier than in other belligerent countries as a result of the more pressing emergency.

England started out by instituting complete control of her railroads, which, incidentally, had been prepared for war long in advance. An improvised measure, however, was the centralization of all sugar imports. In peace time, Britain had imported most of her sugar from Germany and Hungary; now she had to turn to new sources of supply, principally Cuba and Java. Concentration of buying seemed necessary in order to avoid an undue rise in prices. The centralization of beef imports was a similar exercise of business judgment. Otherwise, there was practically no difficulty of supply at the outset of the war, and in characteristic fashion everybody was most concerned with keeping the interference of war with peacetime economy at a minimum. "Business as usual" was the generally ac-

cepted maxim of the day. But it could not last long. The numerous ordnance departments and procurement divisions of the armed forces in making purchases for their increased requirements found themselves competing with each other for the output of industries with limited capacity—and the inevitable result was rapid increases in prices. Some more systematic form of organization became essential if the government was to obtain what it wanted. Competitive bidding was replaced by collective bargaining as associations and committees authorized to speak on behalf of a whole industry were organized to conduct negotiations. In the spring of 1915, a Ministry of Munitions was created which classified all industry according to its importance for the pursuit of war. Price-fixing was introduced, mainly on a cost-plus basis. The number of government agencies, boards, and committees increased rapidly and by 1916 government direction had reached every corner of the land and every phase of the national economy.

Full-Fledged War Economy Emerges in 1916

In all belligerent nations government interference had started with isolated efforts at straightening out a few difficulties caused by the economic disruptions at the outbreak of the war. However, as soon as one gap was bridged, a new one appeared and another government agency came into being. Solving its particular problem, it created new dislocations somewhere else. In reality, there were no particular and separated difficulties; there was only one problem: the ordinary demand of the population and the vastly increased requirements of the armed forces could not possibly be satisfied by the existing means of production. War economy was the direct result of the new method of warfare.

When the German plan to achieve a quick decision was defeated in the Battle of the Marne, a new phase in the history of warfare began. The field fortifications of either army, defended by modern arms, could be successfully attacked only by a force far superior in numbers. Yet neither opponent was able to raise an army sufficiently larger than the other. Superiority had to be sought in the quality and quantity of equipment and ammunition: the application of modern methods of industrial mass production was the logical way to victory

and the only protection against defeat. Within six months after the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions, England had increased twelve-fold her daily production of shells. And this was only to provide the basis for a new multiplication of output. The Battle of the Somme, which started July 1, 1916, was fought with an entirely unprecedented supply of munitions. Each soldier in the field had to be backed up by perhaps four or five workmen in the war industries. Germany's monthly war expenditures in 1915 and during the first half of 1916 averaged about 2,000,000,000 marks, which was more than the total cost to Germany of the war of 1870-71. Within three months after the Battle of the Somme, Germany's war expenditures had risen to 3,000,000,000 marks a month and in the fall of 1917, they exceeded 4,000,000,000 marks. The expenditures incurred by the Allies paralleled these figures. Such gigantic concentrations of industrial power could not be achieved with peacetime methods of private business enterprise.

The stalemate of military operations had also resulted in correspondingly greater emphasis on Britain's blockade of the Central Powers. Unable to win the war in a short time, Germany and her allies were threatened by economic strangulation. More and more, England realized this was her sharpest weapon. She steadily tightened her control over the business of the neutral countries to prevent them from supplying Germany with foodstuffs and raw materials. Germany, of course, was vitally interested in using every possible loophole of the blockade. Economic diplomacy was turned into economic warfare and every deal in international trade had to be co-ordinated with the requirements of the war economies. Thus, another strong tendency towards centralized direction of the national economies came into play. The methods of warfare in 1916 were fundamentally different from those of 1914; strategy had adopted the possibilities offered by industrialized society and the whole economic system was commandeered for war service.

The entrance of the United States into the war permitted the development of war economy into a system of control on a world-wide scale. During the period of American neutrality, the federal administration had not dared to make any war preparations lest these be interpreted as a move towards involvement in the struggle abroad.

When the country eventually was drawn in, its government was far less prepared in every respect than any of the European belligerents had been three years earlier. However, American industry was already geared for a large output of war material through supplying England and France. More important still, the experience gained in this connection and the detached observation of the gradual growth of economic regulation in Europe had given a number of clear-sighted men in government, science, and industry a better understanding of war economy than most people in Europe had at the time. Under the leadership of these men and with the wholehearted co-operation of almost the whole nation, the national economy of the United States was converted into a war economy more rapidly and perhaps more radically than that of any European country. There was, of course, much friction and wasted energy, and a fairly satisfactory organization was not achieved until a few months before the armistice. But incredible results in production were achieved² and a great new impulse was given to the Allies. American democracy made a double contribution to the final victory: the economic forces contributed fully as much as the military efforts.

The Economic Preparedness of 1939

Most of the wars between 1918 and 1939 did not require war economies, since they were fought by countries that had not yet become highly industrialized. The conquest of Ethiopia did not call for a strong effort in producing war material on Italy's part. Fascist economic policy, moreover, had already introduced a great deal of government regulation in peace time. Japan did not expect any serious resistance when she undertook military operations on the Asiatic continent and she has been reluctant to acknowledge that the "Chinese incident" has developed into a full-fledged war. However, she could not prevent the gradual transformation of her economy into a government-controlled system that appears to be rather similar to the war economies as they had developed in 1916-18.

When Germany chose to risk a war against England and France,

² During the last phase of the war, the United States was producing daily six times as much smokeless powder as was produced during the whole of 1914, and more ship tonnage weekly than was formerly turned out in a year. See G. B. Clarkson, *Industrial America and the World War*, pp. 410, 457.

she was not in doubt as to the economic implications. In fact, "Defense Economics" had been made a subject for university courses as well as for public discussion soon after Hitler arrived in power. Said one authoritative German writer as early as 1934: "The question as to whether we today can meet the situation of the World War in every respect and what we have to do to make our position as secure and strong as possible, especially in the economic field, must not disappear from our minds for one moment."³ Everybody in Germany may not have regarded this as the supreme principle of business, but the Nazi government did; and it gradually established its complete control over every single detail of economic life. It used this control principally to transform the country's business system into a war economy. The transformation was carried so far that only a few finishing touches, undoubtedly also planned in advance, remained to be added when war actually broke out.

The democratic countries were unable and certainly unwilling to establish an entirely government-controlled war economy in peacetime. However, England and France did not forget the lessons of the first World War. The French General Staff is known to have paid close attention to the industrial *potentiel de guerre* and England is believed to have established a shadow organization some time ago in preparation of war economy and economic warfare. Characteristically, a full-fledged Ministry of Economic Warfare was immediately set up when a state of war was declared, and the blockade of Germany begun at full steam. An important British school of strategy proposes to seek final victory by economic rather than military means.⁴ Both countries had also prepared plans for the concentration of their own economic energies on the business of warfare. At the very beginning numerous government regulations were introduced which had taken several years to evolve during the first World War.

The preparedness and immediate action of the belligerent governments were certainly important factors in the relatively smooth transition from peacetime to wartime economy. However, the atti-

³ K. Hesse, *Der Kriegswirtschaftliche Gedanke*, Hamburg, 1935, p. 6, based upon a lecture at his inauguration as Professor of Defense Economics at Berlin University in the Spring of 1934.

⁴ See Liddell Hart, *The Defense of Britain*, Random House, 1939.

tude of the international business community was entirely different from that of twenty-five years ago when the interruption of normal activities caused great disturbance in all markets. Of course, economic nationalism has somewhat reduced the importance of foreign trade to the national economies, and the combination of war scares and armament booms during the last two years has provoked many private war preparations as well. Yet the international security and commodity markets during the first few weeks of the War of 1939 not only failed to be disturbed—but they clearly indicated that most businessmen paid much more attention to the probable demand for war material than to the threatened decline in peacetime business. They expected an immediate repetition of the economic experience of only the later phase of the last war. This presumption was undoubtedly more logical than were the expectations prevailing during the war scares of the last several years when the sensitive markets acted as if a repetition of the economic experiences of 1914 was in store. Nevertheless, anticipations of a war economy closely similar to that of 1916-18 are likely to be rebutted by the actual developments. For two reasons. First, war economy depends on military strategy which is likely to develop surprising new features as it did in every major war. Second, a war economy planned well in advance and made effective at the outbreak of hostilities will probably have results different from that of a war economy haphazardly improvised during several years of warfare. What these results are going to be cannot safely be predicted. There can be no doubt, however, that economic factors must play an ever greater rôle in determining defeat or victory in all wars of the twentieth century.

Financing by Taxation, Loans, and Inflation

Providing the monetary sinews of war was the one economic element of strategy as long as "war economy" in the full sense of the word was unknown. Through the advent of the larger task, the solution of the financial problem has not become any easier or less important. On the contrary. The mobilization of the entire business system increases the necessary amounts in absolute figures and also in proportion to the national resources. To express in figures the total financial burden of war, has become utterly impossible since

the effects of hostilities are so widespread that they cannot be separated. All responsible estimates must be confined to those expenditures which can be directly connected with war, and these estimates, therefore, are much too low. Nevertheless, there may be some indication in the fact that war expenditures of 1914-18 have been computed at more than 200 billion dollars. An adjustment for the inflationary increase of the figures during the latter part of the war, would still leave a total of more than 150 billion dollars of present value, which is equivalent to the total national output of the United States in more than two years. In 1918 the United States alone spent more than one-quarter of the total national income for war purposes. German war expenditures in 1917 are believed to have absorbed about one-half of the actual national output and as much as forty percent of the income of pre-war years.

The methods of war financing were always a subject of much discussion. Theoretically—and when the war was over—taxation was generally regarded as the soundest method, but in practice—when the war was on—loans were usually deemed more convenient. Moreover, inflation, though never openly advocated, has frequently been used as an expedient. England is about the only nation that repeatedly financed a substantial part of war expenditures by taxation. During the Napoleonic Wars, almost half of her expenditures were covered by revenues and during the first World War, a quarter. This latter performance was surpassed by the United States, who paid about one-third of the war cost by taxation. However, this was possible only because of the unusual prosperity during the preceding period of American neutrality and because of the shorter duration of this country's active participation. Candor requires us to acknowledge that war in modern dimensions leaves no choice: every method of financing must be used simultaneously. All that can be reasonably expected is that they be used in the best possible proportion. To determine this, the implications of each form of financing must be considered.

Can the Burden Be Postponed?

In every nation the same arguments have been advanced time and again in favor of financing a war by loans rather than by taxa-

tion. Ordinary expenditures—so the reasoning goes—should be financed by taxation, but extraordinary ones by loans; war expenditures certainly are of an extraordinary nature—why not finance them by loans? The enemy will have to make the final payment after his defeat just as an adversary may be ordered in court to refund legal expenses. The war calls for great exertion in any case—why increase the burden by oppressive taxation? The war is fought to benefit future generations and it is only just that they should help carry the load. After all, financial sacrifices are not as serious as those asked from the generation that carries on the war. So far, so good. But is it true that loans postpone the burden whereas taxes impose it immediately?

It seems to be true from the point of view of the individual taxpayer to whom financing by taxes means the immediate payment of the full amount, whereas the debt service resulting from financing by loans requires a large number of small payments to be made by himself and his children over a long period of years. Yet this is not necessarily so. Many a taxpayer can raise a loan for the payment of an unusually large tax and distribute his load over a longer period of time. Instead of borrowing the money for his tax payment, he may liquidate securities or some other assets, thus likewise parcel out his burden, since his actual sacrifice is represented by the income he would otherwise have received from the liquidated assets. On the other hand, a loan policy requires a strong appeal to every citizen and small subscriptions are accepted, with the result that many of them represent a sacrifice of current income rather than an investment of capital. There is, of course, a general tendency to use income for tax payments and capital for loan subscriptions, but there are many exceptions to this rule.

Moreover, the transfer of money from taxpayers and loan subscribers to the government's treasury is only one link in the chain of war financing. The individual citizen has to raise the money under conditions greatly influenced by the economic and financial policies connected with the war, and the treasury's disbursement of the money again affects the whole business system of the nation. Disregarding for a moment the monetary element, a different and in certain respects more basic view of the burden imposed by war may

be arrived at. Actually this burden consists of the services and goods consumed in carrying on the hostilities and of the loss of comfort and wealth that otherwise could have been produced with these services and goods. Most of the services must be performed and most of the goods must be produced while the war is on. Steel produced in the future does not help win the victory. Of course, some assistance is given by goods produced in the past: military equipment and ammunition prepared for the emergency, raw materials, manufactured goods, and machinery diverted from peacetime purposes to war service. Their employment lightens the immediate burden, but it constitutes a depletion of reserves rather than a borrowing from the future. The national economy has to shoulder the burden immediately, regardless of the methods of financing.

What then is postponed by the use of loans instead of taxation? Nothing but the allocation of the load to the individual citizens who will eventually have to carry it. This is by no means unimportant. First of all the postponement is an expedient to the government which does not like to inconvenience its citizens by heavy taxation while it needs their co-operation. A weak government uncertain of its people's morale will do all its war financing by loans, as the German government did from 1914 through 1918. Obviously, such complete postponement in allocating the burden is a deceit of the nation which, as will be shown, has to make its sacrifice in the form of inflation; this is less troublesome to the government but more onerous to the people. Yet strong and honest governments must also finance some part of their war expenditures by loans, since taxes big enough to cover all the costs would cause too much friction in the business system. It therefore is doubly important to realize that loans have a tendency to facilitate inflation. And it should also be acknowledged that the delay in allocating the burden actually leads to a change in its distribution if the apportionment of taxation to the various groups in the population is different after the war from that prevailing during the war.

The Limits of Taxation

Since taxation is the most honest method of war financing, it should be employed in preference to loans. This conclusion would

be even more stringent if it were possible to levy taxes so as to call for an equal sacrifice from every citizen. Two taxpayers having the same economic resources, the same income, and the same family to care for, will have to pay the same amount of taxes. Yet this amount is likely to call for unequal sacrifices if the present equality of their economic condition is the result of a considerable improvement in the status of one of them and a simultaneous deterioration in the status of the other. Should both changes have occurred suddenly and as the result of the war, the injustice of the nominally equal taxation would be evident. But it would be unavoidable, for taxation must be based on objective indications of the ability to pay, making only slight adjustments for personal circumstances. Business taxation encounters a similar problem since the elasticity in demand and supply is an important factor in determining who actually pays a tax levied on business transactions and business profits. A prosperous industry whose products are in great demand will have no difficulty in passing on the additional burden to its customers, whereas an industry suffering from a depression cannot afford further to impair its sales by a rise in prices. Here again the war itself magnifies the causes of unwanted inequality as it increases the demand for the products of certain industries, necessarily at the expense of others.

Social and economic reasons make it imperative that taxes be limited to a level that does not completely destroy those who are hardest hit although this limitation will always benefit others who do not pay as much as they could. The influence of war on the general level of taxation and on the prosperity of the various industries suggests special taxes on war profits. During the last war, such special taxes were introduced by all major belligerents and also by a number of neutral nations. At first glance a war-profits tax seems to be the most natural of all taxes, but second thought reveals numerous problems only a few of which we shall discuss. The first is the difficulty of determining the war profits. One way of doing it is by a special tax on profits derived from the production of ammunition and related items. But this system disregards many other profits caused by the war, and all countries that began with such a special tax, replaced it by a wider application based on the increase of either assets or income over the pre-war level. This again causes inequitable taxa-

tion of those whose earning power was improved as a normal result of their own previous efforts and investments rather than as a result of war. More important still: war-profits taxation discourages the investment of capital in war industries inasmuch as such investment must depend on the possibility of large depreciation charges and a high rate of profit to offset the uncertain duration of the business. All these objections were not found strong enough to rule out special war-profits taxes but they influenced their application and limited their effect. Experience shows that war-profits taxation is not sufficient to prevent objectionable profiteering and cannot make a decisive contribution to war financing.

Increases in the various peacetime taxes must be the mainstay of war taxation. The possible result thereof is greatly dependent on the type of taxes from which the major portion of revenues is derived. The income tax has proved the most flexible instrument of taxation in war time. Britain's income tax—incidentally a child of the Napoleonic Wars—has greatly assisted in financing her wars during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The United States, after having had an income tax during and after the Civil War, luckily reintroduced it shortly before the first World War. Had it not been running for a few years before 1917, the nation's comparatively good record in war financing would not have been possible. A well established, carefully refined income tax in peacetime is probably the best basis for wartime taxation, especially if its rates, though progressive, are not too high to prevent a substantial rise in time of war. The high level of income taxes in recent years undoubtedly impairs the usefulness of this instrument in war financing. In 1939, the British income tax rate was raised about as much over the pre-war level as during the early phase of the last war; but this pre-war level was about as high as the one reached at the end of the first World War which represented a fivefold increase over 1914.

This factor may greatly influence the apportionment of the load to the various groups of the population since, next to the income tax, the most flexible means of taxation are the excise taxes on consumers' goods and general sales taxes. These will have to yield a greater share of the total revenue, inasmuch as income taxes are already high. Indirect taxes, however, are most burdensome to those who can

least bear them. On the other hand, reliance on the income tax in war time fosters a tendency to increase the relative share of the wealthier people by steeper graduation. This at least has always been the case in England. Therefore, English economists have pointed out that financing of war by loans tends to increase the burden on the poor, since during war the wealthy pay an unusually large proportion of the total taxation. As for the United States, it was contended that after 1918 the tax system was no less progressive than during the war and that any increase in war taxation could have been made only at the expense of the masses.⁵ Taxation cannot be increased beyond certain levels without affecting its apportionment to the various groups of the population. If the burden on any group commanding political influence becomes too heavy, a political limit of taxation is reached.

The Proper Use of Loans

When we stated above that financing by loans does not postpone the burden as far as the national economy is concerned, a reservation should have been made with regard to foreign loans. Insofar as a country can raise money abroad, it can employ foreign labor and foreign goods instead of its own. Loans from an ally tend to be considered contributions to the pursuit of the common cause with the result that they are not repaid.⁶ If and when the loan is repaid, goods must be produced and sold abroad in order to raise the necessary cash. Yet at the time the loan is issued, it provides purchasing power abroad regardless of later redemption. Thus, foreign loans are a means of postponing the burden. Foreign assistance in carrying the economic load of the war can also be summoned by the sale abroad of any assets for which a buyer can be found. England, for example, if she is unable to float a war loan in the United States, may

⁵ John M. Clark, *The Costs of the World War to the American People*, New Haven, 1931, p. 76.

⁶ This view was expressed long before the start of the general discussion about the unpaid war debts. In its first issue of 1919, the London *Economist* wrote: "It would be a pleasant act to begin the New Year by making a peace bonfire of all the promises to pay that our Allies have given us during the war." This influential organ of British public opinion suggested foregoing the debts owed to England while advocating the payment of England's own indebtedness to the United States.

secure dollars by selling assets of various kinds to residents of the United States. American securities can be sold in this country more easily than any other capital assets; but there may also be American buyers for Canadian, South American, Japanese, or English securities. Of course, the British government does not own such marketable assets in peace time but, by persuasion or force of law, its nationals can be caused to hand them over to the government for sale abroad, for which they receive domestic government bonds in payment. The immediate effect of such a transaction is similar to that of a foreign loan. Buying power becomes available for purchases abroad which do not burden the domestic economy during the war. Yet a loan is redeemable and assets sold are not. Such sales, therefore, may involve the definite surrender of important interests. A clear example might be the sale by England of Canadian and Latin-American securities to the United States. Preferably, a nation at war will sell assets which do not control interests of lasting importance. Still, the sale abroad of any asset is a sound means of financing the war, and the issue of domestic loans for the satisfaction of the original owners does not represent an immediate burden on the national economy.

For the bulk of its financing, the nation at war has to rely on its own resources. A part of the goods and services representing the productive power of the country must be diverted from their regular employment to war service, and for this purpose purchasing power—power to command these resources—must be transferred from individual citizens to the government. If and where the men and machines are more or less fully employed, there is no idle capital. Of course, individuals may have deposits in the bank, but the bank has the money invested. Capital must be released from peacetime employment if the government is to get hold of it. To some extent, this release is enforced by the war. Shortage of raw materials causes the reduction of inventories. The conscription of manpower for war service and its attraction by war industry slows down or paralyzes less essential activities and their working capital is set free. With the metal trades engaged in war work, industrial machinery and equipment cannot be replaced at the normal rate, and the depreciation funds set aside for this purpose become unemployed. These various

kinds of disengaged capital constitute a fund available for the subscription of loans. The consumption of this fund in the pursuit of the hostilities is a depletion of national resources, a destruction of past savings, but it is still a sound method of war financing.

To the savings of the past, or rather to that part which can be mobilized, must be added the savings of the present. In peace time the savings of the nation are directly or indirectly invested in the expansion of the productive equipment. In war time, these savings are drained for war service through the channel of loans. They are lured into this channel by an appeal to patriotism and are forced into it by an embargo of all other security issues, save those necessary for the expansion of war industry; and sometimes also by the prohibition of all new construction—again excepting that essential to the pursuit of war. Moreover, efforts are made to increase the current savings. Consumption is discouraged by moral persuasion and, more effectively, by the many ways in which it is made impracticable. Lack of personnel and material, difficulty of transportation, blackouts, and numerous other inconveniences automatically prevent the consumption of many goods and services which otherwise would be used. Finally, rationing and other forceful restrictions may take place, all of them releasing purchasing power. On the other hand, production of goods for warfare, for essential consumption, and for export as well is speeded up as much as possible, resulting in the highest national output feasible under the circumstances. The larger the production and the smaller the consumption, the greater are the savings which can flow into the war chest. Of course, most of the current savings should flow there by way of taxation, which incidentally also serves to discourage consumption. Whatever part of current savings cannot be reached by the tax collector may properly be mobilized by loans together with the disengaged capital resources. Yet as soon as the volume of loans increases beyond these savings funds, the gates to the abyss are thrown open.

Loans Degenerate Into Inflation

Shortly after the entrance of the United States into the first World War, A. C. Miller, a member of the Federal Reserve Board, stated

the case with exemplary clarity: “. . . if the loan policy fails to induce a commensurate increase in the savings fund of the nation, it degenerates, through the abuse of banking credit, into inflation—raising prices against the great body of consumers as well as against the government, thus needlessly augmenting the public debt, and increasing the cost of living just as taxes would. The policy of financing war by loans, therefore, will be but a fragile and deceptive and costly support unless every dollar attained by the government is matched by a dollar of spending power relinquished by the community.”⁷

There are many ways in which banking credit may be abused to create inflation. The most obvious one is through the purchase of government paper, be it bills or notes or bonds, by the central bank which issues bank notes against it. This is no different from the outright printing of fiat money. All other methods are simply a more roundabout path to the same goal. More dangerous than any other method is the one which appears to be the most innocent: extension of credit by commercial banks to private customers with war loan used as collateral, the proceeds being employed in the subscription of more war loan. And, as long as such credit expansion serves to stimulate loan subscriptions, it does not make any difference whether other securities are deposited as collateral or the credit is seemingly extended to be used in normal business. This procedure was most widely applied in Germany during the first World War because of the exclusive use of loans in financing. Thus, the proudly praised record of war-loan flotation was easily reached by sheer inflation. The methods used for the increase of money and credit are never of any importance. Significant only is the fact that credit is extended in excess of the savings fund of the nation, that is, of the current savings and those capital resources that can be mobilized.

Here it becomes necessary to amplify a statement made casually above. It was stated that there is no idle capital if and when the men and machines are more or less fully employed. They, of course, are by no means always fully employed and if they are not, there is

⁷ *Financial Mobilization for War*, papers presented at a joint conference of the Western Economic Society and the City Club of Chicago, June 21 and 22, 1917, p. 145.

what may be termed idle capital. It usually takes the form of an abnormally high liquidity of the banking system. If this is so—at the outbreak of war or at any other time—credit may safely be expanded until in some important section of the business system production reaches the full capacity which cannot be easily increased. With no more goods to buy, the purchasing power made available by the additional credit is used to bid up the prices of material and labor—the vicious cycle is set in motion. Unfortunately, this danger point is more easily reached in war time because of the concentration of purchasing on a limited number of industries, principally the steel and metal industries.

Wartime inflation is doubly dangerous since it can hardly be checked. If a gold currency or a similar monetary system is in operation, an inflationary rise of prices which will cause an unfavorable development of the balance in foreign trade, will drain the nation's reserves of gold and foreign currency, and thus force the central bank to protect these reserves by a deflationary counter-move. Without such an automatic system (which operates nowhere during a major war) a watchful money management may still check an inflation; an increase in taxation and a reduction in government expenditures will serve to reduce the surplus purchasing power. Heavier taxation is entirely possible in war time, but a reduction of government expenditures cannot even be considered. Thus, inflation is allowed to run its course and to accelerate under its own momentum—as it invariably does. The upward trend of prices creates its own speculative possibilities and therefore encourages the use and expansion of credit for more or less speculative purposes. This expansion pushes inflation to its vicious stage.

The use of credit expansion by the government puts at its disposal money and credit which are not taken away from the people. If full-capacity operations of industry or lack of additional manpower precludes an increase in production corresponding to the nominal increase in available money and credit, the greater sum of money cannot buy more—the purchasing power of the monetary unit declines. The government's share in the national output does not increase as much as it would if its additional income was the result of taxation taking it away from the people. But it does increase and

the people's share does decline; this is expressed in the smaller amount of goods they can buy out of their incomes. Thus, inflation is effective as a concealed taxation, but a taxation that does not even exempt the poorest and is not graduated in any degree; it is simply proportional to the income.

As if this were not unfair enough, inflation also causes the most iniquitous changes in the economic status of the individual citizen. The more rigid his nominal income, the more he suffers; the more speculative his position, the more is he likely to benefit. Those living on pensions or income from fixed interest-bearing investments find their purchasing power reduced to the full extent of the decline in the value of money. Employees can raise their nominal wages but not nearly so fast as the value of the money declines. Businessmen depend on their alertness and sometimes on the laxity of their business morale. The debtor who can repay his debt at face value in a currency of greatly diminished purchasing power, gains and may easily gain a fortune at the expense of his creditors. Many of these changes are not only highly inequitable; they are entirely capricious and socially destructive.

All of these dreadful results of inflation are not likely to reach their full proportion during a war. They cannot be permitted to do so because they would greatly hamper the workings of the economic system and would utterly destroy the morale of the people. Therefore, many restrictions are imposed to prevent or at least to delay the rise in prices. For a time, such regulations can be fairly effective although they must be steadily extended as the force of inflation banished from one field attacks another. Eventually such restrictions become so paralyzing that they must be removed after the end of hostilities, giving way to the full impact of inflation. The possibility of delaying the process is no blessing. Were it not for this possibility, no government would dare to let inflation run its course. As it is, most wars of modern times—and many of earlier centuries—have been accompanied by inflation in their later stages when sound means of financing were exhausted. Of course, in many instances such inflation was comparatively mild, as in the United States and Britain during the first World War. It went further in France and Italy and much further, of course, in Germany, Austria-Hungary,

and Russia. This was partly the result of their greater reliance on inflation during the war, partly of their inability to stop it after the war was over. As Pigou pointed out: "under the Peace Treaty, it was politically impossible for any government in Germany to maintain itself in power and at the same time to levy, in an unconcealed form, sufficient taxes or to raise sufficient loans to enable it to meet its international obligations and also to pay its way."⁸ The extreme example of Germany may help in understanding the real cause of wartime inflation: the political inability to confine the economic and financial burden to the community within bearable limits.

Squeezing out the War Supplies

The analysis of war financing should have shown that its methods determine the distribution of the war costs rather than their limitations. The total size of the national economy's assistance to the armed forces depends primarily on the adjustment of the industrial machinery. This is a task of decisive importance and at the same time it presents even greater difficulties than the raising of the money. The American experience of 1917 is a clear example. John Maurice Clark has pointed out that "it proved easier to expand the raising of funds than the effective spending of them. And if it had not been for the running start, so to speak, which the period of neutrality had afforded, this difficulty would have been many times worse."⁹ The modern business system is based on the principle of division of labor, and every industrial unit is dependent on a host of others for its machines, tools, dies, fuel, power, raw materials; it is dependent on transportation of the goods it receives and those it delivers; it is dependent on scientific research and engineering skill, on management experience and labor efficiency. Thousands of details must be worked out and tested and put into operation if industrial production of any small item is to function well. And the number of items required is countless. To put industrial economy on a war footing is a gigantic task indeed.

The production of war material is not the only goal that must be

⁸ A. C. Pigou, *The Political Economy of War*, London, 1921, p. 162.

⁹ J. M. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

kept in mind. The necessities of the population must also be provided and every useless disturbance of the business machinery is an unfortunate addition to the great amount of inevitable waste and friction which reduces the national output. Such reduction may come to as much as a quarter or more. Yet defeat or victory may depend on the size of the national output and the share of it that can be diverted to war purposes. The decisive effect of America's participation in the first World War was largely based on the fact that the country succeeded in approximately maintaining its national income during 1917-18 at the unusually high level of 1916 and in shifting one-fourth of it to war use.¹⁰ On the other hand, Austria-Hungary's campaign efforts could only be weak because her political and social structure did not permit of any diversion from her national income for war purposes; and the contribution of her economy was limited to whatever depletion of existing capital was possible—a source that was exhausted rapidly as war went on.¹¹ It is unlikely that much more could have been squeezed out of the frail empire by any other method. In a stronger country, however, the result may be much more dependent on the system of economic organization.

The Allocation of Labor

Manpower is a primary requirement of warfare, and the first effect of hostilities is the withdrawal of a large body of men from their normal pursuits. As a result, the unemployed will be gradually absorbed either in the army or in industry and agriculture. In addition, the army of workers is enlarged by women, youngsters, and elderly men, who were not employed in peace time. The next step is a shift of manpower from the less essential industries, some of which are prostrate in any case because of lack of supplies, while others must be deliberately curtailed to release employees. Furthermore, hours of employment are increased although too great an increase tends to reduce the speed of work which supposedly is to be increased at the same time. The simultaneous application of

¹⁰ According to J. M. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 122, 123.

¹¹ W. Winkler, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Oesterreich waehrend des Weltkrieges*, Vienna, 1930, p. 81.

longer hours and speed-up creates a strain on the workers which tends to impair both their willingness to co-operate and their health. The pressure may be somewhat alleviated as the enormous increase in the output of war material permits more extended use of machinery and methods of mass production which cannot be applied to the small peacetime volume of these industries.

However, all these expedients cannot solve the problem of allocating skilled labor. The highly technical character of many types of war material makes many trained workers more valuable in the factory than in the field. At the beginning of the first World War this was acknowledged in the case of only a few; yet as the war proceeded greater numbers had to be returned to industry. When the United States entered the war, this problem was already recognized and a highly selective system of enrolment was applied. Such a system has now become the basis of mobilization plans in all countries. New difficulties, however, have developed as war machinery has become still more mechanized, requiring a great number of highly skilled mechanics as part of the armed forces in actual combat as well as on the airdromes and other assembling points behind the fighting lines. It is quite possible that the number of skilled workers directly and indirectly available to each belligerent party may prove to be one of the most decisive determinants of success. Another new problem created by the wholesale excuse from military service is its effect on the morale of the population. The danger of air attack has led to a removal of essential plants from the large cities and industrial districts to the less congested rural areas where they are spread as thinly as practicable. Able-bodied young men work in the factories in the midst of a rural population whose sons and brothers and husbands are in the trenches. And the workmen are well paid, too. A high degree of understanding is necessary in such a situation lest discontent overwhelm the patriotic spirit.

Within industry a similar inequality arises through the extreme differences in business activity. While certain industries are working twenty-four hours a day at full capacity, others must close down. The shift of workers is comparatively easy in districts where a variety of industries is rather evenly distributed. Many districts, however, are dominated by only one group of industries with a

resulting labor shortage in a heavy-industry region and a simultaneous serious lack of employment in, say, a textile district. In this connection there is also a capricious change of income; munition labor may be very well paid, while workers remaining in less essential peacetime industries are put on part-time at a low wage rate. On the other hand, the difference in remuneration is of great help in shifting labor to the war industries. The good pay induces many workers formerly employed elsewhere to disregard inconveniences connected with a change and overcome their natural hesitation. It also attracts men and women who were no longer or never before active in industry, although other factors may be more effective in this respect. As the families of many mobilized soldiers are deprived of the major part of their normal income, the women seek industrial employment, leaving their own previous jobs in the house to the youngsters and the elders. Increased cost of living and higher taxation play a similar rôle. Even in the wealthy classes people living in leisure feel unhappy in an atmosphere of intensive activity for the national cause.

The democratic nations tend to rely principally on these incentives for increasing the supply of labor and for allocating it to the right places. Nevertheless, much governmental action is needed to facilitate the process and to reduce friction. The co-operation of labor's own organizations is of great assistance and labor leaders, therefore, may be called to aid. Government agencies are made responsible for the avoidance of strikes and lockouts through mediation. Working conditions and rates of pay are to some extent controlled by the government, be it on the basis of statutory authority or as the direct or indirect employer of the largest number of people in the country. Employment agencies—if necessary newly created or expanded—are co-ordinated with and directed by the government's central agency in charge of industrial production. Transplantation of labor is facilitated by the large-scale construction of housing facilities wherever a shortage exists. On the other hand, war work is allocated, if at all possible, to districts having a labor surplus. Plants manufacturing unessential goods are forced to close if they employ workers who can be transferred to a war industry. In individual cases, a specific job may be assigned to a potential recruit by the alternative of mili-

tary conscription. In general, however, direct compulsion was and is avoided whenever possible.

In contrast to the democratic nations, Imperial Germany introduced general conscription of labor in 1916. During the first two years of the war, it had adhered to the same methods as other countries, although the military district commanders occasionally used their authority in the labor field. However, when the "Hindenburg Plan" was put in operation, the army commanders requested and received full control of labor policies through the *Kriegsamt* (War Board) combined with compulsory service for all men between the ages of seventeen and sixty. Civil authorities advised against this measure but prevailed only to the extent of excluding the boys between the ages of fifteen and seventeen and the women who, under the original army plan, were also to be subject to service. The practical effect of the law was a topic of much discussion. Undoubtedly it simplified certain phases in the allocation of labor but it probably added little to the total employment. On the other hand, morale and efficiency were unfavorably affected by the workers' natural resistance to coercion. The tension resulting therefrom was one of the more important elements in bringing about the revolution of 1918.

The Nazi government in peace time administers its labor policy by compulsion. Its wartime labor policy has proved much more radical than the Kaiser's ever was. Long hours of work are compulsory, the wages, which were low enough before, were reduced, and payment for overtime goes directly to the government instead of the worker. Yet all this is part and parcel of the Nazi pattern of life, imposed upon the people during years of war preparation.

Conscription of Material and Machinery

The allocation, in one way or another, of sufficient labor to the industrial pursuit of the war does not yet solve the problem. The men must have raw material to work on and machinery to work with and also fuel and power and all the other incidental necessities of industrial production. The small proportion of the industrial system that is geared to the manufacturing of war necessities cannot possibly be increased sufficiently without a nation-wide adjust-

ment. During the earlier stages of the first World War, the numerous ordnance departments of the armed forces in each country tried to purchase their requirements in competition with each other and with private industry as well. They encountered no particular difficulties as long as they were buying in moderate quantities and so far as they were looking for goods that were manufactured for civilian purposes as well as for war. The shoe industry could easily supply millions of boots and shoes for the army, since its normal sales were reduced by the mobilization. It was more difficult to procure enough shells or machine guns because new sources of supply had to be added to the old ones. The prospect of profits caused many manufacturers to convert their plants, especially those whose normal business suffered. But this did not really solve the problem since the army contractors could not deliver unless they received all the necessary raw materials and subsidiary supplies in sufficient quantities and at the right time. There was a shortage of some of these raw materials and it was simply a matter of chance whether or not a contractor could secure all of them in time. The natural accumulation of war business in the highly industrialized districts overburdened the transportation system, too, and general confusion resulted.

The way out of the confusion was the same in every country: the canalizing of government orders through agencies which dealt with demands on an individual industry rather than with the requirement of a certain unit of the armed forces. These agencies might be committees of the respective industries themselves, as in England, or they might be units of some government office, as in Germany. In either case, they could not succeed without co-operation between government officials and businessmen. This situation was most clearly reflected in the American organization as it finally developed: consisting of a commodity division or an industry section in the War Industries Board, representing the government, and a separate committee of businessmen, representing the industry. However it was done, these industry agencies were bound to outgrow their original job of assisting in the purchasing by the various ordnance departments and procurement offices. Government buying consumed a large share of the national output, ranging from a quarter

in the United States to almost a half in Germany and to much greater proportions in individual industries. Directing such a large share of an industry's production leads necessarily to the direction of all of it, especially since the government is also vitally interested in the satisfaction of the more important needs of the population. And directing the output of an industry tends to involve the responsibility for its raw material and labor supply, its wages and prices.

The principal tool of industrial control likewise was a natural outgrowth of the situation, namely the priority system. It started with regulations giving precedence to all urgent requirements of the armed forces. Soon there were so many urgent orders around that it again was a matter of chance whether the most urgent ones would be completed in time. A more refined classification became necessary. In England, for example, all orders for the armed forces were classified "A" but four subdivisions were made, with "A1" being the most urgent war work and "A4" that which was of no particular urgency. The classification "B" was accorded to all business that was considered essential for the civilian population and everything else was Class "C." Similar systems were introduced in other countries including the United States. The belligerents in the War of 1939 undoubtedly started right out with a fully developed priority system. Nazi Germany already had some semblance of it in her government-controlled peacetime economy. Priority, of course, not only affects the manufacturing and delivery schedules of the orders so designated; it also involves the same classifications for the necessary raw material, fuel, and other supplies, and the transportation service as well—all in corresponding proportions. It is apparent that the priority system wields great power. Its utilization is almost equivalent to the establishment of a central management for the nation's industries.

As a matter of course the canalizing of business and the conversion of plants to war work is supplemented by efforts to increase output, especially of products whose lack tends to create a bottleneck. All possible improvements in the methods of manufacturing are employed. Exchange of patents and technical experience among the various members of an industry is encouraged and so are other methods of co-operation, even in countries where anti-trust laws

forbid such exchange. Almost every device is welcome provided it speeds up production. Yet the one motivating factor that serves this purpose in peace time is shunned: the free increase in prices and profits. It could not possibly serve its normal purpose of encouraging supply and discouraging demand, since the decisive element of demand is the government's almost unlimited and urgent need for war material. Prices may be allowed to rise to the point where it pays to operate all available capacity—beyond that they cannot encourage production, but they would rise further if unchecked.

Price control, therefore, is another logical element of war economy. Prices may be fixed either at specified maximum amounts for individual goods or in a certain relation to pre-war prices or with a certain margin above actual cost. Such regulations tend to be circumvented to some extent and they become illusory if the government's own financial policies foster an inflationary uptrend. Then, the regulated prices must follow the rise in costs. Nevertheless, price regulation is effective in limiting profits. Private profits are permitted within the limits set by the controlled prices and private management is allowed to function within the network of the government regulations. The meshes of the net may be very narrow, as they have been in Nazi Germany even in peace time, or they may be wider, as they were in England during the first World War—the net result is never very far from what it could be under a formal conscription of all industry.

Curtailement of Consumption

It may be possible to replace the fighting men by an equal number of people not employed before the war, but it must be done by way of diluting labor with less capable workers. New methods of production may be used, but they can hardly balance the loss of efficiency that inevitably results from the many dislocations of production. The total output of the nation is bound to show some decline at the very time when the war creates a large-scale demand for goods not needed before. Despite all efforts of increasing production, consumption must suffer a considerable reduction. Some curtailment occurs automatically as numerous opportunities for spend-

ing disappear. Traveling abroad, for example, becomes impossible; cars commandeered for the army can no longer be used for pleasure rides; the adjustment of social life to the somber mood of the times eliminates many incentives for luxury consumption. A similarly unintentional restriction of consumption results from the decline in purchasing power experienced by many families and individuals. Mobilization of gainfully employed men is its first source, dislocation of business its next. Then follows more severe taxation and eventually the influence of inflation on prices. The appeal for loan subscription may also encourage saving instead of consumption and the insecurity of the time is an even more potent warning to put aside as much as possible. Among those especially benefited may be a number who are not influenced by such warning, but the majority of the people tend toward retrenchment.

Nevertheless, more drastic curtailment is necessary. The priority system is a most efficient way to achieve it. As it gives first call on the materials and means of production to the armed forces and second call to the industries that serve the more urgent needs of the population, it diverts them from meeting demands considered less urgent from the point of view of the community. Even the satisfaction of the more urgent needs is impossible in those fields that face a greater demand of the preferred classifications than can be satisfied. The control of foreign trade, which we discuss below, works in the same way, and numerous consumers' goods disappear from the market—a most effective way to curtail consumption. However, if the shortage affects vital necessities, the incidence of the retrenchment becomes a social problem. It cannot be left to chance or to the competition of purchasing power to decide who is to restrict his consumption and to what extent. Here again it is felt that the mechanism of prices is no longer able to adjust supply and demand and must be replaced as it becomes ineffective. It is replaced by the combination of rationing and price fixing. It may only affect the distributors or it may restrict the purchases of the individual consumers. The widespread German system of issuing rationing cards for numerous foodstuffs and textiles was the foremost example of the latter method during the first World War. Most heavily hit by

the isolation from many foreign sources of supply, Germany had to restrict the consumer drastically. Social and nervous tension was an unavoidable result, but it was greatly aggravated by lack of co-operation on the part of the rural population who accorded a self-styled priority to their own requirements of agricultural products. Perhaps even more disturbing were the government's own inflationary methods of financing which steadily increased the temptation to create illegitimate markets at prices well above those fixed for the legitimate trade. Here as in other fields the Nazi government resorts to the same economic policies and backs them up by its infinitely more effective methods of policing and intimidation.

Less inconvenient to the people than any other curtailment of consumption is the reduction of waste. In Germany it has taken the form of collecting all kinds of scrap material and garbage that can be used for any purpose, though the cost of collection and conversion would be prohibitive under normal conditions. A similar effect is attained by refraining, in the first place, from needless use of materials. Government regulations to this end have also been issued in Germany, but an even more systematic effort in the same direction was made in the United States during the last war. The Conservation Division of the War Industries Board ingeniously worked out an infinite number of savings in materials and services and put them into effect through voluntary agreements of the industries and trades concerned. Simplifying the form and material of packages was one way to this end. The elimination of unnecessary patterns and sizes was another. And there were many more ways.¹² Only one field was and is in every war virtually immune to all efforts of economy: the provisioning of the armed forces. Lack of business experience on the part of military agencies is a source of much inefficiency; and the civilian organs of government which might know better, do not always dare to interfere, though consumption by the people must be curtailed so much more. Such is the nature of war.

¹² According to G. B. Clarkson, *Industrial America in the World War*, the simplified wrapping of hosiery and underwear saved cartons at the rate of 141,800,000 annually, wooden boxes at the rate of 500,000, and also 17,312 freight cars' space. Reducing the varieties of trace chains from 504 to 72 saved enough steel to build 80 five-thousand-ton cargo ships (pp. 217, 222).

The Management of Foreign Trade

Satisfying both the demands for war supply and the needs of the civilian population is doubly difficult because of the interruptions in the normal flow of goods across the border. Immediately upon the outbreak of war, commerce with enemy countries stops. This usually is of great consequence, for war occurs but rarely between countries that have little intercourse. France and England are among Germany's best customers and vice versa. Because of the interdependence of all international commerce, dislocations cannot be limited to the trade with the enemy. Belligerents and neutrals suffer alike. Yet to the belligerents this is doubly serious since foreign trade represents the only way to increase their striking power without increasing the immediate burden on the nation. Consequently, governments at war make every attempt to utilize fully the remainder of foreign trade for the national purpose. To gear the domestic economy for war and to let foreign commerce escape, would not be logical.

The regulation of foreign commerce starts with the control of the purchasing power available for imports: gold reserves, investments that can be liquidated, foreign credits, and revenues from exports. Withdrawal of gold and foreign exchange is restricted to the funds of foreigners or completely prohibited. Liquid means held abroad are bought up against domestic currency and, as need arises, nationals are asked to liquidate investments abroad and to hand over the foreign currency to the government. In short, complete exchange control is established with the immediate result of splitting the exchange market into an official one at home and a free one abroad. This system may be easily abused to conceal the effects of an inflationary policy from the nation. In Germany it was forbidden during the first World War, and it is now forbidden again even to mention a foreign quotation of the mark to anybody excepting banks. However, this need not be so, and exchange control can also be used simply as a tool to guarantee the concentration of foreign purchasing power on the most desirable imports. Therefore, a system of import licenses is always connected with exchange control.

In the beginning, the regulation of exports may only serve the purpose of securing the complete surrender of the foreign exchange released. Yet soon the restricted volume of foreign commerce develops certain characteristics of barter trade. The fact that the foreign trade of the countries at war is carried on as a government-controlled entity compels those neutral nations who are dependent on commerce with the belligerents to adjust their own economy in a similar manner. With their normal supplies impaired by the general disruption of trade, they are forced to insist on receiving such goods as are most essential to themselves. The belligerents, therefore, cannot any longer be content with keeping the total of their exports at the highest level their industry can maintain, but they must also make sure that these exports are such as to achieve the greatest possible barter effect. The entrance of the United States into the first World War was of great help to the Allies in this respect. The complete control of industry by the War Industries Board made it possible to send desirable American products to neutral countries on the condition that they would provide the Allies with materials at their own disposal, be it nitrates from Chile or mules from Spain. In a similar way Germany used her own exports of coal on which Switzerland and other countries depended.

Such barter deals, and with them the whole system of export control, became increasingly important as blockade and economic warfare were systematically employed. Regulation of foreign commerce continued to aim at supplementing the belligerent's own resources. However, at the same time it was skilfully used to prevent the strengthening of the enemy. Economic diplomacy was interwoven with foreign politics and military strategy. British and American success in this field contributed as much to the final decision of the World War as any other factor. And Great Britain has not forgotten the lesson. From the beginning of the War of 1939, she has made it her business to combat Germany in the field of foreign trade. She bought up supplies on which otherwise Germany might lay her hand. She tried to prohibit German exports so as to prevent a strengthening of the enemy's purchasing power. And all these activities of economic warfare must be tied in with the control of domestic business. War economy is still a means of securing the

greatest striking power of the army, the navy, and the airforce. But it has also become an element of strategy in its own right.

The Single Purpose Is Supreme

When a nation is at war, the ordinary needs of the population and the tremendously increased demands of its armed forces cannot both be satisfied by the peacetime means of production. This is the basic economic reason for the establishment of a wartime economy. In normal periods, governmental interference with the economy is strictly limited in scope. In keeping with the general character of modern society, economic adjustment is left to the free play of a system based on private property, individual initiative, and free competition. To be sure, this free play is and always has been somewhat restricted by governmental action as well as by economic inequalities and monopolistic tendencies. Yet a comparison between peacetime and wartime economies shows clearly that in time of peace the free play of economic forces is the dominant element in correlating supply and demand.

Why must we cease to rely on the mechanism of prices and wages, interest rates and taxes, when war grips the nation? Severe taxation would serve to restrict consumption, and a competitive rise of prices, wages, and government interest-rates would divert the nation's resources into war work. This, however, would be a slow process and its gradual development could not be accurately foreseen. In peace time, it is preferable for economic adjustment not to occur precipitously; to plan it with exactness would be desirable only if this were the most efficient way to provide the greatest satisfaction to the largest number of people. Individual needs and desires vary widely, and "greatest satisfaction" means very different things to different people. Yet, in war time these differences do not count. Nor do the advantages of gradual adjustment. The single purpose of winning the war is supreme. Speed is of the essence and successful strategy depends on accurate predictions of economic resources available at future dates. Automatic economic adjustment through the monetary system would be less injurious to many individuals but it could not meet the specific requirements of the rapid and predictable concentration of economic resources, which war necessitates.

The Government Takes Complete Control

Even when war economy was fully developed during the first World War, it was generally not regarded as a system fundamentally different from the business system of peace time. It was thought of as a sum of numerous governmental regulations which merely modified the competitive system when and where such modification became unavoidable. But the opposite view is in far closer agreement with the facts. In a wartime economy the entire economic system is controlled by the government and remnants of the free play of economic forces operate only by sufferance. This drastic alteration may find very little expression in legislation, but it is so in fact. Legal adjustments usually are confined to general authorizations granting power to the executive over wide fields and to specific laws regulating details considered most essential. These laws, which are few and far between, are used as pillars of a bridge over which governmental authority reaches every point it desires to control. The material used in building this bridge depends on the political constitution of the country. In Imperial Germany the military authorities were above the law when a state of war was declared; they were free to direct anything as they pleased and they gave a helping hand to civilian agencies whenever this was thought necessary. In Nazi Germany the will of the Führer and the party is sovereign even in peace time. But in democratic countries, the government can act almost as freely since it is assured of the consent of the governed to every measure it deems necessary to win the war, and the desire for national unity eliminates most criticism and opposition.

The national spirit of co-operation is the real source of a democratic government's wartime power over the country's economy. The World War experience of the United States illustrates this most clearly. The Chairman of the War Industries Board said to one manufacturer literally and to many others in essence: "We know perfectly well that the government cannot conduct your mills efficiently. But by the time we commandeer those mills you will be such an object of contempt and scorn in your home town that you will not dare to show your face there. If you should, your fellow citizens would call you a slacker, the boys would hoot at you, and

the draft men would likely run you out of town.”¹³ And if this was not enough, the specific powers granted could be stretched to fit many situations for which they were never intended, as shown by another example. An automobile manufacturer who was requested to close his plant in order to save men and materials for more urgent purposes, refused to comply because he considered it unjustified. But he had no choice when his coal was commandeered.¹⁴ The Government had no choice either. It had to take control, if it was to achieve its goal.

When it comes to the details of war economy, there are many different ends to be attained simultaneously and the achieving of one may easily involve the defeat of another. What our previous paragraphs have described in general terms is in reality split up into a great number of specific tasks and every one of them has to be fulfilled by a specific governmental agency. It is impossible for so many agencies to avoid colliding with one another. The *Dictionary of Official War-Time Organizations* compiled for Great Britain¹⁵ fills more than three hundred pages though the functions of each organization are described in but a few lines. Priority and commandeering, price fixing, and rationing are the instruments of co-ordination. At the outset, they may be administered by various separate organs of the government but a formal or informal merger of these organs must eventually take place. There is no clearer illustration of such a concentration of power than the letter in which President Wilson appointed Bernard M. Baruch Chairman of the War Industries Board. The list of the Chairman's duties, as enumerated in this letter,¹⁶ shows that he was to be the supreme authority for all economic matters requiring government action. "The War Industries Board embraces all and each of the Nation," said the Chairman quite truly in an explanation of the Board's functions.¹⁷ Once such an all-embracing concentration of power is achieved, war economy is fully established. It was achieved in every major

¹³ Reported by G. B. Clarkson, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Published by N. B. Dearle as a volume of the *Economic and Social History of the World War*.

¹⁶ See *American Industry in the War*. A Report of the War Industries Board. By Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman. Washington, 1921, p. 25.

¹⁷ Same Report, p. 6.

country during the first World War. And according to all indications, the belligerents in the War of 1939 established it right from the beginning. The governments are in control of every economic activity in their respective nations, though the manner in which this system operates naturally depends upon the nation's political system. The exercise of economic control may be dominated by or co-ordinated with the military command. It can never remain independent of it.

Economy and Strategy

In Imperial Germany, the military high command was in complete control from the moment war economy reached its full development in the latter part of 1916. The Führer of Nazi Germany has formally delegated his power to Marshal Göring, who supposedly combines in his person the representation of the army and the all-powerful party. In the democratic countries, the army command is responsible to the government and co-ordinated in this way with the agencies controlling economic activities. Yet, in either system, military strategists must regard economic factors as part of their plans. The functioning of the economy determines the very first strategic decision, namely the size of the army to be put into the field. Tsarist Russia's breakdown was imminent the moment the personnel of her poorly developed industrial and transportation system fell below the indispensable minimum; the largest army ever assembled became powerless when the home organization was paralyzed. The right proportion of soldiers to workmen must be carefully ascertained and adhered to, and it is not the same for every country. Occasionally published figures cannot be taken at face value since their real meaning depends on exact definitions¹⁸ which frequently are not given. Yet certain tendencies are obvious. A country that can import freely will require a smaller proportion of its manpower at home, whereas a country forced to be self-sufficient because of a blockade will have less manpower available for the army. A correspondent of the *New York Times* reported from Paris on October

¹⁸ The term "soldiers" sometimes refers to all men mobilized and at other times only to those actually engaged in combat; "Workmen" may include either those producing army supplies only or all who are necessary to keep the economic system going.

15, 1939, that according to estimates of French technicians "the needs of each German combatant calls for the employment of ten to twelve men in the rear, compared with the Allies' five to seven men." The exact meaning of these figures is not clear and their relative proportion may or may not be correct, but there is no doubt that Germany's figure must be substantially above that of the Allies.

The dependence of warfare on industrial production renders doubly significant every move that strikes at the enemy's economic system. Aerial attack may possibly prove to have its strongest effect through its paralyzing influence on the enemy's industry and transportation. Changes in a front line may also have the greatest importance because of economic consequences. The French advance into German territory at the beginning of the War of 1939 forced the shut-down of the mines and steel mills in the German Saar district and simultaneously protected the similar plants in French Lorraine. The conquest of Poland incidentally added substantially to Germany's industrial plant and gave her many additional workmen—both plant and men to be vigorously exploited. Such exploitation of an invaded land may be precluded if there is time for demolishing industrial facilities. Germany's occupation of Rumania during the first World War fell short of achieving its goal because it was delayed long enough to permit the Rumanians to destroy the oil wells. On the other hand, German army engineers won a battle by reorganizing the Hungarian railroads so that a large quantity of grain could be imported from Rumania during the last few months of her neutrality.

Timing is the one element of strategy which exercises the greatest influence on the combined efficiency of the army and the economy. No military action can be successfully undertaken unless industry has produced in advance an ample supply of equipment and ammunition. The long period of relative quiet in the War of 1939 may be in part explained by the necessity of preparing unprecedented quantities of supplies. On the other hand, economic factors may compel Germany to act. Her economic strength is likely to reach its maximum at an early date since she will have difficulty in replacing the raw materials and foodstuffs which are being consumed despite

the most severe restrictions.¹⁹ At the same time, her opponents have a long way to go before they reach their maximum economic vigor unless she succeeds in breaking Britain's rule of the seas. Whoever wins this war will owe his victory to his more efficient combination of both war economy and military strategy.

The Rôle of Preparedness

The War of 1939 is the first war for which economic precautions were taken on a large scale. Plans were made by all governments for the organization of war economy in general. Even the United States took preparatory steps in recent years. However, the European governments went much further. Their priority systems were ready to be introduced; the groundwork was laid for the regulation of their international commerce and foreign exchange; price control and rationing were prepared insofar as they were deemed necessary. Most countries which could afford it also assembled in 1938 and 1939 considerable stocks of raw materials and foodstuffs either directly for the account of the government or, upon government suggestion, for private account. Special attention was given to the so-called "strategic" raw materials, that is, those whose lack might easily create a bottleneck in the production of war supplies.

More important still was the industrial preparation, which was only in part incidental to the armament race of recent years. Matters were so arranged that the billions provided for the purchase of army supplies served simultaneously the purpose of preparing a large capacity of armament manufacture. Orders were no longer concentrated on a comparatively small number of factories, as was the case before 1914. They were spread thinly throughout a country's industry so as to educate the largest possible number of manufacturers in wartime production. Such "educational orders" were also made contingent on the outfitting of the plant with the necessary dies, tools and machines, as well as the proper maintenance of this machinery. As a result there was great activity in the machine-tool industry and related lines which likewise became acquainted with the products required of them in war time. The aircraft industry was stimulated to a still greater extent and far beyond the speed of

¹⁹ For details see *Fortune*, issue of December, 1939.

its natural growth. Finally, a great number of manufacturing plants in many industries were investigated in order to ascertain how they could best be converted for wartime production.

All these and numerous other details of preparation were integrated in each major country into a complete blueprint of war economy. The general outline of one of these blueprints has been published, namely the Industrial Mobilization Plan of the United States. Based on a complete understanding of the mutual interdependence of all economic functions in war time, it provides for one major agency to co-ordinate these functions. War economy under this plan would parallel to some extent the final organization of 1918; but it would be even more comprehensive, more logically set up and, above all, immediately effective. In fact, the 1939 revision of the plan makes it fairly clear that in peace time the Army and Navy Munitions Board represents a skeleton of the War Resources Administration. The corresponding organizations in England and France began to function the instant the War of 1939 broke out. Less than three months later, they were so fully developed that it was possible to merge their activities into one Allied Supreme Economic Council. During the first World War three years elapsed before a less complete co-ordination was achieved.

For some time already, such developments could be observed in Nazi Germany, whose whole economy was actually converted into a war economy in every respect. For several years all of her economic policies served no other purpose.²⁰ The Nazi government forced its people in peace time to make all those efforts and sacrifices previously required only during the World War. Not satisfied with preparing for the production of war supplies, the Nazis developed a domestic production of substitutes for a number of raw materials which might be shut out by a blockade. There can be no doubt that this unprecedented policy has strengthened Germany's position in several respects. Yet in others, German's economy has been weakened by the same process. The depletion of national resources, which we described earlier as an element of war economy, occurred to a large extent even before the war started. The country's reserves are smaller now by that much. It is likely that the policy of pre-

²⁰ See *Fortune*, October, 1939.

paredness has increased Germany's ability to win a short war but has reduced her capacity for withstanding a long one.

Even more important: such an extreme state of economic preparedness created a strong tendency to precipitate war. Many of the disruptions and dislocations that normally must be expected at the outbreak of hostilities had already occurred in peace time, and the economy was somewhat adjusted with the result that the inhibitions against going to war were greatly lessened. Simultaneously the free play of the economic forces was restricted to such an extent that readjustment of the economy to peacetime purposes was almost as difficult before the war as it normally would be after a war.

It has been said that every armament race tends to lead to war. The steady accumulation of arms cannot be continued indefinitely and there might easily be an inclination to use them rather than lose the money invested. However, the totalitarian form of economic preparedness presents even graver features. It develops entire industries which could not exist under a competitive system; it deprives other industries of a secure foundation and in addition makes them dependent on the so-called "defense economy." Consequently the discontinuation of such an economic system of preparedness for war would not only result in the waste of large expenditures. The readjustment would also create an economic crisis of unpredictable proportions. A government responsible for such a dangerous policy might not be able to survive the crisis and might easily prefer a war—for a war would be the best possible justification of the burden it imposed upon the people.

Shadows over the Future

When war comes to an end, the troops are demobilized and so is the war economy. Yet demobilization of both army and industry is not an easy task. The men cannot be released all at once, but within a few weeks millions do come home and more millions within a few months. Some of them will have no difficulty in returning to their peacetime occupations but many will. Industry geared for the largest possible production of war materials suddenly stands still. The government must take delivery on some contracts although it has no use for the material, and it must make compensation for the

cancellation of other orders. But this does not bring new sales, and a wave of unemployment sweeps the country. Part of the large personnel that was engaged in the direction of war economy is diverted to handle the newly arisen difficulties. Employment-agency services are directed to smoothing the path for those returning from the trenches. And some of the means already set aside for the continuation of hostilities can be used for government peacetime works that were neglected during the war. Gradually the deferred demand of private consumers also exercises its influence. All over the world the wheels of industry begin to turn again. Once started they will soon speed up. The inflationary addition to purchasing power is still present and the gates of rationing and priority, which kept it away from the market, are gradually opened. Reconstruction of destroyed areas also gets under way. The post-war boom is initiated.

In some countries this boom collapses after a while when inflation is checked. In the less fortunate nations inflation gathers momentum and it takes a number of years before they can return through a deflationary crisis to a status approaching normal. These less fortunate peoples are the vanquished, who naturally have to bear a disproportionately large share of the cost of reconstruction. Yet whatever form tributes may take, they cannot ever be large enough to cover all those costs that continue to accumulate after the end of hostilities. Demobilization, compensation for damages, reconstruction, and pensions pile up to huge amounts. If the beaten nations should bear all these costs, they would have to export a corresponding amount of goods to the victor countries; but these countries are not willing to take imports on such a scale. War-cost distribution can end only in a compromise and it ends better the sooner a realistic compromise is made.

The system of government-controlled war economy hardly disappears without a trace. In fact, it is likely to find advocates of its continuation in a form adjusted to peacetime purposes. Some of the men who participate in the direction of war economy become fascinated by its attractive features. Things can be accomplished so much more effectively and more quickly; efforts can be directed towards the essentials and silly waste can be prohibited. Why should not these methods be put to service for the more noble purposes of

social reform and economic progress? Walter Rathenau, who was a social philosopher rather than a hardboiled business man, was moved by his wartime experience to become an apostle of "planned economy." Similar views were discussed among the men in the economic war organizations of Great Britain and the United States.²¹ From their seats of power they saw the achievements of war economy and hoped these could be separated from its shortcomings. But the system is an entity and its principal dangers cannot be avoided without sacrificing its advantages. Judging by actual results, it did not deserve to be perpetuated.²² The people as a whole did not look favorably upon an economy that demanded sacrifices in terms of freedom and comfort. They were willing to bear such sacrifices as long as the nation was bent on winning the war, but they saw no incentive for continuing them in peace time. War economy is the suitable system when the single purpose is supreme; but it is scarcely fit for the manifold aims of peace time.

To be sure, there are numerous hangovers of wartime economy. The most significant change from pre-war times was represented by the restrictions of international trade and foreign exchange, neither of which ever quite disappeared. Yet this was not attributable to the wartime economy *per se*. It was the result of the economic nationalism that had been intensified and spread all over by the madness of the war and the economically irrational peace treaties. Wartime economic organization, however, survived in the form of a number of governmental regulations which were considered beneficial in specific fields of domestic economy. Co-operation within the industries also was greatly stimulated by the war experience and many business associations were continued for purposes both noble and ignoble.²³

However, there is reason to assume that the remnants of war economy which were preserved owed their success only partly to the

²¹ See E. M. H. Lloyd, *op. cit.*, and G. B. Clarkson, *op. cit.*

²² John Maurice Clark summarized his judgment in *The Costs of the World War to the American People*, p. 44, as follows: "The disappointing outcome . . . is in part, no doubt, to be written down as an instance of inefficiency on the part of popular government in meeting an emergency of this character."

²³ Price fixing and stifling of competition were among the ignoble purposes; collection and publication of many useful statistics among the nobler ones.

war; they represented a selection that conformed to the general trend of economic organization in peace time. In any case, these remnants were only a small part of the octopus that disappeared with its *raison d'être*. It returned gradually only as the danger of war became acute once more. And it will be here again and again until the war will be won that actually ends war as an instrument of national policy.

Suggested Readings

A brief essay cannot attempt to do more than provide a general understanding of and introduction to the manifold facts and problems of wartime economy. Though no single comprehensive and up-to-date work on the subject has (to the writer's knowledge) as yet been published, a number of treatises and a considerable mass of source material are available. Some of the more interesting books in the field are the following:

Industrial Mobilization Plan, Revision of 1939, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1939. This short official document gives a clear insight into both the scope of war preparations in a contemporary nation and the all-embracing character which war economy would have if the United States should become involved in a major war.

Pigou, Arthur Cecil, *The Political Economy of War*, London, 1921. Although largely based upon the experience of 1914-18 and in some chapters confined to specifically British problems, this still seems to be the most searching analysis of the fundamentals.

Einzig, Paul, *Economic Problems of the Next War*, London, 1939. Not nearly so thorough as the Pigou volume, and deliberately confined to the British point of view, but up-to-date and easily understood and a rather complete enumeration of all war economic problems.

Clark, J. Maurice, Hamilton, Walton H., and Moulton, Harold G., eds., *Readings in the Economics of War*, University of Chicago Press, 1918. An extensive collection of pertinent discussions on all aspects of war economics. Though intended to clarify the tasks of the United States in the first World War, it is still a very good introduction to the whole subject.

Speier, Hans, and Kähler, Alfred, *War in Our Time*, Norton, 1939. A collection of essays on war from numerous aspects, including thorough discussions of economic phases on an up-to-date basis.

Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science: issue containing the

papers presented at the Annual Meeting, November 15, 1939. Particularly valuable are the contributions by Robert Warren and Lionel D. Edie.

- *Clark, J. Maurice, *The Costs of the World War to the American People*, Yale University Press, 1931. A review of the economic consequences of the war for the United States, throwing light on many fundamental problems and analyzing a considerable number of facts.
- *Gide, Charles, and Oualid, W., *Le Bilan de la guerre pour la France*, Paris, 1931. Similar in intention to the previous volume though different in method and material, and therefore a valuable supplement to it.
- *Winkler, Wilhelm, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Österreich während des Weltkrieges*, Vienna, 1930. An interesting survey of the economic result of the 1914-1918 conflict, far more comprehensive than its title indicates.
- Bogart, Ernest Ludlow, *War Costs and Their Finance*, Appleton, 1921. A comprehensive survey of the financial aspects of all countries participating in the World War.
- Clarkson, Grosvenor B., *Industrial America in the World War*, Houghton Mifflin, 1923.
- *Beveridge, Sir William, *British Food Control*, Oxford, 1928.
- *Lloyd, E. M. H., *Experiments in State Control at the War Office and the Ministry of Food*, Oxford, 1924. The last three volumes analyze and illustrate the organization of war economy and include important historical material.

* The volumes preceded by an asterisk are part of the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, edited by James T. Shotwell, and published for the Carnegie Endowment by the Yale University Press and for various European publishers for whom the same press is the American distributor. This collection, which includes almost 150 monographs from 21 countries, is the richest source of factual material.

THE STATE IN WAR TIME

■
Max Lerner

War is the health of the state." This sentence occurs again and again in Randolph Bourne's brilliant *Unfinished Fragment on the State*, one of the essays in his *Untimely Papers*.¹ He used it, of course, with ironic intent. He was seeking a phrase that would express the brutal energies released by war and at the same time pillory the fetishism of force among the absolutist believers in state power. From such a standpoint Bourne was obviously right. Once you assume that force is the meaning and essence of the state, then war becomes the health of the state: for it is in war time that the elements which threaten the position of the governing group can be best suppressed by resort to force in the name of national cohesiveness and patriotic fervor.

Bourne was one of our great democratic thinkers. So too was Walt Whitman. Yet the latter spoke of "sweet wars, life-giving wars." "Beautiful that war," he wrote afterward of the Civil War, "and all its deeds of carnage must in time be utterly lost." And Lewis Mumford, whose democratic integrity is equally unquestionable, has in *Men Must Act*² echoed and reaffirmed Whitman's temper and applied it to whatever wars may have to be waged against that barbarism of the human spirit that we call Fascism.

¹ Huebsch, 1919.

² Harcourt Brace, 1939.

Thus on the one hand, Bourne and the association of war with absolute state power. And on the other, Whitman and Mumford, asserting humanist values by which they wish war and the power of the state to be judged. If Bourne is right, in his implications as well as his statement, war inevitably leads to the brutalization of the individual by the state. If Whitman and Mumford are right, the state in war time takes its character from the ends for which and the ways in which the war is fought.

It is an old and ever-new antithesis, and we shall probably never resolve it. Americans are faced with it today in confronting the problem of involvement in war; and if we should enter the present struggle we should have to face even more sharply the problem of government power in war time. For that reason Bourne's essays are as contemporary as they were when they were written in 1917. And for that reason too a re-examination of the state structure and functioning during the Civil War under Lincoln and the World War under Wilson has become of considerable moment for the future. Both Presidents were genuine democrats and both were sensitive to the dangers of excessive state power and popular hysteria in war time. The night before Wilson read his war message to the American Congress, he made a gloomy prediction to the editor of the *New York World* that he was unleashing forces he would not be able to control. And Lincoln stated as well as anyone the dilemma that the democratic state faces, whether with regard to war or any other crisis of power. "Must a government of necessity," he asks, "be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?" The answer as Lincoln gave it not only expressly but also, by implication, in his conduct of the war is the answer that most of us would give today: that the very meaning of democracy lies in the attempt to create and maintain a collective strength by a mechanism that still provides for individual liberty—not because we make a fetish of individual liberty even when it defeats the majority will, but because only through individual liberty can one majority be replaced by another majority. But it is an answer that is easy enough to formulate but hard to apply. The world has not yet learned to spell it out concretely, and it will cost blood and agony of spirit before it is eventually spelled out.

One thing we know: that in a war all problems of state power and human values become accentuated. In war time state power is maximized, whatever the form of the state; in war time civil liberties are at a straining point; in war time those in positions of control show an impatience with democratic methods as being cumbersome and inefficient; in war time critical opposition to the ruling group is a dangerous luxury; in war time the veneer of the superego which separates the political animal from his deepest instinctual life comes closest to being scratched away. And whatever obstructions in the path of cultural advance some wars may help to remove, the process of political and psychic recovery is always a desperate one, whatever the war.

Nor is it possible any longer wholly to escape the heavy hand of war on a state and a culture merely by keeping them out of involvement in it. The western state system that we live in is as surely a war system as it is economically a capitalist system and politically a system of organized force. And war reaches to the fibre of it. For years the approach of the second World War forced Germany, England, France, Russia, and to an extent even America to a brink-of-war economy that contained no elements of social health. As I write⁸ Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Finland are not yet participants in the war: yet the fact of war around them has compelled them to mobilize their entire economic and cultural resources and the whole structure of their state power on a war basis. This is true to a disconcerting extent even of the United States, separated though it is from the war by an ocean. The government departments and commissions have been placed on what amounts to a war footing; M-Day plans have been made; a new War Resources Board has been created, dissolved, and as I write there is talk of its being invoked again; the State and the War and Navy Departments dominate the governmental scene. The question that every administrator must put to himself is: "Are we ready to do what we would have to do if and when we enter the war?" George Russell ("A.E.")

⁸ Because this essay deals with the changes in political mechanisms produced by war, I shall have to make a number of references to contemporary events and situations. The reader will of course understand that those events will change as the war proceeds. But I felt that the analysis would lose enormously in value by omitting such references.

remarked somewhere, "We become what we contemplate." In a world at war, preparedness is a necessity; but it is also true that a nation that prepares thus generally gets, at least in psychological terms, what it is preparing for. In short, while the distance between a state at war and a state in a world at war is still significant, it is a diminishing one.

War Maximizes State Power

War maximizes state power. The Romans recognized this, and provided for a constitutional dictatorship in wars and other crises, whereby the consuls yielded their power and entrusted the entire safety of the state to a dictator, who was to see to it "that no harm came to the state." Machiavelli, in his *Discourses*, has a brilliant defense of this: if a republic, he argues, does not provide legal machinery for a dictatorship in time of crisis, then the crisis will compel it to adopt a dictatorship under illegal forms. One might reply that the idea of constitutionalism and the idea of absolute power are scarcely compatible. However that may be, the precedent of the Roman Republic is anything but consolatory, given the history of the Roman Empire that followed it.

The French government today is virtually a constitutional dictatorship in the Roman sense. In effect what has happened is that the Prime Minister, having first obtained the consent of the Chamber of Deputies to do so, is ruling without the Chamber of Deputies. It may be said, in defense, that the change of democratic state forms in the direction of such a decrease of parliamentary safeguards is proof of a saving flexibility in the democratic state. Certainly Germany even before the outbreak of the War of 1939 had so completely become a totalitarian state that there was little room for a further extension of state power. All that Hitler could do, when he took the final plunge of the invasion of Poland, was to broaden the definition of treason, increase the number of acts coming within it, place the people on a rationing system of foodstuffs and basic war supplies with severe penalties for infraction, and set the Gestapo to work harder than ever. Nevertheless, whatever may be said of democratic flexibility, the example of France indicates how far a democracy

may be compelled by the necessities of war and of internal strain to obliterate its parliamentary character.

The trend in war time is generally away from legislative and toward executive power. This is true even when, as in the American Civil War, the legislature continues actively in session and the system of periodic elections is maintained. Carl Sandburg's monumental *Lincoln: the War Years*⁴ gives abundant proof of Congressional speech and activity highly embarrassing to the President; and the election campaign of 1864 almost ousted him from office. Yet there can be little doubt that the executive power in Lincoln's administration was dominant as never before in American history; and the process was repeated under Wilson. Not only is the executive as war leader compelled to assume both civil and military functions: but so closely is the successful prosecution of the war bound up with every phase of the community's life, that an important war decision is bound to ramify through the whole economic and political structure. Lincoln proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves as a war measure, but its effects both for the North and South were significantly economic.

The emphasis on the executive and the retreat from the parliamentary principle are not difficult to account for. Government by discussion is generally regarded as a peacetime luxury, even in a democracy. In war time the urge is toward quick and secret decisions and immediate action. Under modern conditions especially, war is an exercise in a planned society, and what is needed is, on the one hand, *expertise*⁵ and, on the other hand, the articulation of parts in the governmental machine. Moreover, no government today wishes either to stand the barrage of parliamentary criticism, or to reveal its plans and its casualties by submitting them in open parliamentary session. Finally, when half the world operates under an authoritarian "leadership principle" of one sort or another, the other half is never so likely to feel itself at a disadvantage on this score as in war time. And while both the people and the leaders in a democracy are likely in their conscious minds to resist the acceptance of the principle of one-man rule, many of them have deep inner reser-

⁴ Four volumes, Harcourt Brace, 1939.

⁵ The English language lacks a good word which will express, as this French word does, a body of trained administrative knowledge and expertness.

vations; and the war emergency gives them the chance to elude the censor of their conscious selves by stressing the need for extraordinary executive power in war time.

War also adds increased burdens and powers to the administrative structure of the state. During the World War many of the governments, including the American, were forced by the military emergency to increase their control over economic life. In that sense, the World War must count as a landmark in the twentieth century's march toward increased collectivism. It is the recognition of this fact by the owning classes throughout the world that accounts to an extent for their diminished enthusiasm about the War of 1939. They have come to understand that no matter for what and by whom a war is fought, it involves economic co-ordination, a system of priorities, heavy taxation, a large measure of destruction of wealth through military action and confiscation through governmental. So far as concerns the administrative, an *ad hoc* board⁶ or commission was generally resorted to in America during the first World War whenever a specific task of co-ordination—such as the work of the War Labor Policies Board or the War Resources Board—had to be undertaken. And here again, *ad hoc* war administrative structures have often proved a stimulus and a precedent for similar peacetime extensions of governmental control.

But if war procedures tend to carry over into the peace, the same is not true generally of peace procedures carrying over into a war period. When the United States entered the World War in 1917, for example, many of the governmental agencies developed under Wilson's first term virtually suspended operations, and their functions were taken over by *ad hoc* war agencies. This is one of the reasons, although not the principal one, why war generally puts an end to any period of social reform. To an extent, of course, much depends upon how stable the agencies have become before the war breaks out. In the early months of the War of 1939 some hope was expressed in Washington's government circles that in the event of American war participation the regular New Deal agencies such as the Securities Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations

⁶ This term is generally used to indicate governmental boards and agencies for a specific purpose and a limited time, as distinguished from agencies of a more general character and of greater permanence.

Board, and others would continue to operate, with the adjustments necessary for their war functions. It must be remembered, in considering any parallel with the Wilson administration, that the President had been in office for less than a year and a half when the European War broke out and had scarcely had a chance to launch his domestic program along with its administrative procedures; whereas the New Deal had had almost two terms before the War of 1939 broke out.

Even more important, however, than the question of whether peacetime agencies and procedures survive entrance into a war is the question of the character of the bureaucracy. It is a truism that with a war the militarist mind comes into power, both in the field and behind the lines in the civil occupations. The reasons advanced are usually the need for special *expertise* and for cutting bureaucratic red tape; and yet too often the military mind represents only a particular variety of the bureaucratic. But perhaps the greatest casualties in this area come not so much from the displacement of officials as from the change that war brings in their temper. The greatest assurance against a breakdown of the democratic fabric in war time is the existence during peace periods of a bureaucracy firmly conditioned to democratic habits of mind.

The problem of government personnel, difficult enough in peace time, is doubly difficult during war. Efficiency becomes god, and all other considerations are scrapped in its name. Yet this is often only another way of saying that decisions are made upon insufficient reflection and without an adequate pooling of the available intellectual resources. In the attempt to avoid the blight of the routineering mind of the peacetime government official, war governments often fall a prey to another species, the wartime routineering mind. Graham Wallas, in his suggestive book *Our Social Heritage*,⁷ has some provocative comments drawn from British experience during the first World War, on the lack of genuine creative thinking in most war administrations. And Mr. Ivor Jennings, in his brilliant treatise on *Cabinet Government*, has given us some insights into the workings of the British War Cabinets, offering considerable evidence that no opportunity is provided for the sort of thinking that

⁷ Yale University Press, 1921.

emerges from the meeting and resolution of conflicting points of view.

Much depends, of course, on the inner social structure of the state. The Napoleonic regime, born of a revolution and dedicated to the "career open to talents," was able to achieve an effectiveness of personnel not possessed by the older regimes with more deeply entrenched elites. It will, in general, prove true that a firmly established class structure in a state, especially an *ancien regime* class structure such as the Russian and Austrian empires had during the first World War, places a heavy disability on the war administration. Even the vaunted efficiency of the German military machine during the first World War proves in historical perspective to have been vitiated by the arrogance and inflexibility of the Prussian Junker and military classes, which often served as a cloak for the grossest inefficiencies. It is still too early to judge of the conduct of the war by the present German Government; yet following the Paretian⁸ theory of the "circulation of the elites" as a result of revolutionary overturn, one may hazard the guess that the Nazi governing group is likely to prove more mobile both in its military and diplomatic maneuvers. The point is borne out even more strongly by a comparison between the Tsarist Government in the World War and the Soviet Government in the War of 1939: there is a vigor and daring in the latter that were fatally absent in the former.

The case of Great Britain is in this respect an interesting one. The British governing group is one of the most deeply entrenched in Western history. In the diplomatic area it has during the past decade been characterized by a peculiar form of sophistication rather than by daring and imaginativeness. Again, in Pareto's terminology, its vigor has been that of the foxes rather than of the lions. There has been considerable criticism in England of some of the current appointments to strategic posts in the war government. An editorial in the *New Statesman* characterized one of them as "the worst appointment since the Emperor Caligula made his horse a proconsul." And undoubtedly there has been a tendency for some of the peacetime inertia of a ruling group confident of its position and limited

⁸ Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, Harcourt Brace, 4 vols., 1935. On the new elite in Germany, see O. G. Villard, "Germany Has Power," *Nation*, Nov. 25, 1939.

in its perspective, to carry over into war time. Even the entrance of Winston Churchill into the Cabinet as the driving force of the war government represents not so much the accession of new energy to the governing elite as it does the conscription of old energy (since Mr. Churchill's formative experience was that of the first World War) under the compulsion of popular demand.

Quest for National Cohesiveness

The quest for war efficiency is only one of the driving forces in changing the forms of state power in war time. Just as important is the quest for national cohesiveness and mass support of the government. A totalitarian state can make few structural changes in this respect. It has already, even before the war, achieved a unity of governmental structure not by the process of including opposition groups in the government but by the process of excluding dissident groups from power of any sort. But a government operating under democratic forms has three principal devices at its disposal: (1) the coalition cabinet, or the creation of a "national" government; (2) the political truce; and (3) the integration of the labor movement with the war administration.

The most famous examples of the war coalition government are the *union sacrée* in France and the "war cabinet" of Lloyd George in Great Britain, both during the first World War. One of the corollaries of such a coalition is a quasi-dictatorial power. The Asquith war cabinet, organized in May, 1915, contained members from all parties except the Irish Nationalists: but it failed to assume plenary powers and had to give way in December, 1916, to the Lloyd George coalition, which had no such scruples. The *union sacrée* under Clemenceau operated in essentially the same fashion. In a coalition cabinet of this sort, the forces of the Left generally give up more in the way of concessions than the forces of the Right. This may account, at least in part, for the refusal thus far of the British Labour Party to enter the reconstituted Chamberlain-Churchill war cabinet, thus stripping it of any character as a "national government." The Labour Party Executive evidently felt that to enter such a cabinet would be to tie its hands as an opposition group. For membership in a cabinet carries with it, once the cabinet decisions have been

made, the duty of standing by them or of resigning. After a war is over a coalition is unlikely to give up willingly the power it has assumed. The British coalition carried on until 1922, refusing to disband on the ground that it would be catastrophic to handle the difficult peace negotiations and the problems of demobilization and reconstruction except in terms of national unity. And the *union sacrée*, under the name of the *bloc national*, won the election again in 1919.

Coalitions are most characteristic of cabinet governments. They are far more difficult under the American presidential scheme. Yet just as Woodrow Wilson during his early years as a professor advocated, in his book *Congressional Government*, a revision of our governmental mechanism in the direction of cabinet government, so Walter Lippmann has come out in several of his recent columns as an advocate of an American coalition cabinet. His premise is that a state in a world at war faces problems so grave that no administration that does not possess the confidence of all groups, classes, and parties can direct the nation safely in such a crisis. His proposal is that President Roosevelt include in a special war cabinet representatives of the Republican Party and anti-New Deal Democrats. Implied in the proposal is, of course, the premise that the outbreak of the European war must mark the abandonment of the social program of the New Deal in the interests of national unity. And with such a premise a very considerable body of American opinion would be in disagreement—quite apart from the technical difficulties the plan would involve under the American governmental structure.

This raises the question of the second device—the political truce. The British government in the War of 1939 has secured the assent of the other major political parties to what amounts to a suspension of the regular electoral system: the parties have agreed not to force a general election during the duration of the war; and they have agreed also that by-elections will not be contested, but that the seats will be filled by nominations from the party of the previous incumbent. Much the same arrangement applied during the first World War. In effect, it insures the continuance in power for the duration of the war of the same government, although not necessarily of the same cabinet. It insures a Tory government, which may, however,

under pressure shift from a cabinet headed by Neville Chamberlain to one headed by Winston Churchill or Lord Halifax. For the Opposition this means a surrender of the chance of coming into power, short of defeats so disastrous as to cause a revolution in popular feeling. But, perhaps paradoxically, it offers some compensations in the greater freedom for a Parliamentary Opposition. So long as the Government does not fear being forced out as a party, it is likely to tolerate a considerable amount of criticism in Parliament. And this criticism has been voiced, extending curiously enough to the Tory party members themselves, who feel freer to express dissent from particular policies of the Government when they know that its existence is not at stake. But from the standpoint of the Labour Party, it will be interesting to watch whether it can offer a vigorous opposition when the final goal of all opposition—the achievement of Party power—has been removed. Political experience has in general demonstrated that under a party system such a goal, with the office-holding and perquisites that it implies, is a necessary carrot held in front of a donkey to keep him moving.

Behind the whole idea of a political truce there is of course the driving consideration that no state in war time can afford either government by deadlock or the undermining of public confidence that may result from the instability of governments and too rapid a political succession. The danger on the other side is a clear one: that a political truce will go beyond a truce into the region of complete political homogeneity. That has not happened thus far in Great Britain, but it is an ever-present danger in any democracy at war. And if it should ever happen it would mean that the only organs upon which a democratic society can depend to rescue itself from the constrictions of a war period would have become atrophied.

America has never had the tradition of a party truce during war time. The New England Federalists, during the War of 1812, came close to secession and even to the margin of treason. The outcry against the Mexican War was enormous. In the Civil War there was the striking spectacle of General McClellan, head of the Union armies, scarcely concealing his maneuvers to get the Democratic nomination for the Presidency and run against his commander-in-chief, Lincoln; and while there was much public agitation against

Copperheads, the limits of their action were, except in the Vallandigham case,⁹ scarcely circumscribed by the government. American participation in the World War took place between elections, yet the Republicans by no means suspended their activity. Of course, in every American war, there has been considerable talk of a political truce: but it has never gone beyond the stage of rhetoric. At the outbreak of the War of 1939 President Roosevelt, in terms that seem strangely contradictory, declared a "qualified emergency" and asked for the suspension of partisanship. For a while, like a chicken hypnotized by a snake, the Republicans responded. But even before the Neutrality Act was passed, the votes in Congress were shaping up fairly sharply along party lines.

The third device I have mentioned is the integration of the labor movement with the war government. So long as the European labor movements were part of the Marxian internationals, and imbued with more or less of a Socialist outlook, there was a question of whether such an integration could be accomplished. The voting of war credits by the Socialist Parties in the first World War and the decision of labor movements to collaborate with the governments in the war represented the turning point on this problem. The labor movements in the totalitarian states were of course crushed between the wars of 1914 and 1939, and any refusal on their part to collaborate, whether in Germany or Austria or Czechoslovakia, would have been revolutionary treason and punished as such. But in England and France also there was little question at the outbreak of the War of 1939 that collaboration would be somehow managed. What has happened in England is that not only was a political decision taken by the Labour Party to agree to a political truce, but in effect an economic decision has also been taken to submerge class demands and workers' needs in the national interest. In France the problem was complicated by the greater influence of the Communist Party in the *Confédération Général du Travail*, and the new party line of the Communists toward the war after the Nazi-Soviet Pact. One element, clearly, in Premier Daladier's decision to outlaw the Com-

⁹ C. L. Vallandigham was a Democratic leader in Ohio who kept up a barrage of criticism of the Lincoln administration on the ground that the war was "a costly and bloody failure" and who was banished to the Southern lines by the order of the Union general in command of the district.

munists and break up the trade unions in which they were suspected of having influence, was the fear that in no other way could he be assured of labor collaboration.

This indicates the tragic dilemma in which labor movements always find themselves in a state at war. On the one hand, they are faced with dissolution and suppression by the government, and a government, moreover, which is generally able to whip up anti-labor feeling, if necessary, among the middle classes and which has the armed force of a mobilized state at its disposal. One of Edgar Guest's poems, circulated during the first World War by George Creel's Committee of Information, read as follows:

Said the workman to the soldier,
"I will back you to the last
No more strikes for higher wages
Till the danger time is past."

On the other hand, labor movements are faced with the prospect of suspending for the duration of the war their struggle for collective bargaining, better living standards, better working standards, and democratic control of industry. For war "integration" means inevitably the drastic limitation if not the complete outlawry of labor's final weapon of the strike. It means, moreover, the entrance of Big Business representatives (in America, the "dollar-a-year men") into the crucial administrative posts, and the rise of an anti-radical hysteria without which patriotism in the modern state does not seem to operate at its highest pitch and with the least danger to the vested groups. It means an identification ultimately of the employer-employee relation with the relation of government and citizen in war time; and consequently it means that the struggle within the economic realm becomes interpretable as a political and even a military struggle, and is visited with sanctions ranging from those for "interference with the war" and sabotage to those for treason.

Confronted by such a dilemma, labor under a capitalist democracy will, at least for the calculable future, be most likely to choose the course of least resistance, even at the expense of living standards and labor aims. Even in the United States the issue has already arisen in the present war. Robert Bendiner, writing in the *Nation*

recently,¹⁰ reported (without subsequent denials) that the War Department had already presented tentative plans to the heads of both the American Federation of Labor (A.F. of L.) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), calling for a replacement of the strike weapon by mediation machinery in the event of American entrance into the war, and for the creation of regulatory agencies in which labor would have only an advisory voice. During the first World War, the A.F. of L. under Samuel Gompers accepted essentially similar arrangements, and the degree of their "integration" and their collaboration with the war government was fairly complete.

Civil Liberties and Reform Movements

What is true of the labor movements in war time is true also of the status of civil liberties and social reform movements. They are caught in the dilemma of being, on the one hand, unable to use their final effective weapons against a crisis state, and, on the other hand, fearing to lay them down lest they never be able to take them up again.

Civil liberties are the major victim of the state in war time. The state must protect itself against espionage, sabotage, and treason. This is especially difficult since the new ideological wars have become a species of wars of religion, and have enlisted therefore a ruthlessness and a zealotry that will go to any lengths to cripple an enemy. But the attempt to ferret out such activities leads inevitably across the boundary that separates sabotage, espionage, and enemy propaganda from political and economic opposition and their expression. The result is a complex of espionage laws, Red-hunts, and treason laws that often strike at labor organization and liberal and radical opposition under the guise of the national defense and the national interest. Ever since the Alien and Sedition Laws, America has had the experience of reactionary forces operating under a patriotic guise. After the first World War the administration of the Department of Justice under A. Mitchell Palmer was an ironic contrast to the liberal ideals of the Wilson government in its first term and also to the avowed democratic aims of the Allies in waging the war. The Lusk Committee investigation after the first World

¹⁰ "The Army Talks to Lewis and Green," Nov. 11, 1939.

War is paralleled by the Dies Committee investigation during the War of 1939. And the criminal syndicalism laws of the earlier period may presage a similar train of repressive legislation in the near future.

The most glaring example of the suppression of civil liberties under democratic forms in war time is furnished by recent events in France. The Daladier government seized the occasion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to outlaw the Communist Party, arrest forty members of the Chamber of Deputies, disband trade union organizations and seize their funds, and suppress a whole group of newspapers on the Left. It would indicate that the Government feels itself too weak with respect to mass opinion to risk the open expression of anti-Government views, yet at the same time strong enough to carry such a program of repression through.

It is not difficult to understand why a governing group in a war state takes such measures. War time implies a shift of the state's function on the psychological plane. During peace the task the state sets itself is to maintain order and exact obedience. From this standpoint the state has a stake in the relative passivity of the individual: it is the function of political parties and pressure groups to whip up excitement, provided it be kept within a framework of assumptions more or less common to all the parties. But in war time the state dare not allow a psychological passivity to become established or accepted. It must get readiness for action, especially emotional preparedness for the stress and sacrifices of war. Hence it will generally tend to claim a monopoly of propaganda and political expression: to allow parties or individuals to engage in whipping up excitement except under state direction is to surrender this monopoly and endanger the complete cohesiveness of political opinion. Hence the political truces, hence also the limitation of labor action and expression, and hence especially the denial of civil liberties and intellectual freedom.

The only trouble with this train of reasoning, as Lytton Strachey once remarked of Francis Bacon's reasons for active prosecution in the case of his friend the Earl of Essex, is that it should ever have been thought of. Once granted the assumption that intellectual and emotional mobilization are as necessary as economic and military,

and that the war emergency gives the state the right to use any means in pursuit of its aims, then the rest follows. The granting of the assumptions is, however, another matter. And the basic confusion there, is the confusion between the permanent interests of the state and the immediate vested interests of a governing group that seeks to use the war as a way of entrenching itself in power.

When the governing group is progressive and has inaugurated a peacetime program of social reform, the outbreak of war will generally mean the shelving of such a program. The classic instance in American history is the Wilson administration in the first World War, which interrupted its fight for the New Freedom under the impact of the European war before actual American entrance, and was never able to resume it. There are current indications, from the absorption of the Roosevelt administration with problems created by the war, that something of the same sort would happen to the New Deal program in the event of American war participation. War does not always have this effect, especially when social reform measures may be useful as war moves. Thus Lincoln used the Emancipation Proclamation to demoralize the South's labor supply, create a new reserve of Union troops, and provide a fillip for the lagging Northern morale; but he weighed his decision carefully because of the adverse effect it would have on the vested interests of the border slave-holding states which had remained loyal. And the Spanish Government during the Civil War of 1936-1938 sought to carry through a program of land reform in order to solidify the support of the peasants. But these are exceptional cases. In an unstable or transitional economic structure, such as most states today represent, a social reform program involves too many risks of internal tension that would threaten the national cohesiveness in war. It deflects the stream of national energy, moreover, into two channels, and a successful war requires above all a single concentration of purpose.

But if the progressive social program must itself bog down, the peacetime prestige of a progressive government may prove useful with the underlying population in the event of war. Progressive leaders have often a sensitiveness to the public pulse and a flair for popular phrasing which the more dogmatic ruling groups are likely to lack. Wilson as a symbol of a possible democratic world-order

was immensely useful to the Allied prosecution of the World War, although he was to prove troublesome to their control of the peace. And Mock and Larsen have pointed out, in their absorbing book, *Words That Won the War*,¹¹ how important it was felt to be, when America entered the war, to pick as the director of the government propaganda agency, the Committee of Public Information, someone who had already a record of liberalism in thought. And so George Creel was chosen. In fact, Creel's career symbolizes in itself the trajectory of Wilsonian progressivism in peace and war time.

The fortunes of the Committee on Public Information, as traced by Mock and Larsen, illustrate also the ways in which the functions of propaganda and censorship which the state assumes in war time may affect the class controls within the state. One of the tasks of war propaganda rapidly became the mobilization of labor behind the government program on the basis of traditional wage scales, while living costs and war profits were going sky high. And many of the employers were willing to use the Committee in organizing middle-class opinion on the basis of the patriotic duty of labor to accept the *status quo* wage and working arrangements and give up the strike weapon in the national interest. I have already mentioned earlier the tendency in a war administration to have some of the strategic economic posts in the government occupied by industrial and financial leaders as a patriotic service ("dollar-a-year men"). Whatever the intent, the consequence of such a tendency is to shift further the class-balance of power, and to make the war an instrument for the achievement of class rather than national objectives.

The Drift Toward Totalitarianism in War Time

There has been considerable discussion recently of the question of the inner compulsions of a war administration toward a totalitarian structure. It has been argued especially in those American circles that have been steadfastly opposed to European involvements that a democratic government in the struggle against Fascism defeats its own purposes by entering a war; for it becomes thereby itself virtually a Fascist state.

It would be difficult to prove any inevitability of this sort. The

¹¹ Princeton University Press, 1939.

record of both the Lincoln and the Wilson war administrations would indicate that while even progressive governments cannot help surrendering partly to the drift toward totalitarianism in war time, they can minimize that surrender by a creative effort of will. What can be clearly said is that war maximizes the opportunities for a totalitarian structure: but that the extent to which those opportunities are exploited depends upon several important factors.

One of these factors is the nature and temper of the government in power. The Daladier Government in France, fearing its hold over mass opinion, evidently decided to exploit the opportunity to entrench itself in power and become a virtual dictatorship. Yet President Lincoln, perhaps just as sorely tempted in the midst of a civil war, maintained amazingly a democratic temper in his administration of the war. Lincoln was as little the dictator as he dared be; Wilson, for all his personal impatience with opposition, still maintained what was on the whole a government of laws and not of men. It is easy to think of any number of American presidents who would not have risen to the urgent need for a government in war time strong enough "to maintain its own existence." Buchanan comes to mind. But it is difficult to think of any American president who would have created in war time a government "too strong for the liberties of its own people." In short, much depends upon the fabric of legality that has been woven over the course of generations; and the democratic temper of a national leader even in a war crisis.

A second factor is the deep-rootedness of the civil liberties tradition. As yet the British Government has not gone very far in the totalitarian direction of the French. One may guess that it is due, among other factors, to the strength of the British civil liberties tradition.

A third factor is the strength of the opposition and its skill in organizing popular opinion. Thus it would have been far more difficult for Daladier to carry through his repressive measures had it not been that the French Communist Party, in following the Comintern direction after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, alienated French liberal and middle-class opinion and gave an opportunity to Daladier to depict the Communists in the rôle of traitors and saboteurs. Never is the courage of the opposition more needed than in a democracy at war, and never is it more useful socially. True, it finds

its scope for expression limited, and its opportunities for vigorous criticism crippled. Yet here again everything depends on the political habits that have been established. In England not only are the Communists still within the bounds of legality, but even such progressive organs of opinion as the *New Statesman* and *Time and Tide* have taken on a vigor of tone which they have not always had before. Here as elsewhere *c'est le dernier pas qui coute*.¹² If a nation has never had a strong tradition of giving freedom to opposition opinion, then it has been preparing the ground for totalitarianism all along; and the war is merely the final push that sends the whole structure toppling.

A fourth factor is expediency. One may again guess that the British government is doubly careful not to take measures that might be interpreted as suppressive of opposition opinion so long as the position of the United States as a neutral is so crucial in the outcome of the conflict.

Perhaps the dangers of the totalitarian trend in war time may be best put in terms of the types of mentality that tend to come to the fore in a war administration. The militarist mind—absolutist, authoritarian, and inflexible—assumes a position of prime importance. That is part of the meaning of the constitutional struggle that for centuries has been waged in both America and England to keep separate areas of civilian and military control in war time. It is the meaning, for example, of *ex parte* Merryman, the famous case in which Chief Justice Taney fought to keep the jurisdiction of civilian courts free from the encroachments of military tribunals. But even more important is the tendency of the military mind to be carried over into the conduct of industry, the treatment of labor, and the organization of mass opinion.

Secondly, the patrioteering mind comes to the fore. It is a mind which Thorstein Veblen, writing in the midst of the patrioteering anti-radical hysteria which followed the first World War in America, savagely attacked in an essay entitled *Dementia Praecox*. It differs from the patriotic mind in its intolerance, its hysterical pitch, and its availability in being used to carry through a repressive program.

Thirdly, the bureaucratic mind comes to the fore. The urgencies

¹² "It is the last step that counts." (literally *couter* = to cost)

of war are such as to make the exercise of administrative discretion a danger and reflective judgment a luxury. Sometimes the limitations of the bureaucratic mind lead to paradoxical results. Thus Thorstein Veblen suffered the irony of having George Creel's Committee on Information use his book, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*,¹³ as grist for its propaganda mills, while the United States Post Office Department was holding it up as subversive doctrine.

In attempting to appraise the hold of these types of mentality in war time, it is necessary to go into the realm of the exploitation of the irrational impulses in men that war makes possible. Mr. L. P. Jacks, at the outbreak of the first World War, spoke of "the peacefulness of being at war." And it is true that war offers a form of release to the intolerable tensions of living in a complex society and one in which the individual finds so many of his impulses frustrated. In war the individual becomes finally part of the collective mass, taking his place with a certain sense of relief in the great hierarchy of state power. In fact, one of the difficult problems of psychological analysis is to decide whether in war time, to use the language of D. H. Lawrence, the Demos is sleeping or sleep-walking.

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PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC OPINION

■
Ralph D. Casey

Because of the debasement of the word during the last war, propaganda has taken on a meaning which it does not deserve. It is commonly employed as an epithet of derogation and is popularly used to characterize any presentation of fact, theory, or program with which one disagrees. Many persons feel that propaganda is altogether reprehensible. Many fear its influence. As a result of this confusion important causes have sometimes been unfairly stigmatized by the use of a word which popularly connotes selfishness, dishonesty, or subversive action.

Agnes Repplier once complained:¹ "When one looks in the dictionary for the word 'propaganda,' its definition suggests nothing reprehensible. Why should not an organization for 'spreading doctrine or a system of principles' be a decent, candid, and upright organization, inviting the attention and challenging the good will of mankind?" 'Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide'² is an august, mouth-filling title, inspiring nothing but respect. One of the

¹ "A Good Word Gone Wrong," *The Independent*, Oct. 1, 1921, p. 5.

² A Commission of Cardinals was set up by Gregory XIII to spread Catholicism and to regulate ecclesiastic affairs in heathen lands and in heretical areas. In 1622 this commission became the Sacred Congregation *de propaganda fide*. This was the first propaganda institute.

ill turns done by the war was the investing of this ancient and honorable word with a sinister significance, making it at once a term of reproach and the plague and torment of our lives."

Careful students of propaganda refuse to accept the subjective connotations of the word. Ethical and moral concepts are regarded as having no real validity if one wishes to be scientific in his approach to the problem of determining what is propaganda, nor do informed analysts attempt to make arbitrary and idealistic distinctions between "education" and "propaganda," although the view that the two differ in the transmission and control of "accepted" as opposed to "controversial" attitudes has value.³ Experts are wary of characterizing emotion-laden appeals as propaganda and those burdened with logical arguments as non-propagandistic.

The etymological definition of propaganda frees the word from the pernicious connotation. The *New English Dictionary on Historical Principles* describes it as "any association, systematic scheme, or connected movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine or practice."⁴ Even the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, whose whole effort is built on the theory that the ordinary individual can be trained to act on the merits of the facts if apprised of the workings of propaganda, in defining propaganda makes no attempt to place "socially-desirable" promotional effort in one watertight compartment and propaganda detrimental to the interests of "the majority of the people" in another. As generally understood, says the Institute, *propaganda is expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends.*⁵

Many present-day students of the propaganda phenomenon content themselves with the statement that propaganda is an organized effort to accomplish a social change by suggestion. Still others prefer to think of propaganda in terms of symbols—words and word substitutes—which are managed in such a way as to control the attitudes

³ See Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, Knopf, 1939, p. 10.

⁴ Quoted by Fred S. Siebert in "Freedom of Propaganda," *Journalism Quarterly*, March, 1935, pp. 27-28.

⁵ *Propaganda Analysis*, Vol. 1 of the publications of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc.

and actions of groups of persons. Both schools are of the opinion that propaganda can be used to describe the influences that are exerted openly and legitimately, as well as those that are used secretly and illegitimately.⁶

Miss Lucy Salmon gives support to this view. She points out that the various grades of propaganda "shade into each other almost imperceptibly."⁷ At one extreme is the propaganda whose function "has become one of perverting opinion and of converting to falsehood."⁸ At the other, the honest and above-board promotion of an idea or program. In the usual sense in which these words are used, propaganda can be utilized in the promotion of "good" as well as "bad" causes.

But it should always be borne in mind that those who make use of suggestion and who manipulate symbols have an objective in mind. "The differentia of a propaganda," remarks Major Peter C. Mitchell, "is that it is self-seeking, whether the object be worthy or unworthy, intrinsically, or in the minds of its promoters."⁹ Moreover, the matter of acceptance is all important. Richard S. Lambert points up this aspect of propaganda with the remark: "For it is of the essence of propaganda that it should influence persons to do or to think things which they would not do or think if left to themselves."¹⁰

In other words, the propagandist attempts through the use of promotion to achieve some goal. Goals can be achieved and social changes induced by violence, boycott, bribery, and similar means of social control, as Lasswell points out.¹¹ Propaganda achieves its results through suggestion and persuasion. Less subtle forms of attaining objectives require resort to physical threats, bullets, bribes, or bread.

Public opinion is evoked and formulated by propaganda; com-

⁶ In the limits of this discussion, the writer cannot analyze the social dangers of propaganda in irresponsible hands, nor the exploitation of human emotions through its use.

⁷ *The Newspaper and Authority*, Oxford, 1923, p. 310.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

⁹ "Propaganda," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 12th Edition (1922), p. 176.

¹⁰ *Propaganda*, Nelson, 1938, p. 9.

¹¹ Harold D. Lasswell. "The Study and Practice of Propaganda" in Lasswell, Casey, and Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*, University of Minnesota Press, 1935, p. 3.

modities are sold by resort to the same means; health, educational, and social welfare campaigns succeed through propaganda drives; wars are launched, fought, and terminated with the propagandist playing as important a rôle as the military and naval forces and the economic ministries.

The Social Bases of Propaganda

Today's intense preoccupation with propaganda is a significant thing in itself. Even before the outbreak of the War of 1939 a vigorous, if not always an understanding, interest in propaganda had arisen in this country. Without doubt our present consciousness of propaganda has resulted, in part, from learning about the methods of the dictatorships in mobilizing opinion. Displeasure over the practices of the dictators and anxiety for the fate of democracy have actuated many of us to pursue knowledge about propaganda. Harwood L. Childs has cited other reasons why our interest has been aroused.

"The coincidence of Allied success and strenuous propaganda activity during the War," he writes, "the biographical revelations of super-shrewdness on the part of public personages, the claims of some advertisers and professional propagandists, to say nothing of the academic theses and formulas to explain past events, have resulted in a marked glorification of the art of opinion leadership."¹²

Those who are inclined to make a fad of propaganda and who see in it a new social mechanism or strategy which arrived full-bloomed during the World War should bear in mind that "the creation of consent is not a new art." In the contemporary period the technical means for controlling men's minds has enormously expanded and the modern social system requires that many more persons be consulted (even though nominally) before a given line of policy can be adopted. Government propaganda is no modern thing. "In all ages governments, parties and special interests have hired or subsidized editorial writers or pamphleteers to attack the opposition cause and to praise their own."¹³ Official propaganda has been resorted to from time immemorial.

¹² Childs (ed.) *Propaganda and Dictatorship*, Princeton University Press, 1936, p. 4.

¹³ Will Irwin, "An Age of Lies," *Sunset Magazine*, December, 1919, pp. 24-25.

Bertrand Russell remarks:

Herodotus was in the pay of the Athenian state, which accounts for the fact that Athens comes out of his history with so much glory. In the wars of the Guelphs and Ghibellines, the victory of the former was due to the fact that the Pope, through the medium of the friars, outdid the Emperor in the organization of official propaganda. At the time of the Spanish Armada, both Phillip II and Elizabeth organized in quite a modern way. Phillip II's activities in this line are exemplified by Cardinal Allen's "Admonition to the Nobility and People of England and Ireland," accusing Queen Elizabeth of every imaginable vice (quoted in Frederick Chamberlain's "Private Character of Queen Elizabeth"). The British popular horror of the Spanish Inquisition no doubt is derived from English Government propaganda during Elizabeth's reign. Historians and literary men are always taking part in the work; "Henry VIII" is propaganda for Elizabeth and "Macbeth" for James I, who appears as a descendant of Banquo wearing a triple crown.¹⁴

The significant fact concerning the use to which propaganda was put by governments in 1914-1918 and in the War of 1939 was not that it had never before been resorted to on an organized scale. The real phenomenon was the extraordinary intensity and expansion of propaganda under a wartime regime and the skill with which the Allies in particular made it a part of the whole strategy of coercing the enemy in the World War.

Yet this should not have produced profound amazement. The social situation provided a fertile ground for large-scale management of opinion and technicians were already experienced in the manipulation of symbols to control attitudes. Popular education, manhood suffrage, and the spread of democracy generally, the growth of capitalism, and the expansion of industry and technology had already played their part in the development of propaganda in the ante-World War period. To get their appeals before the public, special groups, organizations, and governments had long availed themselves of modern mechanical inventions to transmit information and misinformation over a wide area. Propagandists already possessed a greater weapon than mere intuitive knowledge of the springs that move mankind. Researches in psychology had given them a scientific

¹⁴ "Government by Propaganda" in *These Eventful Years*, Vol. II, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1924 ed., p. 380.

knowledge and understanding of how opinions and attitudes could be formed, prejudices established, and passions inflamed.

The twentieth century is peculiarly the era of universal education. Masses of people possess the tools of knowledge, if not the spirit of it. They can read, even if they cannot universally exercise the critical faculty. Elementary education has created nations of citizens interested in a larger world than that encompassed by their home and their own immediate experience. They had long been subjected to appeals by interested persons who make use of the expanded network of the communication agencies to bridge distance and induce a common acceptance of attitudes.

While free education had given the masses of people the ability to read, popular suffrage had granted them the right to vote and thus to exercise influence. The broadening of the base of political power had long necessitated an expansion of propaganda in politics. Since political leaders under modern conditions could not govern as formerly through the intrigue of a ruling class or the manipulation of political conventions, they had been compelled to devote more time, money, and attention to propaganda as a means of winning popular support and retaining themselves in office.

Viscount Bryce observed the relation of propaganda to political movement in *International Relations*:

All modern propaganda efforts spring out of the emancipation of the masses of the people from the control of their former rulers and the consequent desire to capture public opinion. As long as the monarchs had the whole or even the usually predominant power, it was not the peoples who were thought of, but the sovereign. That is to say, modern propaganda is an attempt to turn to account that deliverance of the peoples from the habit of unreasoning obedience which made the masses, formerly indifferent to politics, acquiescent in whatever international action their government chose to take.¹⁵

And he warned pertinently: "Propaganda can create a fanaticism which may be just as unreasoning as, and more dangerous than, obedience used to be."¹⁶

Although domestic political propaganda is less violent and tends less to the arousal of unbridled passion, it does not make wide use

¹⁵ Macmillan, 1922, p. 24.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

of logical arguments and logical influences in campaign time. The class of experts who rose in the early part of the century to serve in the political entourages as paid publicity men were adepts at reaching the psychological interests of the common man long before field guns spoke on the Western Front. In this country the up-to-date political publicity bureau had been built on the framework of Mark Hanna's organized propaganda division. The candidate no longer depended upon his own oratory and a steeplechase tour across the country. The propagandist put printing press, direct mail, and many other agencies of promotion to work to diminish the barrier between the candidate and the people.

The success of the specialized art of implanting *political* attitudes was not lost on the war propagandist when it came his turn to touch off the springs of action by appealing to popular passions. Moreover, he could profit from the propaganda experience of those who had worked in the economic and social spheres.

The very complexity of the material environment of Western society at the time of the war had called into play extensive measures for dealing with public opinion. Out of modern industry, commerce, transportation, and finance had arisen a myriad of specialized activities, many of them in conflict. Business, industrial, and financial organizations, agricultural groups, chambers of commerce, labor unions, social service and philanthropic agencies, educational institutions, religious sects, and racial configurations all felt the need of either exploiting the public or seeking public understanding of their activities. Some wanted legislation beneficial to their particular groups and organized themselves into pressure lobbies to influence legislation. Still others wished to sell goods and services or desired liberal contributions of money for the development of their activities.

These groups hired symbol specialists to show them how to lift their voices above the Babel of appeals.¹⁷ Since old-fashioned tech-

¹⁷ Lasswell believes the number of symbol specialists has increased both absolutely and relatively since 1870. See his *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, McGraw-Hill, 1936. "Professional authors in America have jumped from an inconsequential number to between 12,000 and 13,000. There are 60,000 artists where formerly there were 4,000; 40,000 actors instead of 2,000; 165,000 musicians in place of 16,000. There has been a tenfold increase in the teaching profession. There are ten newspapermen where there was one in 1870. There are 300,000 lawyers today . . ." Pp. 8-9.

niques were no longer serviceable, publicity men who could make use of more than one agency of mass impression arrived on the scene to complement the press agent, who himself had been born in the beginnings of the mass circulation of newspapers and periodicals and the start of America's broader industrialization. Advertising men no longer thought in terms of simply bringing an article to a consumer's attention or acquainting him with the quality of a product. Persuading the consumer to buy was a self-conscious art utilized by these practical psychologists who knew how to change habit patterns and, if necessary, to play upon fear, hope, vanity, ostentation, greed, and even snobbery to get results.

The Press Learns "Mass Appeal"

The technique of gaining mass attention for newspapers by satisfying the personal wishes and desires of large numbers of persons was a part of a journalist's equipment. Hearst and Pulitzer first blazed the way when they captured huge circulations by satisfying emotional hungers of thousands of lonely and inarticulate readers. Northcliffe did the same when he launched the *Daily Mail*.

Morrill Goddard, who reached 5,500,000 readers with *The American Weekly*, has expressed his estimate of the suggestibility of the average man in his testament of newspaper policy, *What Interests People and Why*, written after editing Hearst's Sunday magazine section for thirty-nine years.

Man's emotions are more frequently stirred than his intelligence. The really intelligent mind is a mind willing and capable of thinking. But many are incapable of real thinking, and to others who are capable, the process of thinking is often painful . . . a large majority of America's 110,000,000 react to emotional appeal of word and picture, but fall asleep when you present something requiring them to think.¹⁸

Goddard lists "the sixteen elements of human interest," a mixture of interests and motives, as love, hate, fear, vanity, evil-doing, morality, selfishness, immortality, superstition, curiosity, veneration, ambition, culture, heroism, science, and amusement.¹⁹ Nancy Mavity, a

¹⁸ Privately published, New York, 1935, p. 16.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

California journalist, speaks of the appeal to primary emotions.²⁰ "Stories with a theme of love, pity, horror, fear, sympathy, jealousy, and sacrifice are sure of an emotional response on the part of the reader, for these emotions are part of our fundamental human heritage."

For good or ill, the modern science of human relations gave the propagandist more scientific insights than the journalist had intuitively evolved into the means by which the attitudes and behavior of groups or masses of people could be modified to suit the purpose of the stimulating agent. The old introspective psychology had thrown little light on the motives in conduct; but, with the application of the principle of biological evolution to psychology and "with the knowledge derived from the mental structure in psychopathological patients," it was possible to formulate a conception of mind that took account of the stereotypes, myths, and rationalizations that govern opinions and conduct. Psychologists demonstrated that reasoning actually serves as a rationalizing agency.

By the time war was declared in 1914, then, symbol experts knew how to reach individuals and groups with basic appeals that would stir the common man to action. As such appeals related to symbol specialists' work, these experts had solved the baffling problems created by material complexities, the increase in population, and the extension of geographic areas in the last century.

Specialists in opinion management had at their disposal powerful agencies of communication. Indeed, the agencies for mass stimulation, the newspaper, periodical, motion picture, and later the radio, not to mention telegraphic and telephonic instrumentalities, helped give birth to the propagandists who adapted these devices to serve their purposes. The communication agencies provided the technological basis by which millions of widely separated persons could share information about matters of common interest. It is no secret that these agencies carried propaganda as well as news. Today the enormous development in the radius of communication brings to the focus of common attention European events which before 1914 could command interest only among cultivated and leisured Americans.

²⁰ *The Modern Newspaper*, Holt, 1930, p. 31.

The Communication Agencies Expand

Proverbially we are a nation of newspaper readers; without an early means of intercommunication such as the press provided, our forebears could never have welded the nation together. R. A. Scott-James remarks: "America from the very first seems to have been aware of the formidable obstacle to nation-making presented by her vast area, and she set herself to overcome the difficulty by setting up electric telegraphs as early as possible, by multiplying her railway lines and increasing the speed of her trains, by linking up the country districts by telephone and trolley cars, by giving infinite thought to quick printing and the quick distribution of newspapers."²¹

A total of 2,483 daily newspapers brought the news of the war to American readers in 1914. In 1917, when we got into the fight, the total had increased to 2,514, the largest number published in a single year in our history. Weekly newspapers and periodicals totalled 16,266 in 1914 and three years later the number was little changed. We should not overlook the periodicals, which in a number of cases have circulations far exceeding that of any newspaper. Broad and cosmopolitan, dealing with national and not restricted local questions, they were an important influence in war time. The periodical field was primarily occupied by approximately 3,000 monthly magazines in 1914-1917. In recent decades their number and circulation has been on the increase.²²

American people have been inoculated against propaganda, but whether they continue to keep a level head or are swept off their feet by the tide of events in Europe, will depend greatly on the treatment of news and the expression of views in the press. While in actual number English-language daily newspapers in this country have declined since 1914, owing to consolidation and chain ownership, total newspaper circulation increased substantially after the war and today's most recent *Editor & Publisher* figures report a total daily newspaper circulation of 39,571,839. Sunday circulation is 30,480,922.

²¹ *The Influence of the Press*, Partridge, London, 1913, p. 165.

²² Data for number of newspapers and periodicals taken from Malcolm M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice, *Communication Agencies and Social Life*, McGraw-Hill, 1933.

Interest in newspapers on the part of British readers parallels that of the American. There were 1,577 newspapers and 3,119 magazines being published in Great Britain in 1937, and in 1934 every hundred families bought 95 morning and 57½ evening papers every day, and 130 Sunday papers every week.²³ The aggregate circulation of ten national dailies rose by 1,750,000 between 1930 and 1937, and that of twelve national Sunday newspapers by about 1,100,000.²⁴ France is also a nation of newspaper readers.

For obvious reasons, the circulation of newspapers has fallen off in Germany since dictatorship was enthroned. In 1937 there were 2,527 daily newspapers in Germany, of which 23 percent had a circulation of less than 1,000, 81.7 percent sold less than 8,000 copies each, and only 1.5 percent sold more than 60,000 copies each.²⁵ Under the Soviet Government circulations of newspapers have increased substantially under "hot-house" stimulation. Most of the papers were established when autocratic rule was in full swing and the governing class, therefore, has never lived in fear of instrumentalities of its own creation.

The press is still a dominant mechanism for enforcing attitudes. Riegel²⁶ and Desmond²⁷ have shown only recently how formidable a part the press plays in international politics and the aggrandizing and defensive tactics of great powers.

Since newspapers exert influence in building up favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward other countries, their responsibility for helping to keep the peace is great. "Every country," remarked Bismarck, "is held at some time to account for the windows broken by the press; the bill is presented, some day or other, in the shape of hostile sentiment in the other country." If a nation finds itself in a war, its press must then become an agency of official propaganda, in greater or less degree.

The radio and the motion picture are now well-established media in national and international life. The first played no rôle in the

²³ Lambert, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²⁴ *Report on the British Press*, Political and Economic Planning, London, 1938, p. 83.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

²⁶ *Mobilizing for Chaos*, Yale University Press, 1934.

²⁷ *The Press and World Affairs*, Appleton-Century, 1937.

World War. The only radio communication in 1917 was through a series of code buzzes in the ether. The second occupied a prominent place in the wartime propaganda campaign. The "talking picture" was not a reality until 1927. The linking of dialogue and sound-appeal to eye-appeal has given it increased potency in the forum of public opinion.

It is estimated that there are 16,251 motion picture theatres in the United States, with an aggregate weekly attendance of 60,000,000. Two-thirds of those who visit the theatres are under thirty years of age. That the motion picture from the point of view of content contains propaganda has been shown by the Payne Fund studies, "Motion Pictures and Youth." Reliable investigations reveal that the "movies" change attitudes, and although it is constantly asserted that the ordinary picture house is not a suitable place for direct propaganda, there is no contradicting the fact that when a war spirit is kindled audiences will react favorably when their own type of "national propaganda" is flashed on the screen. "Pershing's Crusaders" and "America's Answer," produced and distributed by the Committee on Public Information, each had more than 4,000 bookings, and the thirty-one weekly issues of the "Official War Review," a propaganda news reel prepared by the British, French and Italian governments, had a total of nearly 7,000.²⁸

"The value of the cinema in propaganda directed towards allied and neutral countries is potentially very great," writes Captain Sidney Rogerson, an English writer whose little volume, "Propaganda in the Next War," so aroused Senator Nye that he called his colleagues' attention to it on the floor of the Senate. Whether the North Dakota isolationist was possessed of pre-vision, it is difficult to say, but a recent study by Edgar Dale²⁹ reveals that 50 percent of the items in the news reels released October, 1939, to American motion picture houses dealt with war or preparation for war divided in content as follows: United States, 34 percent; French and English, 56 percent; German, 10 percent.

²⁸ James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won the War*, Princeton University Press, p. 141.

²⁹ Author of "The Content of Motion Pictures," "Children's Attendance at Motion Pictures," and "How to Appreciate Motion Pictures." Dr. Dale is associate professor, Bureau of Educational Research, The Ohio State University.

In an earlier study,⁸⁰ in which the themes of 500 motion pictures in each of the years 1920, 1925, 1930, and 1935 were analyzed, Dr. Dale concluded that "the whole question of war is overemphasized, qualitatively and quantitatively, in both feature motion pictures and the newsreels. Our newsreel analysis disclosed that in 1930 and 1931 the ratio of war to peace items was twelve to one. . . . In general, the feature pictures do not present peace as attractively as they do war. For one 'Broken Lullaby' or 'All Quiet on the Western Front,' we have dozens of films glorifying espionage, showing war or the preparation for war as glamorous."

The radio is a unique tool in the arsenal of public opinion and propaganda. In directness and simultaneity, it is the master of all the agencies of mass impression. The first American broadcast of any consequence took place in 1920. The British Broadcasting Corporation was not set up until 1923. Radio's rapid growth has brought it into 26,666,500 homes in a country that boasts 32,500,000 families, a record demonstrating that this comparatively new instrumentality meets a real need of the average American. Abroad, its progress has been marked.

With few exceptions, the radio today is prostituted and corrupted abroad by government press bureaus, censors, and propagandists.

An efficient and speedy mechanism that might have been used to cement international friendships was born in an age when propaganda flourishes and nationalism is unbridled. Competing countries feverishly constructed radio facilities, especially short-wave transmitters, for the purpose of broadcasting propaganda subversive to the interests of other states. The radio was used as part of the game of conducting "the war of nerves." In the hands of the dictator, "the radio became the most powerful political weapon the world has ever known."⁸¹

Radio has already played a significant part in the War of 1939. Its exact effects on neutral opinion are unknown. That it could help to solidify opinion more speedily in this country in the event of our

⁸⁰ Edgar Dale, "Movies and Propaganda," in Elmer Ellis (ed.) *Education Against Propaganda*, National Council for Social Studies, 7th Yearbook, 1937.

⁸¹ César Saerchinger, "Radio As a Political Instrument," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1938.

participation in war than was possible twenty-three years ago, there seems no question.

Mass communication is a characteristic feature of our age. To the press and the telegraphic instrumentalities the motion picture and broadcasting have been added in recent time. In the War of 1939, combatants have not only a speedier and more efficient system of devices over which propaganda may be transmitted, but the multiplication of the media has intensified the stimuli to which the average man is subjected.³² In time of peace the ordinary person has difficulty avoiding this widespread stimulation. In times of war, when one set of symbols and only those manipulated under centralized governmental authority are freely transmitted, readiness to accept these symbols is enhanced.

"Tides of printing sweep over and through the world," wrote Van Doren a few years ago.³³

Rumor never sped as fast or as far. The information, news, and entertainment which once had to make their way slowly by word of mouth may now reach millions of readers in a single day. The result has been to accelerate and extend all the influences brought about by the spread of ideas and emotions. A continent can be roused as quickly as could an ancient city. A hero can be made overnight, a movement started in a week, a crusade got on its way in a month or so. So can divisions be engineered and hostile parties founded. And the most trivial forms of entertainment may be borne in all directions on the same swift tides. With the radio, the moving picture, and the newspaper, western civilization may be represented as a man sitting in a whispering gallery, watching a play, and holding in his lap a book of which the pages continually turn of their own accord.

Modern War and Propaganda

The increased capitalization of modern war, changes in its techniques through industrial and technological advances which make today's wars progressively more destructive and which enable commanders to direct millions of men on the battle front, and, finally,

³² See the discussion of this factor by Malcolm M. Willey, "Communication Agencies and the Volume of Propaganda," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1935.

³³ Carl Van Doren, "Literature" in Charles A. Beard (ed.) *Whither Mankind?* Longmans, 1928.

the rise of nationalism have extended the scope of wartime propaganda.

Robert G. Albion⁸⁴ and Quincy Wright⁸⁵ have explained the significant changes in the techniques and ideologies of war. The reasons why paper bullets are as important in making war as steel bullets can be adduced from their studies.

While Professor Albion is inclined to slight social factors as they affect the making of war, his thesis deserves our attention nevertheless. In his view, the disappearance of absolute monarchies and the appearance of limited monarchies, republics, and other forms of popular government have had vast effects in the way wars are carried out. People's armies replaced professional armies. Millions of conscripts and volunteers fight today's wars. The disappearance of absolute monarchies and dynastic groups and the appearance of the nation-state resting on a broader political base than in dynastic times, engendered a greater national consciousness. In war time the resources of sentiments of an entire people became engaged, along with its economic and military resources.

Professor Albion traces historically the steady rise in the size of armies. He places great stress on the changing composition of those who composed the war forces.

The five centuries from 1300 to 1800 formed the great period of the professional soldier—the man who made soldiering his regular business as opposed to the amateur or part-time citizen-soldier. For most soldiers in the period from 1300 to 1650, war was a regular occupation. All over western Europe, bands called free companies appeared. An able captain would gather a group of men-at-arms and bargain with some king, noble, or city to sell the services of his companies. Professor Albion emphasizes the fact that a single army might contain free companies from a dozen different countries. Soldiers were seldom stirred with patriotic fervor for the cause for which they were fighting. *Under such conditions no propaganda was needed to create and sustain morale.* Soldiers regarded themselves as hired men having a job to do.

⁸⁴ *Introduction to Military History*, Century, 1929.

⁸⁵ *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace*, Longmans, 1920.

Professor Albion fixes 1650 as the approximate date when the professional standing army came in. "A country would keep a permanent force in time of peace instead of hiring job lots of soldiers when war broke out." Even under this system, the armies were not all made up of nationals of the country over which the monarch ruled. The armed forces of Frederick the Great of Prussia contained soldiers from various parts of Europe and the British Isles. Such armies were small, as reckoned in modern terms, a national state contenting itself with forces of from 50,000 to 150,000 men.

Propaganda a Minor Element

Cogent reasons why propaganda was a minor element in the homeland and in the zone of operations are summed up by Professor Albion as follows: In no other period in modern history were people less affected by wars; armies fought in the pay and in the interests of monarchs—Bourbons, Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and so on; the people were seldom called on for military service; armies were small because of the expense of keeping them up. Modern war equipment did not extend a battle front as it does today.

The French Revolution and the attempt of Austria and Prussia to suppress the new state marked a new type of army. From 1792 to 1798 war fever swept through France. The national army that was called to the tri-color represented the whole country and was imbued with a new spirit. Compulsory service was enforced for all men between certain ages and much larger numbers were possible in the armed forces. These French levies "came by hundreds of thousands . . . singing the 'Marseillaise' and burning with patriotic enthusiasm. They were no international group fighting for the Bourbon king. They were Frenchmen, fighting for France. They not only threw the invaders out of their country, but, under Napoleon, conquered most of Europe."³⁶

France had raised a national conscript army in *time of war*. Prussia in 1807 extended this plan to include the training of its citizens in *time of peace*. Forced by Napoleon to limit her army to 42,000 men, Prussia adopted the ruse of training this number intensively for a

³⁶ *Albion, op. cit.*, p. 105.

few months, discharging them, and then calling up a lot of young men for the same intensive drilling. A powerful reserve was built up. Conscription in time of peace became an established reality. After 1870, England alone stayed out of the conscript system.

These were the changes that made Europe into an armed camp on the eve of the first World War. In the previous century, 100,000 men composed a large army. A few years before the Sarajevo incident touched off the flames of war, Germany possessed 806,000 men in its peacetime army; France, 818,000; Russia, 1,284,000; Austria, 370,000, and each nation had millions of fully trained reserves ready for war.

Professor Albion's thesis is summed up:

The spirit of the new national armies was different. The old professional soldiers often *cared little about the cause for which they fought*.⁸⁷ Frequently it was merely a monarch's desire to grab or to defend some small piece of territory. The new soldier had a more definite interest in a war even if the military service itself appealed to him less (than to the professional) soldier . . . old professional armies might contain soldiers from a dozen different lands. The new armies, except for special units like the French Foreign Legion, were composed wholly of nationals. The German army was all Germans, the French all Frenchmen, and the Russian all Russians. The whole population was affected, for almost every household had some member liable for service. Deliberate propaganda stimulated enthusiasm for one's own army and hatred or fear for the enemy. The hate between many of the nations spread through the armies and the peoples. This system, in addition to its cost in money and time, also led to a vaster, more bitter and more thorough-going war of peoples against peoples.⁸⁸

Extreme patriotism is no more important than making great sacrifices at home in the service of fighting troops at the front and navies at sea. Clothing must be provided for millions of men and guns and munitions must be manufactured to throw into the maw of the war machine. There is a disorganization of industry and commerce and wide social dislocations. In this emergency, the state of the people's morale is of great importance. Propaganda helps

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. III. Italics the writer's.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. III.

maintain the necessary spirit and confidence at the front and zeal and hope in the homeland.

When great powers fight a war billions of dollars are expended. Millions of men can be maintained at the front and huge expenditures made for the manufacture of the instruments of war only because the industrialization of society has provided surpluses which can be burned up in the flames of conflict. This misapplication of capital brought us our great post-war depression, yet the warring nations can still spend sums of astronomical magnitude for the purposes of accomplishing political ends.³⁹

Technological progress has also helped to make possible large-scale military and naval actions. Paved highways, motorized equipment for conveying men, arms and munitions, the field telegraph and telephone for the direction of great masses of armed men from a central point, machine tools and electrical power for manufacturing death-dealing instruments—all are based on technology.

If modern war could be fought between two relatively small groups of mailed horsemen, as it was generations ago,⁴⁰ and if communities of people were not organized into great national states possessing sufficient accumulations of wealth and technological equipment to wage a long and expensive war, propaganda might not be such a necessary concomitant of conflict. The very size of modern states and the vast populations living within their borders require propaganda to unify individuals in support of a common war aim and to encourage voluntary sacrifices in the hope of winning the common victory.

*Techniques of War Propaganda*⁴¹

Although the oldest known military treatise describes the use of war propaganda, its first organization in a scientific manner was,

³⁹ Possibly it can be argued that such expenditures can be made only through the aid of non-belligerent countries. In November, 1938, the U. S. Treasury Department reported that European nations still owe us \$14,497,161,340 as a result of the War of 1914-1918.

⁴⁰ See Wright, *op. cit.*, for various methods of employing force in war time.

⁴¹ The writer is indebted to Professor Russell I. Thackrey, Department of Journalism, University of Minnesota, for assistance in the preparation of this section.

as Professor Lutz⁴² points out, during the War of 1914-1918. In that war propaganda became "one of the three chief implements of operation against a belligerent enemy,"⁴³ and, as such, an instrument of active warfare ranked with military and economic pressure.

The post-war studies and revelations concerning the field of operations, organization, and techniques of propaganda during the conflict have become part of the background and equipment of propagandists interested or involved in the current European struggle; so much so that some early efforts of the "war of words" of 1939 were recognizable as the fabric of 1914-1918 applied to the framework of today. The experience of the first World War should also become part of the background of the alert citizen anxious to establish and retain critical and objective standards by which to ascertain the real interests of his country in time of conflict.

Some one has truly said that the War of 1914-1918 was one of the most remarkable campaigns of opinion management in the history of the world. Lutz has described its objective as the endeavor to control public opinion toward the national cause as well as to promote public sentiment against the enemy.

Within each belligerent country the propaganda arm, working toward the goal of military and political victory, had as its major strategic objectives the following:

- (1) To mobilize hatred against the enemy;
- (2) To preserve the friendship of allies;
- (3) To preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the co-operation of neutrals;
- (4) To demoralize the enemy.⁴⁴

With particular emphasis on the rôle of war propaganda in defending the "home front" through building up and sustaining the morale of the country, Professor Lutz summarizes its aims and objectives thus:

Its definite purposes . . . were to maintain the morale of the armed forces of the state, create a favorable state of mind at home,

⁴² R. H. Lutz, "World War Propaganda" in Quincy Wright, *Public Opinion and World Politics*, University of Chicago, 1933, p. 159.

⁴³ H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Knopf, 1927, p. 9.

⁴⁴ Lasswell, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

lower the morale of the enemy, influence favorably neutral opinion concerning the reason, justice, and necessity of the conflict, and, if possible, induce friendly action. In other words, the purpose of all war propaganda issued by belligerent states was to increase the national fighting zeal, influence neutrals, and set forth the just cause and humanitarian aim of the belligerent. Through the published statement of war aims, governments enabled propaganda to coincide with policy. Again, by the effective use of censorship a reasonable amount of social control was exercised during a time of group crisis.⁴⁵

Although the work of the propagandist in giving effect to these purposes fell into well divided fields of operation, success in each depended so much upon the efficiency of operation in others that the importance of centralized control of propaganda activities emerged as one of the clear lessons of the first World War.

Thus morale-building propaganda of each country among its own troops at the front worked, with the aid of censorship, to relieve anxiety of and provide encouragement to the civilian population at home.

Propaganda behind the lines among the entire population not only was fundamental to successful prosecution of an all-inclusive modern war on the economic and industrial front, but sustained the troops in the trenches by the conviction—transmitted through letters, newspapers, and new arrivals from home—that loved ones were well cared for and that the civilian front was both willing and able to maintain the flow of supplies essential to military operations.

High morale at home and in the trenches made much easier the task of preserving friendship and unity with allied countries by stressing determination, strength, enthusiasm, and cultural and moral kinship.

Among neutrals the spectacle of a united, determined, strong country operating in close harmony with its allies in turn reinforced the desires of those wishing to enter the war as active participants or at least to offer "benevolent" rather than strict neutrality; while giving pause to the neutral whose sympathies and interests might cause it to incline toward alliance with the enemy.

Neutral opinion in turn proved a potent aid to propaganda in

⁴⁵ In Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

enemy countries, where the task was to weaken morale both at the front and behind the lines by destroying confidence in home leadership, in allies, and in the ability to win.

How did the propagandists operating in each of the above fields carry out their assignments? What were the techniques used? Those which proved effective on the "home front" are basic.

As Lasswell has pointed out:

So great are the psychological resistances to war in modern nations that every war must appear to be a war of defense against a menacing, murderous aggressor. There must be no ambiguity about whom the public is to hate. The war must not be due to a world system of conducting international affairs, nor to the stupidity or malevolence of all governing classes, but to the rapacity of the enemy. Guilt and guilelessness must be assessed geographically, and all the guilt must be on the other side of the frontier. . . .⁴⁶

Which is another way of saying that since twentieth-century morality condemns war as an instrument of aggression, every country that resorts to arms feels it must defend itself against the charge that it has violated the moral code in entering upon a conflict. From the moment that a war begins until years after a peace treaty has been signed, governments will attempt to prove they were in the right in waging a war and in acquiring the territory of another as a result of victory. "Villains" must defend themselves. The "virtuous" acclaim the purity of their aims.⁴⁷

"Collective Responsibility"

One of the most efficacious methods of achieving this concentration and "economy of hatred" and thus unifying the home forces for the struggle is what Beaglehole calls the "techniques of attributing collective responsibility to the enemy." He says:

This can be done effectively . . . by setting up before the masses a representation of the German Brute or the British John Bull or the American Uncle Sam and against this representation laying all the crimes committed, real or alleged, or harm done by the enemy forces. Some offence, for instance, has been committed by a German; there-

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴⁷ Statesmen write memoirs after the war to uphold the thesis that the war aims of their country deserve support and approval.

fore Germany did it, and to punish any German whatever is to inflict satisfactory punishment for the offense.⁴⁸

Sir Norman Angell⁴⁹ tells of the Allied airman who replied, "They drowned my brother," when asked his feelings about the rightness or wrongness of a reprisal bombing raid over some German cities. Thus, as Beaglehole says, because a sailor in Hamburg is instrumental in drowning an Englishman in the North Sea, an old woman in a garret at Freiburg or some children in Munich who have but dimly heard of war, and could not even remotely be held responsible for it, or have prevented it, are killed with a clear conscience because they are Germans.

As part of this process of fixing collective responsibility each side concentrates on one or a few leaders of the enemy as personifying the enemy. The German Kaiser and his sons on the one hand and Lord Northcliffe (director of British propaganda in enemy countries) on the other filled this rôle during the War of 1914-1918. From the outbreak of the War of 1939, similarly, Hitler individually and the Nazi extremists collectively constituted "the enemy" for the British and French, while in the German press Winston Churchill became "the archetype of black-hearted Briton."

Emphasis on the "collective responsibility" theme is stressed so strongly in Germany today that a Berlin correspondent described its presentation to the German citizen thus:

At breakfast the headlines of his favorite newspaper warn that "England seeks world domination." On the subway, a poster depicts England as a tarantula squatting over Europe with its hairy and bloody legs placed on Africa and India. At lunchtime the radio asserts England, owning a disproportionate part of the world's surface, begrudges Germany her place in the sun. . . . In the evening, if he decides to stay home and read, he finds his favorite magazine featuring an article on "British brutality throughout the ages" and if he goes to the movies he sees a newsreel about the British blockade "against German women and children."⁵⁰

The press and other agencies of mass communication in all

⁴⁸ E. Beaglehole, "Some Aspects of Propaganda," *Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, June, 1928, p. 99.

⁴⁹ Cf. *Human Nature and the Peace Problem*, Collins, London, 1925.

⁵⁰ United Press dispatch by Richard C. Hottel, Minneapolis *Star-Journal*, Nov. 3, 1939.

countries play an important part in popularizing the conception of collective responsibility through the use—comparatively innocuous under conditions of peace—of such terms as “Germany declares . . .,” or “France announces . . .,” or “Britain resolves . . .,” etc.⁵¹

As Beaglehole describes the cumulative effect of the process:

It is eagerly taken up by the masses because it enables them to settle any qualms of conscience in regard to the justification or otherwise of their action in thus lumping together the sheep with the goats. Once you can say quite definitely that the enemy, taken collectively, is entirely in the wrong, it saves you the trouble of laboriously considering all the evidence of the case and of trying to sheet home the blame in the proper quarter. Collective responsibility enables you to swamp thought in an emotional blur of unrestrained hate. . . .

The policy of applying the notion of collective responsibility to one's opponents gains its effectiveness because it makes an unconscious appeal to primitive impulses of group solidarity. In any comprehensive propaganda this policy is further fortified by the use of vilification and systematic abuse of those opposed to one's own side. When once the critical faculties of the mass have been blunted by unrestrained indulgence in hate and fear of a common enemy—rationalized though this hate may be as “righteous indignation”—the majority of men will be prepared to overlook many incidents in the carrying on of a war or political campaign at which they might otherwise be inclined to feel moral scruples. . . . Official propaganda in the Great War made sure that all the inhibitions which society normally imposes upon the free expression of passion would be quickly removed by painting the enemy in the blackest of colors, by representing him as little less than a fiend straight from Hell—or Russia. Furthermore, when this policy of vilification is supported by the recognized leaders of the thought of a country or by those who, through their possession of a certain literary or professional reputation, are looked up to and admired by the masses, it is easy to get the latter into such a state of credulity that no “atrocities” story is too extravagant for belief. They will even go so far as to obtain real emotional satisfaction at the thought that their opponents boil down their dead for glycerine!⁵²

⁵¹ Cf. Beaglehole, *op. cit.*

⁵² *Op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

"Satanism" as a Propaganda Pattern

The collective portrait of the enemy as an arch-fiend was built up not only by the emphasis on atrocities, but by a more inclusive process which Lasswell calls "Satanism"; the effect of which is to reinforce and lend further credibility to the charge that the enemy and the enemy alone caused the war. "Thus, by a circularity of psychological reaction, the guilty is the satanic and the satanic is the guilty."⁵³

The enemy is always insolent and his conduct insufferable. His boastful patriotic songs, whether "Deutschland über alles" or "Rule, Britannia!" are proofs of this point. But the enemy is also sordid and entered the war purely for commercial gain. He has an inherently and nationally untrustworthy character, which may be shown by scholarly appeals to the record of history. He is quarrelsome, crude, and wantonly destructive—particularly in the case of churches—and he conducts a lying propaganda. Emphasis on this last aspect serves to condition the public not only against enemy propaganda, but against rumor originating at home, or against acceptance of unpleasant truth which the censor has withheld. The public is prepared to dismiss it all as lying enemy propaganda. To this end a French writer of the World War period quoted "a Latin historian, Peterculus" as finding "the ancient Germans a race of born liars" while German school children used such copying exercises as "Reuter's (British) Agency, the fabricator of war lies."⁵⁴

Although a disproportionate emphasis has been placed on the effect of manufactured atrocity stories during the World War, several atrocity tales for which little or no basis in fact has been established were circulated widely—some despite the opposition of the official war-policy and propaganda agencies—and were unquestionably effective in arousing hatred.⁵⁵

Among the "atrocity classics" circulated in Allied countries were the story of the Belgian (sometimes French) baby whose hands had been amputated by degenerate German soldiers to prevent his serv-

⁵³ Lasswell, *op. cit.*, p. 77. Other material immediately following is summarized from Lasswell's discussion.

⁵⁴ Cf. Lasswell, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4.

⁵⁵ Ponsonby's *Falsehood in Wartime* (Dutton, 1936) places a great deal of emphasis on the effectiveness of these stories.

ing in future wars; the "crucified Canadian" soldier; the French child shot for pointing a toy gun at the invaders; the centuries-old story of the tubful of eyes gouged out by the terrible Turk; and the report that the bodies of German soldiers were being used by their countrymen for the manufacture of soap. Among the more persistent themes in Germany were those of civilian sniping against German soldiers; use of disease bacteria as Allied "weapons"; rumors of a French hospital for German prisoners whose eyes had been gouged out.

Professor Tansill says there is no mistaking the fact that the publication of the report on German atrocities of the Bryce Commission had far-reaching effects in America.

From 1907 to 1912 Lord Bryce had served as the British Ambassador at Washington, and his "American Commonwealth" had stamped him as a penetrating though friendly critic of American institutions. His evident scholarship and unimpeachable character had raised him to a high place in American estimation. . . . The established reputation of Lord Bryce for critical scholarship seemed a guarantee against conclusions dictated by war hysteria.⁵⁶

Examples of atrocity stories have crept into the press since the War of 1939 began.⁵⁷ Whether the atrocity pattern will play a significant part in the propaganda of today's conflict is a subject on which experts do not agree. The necessity for this type of propaganda is less pressing in Britain and France than in Germany. Months of reading of cruelties in German concentration camps and the severe treatment meted out to "non-Aryans" and subject races, has already aroused people in neutral as well as Allied countries.

Germans have accused imperialists of "atrocities in South Africa during the last forty years." As counter-propaganda the British Foreign Office quickly overcame its "reluctance" to "take an action that might have the effect of spreading hatred" and published a

⁵⁶ C. C. Tansill, *America Goes to War*, Little, Brown, 1938, p. 298.

⁵⁷ Some of these stories were at the expense of Germany's enemies. Thus the "Belgian baby without hands" became a German baby which had lost its hands to brutal Poles; the "crucified Canadian" became a German forester, crucified because German. For summaries of atrocity stories in the early weeks of the War of 1939 see September, 1939, issues of the magazines *Time* and *Newsweek*, bulletins of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc., and Harold Lavine's "The Propagandists Open Fire," *New Republic*, November 1, 1939.

White Paper on anti-Semitic excesses in Germany and on conditions in German concentration camps.⁵⁸

It remains to be seen whether this is the first link in a long chain of atrocity stories. The Allies are no doubt aware that a secure peace cannot be written after this war in the same atmosphere that hung over Versailles following the last.⁵⁹

Propaganda and Real Events

More important than the fabricated atrocity stories, however, were those growing out of real incidents. Some of these were of a type which inevitably occur under war conditions; others the result of differing conceptions of the proper conduct of neutrals, belligerents, and of civilians in occupied zones. Propagandists of both sides compiled and in some cases counted and classified atrocities committed by the enemy. Superior knowledge of the backgrounds and psychology of American neutrals enabled Allied propagandists to make a world-martyr of the nurse, Edith Cavell, while German propagandists failed to take advantage of executions of their nationals under similar circumstances.

While atrocity and kindred stories aroused and unified hatreds, they were also effective in creating fear of the enemy. Fear must be so great as to convince soldier and civilian alike that the alternative to battle is, at the best, misery and enslavement.

Since hatred and fear may lead only to discouragement, defeatism and eventual revolution, the war propagandists of 1914-1918 found it important to stress their own side's idealism and the certainty of victory. Emphasis on idealism was particularly important in the case of those who up to the outbreak of war believed it unjustified and its acceptance intolerable.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ See excerpts from the White Paper in the *New York Times*, October 31, 1939, particularly the statements of J. E. Bell and R. T. Smallbones.

⁵⁹ In this connection see Professor Lewis A. Dexter's review of Rogerson's *Propaganda in the Next War* in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, October, 1939. Professor Dexter says that "in most societies the true objective of warfare is the establishment of a favorable and lasting peace (as after 1815 or the deletion of Carthage) and that in the modern world this makes 'hatred of the enemy' . . . undesirable; the war should be regarded rather as a 'job to be done.' One of the real problems of an effective and far-sighted propaganda machine in the democratic countries should be to discourage hatred of the enemy."

⁶⁰ See Irene Cooper-Willis, *England's Holy War* (Knopf, 1928) for an elaboration of this thesis.

Once in the war, these idealists clutched at every evidence of their own country's purity of aim and of the enemy's debasement, and "changed an old-fashioned war devoid of spiritual aims, a war merely of material interest, into a Holy War—a War to end War, a fight for Trust and Tryst, a War to Save Democracy, a War to Emancipate Europe from the Tyranny of the Mailed Fist."⁶¹

A further necessity for the appeal to idealism is described by Beaglehole as follows:

Even though the causes leading to war in modern times may be entirely honourable and "above the board" . . . these same causes may be too complex and may go back too far into the past for the public to disentangle and see in the right perspective. Probably, if so understood, they might not provide sufficient emotional "kick" to force the public to identify itself in a whole-hearted fashion with the prosecution of the war. Thus, just in proportion as the real causes of a war are of a prosaic nature, political or economic, is it necessary to blend the crowd with an aura of sublime and growing idealism.⁶²

A pointed, though in itself unimportant, illustration of the operation of the propaganda of idealism in belligerent countries occurs in these parallel quotations growing out of the War of 1939:

Brief intermittent references in the London newspapers indicate that many U-boat crews are in English concentration camps and are being treated with the utmost consideration. In a former five-story cotton mill in the heart of a northern industrial area are fifty men who marched rigidly and grimly through the barbed wire enclosure into their improvised prison expecting to be accorded treatment something like that meted out to the hapless inmates of Nazi prison camps. Instead they were taken in charge by strict but kindly guards and soon were enjoying a substantial meal. . . . Through their own leaders they have expressed . . . their appreciation of the consideration shown them.⁶³

The *Berliner Morgenpost*, No. 236 of October 1, 1939, published an article by one of their reporters who recently visited a prisoners' camp, and which contains the following remarks:

. . . In an officer's prison-camp, the French and the British are quite noticeable in comparison to the others. Their uniforms are

⁶¹ Beaglehole, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *New York Times*, Nov. 3, 1939.

good, and their quarters lively. They state that they are completely satisfied with their quarters and with the food and treatment they receive. . . .⁶⁴

Summarizing the appeals of "home front" propaganda, Lutz says:

To achieve this control, organized propaganda proclaimed the certainty of victory unaffected by temporary reverses in theaters of operations, urged endurance in the hour of defeat, set forth the financial resources and economic strength of the state while explaining ephemeral difficulties due to shortage of food, fodder, and key raw materials, and finally appealed to political union to wage successfully a war of defense which would nevertheless redress wrongs, punish outrages, reflect glory on the armed forces, and satisfy historical national aspirations. The deliberate development of the spy mania was also at the outbreak of war an effective means of mobilizing opinion and arousing all groups to immediate joint action.⁶⁵

American War Propaganda

After the United States entered the first World War, President Wilson entrusted the task of making these appeals effective to the Committee on Public Information and gave its dynamic civilian chairman, George Creel, direct access to those important determiners of policy, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, by making them the other members of the Committee.

A recent study describes this remarkable organization:

Mr. Creel assembled as brilliant and talented a group of journalists, scholars, press agents, editors, artisans and other manipulators of the symbols of public opinion as America had ever seen united for a single purpose. It was a gargantuan advertising agency the like of which the country had never known, and the breathtaking scope of its activities was not to be equalled until the rise of totalitarian dictatorships after the war.⁶⁶

America had reached the war pitch through a variety of causes, including the emotions aroused by loss of life on the *Lusitania* and

⁶⁴ *News From Germany* (German propaganda letter) for October, 1939, issued at Starnberg, Bavaria, Germany.

⁶⁵ In Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁶⁶ James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won the War*, Princeton U. Press, p. 4. For a description of the work of the committee by its chairman see George Creel, *How We Advertised America* (Harper, 1920), or the *Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information*.

on American ships; the common cultural tradition with Great Britain; economic causes such as trade and the war loans, and Allied emphasis on democracy. "Their" war had become "our" war; "their" enemy, "our" enemy.

The Creel Committee was not a censorship, and no doubt it helped avert a severe and stringent censorship, but the few publicists who were not inclined to co-operate knew that violation of the Committee's list of "voluntary" restrictions might involve difficulties under the Espionage or Trading With the Enemy Acts. As has been said of Mr. Hoover's wartime Food Administration, the effect was that "individuals were forced to conserve voluntarily!"

The chief function of the Committee on Public Information was *positive*. Americans were conditioned to getting information by agencies of mass communication to an extent unequalled by the masses of any other country, and nowhere else were these agencies at such a high pitch of efficiency. Although "News was the lifeblood of the C.P.I."⁶⁷ the word news must here be interpreted as information and ideas, transmitted through all the available media, stressing America's idealism, strength, unity, kinship with the Allies, and the unworthiness of the enemy. Plenty of material about war plans was available to the press and others from the C.P.I., and there were few other "safe" sources.

The Domestic Section of the Committee waged the battle for unity on the "home front." The Division of News issued more than 6,000 releases which Mr. Creel estimated as utilizing 20,000 newspaper columns a week. The *Official Bulletin*, with a subscription price thought to be prohibitive, attained a peak circulation of more than 118,000. The nationally famous scholars of the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation prepared 105 publications which circulated 75,000,000 copies. This division's National School Service reached 20,000,000 homes through the schools. The Film Division got back in rentals nearly three-quarters of the million dollars it spent. The Bureau of War Expositions reached 20 cities, 2,000,000 persons in Chicago alone, and the Bureau of State Fair Exhibits prepared displays seen by 7,000,000.

Labor was reached by the Labor Publications Division and by the

⁶⁷ Mock and Larson, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

independent Alliance for Labor and Democracy. Advertising men, artists, and cartoonists donated their services and newspapers and magazines their space. More than 75,000 volunteer speakers were organized as Four-Minute Men for talks before public gatherings. The Division of Women's War Work prepared 2,305 news stories and 292 pictures about women in the war and answered 50,000 letters from wives and mothers. . . . The list stretches on.⁶⁸

It was a gigantic task and, as one recent commentator has said:

It was so great a triumph that historians like Henry Commager and S. E. Morison have raised the question whether the generations affected will ever fully regain their original poise. That some such pressure to conform was vital at the time was fairly obvious, and it is not to be doubted that under an administrator less patient and liberal than Mr. Creel the effect would have been more nearly disastrous. But that American democracy seems to have recovered from one siege of regimentation does not necessarily mean that it did not suffer, or that it could survive another . . . protracted whippings-up of the spirit, dilutions of truth and manipulations of fact, however earnestly intended and "justified" by events, must leave some permanent mark on the national character.⁶⁹

Propaganda mobilizes opinion and censorship. The censorship suppresses the news which the governing authority fears might lower morale at home, sustain the hope of the enemy, or cause doubts regarding the justice of a cause to arise in the minds of neutrals. "Inconvenient ideas" and displeasing opinions are restrained.

There can be no doubt that the censorship greatly aided the Allied cause in the World War. The fact that the Allies cut the two principal German trans-Atlantic cables is well known. A cable censorship was established by the British, the press censorship was invoked, and a censorship of foreign mails was in operation in 1915. Neutral ships were required to enter British ports for the examination of their cargoes for contraband. The mails were examined either at the port or at London.⁷⁰ In the zone of military operations, censorship was strictly enforced.

⁶⁸ For the most complete available summaries, see Mock and Larson and Creel.

⁶⁹ Ralph Thompson, "Books of the Times," *New York Times*, October 16, 1939.

⁷⁰ See John A. Fairlie, *British War Administration*, Oxford, 1919, pp. 133-137 for a good concise description of the British censorship in the World War.

Similar forms of censorship were adopted by the Central Powers. In the United States, the censorship was voluntary in the sense that newspaper publishers and editors agreed not to print certain items of news specified by the Committee on Public Information.

In the War of 1939, propaganda and censorship again march hand in hand, twin weapons of control,⁷¹ and while the forms of censorship do not follow exactly the 1914-1918 set-up, propaganda patterns in this war seem strangely reminiscent of the World War.

Propaganda in the War of 1939

A month after the war began Allan Nevins predicted that the foreign propaganda produced by today's European war would be "substantially less oppressive in quantity, and substantially less offensive in quality, than that employed in 1914-1917."⁷²

"Another Bryce report would be read with so liberal a sprinkling of salt that few would stomach it," writes Professor Nevins. "Stories of murdered hostages would be examined not emotionally but with a stern criticism of authorities; tales of crucified prisoners and bayoneted babes would be likely to arouse a revulsion of feeling."⁷³

It is quite true that some of the old propaganda patterns have worn so thin as to be no longer serviceable. Many of the first World War tools of propaganda are still in use, however, as any analysis will show. While no battalion of lecturers from abroad has reached our shores early in the War of 1939 and while no flood of brochures and books from a counterpart of Wellington House called attention to the uprightness of a cause, European propagandists are still playing old tunes. They have had the aid of a powerful new weapon of mass communication in this connection—the radio. In today's war, European protagonists on the propaganda stage speak to world audiences when important appeals are needed to bolster "home front" morale. It can be argued from the evidence that Lutz's classification of "home front" propaganda as separated from appeals

⁷¹ In the first months of the war the German censorship was less exacting as regards mails and transmission of news dispatches than the British and French. The strict censorship of the French government was relaxed somewhat after early experimentation with the form this control should take.

⁷² "Propaganda: An Explosive Word Analyzed," *New York Times Magazine*, October 29, 1939, p. 18.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

prepared for neutral nations has broken down, at least in the early stages of this war.

It is true, as Professor Nevins says, that "the French and British need no mighty effort of propaganda" to create a strong anti-Nazi sentiment. The reading of the Gallup polls reveals the strong sentiment in favor of the Allied cause. The French and German governments realize full well that any obvious and overt effort to affect opinion in this country would defeat its own purpose. But the remark of Lord Lloyd⁷⁴ that the "best propaganda in America is no propaganda" is not a dictum that is fully observed by the English and French. And the Germans are working indefatigably to win some support for their war aims.

In this war, as in the last, each side denounces the other as having been responsible for its outbreak. Appeals of this sort⁷⁵ are designed for neutral ears as well as for home consumption. French public men throw the blame at Hitler.⁷⁶ The British do likewise. In the first World War, official documents rolled off the press in the effort to fix guilt, and books, pamphlets, leaflets, newspaper articles, and lectures reinforced the plea of innocence. Already we have had the "white" and "blue" papers on the contending governments assuring us of their innocence. Sir Nevile Henderson, late British ambassador in Berlin who had been accused by Liberal and Labor party members of holding Germanophilist tendencies before the war, issued a 12,000 word first-hand study of Hitler, the Nazis, and the Germans after his return to London. Such significant phrases as the following appear: "Though he (Hitler) spoke of his artistic tastes and of his longings to satisfy them, I derived the impression that the corporal of the last war was even more anxious to prove what he could do as a conquering generalissimo in the next. . . ."

Chamberlain, Churchill, Eden, and other members of the British government have never tired of laying the blame for the conflict on the enemy. In an Armistice Day broadcast addressed to the women

⁷⁴ Made to the foreign editor of *Newsweek* in the summer of 1939.

⁷⁵ In the classification of the appeals mentioned in the following, the writer has had the assistance of Andie Knutson, a graduate student at the University of Minnesota.

⁷⁶ See the text of Daladier's speeches broadcast to the people of France on September 3 and October 10, 1939.

of the British Empire, Queen Elizabeth used the same appeal, albeit in a minor key:

I speak today in circumstances sadly different. For twenty years we have kept this day of remembrance as one consecrated to memory of the past and never-to-be-forgotten sacrifice and now the peace which that sacrifice made possible has been broken and once again we have been forced into war.

At the other extreme, spokesmen of the Third Reich accuse Britain of having goaded Germany into the war after waiting until a pretext sufficiently "moral" could be found for launching the conflict.⁷⁷ Britain, says Hitler, finally induced Poland to provoke Germany until she took up arms.⁷⁸ Britain lighted the first match. In an address to munitions workers on September 9, 1939, General Göring charged: "You declared war on us, Mr. Chamberlain, not we on you."

As to "white papers," the Germans have recently circulated to Americans from the German Library of Information,⁷⁹ 17 Battery Place, New York, the *German White Book* with copies of *Facts in Review* from the same source.

Nations in war time accuse others of making the war. None confesses or admits the selfish intrigues and fatal decisions that were made in Europe from 1871 to the present day. None reminds us that territorial and economic rivalries are still as fundamentally important as ideological antagonisms.

As a corollary to the appeal that the rival nations or group of nations was responsible for war, each will allege it fights only in self-defense. During the first World War, Lord Northcliffe, while director of British propaganda in enemy countries, advised that "the Allies must never be tired of insisting that they were the victims of a deliberate aggression." The invasion of Belgium and France gave strong popular support to this argument, as all who lived during the period of belligerency will recall.

Apparently, the Allies will not neglect Northcliffe's counsel. The solemn declaration of King George in his first world-wide broadcast

⁷⁷ Von Ribbentrop's address at Danzig, October 24, 1939.

⁷⁸ The Führer's "Appeal to the Nation" on September 4, 1939.

⁷⁹ For Libraries of Information, Ministries of Information, etc., substitute Libraries of Propaganda, Ministries of Propaganda, etc.

contained these words: "We were forced into the conflict," and "the freedom of England and the whole British Commonwealth of Nations is in danger." In replying to the offer of the King of the Belgians and the Queen of the Netherlands to mediate, he emphasized that Britain's war aim was "the redemption of Europe from the perpetually recurring fear of German aggression so as to enable the peoples of Europe to preserve their independence and livelihood."

Daladier told the French: "We are fighting to defend our land, our homes, our liberty." The Germans, on the other hand, find that they were compelled to use "force against force" to protect themselves against a Poland which, they assert, refused to settle neighborly relations peaceably and resorted to force.

That the plea of idealism has colored the Allied propaganda in this war, as in the last, is evident. Democracy, freedom, individual liberty—these were contrasted in the first World War with the "Prussian system" and the "rule of might." President LeBrun now tells his people: "It is the liberty of the world . . . which is at stake!" The British king proclaimed: "We have been challenged by the principle of force, that might makes right."

Harold Nicolson, member of Parliament and formerly of the British diplomatic service, expressed a variant of this appeal in the *New York Times Magazine* for November 5, 1939, in an article entitled, "The Biggest Factor: The Home Front."

We know that the evolution of the human race has been marked by certain advances. Greece gave us the beauty of the liberated mind and Rome the sanctity of law and contract. Christ taught us gentleness and tolerance, truthfulness and unselfishness. The blessings of honesty, the delights of scholarship, the balance of reason, the refinement of art—all these have been evolved in the Christian epoch. They were great and gentle attainments. In Russia and Germany they have been denied, ridiculed and persecuted. We know that had we surrendered to Hitler we should have been betraying mankind. We know that there was nothing else that we could do (but resist).⁸⁰

During the first World War, attempts were continually made to awaken and inflame among Allied, neutral and, finally, the Ger-

⁸⁰ Curiously enough, Mr. Nicolson neglects to mention Italy among those dictatorships that have denied, ridiculed, and persecuted the attainments mentioned.

man peoples, hate for the Kaiser and the military classes. Propaganda history repeats itself. In this war, Hitler and the Nazi hierarchy are the objectives of attack. Substitute for the "military degenerates" in the following example of first World War propaganda the phrase, "Hitler and the Nazi leaders," and you have a fair counterpart of the type of appeal being made today.

Many clear-headed Germans know today that the war was instigated by the military degenerates of Berlin. . . . The German people were lied to, to force them into a war which they did not want. They call it a war of defense, a war of liberation, but it is nothing but a war of conquest and stealing.

Hitler is an easy mark for such attacks. His unwillingness to arbitrate the Polish issue is so clearly evident that the attack can be made directly at him.

The English and French are following the technique of 1914-1918 when they continue to emphasize that the destruction of the German people is not one of their aims. "We have no quarrel with the German people," said Anthony Eden in a radio address on September 11, 1939, and in a direct appeal to the German people via radio Chamberlain asserted: "Hitler has betrayed you . . . We are not fighting you, but the regime which has betrayed all Western civilization and all that we and you hold dear."

Hitler's attempt to follow the pattern of this appeal ended in a complete misunderstanding of the psychology of his opponents. In the "Appeal to the Nation" he began promisingly enough. Germany was "not against the British people as a whole." He ended on a false and bitter note: "We are against the Jewish plutocrat and democratic upper crust which fears Germany because it fears contagion of the better German social model."

Both sides are once more working the appeal that their rivals are pursuing a policy of world domination, oppression, and encirclement, as opposed to their own natural need and right to expand. In an October 11, 1939, broadcast Premier Daladier declared that Germany wishes "the destruction of Poland in order to ensure rapidly her domination of Europe and the servitude of France." During the neutrality debate in Congress, Lord Lothian, the British ambassador at Washington, apparently deliberately avoided making speeches,

but on the occasion of the meeting of the Pilgrim Society in New York on October 25, 1939, he suggested that the Hitler regime had no intention of remaining within its present boundaries if it should win the war. The Allies have made some progress in capitalizing on the Hitlerian term *Lebensraum*, or the right to "living space."

But what have the Germans said of encirclement? "For centuries," Hitler asserted in his address to the nation on September 4, 1939, "England has pursued her aim to make European people defenseless in pursuance of the British policy of world conquest."

In the first World War, each side proclaimed the certainty of victory unaffected by temporary reverses. Even a casual reading of foreign news in our own press will reveal the use of this assertion by the contending propagandists. To make doubly certain that the full strength of its armaments would be appreciated, the French high command permitted newspaper correspondents to view the Maginot Line. Newsmen in Germany were escorted to the West Wall to see its impregnable defenses. Then the *Pressestruppen* or press troops of the invading German army took thousands of photographs to show⁸¹ the strength of the mechanized German army in Poland and these were sent by radio or through neutral ports by post to the newspapers of the world. The American movie-goer has seen plenty of shots revealing the naval, military, and air preparations of the British and French.

In the verbal argument over which side is the stronger, the British

⁸¹ Melvin K. Whiteleather, an Associated Press correspondent in Berlin, described in the December, 1939, issue of the *Journalism Quarterly* the new war coverage instituted by the German army.

"A 'propaganda kompanie' does it all, getting the news and the pictures under an arrangement made between the military and the Propaganda Ministry. The men in the army do regular service—but all are newspaper men. They wear uniforms, carry weapons and are under the command of the officer of the unit to which they are attached. They go into battle and experience the same things as does a regular soldier. . . .

"The material they gather is sent over army wires to the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. The ministry uses what it likes, distributing it to newspapers through the official news agency. It is reproduced . . . marked with the author's name at the end.

"Pictures are made and distributed in the same way. Photos have become more important in this struggle than heretofore. Photographers are carried in bombers to photograph results.

"The 'propaganda kompanie,' as has been revealed, lost seven men in the Polish campaign."

have relied upon Winston Churchill, who scorns to mention statistics or numbers of fighting units but impresses the world with the British determination to "persevere in making war until the other side has had enough."⁸²

Strangely enough, the British have failed to emphasize their exact resources in money and capital, shipping, raw materials, and so on. Herbert Hoover's summary of the Allied financial strength is the best statement made on this point, and the former President obviously wrote in this vein to discourage the pro-interventionists in this country who were fearful of the Allied ability to hold out.⁸³

An appeal to neutrals by creating common bonds and aims or by reviving those already existing helped mobilize American sentiment in 1914-1918. Common language and traditions created a strong tie between England and the United States, vitiating the German effort. Without avail, the German propaganda machine in this country played up the burning of Washington by the British, the inciting of Indian insurrections by the English in colonial times, and the British attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine.

Delicate hints and outright statements of the mutual responsibility of Great Britain, France, and the United States in the maintenance of free institutions and the democratic way of life have been thrown out in this war. Churchill told world radio listeners on November 12, 1939, that the Anglo-French entente enjoys the sympathies of the United States which would be left "single-handed to guard the rights of man" if the Allies were defeated.

This effort to involve the sentiments of the United States began as soon as war was declared in 1914 and Lord Lothian's address before the Pilgrim Society seems to have followed the pattern sketched out by Sir Gilbert Parker, Wellington House propagandist, before the same society just after the first World War started. Both compared the "publicity" of the British with the "propaganda" of the Germans.

"Hands Across the Sea" was used to stereotype the emotional and historical bond existing between the Allies and this country in the

⁸² See his Empire-wide broadcast on November 12, 1939.

⁸³ Interview with Mr. Hoover by Roy W. Howard, *New York World-Telegram*, October 3, 1939, pp. 1, 9.

last conflict. What characterization historians of the future will give to the present-day propaganda is something for the future to decide.

A negative German appeal to offset the British has been attempted by Von Ribbentrop.⁸⁴ He called our attention to the fact that Germany is precisely the country among all others which has most faithfully observed and respected the Monroe Doctrine. Britain, he added, has tried continually to throw the seeds of discord between America and Germany.

Britain, of all countries, has every reason to be extremely cautious of the use of this sort of propaganda, for while Germans always respected the Monroe Doctrine, the existence of many British colonies, possessions, coaling stations, naval bases, etc., on the American continent is a constant infringement of this doctrine and could at any time bring Britain into serious conflict with it. This has already been shown by Britain's reaction to the Panama decision.

Germany's effort to detach France from Britain by appealing over the heads of Daladier and his ministers to the French people is reminiscent of similar tactics pursued by the Allies against the Central Powers in the first World War. Vague references by British intellectuals to the establishment of a new world order follow the older pattern. The reader will call to mind other current appeals which fall into the grooves of the great propaganda campaign of 1914-1918.

Words spoken by prime ministers and other official sources spread by imitation and contagion to unofficial groups and individuals. Minor officials, editors, publicists, educators, clergymen, and others having prestige and standing in the national community will echo the appeals of political leaders. Soon there is a great diapason in which the voices of the multitude will join.⁸⁵

Propaganda is inevitable in the modern world. In war time it becomes so powerful an instrumentality that it vies with the military and economic forces as a major pressure against one's enemies.

Neutrals should attempt to recognize propaganda for what it is. Intelligent analysis of what they read, what they hear, and what they

⁸⁴ Danzig address, October 24, 1939.

⁸⁵ The masses themselves will create their own propaganda in times of great emergency. See Fernand van Langenhove, *The Growth of a Legend* (Putnam, 1916) as one attempt to illustrate this process in war time.

see, will provide a prophylactic which may have some effect against the subtle efforts to control their opinions and sentiments.

Totalitarian Propaganda

The success of Allied arms in the first World War was in part the result of the shrewd management of sentiment and opinion by those in control in London and Paris and later, Washington. Every combatant national state directly contributed to a common consciousness of propaganda, if only by stigmatizing inconvenient ideas as "enemy propaganda." And although the masses of the people were only dimly aware of how expertly their passions had been unleashed and their desires and urges played upon by persons in authority, the lesson did not go unobserved among those who contemplated political action on the post-war stage.

The war settlement left the Allied nations in possession of the spoils of victory. While British and French society was subjected to extreme stresses and strains, which were never fully adjusted, neither the French nor the British suffered the economic consequences or the deflation of the national pride that resulted in Germany (and in Italy, also). The Central Powers lost the war and Italy, or so she thought, lost the peace.

In accounting for the insecurities that pervaded Central Europe and the Italian peninsula, there is no necessity here to decide whether the character of the social soil was the result of the emotional needs of the people or the breakdown of a capitalist economy from the blows of the war. The fact remains that the soil was ready for the seeds of dissension. Cognizant of the techniques by which masses of men could be moved, those who led the dynamic Fascist and Communist movements called into play the twin weapons of propaganda and censorship which had proved so effective in war time and which had been forged in the social and technological furnaces of our modern times. To these weapons they added a third, *force*—a wartime tool put now to the uses of a state in "peace." Dictatorship called into play the very instrumentalities that had won the war. Indeed, in Max Lerner's view, "the techniques of propaganda upon which the dictatorship chiefly relies, both in building and maintaining its power, are in reality those used, though less arro-

gantly and with a less explicit political intent, in a democratic society."

He adds:

I am not referring to the Black Shirts or the Brown Shirts, to the March on Rome or terrorism, but to that entire mastery of mass persuasion without which all the shirts would have been only so many yards of cloth and the March on Rome merely a paranoid fantasia. The democratic state has had to dispose of an increasing amount of unneeded products that its machines were turning out, it has had to drum up the war fever, and it has had to give its masses the illusion of power while withholding the actuality. To do all this it evolved a technique of advertising and of high-pressure salesmanship, a flamboyant journalism, a radio and a cinema that stamped the same stereotypes on millions of brains. We have been naïve enough to believe that our nationalism and militarism, our race and class conflict, our advertising and salesmanship, our techniques for influencing opinion and manipulating the effective symbol in swaying mass emotion would always remain in the same pattern. But under Fascism an economic and political convulsion has disarranged the pattern and is forming its elements into a new one.⁸⁶

When dictatorship captured power the governing hierarchy undertook to become the sole maker of public opinion. The Russian Revolution of 1917 established a dictatorship which frankly enforced "a monopoly of legality" for Communist propaganda within Russia and sought by means of the Third International to revolutionize capitalist governments. Italian Fascism captured by degrees a complete monopoly of the propaganda apparatus and imposed a rigorous censorship on oppositionist ideas. When the Nazi party came into power it recognized that in a dictatorship the regimentation of opinion is primary. The Nazi system took over Communist and Fascist techniques and invented new ones. It established a ministry of propaganda, licensed and catalogued journalists and expelled newspapermen whose ideas were contrary to Nazi policy, captured the broadcasting system, spread a continuous pattern of governmental propaganda, and censored inconvenient ideas at home. Hitler and Göbbels were past masters in popular electioneering and propaganda.

⁸⁶ "The Pattern of Dictatorship" in Guy Stanton Ford (ed.), *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, University of Minnesota Press, 1935, pp. 18, 19.

The ideology of the dictatorship permeated government, the school, the church, cultural agencies, art forms.

The real danger of the dictatorships to the Western democracies became apparent when Italy and Germany felt strong enough within to challenge their "enemies" without. The apparatus of propaganda directed itself into the international sphere. The technique of propaganda and censorship which finally caused even an opinionated man like Neville Chamberlain to recognize its dangers has been aptly described by Professor MacIver:

Armed with an exclusive ideology it (dictatorship) goes forth to battle. By the use of its ideology it drains all other organizations of power. With its aid the dictatorship penetrates foreign countries and dreams of conquering the world. With its aid, the dictators prepare the ground in those particular areas or countries which they seek to annex or to control or to attract within their sphere of influence or even to make receptive for some trading deal. Suppressing all minorities at home they diligently foment congenial minorities abroad, as propagandist centers to further their cause. By means of their monopoly of propaganda at home they perpetuate the sense of crisis so necessary to their continued existence.⁸⁷

First, sympathetic groups are formed within the territory which the Nazis wish to annex or control. Second, these groups are supplied with funds, emissaries, and propaganda. Third, when the time is ripe, military support is given to the minority element.⁸⁸

In the face of the divisions of opinion that exist in democratic countries, the establishment of a strong and aggressive resistance to the single and centralized propaganda and tactic of a dictatorship imposes extraordinary difficulties. Systematic propaganda on a large scale in democratic countries is divided among many institutions and groups. Opposition political parties and idea groups may not be in agreement with the government of the day on what policy to pursue against the encroachments of the dictatorship into fields now held by the Western democracies.

The irresolution, vacillation, and weakness of France and England

⁸⁷ R. M. MacIver, *Leviathan and the People*, Louisiana State University Press, 1939, p. 53.

⁸⁸ See H. J. Seligman, "The New Barbarian Invasion—Fascist Propaganda," *New Republic*, June 22, 1938, for a discussion of techniques used in Germany's advance preparation on the eve of the Czech crisis.

in the Spanish situation is explainable in part by division of opinion within the democracies. Chamberlain's "settlement" of the Czech problem at Munich brought into strong relief the contending opinions within England. Cleavage was apparent within the governing group itself. The old type Conservative-Imperialist split with the Conservative-"Fascist" type of mind represented by the Prime Minister. The Labour Party, the isolationists, the Locarno school, the believers in collective security, the Peace Union, Lloyd George's Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction, all these represented enclaves of opinion. Something like a coalescence of group attitudes into one unified State opinion was made possible only when war was declared against Germany on September 3, 1939, and there are evidences that complete organization and psychological unification of sentiment have not yet been fully achieved in England.

Defeat of Germany in the war will have unpredictable results. Two years ago Bertrand Russell suggested "that the next war, like the last, will end with a crop of revolutions, which will be more fierce than those of 1917 and 1918 because the war will have been more destructive."⁸⁹ Whether the new revolutionary governments that emerge will abandon their reliance upon propaganda, censorship, force, time alone can tell.

Today's Propaganda Problem

"I have never believed," wrote Walter Millis a month after the War of 1939 began, "that there were any two or three simple 'causes' of the American entry into the first World War. I have never believed that it was primarily propaganda, or the Morgan's loans, or the growth of the war-supply industries, or the ambitions and confusions of Mr. Wilson, or the barbarity of the submarine or the menace of German imperialism which 'got the United States into the War.' Rather, it seems to me, that American intervention was the end result of a highly complicated process with which each of these factors, acting and interacting upon all the others, had something to do, but in which none of them was clearly decisive. . . ."⁹⁰

⁸⁹ "Power Over Opinion," *Saturday Review of Literature*, August 13, 1938, p. 14.

⁹⁰ "1939 Is Not 1914," *Life*, November 6, 1939, p. 69.

This is a saner and more scholarly view than the thesis advanced in Professor H. C. Peterson's provocative volume, *Propaganda for War*, which attempts to demonstrate that Americans were clay in the hands of the Allied potter and to show that propaganda, especially from British sources, was the greatest single factor in plunging us into the conflict.

Professor Peterson presents his case so shrewdly that persons without a discriminating knowledge of the causes of war will find it difficult to resist his thesis. Possibly a fair share of his readers feel certain that "history will repeat itself," although the author of *Propaganda for War* admonishes them not to be taken in again.

The cumulative effect on the American mind induced by the reading of wartime propaganda exposures is at once therapeutic and disquieting. We are put on guard. But at the same time fears are aroused that propaganda is powerful enough to batter down our resistance. Squires, Lasswell, Millis, Tansill, Lutz, and Seymour opened our eyes to the part played by this weapon in 1914-1918 and Ponsonby, Viereck, and Peterson sent cold shivers down our backs. But despite our fears, we were provided with certain safeguards when the War of 1939 began.

In the month of January, 1917, when President Wilson wrestled with the peace problem, the *New Republic* warned that there were "official aspects of the war of which the people have only vague knowledge. . . ."

They are the secret diplomatic intrigues and maneuvers for a shifting of the balance of power in the Near East, Africa and even the Pacific, Persia, Morocco, Mesopotamia, the Congo, the Dardanelles, China, the backward territories of the earth. These are the stakes over which the coalitions were formed; it is for these that European diplomacy has played.⁹¹

The realism of this comment may not have been apparent to the American war party and Allied sympathizers in 1917. Today we have greater knowledge of power politics. The voices of Herbert Hoover and Charles A. Beard warned us early in this war that Europe is dominated by what the former President calls "a hell's brew of malign spirits."⁹² The desire to help the democracies in

⁹¹ Reprinted in the *Minneapolis Journal*, January 19, 1917.

⁹² Herbert Hoover, "We Must Keep Out," *Saturday Evening Post*, October 28, 1939.

time of great trouble is offset by a realistic effort to appraise the present European situation sincerely from an American point of view and in light of our national interests. The average American says to himself: "We went into the last war and what did we get out of it? Loss of blood and treasure, a depression, depletion of trade and markets, and the satisfaction of being called Uncle Shylock when we sought to collect our debts."

The communication agencies have a wiser and better informed understanding of their function in this war than in the last. In this war both the press and the radio exercise greater caution in the handling of news from Europe. Readers and listeners have been warned of the censorship and the propagandistic influences working abroad and at home. News services, special correspondents, and cable desks have gone to extraordinary lengths to separate news from propaganda. During the week of September 5, 1939, the major broadcasting chains adopted a "war coverage agreement" in which they pledged themselves "to avoid horror, suspense and undue excitement" in reporting the news; to try to distinguish between fact, official statement, rumor and propaganda, and to maintain fairness to all belligerents.⁹⁸

It is well that this step was taken. When Great Britain and France declared war on Germany September 3, the air was charged with excitement throughout the day. In curtailing its foreign broadcasts and avoiding emotional commentary, the radio, no doubt, was recalling Orson Welles and the Martian invasion.

In this war American news associations and individual papers have protected themselves against the excessive forms of propaganda that found their way to our shores in 1914-1918. There are a greater number of American correspondents in capital cities than before the Great War who see today's events through American eyes. They are fortified, moreover, with a greater knowledge of the background events that destroyed the peace and caused the conflict.

Still, it must be remembered that propaganda is largely at the mercy of events. The invasion of Belgium, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the merciless submarine campaign—these circumstances stirred

⁹⁸ For the text of this agreement, see *Broadcasting*, September 15, 1939, pp. 11, 83.

us to take sides. Bruntz⁹⁴ has shown that Allied propaganda became really effective in demoralizing the morale of the German "home front" only when the British blockade had reduced the country to a state of want and hunger. Failure of Ludendorff to achieve victory in the 1918 campaign further demoralized the German nation. There is no propaganda like a deed, remarks Nevins.⁹⁵

This country can neither manage events abroad in times of European belligerency nor isolate itself wholly from outside propagandistic influences. The United States lives in a world in which propaganda is used as an instrument of political strategy. But this country can put all foreign propaganda to the test. It can appraise such appeals from an American point of view and in light of our national interest. The next year or two will reveal whether American public opinion can stand on its own feet.

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⁹⁴ George G. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918*, Stanford University Press, 1938.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

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WAR AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS



Willard Waller

WE have now passed in review the adjustments of economic institutions, government, and agencies of opinion which war compels. In this chapter we shall deal briefly with the effects of war upon the population, the mores, and the community, and upon such institutions as the family, the school, and the church. Because of the great importance of military institutions in war time, we shall include an analysis of the army as a social institution. We shall also touch upon the relation of war to social problems and to revolution.

Before considering the effect of war upon social institutions, we should perhaps mention briefly certain effects of war upon the biological substratum of society. We all know that war is a great killer, but actually it takes more lives than we usually charge to its accounts. Bullets kill many; famine and pestilence sometimes kill more. A major war chokes off life at its source; it kills babies and at the same time cuts the birth rate drastically. Prolonged conflict changes the biological stock of the nation for the worse. Many of the things that war does to society are derived from what it does or threatens to do to life itself.

Famine and pestilence nearly always tread upon the heels of the marching armies. Starvation and disease germs, of course, know

nothing of the laws of war. They strike soldiers and civilians alike. Almost any infectious disease may become epidemic under war conditions, even though health conditions in the modern army are often better than in the civilian population. Measles and typhoid fever together killed 4,246 soldiers of the Union Army during our Civil War, about 1.75 percent of those enlisted. Scarlet fever, influenza, yellow fever, relapsing fever, and malaria on occasion spread widely and kill large sections of the population. Prinzing,¹ however, prefers to designate as "war epidemics" the following diseases: Typhus fever, bubonic plague, cholera, typhoid fever, dysentery, small-pox, and scurvy. On the basis of studies made at the conclusion of the first World War, we might certainly add tuberculosis to this list. Venereal disease, likewise, has had a long military record, and has spread widely during and after war.

History affords many instructive instances of the spread of pestilence and plague by marching armies. Once an epidemic has gained headway, it is carried to the homeland of the victors and shortly thereafter to neutral nations. During the Thirty Years' War Germany was repeatedly ravaged by typhus fever and bubonic plague, as well as by dysentery, scurvy, and small-pox. During the same period pestilences probably traceable to the war visited The Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Italy, and England. According to some estimates, and those not the most extreme, Germany lost approximately half her population in the Thirty Years' War. The twenty years of fighting after the French Revolution are likewise memorable no less for their pestilences, particularly typhus fever, than for their glorious victories. Typhus fever raged throughout Europe as a result of Napoleon's Russian campaign. The brief Franco-Prussian War cost Germany an estimated 170,000 lives as a result of a severe epidemic of small-pox. Typhoid and other diseases killed nearly twice as many Englishmen during the Boer War as died from battle-wounds. Among the Boer population, especially that confined in concentration camps, the death rate attained a great height; about one-fifth of those confined perished in a period of fifteen months.

Medicine and sanitation have made great strides, and it is possible that such devastating plagues will never occur again. The experience

¹ Prinzing, Friedrich, *Epidemics Resulting from Wars*, Oxford, 1916.

of the first World War supports this hope only in part. The health of the armies, considering the conditions under which they lived, was excellent; only influenza appears to have struck men in uniform to any extent. Civilian populations did not fare so well. There was a severe epidemic of typhus in Serbia late in 1914, and at the end of the war typhus struck again in Serbia, Greece, Rumania, and Poland. Tuberculosis increased greatly throughout Europe; famine apparently helped it to assume more malignant forms. Malaria, which had been brought under control in most of Europe, again became a menace. Typhoid fever, controlled among soldiers by vaccination, killed many civilians. Infant mortality rose sharply in nearly all the warring countries. England managed to reduce the infant death rate. Toward the end of the war came the pestilence, influenza. Its incidence was world-wide and the grand total of its deaths could hardly be estimated. We may safely say that in spite of modern science there is every reason to suppose that any major war will be attended by a number of deadly pestilences.

War is sometimes justified on biological grounds. It is said that the mortality of war favors the survival of the fit. The weak are eliminated by bullets and disease; the strong live to perpetuate the race. Very little can be said for this view. All the cogent arguments are on the other side, and only the near-impossibility of proving anything conclusively about human affairs prevents the idea that war is a eugenic factor from being shown up for the palpable falsehood which it almost certainly is. The plain facts are as follows: Death in battle is negatively selective; it is a dysgenic factor. The army takes the best and kills a large percentage of them, leaving the physical rejects to reproduce the race. This is very clearly the case with large modern armies, which select the capable from the total population. Further, battle-death probably selects many out of the best types in the army; the death rate of officers is always high. There are statistics from the French nation which seem to show that the dysgenic effect of prolonged military activity, with regard to certain measurable traits, is considerable.²

² Death from disease among soldiers and civilians is doubtless selective to some degree, but so many factors enter in that it would be difficult to show that it has any important eugenic or dysgenic effect. From this point on the argument becomes complex, with many theoretical claims and counter-claims.

The first World War profoundly altered the age and sex ratios of the populations of the leading contestants. The birth rate fell off sharply, producing a deficit of children. The shortage of men in certain age groups was marked. A comparison of the last pre-war census and the first post-war census of European participants is revealing.⁸ Germany's population in 1910 was 64,926,000; in 1919 the population, excluding some 400,000 prisoners of war not yet repatriated, had fallen to 60,412,000. In 1910 Germany had 7,791,000 children below the age of five, approximately twelve percent of the population. In 1919 there were 3,821,000 children in this age group, the percentage having fallen to 6.3. The surplus of women in the twenty-to-forty age group is shown by the following table:

<i>Age group</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Surplus of Women</i>
20-24	2,390,000	3,018,000	628,000
25-29	2,004,000	2,693,000	689,000
30-39	3,888,000	4,592,000	704,000

There were somewhat more than eight million men in the twenty-to-forty age group; there were about two million extra women. There were five women for every four men. The disparity was less marked in the upper age groups.

In France the situation was similar. Her population decreased from 39,192,000 in 1911 to 38,798,000 in 1921. The number of children below five decreased from 3,471,000 (8.9 percent of the population) to 2,398,000 (6.2 percent of the population). The disturbance of the sex ratio is shown by the following table:

<i>Age group</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Surplus of Women</i>
20-24	1,405,000	1,642,000	237,000
25-29	1,231,000	1,553,000	322,000
30-39	2,524,000	3,007,000	483,000

There were approximately one million extra women in this age group, or about six women for every five men.

In England and Wales the situation was similar but less pro-

These arguments do not, in the opinion of the writer, dispose of the fact that war kills off a certain percentage of the able-bodied young men.

⁸ Figures are taken from the *International Statistical Yearbook* of the League of Nations (1926-1928).

nounced. The population increased from 36,070,000 in 1911 to 37,887,000 in 1921. Children below five were, however, less numerous in 1921 than in 1911, decreasing from 3,854,000 (10.7 percent of population) to 3,322,000 (8.8 percent of population). The disturbance of the sex ratio is shown by the following table:

<i>Age group</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Surplus of Women</i>
20-24	1,448,000	1,703,000	255,000
25-29	1,340,000	1,620,000	280,000
30-39	2,555,000	2,992,000	437,000

There were almost a million extra women in the age group covered, or approximately one extra woman for every five-and-a-half men.

The disturbance of the sex ratio was less than has sometimes been supposed. If, however, we consider that many of the men had been disabled and many other survivors had been pronounced unfit for military service, we see that there was a real shortage of able-bodied men. The economic effect of this shortage must have been considerable. The deficit of men was also sufficient to interfere seriously with the monogamous pattern of family life. There were in each nation a number of women who could not marry. In certain classes, particularly the British middle classes, the shortage of men was acute. This situation must have had profound effects upon the morality of the family. The lack of births during and just after the war produced a permanent shortage in certain age groups. In 1934 the French were forced to extend the period of military service ~~because of~~ the shortage of babies during the war years.

War and Social Institutions: General

We turn now from the biological basis of society, the population, to society itself. The most convenient way to conceive of what war does to society is to trace its effect upon the most important social institutions. The institutions which flourish in peace are subjected in war to a long series of stresses and strains. The routines of life upon which institutions are founded are disturbed or even destroyed by the exigencies of combat. Far-reaching economic dislocations affect every breakfast table and every purse. The family gives up its members, and its members more or less reluctantly forsake the pattern of

family living. The community faces new tasks at the same time that it is profoundly disturbed by a change of its membership and an alteration of the activities within it. The school, which is the custodian of innocent life, and the church, which stands between men and God, are alike harnessed to the task of winning the war. All social problems change, mostly for the worse; new problems of unexampled magnitude appear. The old moralities lose their hold upon men. The army, which is normally quiescent in a democracy, now becomes tremendously active.

In ordinary times the institutions of society are so interwoven that each strengthens the others. Family, church, school, community, state, and economic institutions work in close co-operation and with only occasional frictions. The relation of each institution to all the others is a powerful conservative factor. No one institution, such as the school, can depart sharply from the established consensus without encountering resistance from the functionaries of other institutions; since it is impossible to change all the institutions of society at once, change usually comes gradually and in piecemeal fashion. In war everything is different. War puts unprecedented strains upon every institution at once; it changes them all at the same time and it profoundly alters the relations of institutions to one another. The state waxes fat; in war it nears the absolute limits of its activity. Other institutions are relieved of some functions and forced to take on others. Latent institutions spring into activity. New needs arise, and new institutions to take care of them. This, in the most general terms, is the picture of social institutions in time of war.

The thrust of social change in the institutions of a nation at war is thus multiple. Institutions change by being put to the new uses of war. The school, for example, is called upon to take charge of evacuated children from the great British cities. It is hard to see how the teachers find time for all their old tasks in the midst of so many new ones. Institutions change also because their relation to other institutions changes. In the case of the evacuees mentioned above, the family and the local community have formerly shared control of them with the school, but now the single agency has a much increased responsibility. Each institution, therefore, must change because all the others are changing. Once the process is in train, it

goes on until the whole social order takes the shape determined by war.

Because of institutional dislocations, the machinery of war nearly always creaks at first. In the first World War, there was a crisis in munitions in nearly every country, and only after the greatest efforts could the necessary allocation of economic resources be effected. There was also, in one nation after another, a collision of military and civil authorities, a phase of institutional readjustment. Many new institutions with wide functions were created to meet the exigencies of war. In Russia, for example, there were the *Zemstvos*, which took care of the wounded and otherwise performed a wide range of humanitarian services. In America there was the expansion of the Red Cross with its thousands of paid workers and its uncounted millions of helpers. Among the special agencies created by war should be mentioned the countless committees for this and councils for the other; in war time such committees often exercise generous powers with very little check.

The effect of war upon institutions and upon human life is undeniably bad, so bad that it would be next to impossible even to estimate the losses in welfare fields which it entails. In one respect, however, the effect of war is undoubtedly beneficial. There are many institutions, such as schools and churches, which normally tend to become so embedded in their own routine that they fail to serve the useful human purposes for which they were created. Then we have empty formalism in religion, and schools that are conducted principally for the benefit of the faculty and the administrators. This condition we sometimes call institutionalism. A war is almost a specific cure for institutionalism. It compels the school to face once more its essential tasks, shatters its routines, demoralizes students and faculty, and forces a reconsideration of objectives. Doubtless the cure is worse than the disease.

War and the Mores

Perhaps the most useful of all sociological concepts is that of the *mores*. The word *mores* is a Latin importation of plural form possessing no singular in English. William Graham Sumner introduced the term into the vocabulary of sociology and used it to designate

the customs which regulate the standards of right and wrong, and indeed all the standards of value, of a people. It is a sociological truism that the mores can make anything right and prevent condemnation of anything, a view which Sumner developed with inexhaustible fertility of argument and example in his book, *Folkways*. Sumner distinguished two classes of customs: the folkways, which are simple customs, and the mores, which are regarded as necessary for group welfare and are supported by strong sanctions.

Our conceptions of right and wrong are in fact almost altogether dependent upon the customs of the group to which we belong. In some cultures unwanted children are strangled or exposed with no thought of wrong. In others the old are abandoned or killed as a matter of duty and affection. The sexual exclusiveness of marriage varies widely over the face of the earth, as does also the value attached to premarital chastity. The values of property, of human rights, and of life itself seem to be fixed almost arbitrarily by the custom of the group. These basic standards, the mores, are the sacred customs which it is wrong to violate and right to follow. Their observance is regarded as somehow necessary for group welfare. Every group has such customs, but they vary widely from group to group. There is no absolute right or wrong anywhere in the world; everything is relative; there are only acts which are right or wrong in accordance with the code of some particular group.

All social institutions may be thought of as founded upon the mores. Institutions represent formal trends in the mores. An institution consists of a concept and a structure. The concept is the basic idea of the institution; the structure is a body of functionaries prepared to act in a certain way in a prescribed conjuncture of circumstances. Institutions derive their existence from the mores, and are at all times dependent upon them. The law, for example, cannot successfully depart very far from the moral sense of the people. Many of the difficulties of wartime social change arise from the attempt to create institutions for which the existing mores furnish no basis.

We may therefore estimate the effect of war upon society by analyzing the effect of war upon the mores. War changes the mores in a number of ways. Ordinarily the mores change rather slowly;

they adapt to the changing situation and perhaps it may be said that they evolve, but ordinarily they do not go through striking or sudden metamorphoses. Because they are the basic standards of many people, because they are interwoven with the habits of many people which are in turn interwoven with one another, the mores present a stubborn resistance to any attempt at a sudden change.

War produces confusion and decay of the mores. It is beyond human nature for a group to change its mores suddenly, and yet the driving necessities of war demand that the group should suddenly change its mode of living. And it does change it, as needs it must when the devil drives, but it retains its old moral ideas. Gradually new, wartime mores arise to cover novel situations; also adaptations of the old mores. There are many violations of the pre-war mores, some of which are condoned by the mores of war time. Still the former mores persist and one cannot violate them even under the urge of imperative necessity without paying some penalty. In time this confusion of the mores may give way to a new moral consensus, but that is a matter of many years, and wars do not usually last that long. After the war, there is a process, but not an equal and opposite process, of readjustment of the mores to the conditions of peace.

A social philosopher who was sufficiently bold might attempt to describe the effect of war upon the mores in a single formula. The formula might possibly be something like this: In war time there is a decay of all the established moralities, which tend to be replaced by hedonistic life adjustments on a short-term basis. In a word, the mores decline, and vices spread and become respectable. This formula does not, of course, describe the nascent new codes of war time.

If we study the impact of war upon the mores more soberly and in more detail, we discover a long series of moral dislocations comparable to the dislocations of economic life which war entails. The most obvious change in the mores is the reversion to the tribal morality which commands solidarity within the group and enmity toward those outside. This moral distinction between the in-group and the out-group is not, of course, a real change in the mores, although it looks like one, because the mores allow for certain exceptions in case of war. There is a codicil to the commandment,

"Thou shalt not kill," to the effect that killing is permissible in war. Nothing is said about this codicil, but nearly everyone accepts it. It is significant that only a few sects take the commandment against killing literally and become conscientious objectors. Reversion to tribal morality not only relaxes the taboo against homicide, but renders various kinds of deception entirely legitimate when perpetrated upon the enemy. In-group morality also imposes great obligations of solidarity and mutual aid within the group; it is understood that there must be social peace within the group when an enemy threatens. In the first World War, France had her *union sacrée*, Germany her *Burgfrieden*; in other countries also there was a truce to inner struggles. Kirkpatrick has called attention to the way in which modern methods of communication reinforce this feeling of intimacy within the group. Propaganda, the radio, and the movies make the leaders of the nation members of every intimate group. They are almost literally members of every family. It is noteworthy that Germany had obviously made the transition to the tribal morality by the time Hitler came to power. The tribal morality of the in-group and the out-group is contained in the mores of every military power. Reversion to this morality is a necessary precondition of war.

War creates a great number of new social situations and forms of human association which are not regulated by any pre-existing custom. People of all social classes are thrown together in the air-raid shelters. This is precisely the sort of situation which calls for the development of new folkways which may in time harden into mores. The great concentrations of population in the armies are regulated as to the most important ways of life by military rules, but there are many interstices in such a social order, and customs soon arise which furnish a sort of guidance. War sometimes creates entirely new communities or expands existing ones to several times their size. In such cases new mores must emerge. When some hundreds of young women, for example, are brought together in a new or greatly expanded community for the manufacture of munitions, they soon come to live by a greatly changed morality. On a smaller scale are the adjustments of life to the ever-present gas mask, the "little brown

box" which Britons have celebrated in song and feminine ingenuity has adorned.

War interrupts the routines of life corresponding to every major social institution and in time affects the mores upon which these institutions are founded. The basic conditions of family life are changed; men are taken out of the family by the army, and women by the new tasks of war; many children are sent to refuges in the country. Death breaks up many families; other families lose their physical basis when their members become refugees. Under such circumstances the mores supporting the family must inevitably give way. The same kind of situation changes the mores of private property. Under war conditions, the control of the individual over his property is weakened; the whole attitude toward private property changes.

The school must also give up its sacred routines. Teachers must forget some of the fine points of their art and do the best job they can under difficult circumstances. Even the church must change the nature of its message. In general, it seems to be the task of the church to rationalize the moral *volte-face* involved in the reversion to tribal morality; the church must explain that the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" does not mean "Thou shalt not kill," but that under certain circumstances, such as a holy war, it really means "Thou shalt kill the enemies of thy country without mercy and by every means in thy power." Changes in the mores underlying social institutions will receive further attention in the sections devoted to such institutions.

A perplexing phase of the change of mores in time of war is the great apparent gain in the mores of humanitarianism. It is not barbarism alone which grows under war conditions, for there is a great effulgence of humanitarianism and idealism. For the most part, this phenomenon is a phase of the reversion to the tribal morality of the in-group and the out-group. The direction of hostility toward the enemy leaves the in-group at peace. There is a rapid growth of organizations for the care of the wounded, the widowed, and other victims of the hazards of war. Members of different social strata draw closer together in the common cause. Members of the group now have a common purpose, and realize at length that they are

necessary to one another. Revelling in their new-found solidarity, sustained by a sense of their righteous cause, people vie with one another in service and sacrifice. There is often a "great spiritual awakening," or some movement of opinion so described by optimistic divines. In modern wars, where the economic strain is so important, sacrifice is often as valuable as service. A movement of the mores toward asceticism is therefore functionally appropriate. Chambers describes such a phenomenon in Germany in the early years of the first World War:

A wave of asceticism swept the country. Meetings and exhibitions were held to propagate the virtues of frugality. *Wanderredner* instructed eager audiences in the homely science of mastication. Schoolmasters and clergymen joined in the campaign for the plain and simple living. Civilized man has a complicated diet, and he is the most wasteful of feeders. The natural foods of his animal ancestry had much to recommend them, and the necessities of war indeed might restore a simpler, healthier life to the people at large.⁴

Similar phenomena were observable in the United States, where the campaign against waste took on an aura of holiness.

The reversion to tribal morality is not quite sufficient to account for the growth of the humanitarian spirit during a war. In various ways a war emancipates people from their routines of habit and makes them see the social order in an unaccustomed light. There emerges a determination to make the nation over into a better and juster pattern when once the war has been settled; but first the war must be won. Liberal leaders acquiesce in this compromise, and frequently attain considerable recognition. The sacrifices which war asks of peoples demand constant redefinitions of war aims; in such oratorical interludes of war many vague and unenforceable promises of reform are made. It is probable, too, that the mass misery of war has considerable effect. Humanitarian efforts flourish in neutral as well as belligerent countries. Great campaigns for war relief were started in the United States almost immediately after the commencement of hostilities in 1939. If the experience of the previous war is a guide, these activities will be continued until long after the war has formally ceased.

⁴ Frank P. Chambers, *The War Behind the War*, Harcourt Brace, 1939, p. 158.

The end of a war finds the mores in confusion. The mores of the pre-war period are still powerful and despite their losses, they are still the most important code governing behavior. There is certain to be a strong tendency to return to the former moral consensus, a tendency which Warren G. Harding expressed in his "back to normalcy" slogan. But situations have inevitably changed, and the old mores are no longer adapted to life conditions. In addition, new mores have arisen which contest the field with the older codes. Further, war leaves a great many people who are emancipated from nearly all codes; they have lost their old moorings but found no new ones. Culture conflict and personal shocks have combined to put them outside the influence of the ordinary controls of society. The soldier especially has come to live by a code which conflicts sharply with that of civilian life, and it is hard for him to find the road back. The humanitarianism of war is in eclipse in the post-war period, if not actually in disgrace, but there are many who still feel its influence. These frustrated idealists become the cynics and futilitarians of the post-war period. Naturally, when the mores are confused, it is the young who feel it most. Older persons somehow work out the necessary compromise, but the young tend to be thoroughly disorganized.

Why War Changes the Mores

At the risk of some repetition, it seems desirable to describe somewhat more specifically the ways in which war changes the mores of a people.

The mores change because the situation changes in such a manner that the mores are no longer adapted to it. When husband and wife live apart for long periods, the mores of monogamy give way; so with other family mores. Furthermore, war breeds widespread poverty, and hunger is a universal solvent of institutions: no moral code is proof against starvation. Nor can patriotism or military discipline or fear of the secret police hold the people in line when hunger really begins to get in its work. It is, of course, the aim of economic warfare to break the enemy's will to resist by means of hunger.

The mores change because the normal process of transmitting the mores to the younger generation is interrupted. The family institu-

tion suffers greatly in war, and the family is a great conservative force as regards the mores. When members are removed from the family, the moral equilibrium inevitably changes.

The family and the intimate groupings of the community normally keep their members under surveillance and prevent behavior contrary to the mores. *In war human beings are emancipated from these groups and are free to behave in the manner which strikes their fancy.*

War produces a great number of ruined persons; individuals who no longer have a stake in the moral order and are therefore beyond the ordinary standards of good and evil. Some have lost their occupations or careers, some their families, some their homes and their families; some suffer from incurable injuries or diseases. All such persons are a threat to the moral order. They are often widely diffused through the nation. They carry confusion wherever they go.

War stimulates internal migrations and thus produces conflict of cultures. In the warring nations hordes of refugees tramp back and forth in accordance with the progress of the war. Millions move about as a result of economic changes. Even in neutral nations the unsettlement is felt. The migration of Negroes to northern cities of the United States during the first World War was an enormous movement involving at least 400,000 migrants in a brief period. It unsettled the rural South as well as the urban areas of the North. In the War of 1939 the attempt to evacuate the larger cities created stupendous movements of population. The effects of such mass migrations are certain to be incalculably great.

Wartime propaganda inevitably disturbs the equilibrium of the mores. The mobilization of the national effort necessarily involves the fracture of some of the settled habits of the group, and often propaganda is employed for this purpose. When some of the mores are attacked, the authority of the others is weakened.

The morality of the soldier exerts a disturbing influence upon the rest of the population. The soldier's moral code is much simpler than that of the civilian. He must be brave and obedient, as clean as possible, and loyal to his own small in-group. Sexual license, "scrounging," and pilfering, and the cultivation of various vices are

permitted to the soldier. Outside the purely military sphere the soldier is not held responsible.

In war time there is an immense extension of social control of the military sort, which favors a decline of moral responsibility. Moral responsibility presupposes autonomy, which is lacking when one is under orders. This facilitates further decline of social norms. The vices flourish in war time. The inability of anyone to make plans, both because the future is uncertain and because it depends upon the will of others, is another factor in the decline of moral responsibility. Both soldiers and civilians must spend a great deal of time waiting: waiting for supplies, for orders, waiting for something to happen, waiting for news of what has already happened. And this is very demoralizing.

These, in brief, are some of the reasons for the change of the mores in war. Most of these processes will become somewhat clearer as we proceed with the analysis of the effect of war on social institutions.

War and the Family

Perhaps more than any other institution the family must bear the brunt of war. It loses its members to the war machine. The morality upon which it is based is subjected to rude shocks. In a large-scale war some millions of families are broken by death. Nevertheless, the family survives.

The real strain of many features of war is felt only in the family. Because of the resilience of the family form of organization many shocks are wholly absorbed in that sphere. When a peasant farmer or a small businessman is called to the colors, his wife and children may step in to carry on the family activity without any interruption, something which would not be possible in a non-familistic society. When the price of food rises, the effect is felt first and always most keenly at the tables of particular families. When a man is killed, the state assumes some of the burden of supporting his family, and his widow assumes the rest. When a man is crippled, he lives out his days in the bosom of his family. In all these things, the family serves as a sort of shock absorber for the rest of society. It is also clear that war relieves a certain number of the stresses and strains of family life. But the relief is temporary and its cost is great.

The list of dislocations of family life in war is long. First and foremost, war takes men out of the family and puts them into the army. Ordinarily the soldier never quite adjusts to the pattern of non-family living, and progressively idealizes his life in the family before the war. Similarly, the family does not ordinarily adjust completely to the loss of a member to the army. Nevertheless, family unity is often injured by the re-education of its members to the pursuits of war.

Not only men must leave the family; women leave it also. When women take men's jobs in time of war, or take up the new jobs created by war, the result is that women escape from the family and from their accustomed routines in the family. It was generally agreed that war work during the last war, with its long hours spent in labor and transportation, its unhygienic conditions, and its often disorganizing moral conditions, had produced permanently injurious results. The relation of a decline in female health to child welfare is obvious. It should be added that not only did women enter war work during the last war; children entered it also. In England some hundreds of thousands of them below the age of fourteen were put to work between 1914 and 1918. The price in terms of child health and juvenile delinquency must have been high.

The bereavements of war are many. As we have seen, war kills not only by bullets but by disease as well. There is no succession in the family, no understudies for most rôles; every loss is in a sense permanent and irremediable. After the war, the sex ratio of one age group has been badly distorted, and there is a decline in family life on this account.

The alterations of family morality produced by war are immense. When both men and women are living in non-family institutions, when community controls are relaxed, the sexual life flows in unconventional channels. Promiscuity increases. Prostitution flourishes. It is a curious fact that in war time the growth of prostitution is hushed up, and any attempt to publicize it is likely to meet with resistance. During the last war, venereal disease was kept in check in some of the armies, but its dissemination has long been associated with war. The general relaxation of standards affects also the mores governing courtship and marriage. The instability of war marriages

is proverbial, and there is every reason to suppose that the popular belief is founded on fact.

England's evacuation experiment in the War of 1939 may serve as an example of a well-justified and thoroughly desirable war measure which nevertheless strikes at the foundations of the family and the school. The near-failure of the experiment illustrates also how tough are the habits of living in family and community.

During the early days of the War of 1939, some 1,400,000 persons were removed from the great cities of England to rural areas in which it was hoped they might be safe from German bombers. In this number were included approximately 808,000 school children who were evacuated in small units with their teachers and classmates. There were included also 514,000 mothers and children below school age. About 100,000 babies were taken in nursery units. There was also a certain number of hospital cases. The entire scheme was voluntary as regarded the evacuees, but the reception of the evacuees in country areas was forced. The initial cost of the scheme, including preparation of quarters and transportation, was around £2,000,000. The estimated weekly cost of billeting the evacuees was £450,000. It does not seem too much to say that the evacuation of the cities was one of the most gigantic sociological experiments in history.

Once the scheme was put into effect, the fable of the city mice and the country mice began to be dramatized on a colossal scale. Letters to the London *Times*, unflinching register of British opinion, told of the clash of the urban and rural mores. Many of the evacuees were welcome guests; many, perhaps most, were made comfortable in their new homes. But the conflict of standards of living and attitudes toward life was nevertheless severe. Some of the children were verminous; many were dirty. Many of the mothers missed the pubs, and the children missed the excitement of the city streets. The evacuees came, of course, largely from slum areas, and their knowledge of the amenities of life was necessarily limited.

There were many amusing incidents. One little boy had an old and greatly worn toothbrush which he refused to surrender; he was attached to it because it had belonged to his uncle. One excellent citizen rummaged about in his attic to locate some children's games for two anticipated little guests. After a boring session with parcheesi,

dominoes, and snakes and ladders, the two boys asked their landlord for a deck of cards. The upshot of it was that the host had to borrow train fare for his next day's commuting.

The invasion of the privacy of the English home is undoubtedly one of the most significant aspects of the evacuation. For centuries it has been said that an Englishman's home is his castle. Compulsory blackouts and the billeting of evacuees altered this situation considerably. For the most part, the British public appears to have given cheerful co-operation. A few landowners refused to co-operate, and were fined approximately \$125.

Once the city guests were installed in their country homes, some sort of trouble was likely. The country folk regarded the fees paid by the government as inadequate. For billeting a mother the weekly fee was set at about one dollar, with an extra sixty cents for each child with the mother. This does not include food. The mother is supposed to supply her own food and do her own cooking with the result that she and her landlady are likely to get badly in each other's way. The dirty habits of many of the evacuated mothers have caused no end of distress to careful housewives, and children are said to have caused some damage. It has been found that it is easier to take the evacuee out of the slum than to take the slum out of the evacuee.

On their side, the evacuated mothers have had much reason to complain. The chief burden of adjustment to the new way of life fell on them. They must care for themselves and their children under difficult conditions, and often in homes where they feel unwelcome. Prices of food are higher in the country than in the city. They missed the conveniences and excitement of city life. A large percentage of the mothers returned to the city within a few weeks. They preferred the risk of air raids to country life. How large this percentage is there is no way of saying. It may be that as many as fifty percent of the mothers returned to the city within a few months. When evacuation was begun, four hundred and twenty-four Liverpool mothers and children were sent to a small village in Wales. Three weeks later all but fifty had returned to Liverpool.

As a result of the evacuation, a number of families have been completely broken up. A train-caller in London has five children. One of

them was in a hospital when war began and was sent to another hospital thirty miles south of London. Two other children went with their school to the West Coast. A fourth went with his school to Devonshire. The fifth child and the mother were billeted in a village forty miles northwest of London. Thus the war scattered this one family over a large part of England. What the ultimate effect upon the family will be is a matter that certainly invites conjecture.

Included among the evacuees were more than 800,000 school children who made their rural adventure under the supervision of their teachers. This procedure involved taking these children away from their parents and placing them out in crude approximations of foster homes under the care of the schools, a momentous shift in control. There were innumerable problems. It was difficult to provide accommodations in the same locality for children belonging to a single school. Somewhat less than a hundred children from a school in Surrey were scattered through three parishes, being more than twenty miles apart in some cases. There were difficulties with water supply and sanitation; it was difficult to provide schoolrooms.

The psychic shock to these school children must have been considerable. Children's agencies in the United States spend an immense amount of time and effort on the placement of children in foster homes. It may easily happen that before a child is placed the social worker will pay several visits to the foster home, make a study of the child over a period of weeks, consult her colleagues and supervisors, and perhaps call in the psychiatrist and other experts. All this is done because experience has shown that a wide range of maladjustments may occur as a result of foster-home placements. The English authorities had to place 800,000 children in a very brief time. Such placements, whether in homes or in institutions, would have to be on the basis of physical care only. Facts are lacking, and may never become available, but we may be sure that everything which can possibly happen to children has happened to some of the 800,000. At the same time it is probably true that most of the children have adjusted reasonably well. In the case of the majority of normal children placed in normal homes, we may suppose there are no serious present problems. The long-term effects of the experience are another matter.

From the point of view of the schools and the teachers, the task must have appeared almost insuperable. Schools are not flexible institutions, and teachers are likely to be rather limited and rigid in their outlook upon life. It is interesting to speculate as to what must have gone on in the minds of these British teachers, who a few months before, perhaps, conducted bitter disputes as to the advisability of changing the arithmetic hour from eleven o'clock to ten-thirty, when suddenly they found themselves responsible for the welfare of their charges in school and out, when for once they had to care for the whole child and not merely for that part of a child that goes to school. The establishment of normal school-routines in evacuation areas will doubtless be a matter of many months.

Many children did not leave the cities, or left only to return in a short time. It is estimated that about 2,000,000 children were living in the dangerous areas. Since the schools have been moved to the country, many of these children were deprived of the opportunity for education. The consequences of this situation may easily be serious. In Paris, schools for such children were reopened on October 15, 1939.

In addition to the evacuation under governmental auspices, there was considerable movement of population by way of purely private precautions taken by the upper economic groups. This exodus probably caused relatively few problems, inasmuch as it fitted in with already established modes of family and community life. Some idea of the magnitude of the changes that have taken place in England may be gained from one small detail of evacuation; a large number of dogs and cats (estimated from 200,000 to 2,000,000) have been put to death as an air-raid precaution. If the experience of the World War of 1914 is a guide, there will soon be a heavy increase in the demand for dogs.

Government officials now admit three serious mistakes in the evacuation procedure: (1) The failure to provide medical examinations of the evacuees, (2) the fact that evacuees were sometimes sent to places where there were no accommodations for them, and (3) the error of placing mothers with young children in private families. The actual physical procedure of evacuation is said to have been very well organized. As to the social side, it seems legitimate to wonder

whether those who planned the evacuation really had any conception of the institutional and personal dislocations which the scheme involved. It seems certain that the long-term effects of such a scheme will be incalculably great.

The family institution derives its strength from the interwoven habits of family members, from discipline ingrained by habit and enbuttressed in the mores, from a set of mores which holds each family member in his place, from sentimental interdependence of family members, from the struggle to attain a common goal. We have seen how all these things are shattered by the advent of war.

War and the Schools

When we think of war we usually think of its more dramatic aspects, of battlefields strewn with the slain, or perhaps of widows and orphans, or of refugees, or of widespread starvation. There are other aspects of war which ordinarily go unconsidered in spite of their very great importance. For instance, war interrupts the educational process, turns the schools to new and unaccustomed uses, gives a certain age group a substandard education, and cripples the school system for many years.

It is easy to describe the effect of war upon school in those regions where the actual fighting takes place. War destroys the schools there, and puts an end to formal education. Even where there is no actual fighting, it may not be possible to carry on schoolroom instruction. If this situation is prolonged for a sufficient length of time, there arises a generation of children like the "wild" children of Russia in the post-war period. Largely freed of family ties and out of reach of schools, these children lived on the edges of society and led a life little better than that of beasts.

Visitors to Russia in the post-war years were struck by the numbers of such "wild" children, who thronged the markets and railroad stations, seizing every opportunity to beg or steal. They were largely the heritage of years of civil war. Their parents had been killed in battle or executed, or in some way the children had become finally separated from them. They were not true "feral" children, that is, children without any culture at all, but they were certainly out of touch with most of the control institutions of so-

ciety. Naturally, many of them were juvenile delinquents of the most hardened and vicious type. Possessing great skill as stowaways, they migrated all over Russia. In 1925 their number was estimated at 300,000, but such an estimate is only a guess. The government waged a strenuous campaign to settle them in children's institutions, and they disappeared within a few years. Until they were thus domiciled, schooling was, of course, altogether impossible.

Even where the tide of war does not roll, war destroys or damages education. Routine is, and perhaps should be, sacred in the schools. War interrupts the routine of every citizen and of every institution. When war begins, the schools adapt to the situation and divert their activities to the task of winning the war. Classroom instruction revolves around the theme of war to a considerable extent, with incidental losses and gains. School children are organized into groups for various kinds of war work. If there is a shortage of metal or other goods, school children collect odds and ends to be salvaged. If there is a campaign for the Red Cross, the children not only join as junior members, but canvass the community for members. War-garden movements flourish in the schools and are mediated by the schools to the communities. There are hundreds of special activities, focussed every month on different objects; there are campaigns for writing letters to the men in the service, Liberty Loan letters, and so on endlessly. School children help to sell bonds, distribute propaganda, and in general help to organize their community for war. In all this, the school serves as an agency which organizes the local community to serve the ends of the more inclusive community, the nation.

When the school is thus metamorphosed, teachers, and especially administrative heads of schools, become community leaders. They head up committees; they make speeches; they try to enlist the support of their community for the national program. In many respects this contact with the community is no doubt vitalizing to persons who have spent much of their lives in a quiet eddy while all the main currents of life flowed by. Unfortunately any favorable effect which might be so produced is more than neutralized by other disorganizing influences at work upon the schools.

If the schools assume the function of organizing the local com-

munity for the national program, that is, for the war, it naturally comes about that the teacher who opposes the war or supports it lukewarmly must pay a heavy penalty. Academic freedom is almost non-existent in war time. Beale has described the suppressions which took place in the United States during the first World War as follows:

The World War itself raised important problems at the same time that it imposed rigid repression of freedom. Opponents of the War were effectively silenced. Not only government agents but all that stripe of men who enjoy shouting and bullying set up a hue and cry against "disloyalty" in the schools. Not only teachers who openly opposed the War or had formerly been known as "pacifists," but all who were suspected of not giving vigorous support to it, were subjected to local pressures, investigated, and made to give positive proof of their "loyalty" to the war system. The charge of pro-Germanism was hurled at them . . . Pacifism was made synonymous with treason. The schools were used to breed hate and to circulate what recent studies of war propaganda have proved to be official lies invented to create a war spirit. Teachers who resisted the general unreason and popular hysteria were vigorously punished. Views about the War that historians and teachers generally hold today would have led to instant dismissal. Teachers, instead of standing for reason and critical thinking in time of general hysteria, were swept along by popular passion into actually helping to create the war psychology.

Educators joined in the violations of freedom . . . Instead of standing squarely behind free expression for teachers, the committee of the American Association of University Professors recently established to protect "academic freedom" gave its support to suppression of freedom in matters relating to the War. It acquiesced in the drastic wartime laws denying free speech . . . Teachers themselves demanded the dismissal of their fellows who opposed the War.⁵

During the World War of 1914 and the post-war period, the teaching profession in the United States was literally and figuratively emasculated. The army made heavy demands upon the profession for officer material; teachers made good officers. The multitudinous varieties of war work attracted yet others. Perhaps the most important cause of the threatened annihilation of the

⁵ Howard K. Beale, *Are American Teachers Free, an Analysis of Restraints upon the Freedom of Teaching in American Schools*, Scribner, 1936, pp. 22-25.

profession was inflation. Salaries were already low; prices went up and salaries did not. Many teachers left the profession, very likely many of the best. Enrollment in normal schools fell off heavily. By 1919 the situation had become a national scandal. It was estimated that 143,000 teachers left the profession in that year. There was a nation-wide shortage of teachers. A survey by the United States Commissioner of Education showed that there were 18,279 schools closed because of lack of teachers and 41,900 taught by teachers said to be "below standard but taken on temporarily in the emergency." A different estimate placed the teacher shortage at 39,000 and the number of teachers employed but with defective qualifications at 65,000.

Increases in the pay of teachers and other measures remedied this situation in large part in the course of a few years. It should be emphasized, however, that this wartime dislocation damaged the profession in other ways that are not so easy to remedy. Many of the teachers who left the profession during the war years were among its most valuable members; such people cannot be replaced by merely increasing the output of normal schools. On the other hand, many persons entered the profession with sub-standard qualifications during the war years, and remained to handicap it for many years thereafter. The emasculation of the teaching profession is thus one of the costs of war. If the teaching profession suffered as it did in the United States, we can easily imagine what happened in the nations more directly affected.

The situation is naturally much worse in the colleges, where the students are of military age. The first World War worked havoc with collegiate instruction in Europe, and sadly disrupted it in the United States. Immediately after the declaration of war, American colleges were in a fever of patriotism. Students left in the midst of their courses to enlist; their teachers were not far behind them. Enrollments fell off heavily; in a few colleges more than fifty percent. Largely because of the loss of tuition fees and dormitory rents, the colleges had a very hard time financially. Social and athletic programs and other student activities were, of course, eliminated, curtailed, or greatly simplified.

After the initial period of disorganization had passed, it came

to be realized that the colleges had to be supported as a part of the national effort to win the war, and every effort was made to repair the damage. It was recognized that students under draft age could serve their country best by continuing their education. Late in the war, collegiate and military instruction were combined in the Students' Army Training Corps. This experiment ran but a few months, and probably was not altogether successful. Women's colleges suffered far less than others in the upheaval of war. Enrollment did not suffer. Even here some effort was apparently needed to convince the students that they should complete their courses before plunging into war work. One pronounced effect of the war upon the women's colleges was the decline in the number of graduates who went into teaching, a change incidental to the opening up of new careers for women.

Some relatively permanent damage was probably done to American colleges by the war. There were numerous losses of promising faculty members and replacements on an inferior level; the new members were then protected by tenure rules. Some of the language departments sustained great damage. Here again the slow processes of peace have consumed years in repairing the ravages of war. In other professions the training period was sometimes shortened because of military needs. Many college careers were interrupted. Many students received collegiate credit for military service. The cumulative effect of such things was no doubt considerable.

It may be that the War of 1939 will result in somewhat less wanton destruction of educational resources. The countries involved have profited from their previous experiences to some extent. In the early months of the war the English, at least, made every effort to keep their colleges going in normal fashion. Conscription withdrew a large number of the upperclassmen. The freshmen were undisturbed. Enrollment of male undergraduates was approximately sixty percent of normal. Every effort was made to keep too large a proportion of faculty members from going into government services. Training in certain technical fields was greatly stimulated.

Perhaps the most vicious effect of war upon education is its distracting influence. It is hard to concentrate upon normal educational

processes when the world seems to be falling to pieces. Eighteenth century poetry is likely to seem dull to a boy who feels that he may have only another year or so to live. Even the professors lose interest in education and scholarship and devote themselves to the tasks of war. Often enough the professor's chore is to enunciate some pseudo-scientific vilification of the enemy. Not until some years after the war does scholarship return to its normal channels.

Our analysis of the disruption of the educational system sheds some light upon the changes in the culture which war produces. We know how markedly the post-war culture often differs from that of the pre-war period. Many factors play a part in producing this change, the transmutations of the mores, the transformation of the social scene, and the disruption of the family. It is also clear that the disorganization of education plays a considerable part.

War and the Church

The fate of the church in war time is somewhat similar to that of the school. Like the school the church in normal times performs its functions in a quiet eddy of life, untouched by the turbulent currents of politics and economic strife. People are married in the church, or buried by it; children are christened there; the church gives the people comfort in their sorrows and the hope of life everlasting. Like the school, the church changes its function when there is a war to be won.

War disturbs the normal balance of loyalties and purposes between the larger community, which is the nation, and the various smaller communities. It becomes necessary for the large community to dominate the local communities in order to win support for its gigantic enterprises. The organization of the local communities for war activities becomes a national necessity. Two institutions are ready to hand for this purpose, the school and the church. They are therefore wrested from their normal round of activities and utilized as agencies of community organization.

There is a peculiar difficulty in the case of the Christian church. Christianity is in theory a pacific religion; it preaches that we should not kill, and in fact commands us to love our neighbors. But Christianity, while pacific in tone, is also infinitely flexible;

and the church is peculiarly responsive to the climate of opinion in which it functions. In all nations, the Christian church has found a way to reconcile itself to the dominant practices of nationalism.

In his recent book, *Preachers Present Arms*, Ray Abrams has told the story of the American churches during the World War of 1914. The churches did not oppose the war; on the contrary they did their bit. The rationalization: This was a holy war. Killing is usually wrong, but when we are faced with flagrant injustice we must fight. The enemy is the embodiment of all evil; he is the devil incarnate; his other name is Beelzebub; "Made in Germany" is stamped on the bottom side of hell. There were some bloodthirsty sermons in the name of the gentle Christ. God, we were assured, was on our side; He would bless our cause.

It ill behooves the present writer, as a representative of the academic profession, to labor the sarcasm. The preachers yielded to the general hysteria; so did the professors. There were a few sects whose members stood out against armed violence and submitted to the manifold indignities which were heaped upon conscientious objectors. Thousands of Quakers once more proved themselves willing to face imprisonment for their faith. When the hysteria had passed, the preachers apparently repented more quickly and more completely than did other groups.

Perhaps it is only natural that ministers should succumb to the psychic epidemics of war time. When public men become tribal leaders hurling anathema at the enemy, when newspapers distort and poison truth, when historians lose their objectivity, when scientists are willing to subscribe to anything which will help the war, when judges and juries forget justice in the passions of the moment, it would certainly be too much for human nature for the ministers to stay out. If the ministers traduced their faith in the War of 1914, as they certainly did, they were hardly alone.

The post-war period is marked by religious unsettlement. The terrors of war, the awakening of group solidarity, the importance of the church as a morale agency, and the idealism of war all accentuate the importance of the church while the war is on. There is some tendency for these things to persist after the war, but the general tone of the post-war period is certainly not religious. There is

a growth of strange new cults, and a revival of spiritism among the bereaved, but in general organized religion probably suffers a net loss.

Community Organization in War Time

War disrupts the normal routines of community life, disturbs the balance between local communities and nation, and at the same time confronts the nation with the urgent necessity of organizing local communities for support of the national program. War also produces a recrudescence of the feeling of tribal solidarity. For these reasons community organization flourishes in time of war. Since community organization is congenial to the American spirit, it flourishes particularly in the United States.

The extent of the disorganization of local communities by war can scarcely be conceived unless one is confronted by the actual situation. In regions where the fighting occurs, community life and its controls are all but completely suspended; the life of the people is regulated by the iron rules of military dictatorship. In other areas the community hangs on stubbornly, but suffers from confusion many times confounded. There is interruption of all the normal institutional routines which serve to keep people in their places and at the stations which duty prescribes. The mores change; the authority of all established standards is undermined. Every social problem which the community has learned to cope with is changed; most of them become more pressing at the time when war is also urging its manifold demands. New industries spring up; old ones are greatly expanded. War orders bring thousands of workers to some communities where there have previously been hundreds. The age and sex composition of the population is altered by the introduction of some hundreds of women munitions workers or some thousands of soldiers in training. War industries sometimes create entirely new communities. War refugees may appear in such numbers that the task of housing and feeding them strains community resources. Internal migrations, such as the northward trek of American Negroes during the first World War, may give rise to immense community problems. The relations of social classes are disturbed by inflation, conscription, industrial dislocation, and

war work. The community loses many of its leaders who are claimed by the nation for service in its war program. Many essential services are likely to be lacking when the need for them is greater than ever. This is true, for example, of medical services. The supply of doctors and nurses is limited, and when the military forces have satisfied their claims there are not enough left to discharge the necessary functions. If medical mobilization is not carefully organized, it is likely to leave large areas without medical care. The fact that war brings epidemics makes the shortage of doctors and nurses particularly unfortunate.

The things mentioned above happened to American communities during the World War of 1914. In Europe the situation was much worse. A survey of a typical French community was made for the American Red Cross in 1918 by Mr. and Mrs. Basil de Selincourt.⁶ The subject was a village with a population of 2600, located at some distance from the scene of fighting. At the beginning of the war there were two factories, the larger of which employed 1540 workers. Some 247 men were mobilized at the outset of the war and over a hundred more later. The smaller factory closed at once; the larger continued to operate shorthanded. In 1918 it had a force of 1010, of which 126 were refugees. The farms of the community continued to function, the families of the owners contriving somehow to keep them going. The cost of living increased some 200 percent during the war. Potatoes increased to eight-and-a-half times their former price. Wages increased about 35 percent.

Analysis of family budgets presented an even more discouraging picture. A workman who earned \$7.20 a week before the war would have earned \$9.60 in 1918, but the goods on his budget, which would have cost \$7.17 in 1914, had risen to \$25.63 in 1918. This disparity could be met only by drastic reduction of the standard of living. Some refugees came to the town in 1916 and 1917, but they totaled only 60 up to January 1, 1918. By July, 1918, there were 283 refugees and repatriates. Those who were able to do so found work in the factory; some lived on a small allowance from the gov-

⁶ This summary is taken from *The Human Costs of the War*, by Homer Folks, Harper, 1920, pp. 152-167. Mrs. Basil de Selincourt is perhaps better known as Anne Douglas Sedgwick.

ernment. Naturally, as the latest comers and the least economically able, they were forced to live in unsatisfactory quarters. There were two physicians, one too old for active practice; the other was responsible for all the population within a radius of twenty miles and in addition held an important public position. There were two military hospitals of sixty beds each. Refugees and repatriates received little medical care. The secretary to the mayor, a poorly paid government employee, was the link between the village and the nation. He did the work of administering the local government and in addition handled the complex and varied allowances made by the French government to individuals and families, to families of soldiers, widows, orphans, war cripples, heads of large families, refugees, and repatriates. In addition to this he administered the complicated food regulations. His salary, augmented by the salaries of his wife and two children, amounted to about \$600 a year. Studies of other French communities seemed to show that the conditions described were quite typical.

In war the established consensus is shattered; the fabric of opinion which binds men's minds together is destroyed; the cake of custom is broken. In the place of that settled public opinion which normally governs life in the community, hysteria and psychic epidemics take possession of men's minds. The wildest schemes seem possible; the maddest rumors float about, perhaps because nothing could seem less improbable than the settled fact of war itself. As in the army, rumors float about in every community, partly because the people know that real news is suppressed. The first few months of the War of 1939 brought some luscious rumors in both England and Germany. In Germany it was rumored that peace had been arranged. In England it was rumored that seven enemy submarines had surrendered and were on the beach at a certain place; why on the beach no one could say, but that is the way with rumors in war time. Such rumors are symptomatic of community disorganization, and they produce further disorganization.

In war time those welfare efforts which come under the vague category of community organization grow very important. Just what community organization means is not altogether clear; in the present essay we are not attempting to define it, but merely

to discuss under a single heading those activities which are usually called community organization. One aim of community organization is to keep up morale on the home front. This is done by getting the people together, by making them feel their unity, by stimulating a sense of pride in their achievements, and by relieving the more extreme cases of distress. Another aim of community organization is to enhance the sense of social solidarity, another to obtain adequate support for social-work enterprises in the community; yet another, and perhaps the most important, to obtain the support of groups and individuals for various aspects of the war program.

Whatever it was that the community organizers were doing during the World War of 1914, they made a great noise about it, albeit the noise was generally not an objectionable one. Four-minute men spoke between reels at the movies, carrying their dynamic appeal to the masses in order to sell Liberty Bonds. Boy Scouts peddled bonds and war savings stamps from door to door. The Red Cross issued appeals that dripped with pathos and asked for the help of every man, woman, and child. There were innumerable volunteer activities carried on by the Red Cross in local communities. Community singing became very popular during the war. People gathered together in thousands of communities to sing about the long, long trail awinding and the long way to Tipperary, with variations. There was other recreational work, and many recreational programs, such as that of the Y.M.C.A., took on new functions.

Community organization demanded considerable redistribution of institutional rôles. As we have seen, the preacher and the teacher must in time of war give up the privileges and immunities to which they are accustomed and become real community leaders. They must serve on committees for the sale of Liberty Bonds, make speeches on the program of the Red Cross, and persuade the housewives to be less wasteful of food. Many new organizations spring up to which new workers and new leaders devote their energies. The American people has a great reserve of energy in its aging women of the comfortable classes, whose lives are ordinarily rather pointless. In war such women can be counted on to do much of the work of the community.

American communities retained some of their awakened community spirit for at least a few years after the end of the war in 1918. Americans had discovered their communities; they said that they would never again allow themselves to lapse into apathy and individualism. Many war memorials and community houses were built which still stand as monuments to our dead heroes and to our experiment in community organization. There were also many commemorative volumes which unfortunately sometimes became "mug books."⁷ Another residue of wartime effort is the improved organization of social services in many communities. Further, a certain amount of the work of the community organizers was taken over by veterans' organizations and so-called service clubs. All this should not obscure the central fact that most efforts at community organization lost their reason for being when the war stopped.

War and Social Problems

To trace the effect of war upon all social problems and all welfare fields would require many volumes. The present treatment, therefore, cannot be more than a sort of suggestive outline. It is presented because there seems to be some value in even a sketchy treatment of such an important aspect of war.

Almost all of the ordinary tasks of social work remain in war time; many become worse. As Devine wrote during the World War of 1914:

Hospitals of civilians; orphanages; reformatories; asylums for the aged; insane, feeble-minded, epileptic; child caring agencies; general relief societies; the whole vast net work of organized philanthropy, whether official, semi-official or voluntary, is profoundly affected by war, in some ways no doubt for the better but certainly on the side of income more often for the worse. . . . Generally speaking, however, the war has certainly obstructed the social movement rather than aided it. . . . The war means not only diminished wealth, lower standards of living, less food, lowered physique, poorer homes, more overcrowding, neglected children, harder, more grinding and more exhausting work, less play for children, greater moral dangers; it means, unless we highly resolve to the contrary, an actual slacken-

⁷ A "mug book" is a book in which one may have his picture published upon payment.

ing of the effort to prevent these evils, even as they exist in normal times.⁸

During a war it is admittedly difficult for established social agencies to carry on their work. This is probably not because of any diminution of humanitarian impulses in the population, but because of the presence of great and pressing problems of war relief. Vast efforts are made for the war sufferers and yet these efforts are never great enough. It is no wonder that established social agencies, whose needs seem less imperative, should suffer somewhat. This situation was recognized in the United States during the World War of 1914, and the Council of National Defense, among its other varied activities, assumed the responsibility of keeping these agencies in operation.

In war the principal task which human kindness is called upon to perform is war relief. War relief means first and foremost keeping people alive. As the tides of war roll back and forth across a territory, they leave behind them millions of homeless, destitute, starving human beings. The human flood necessarily rolls over into the areas where there is no fighting: war creates millions of refugees. The first World War created hordes of homeless refugees throughout Europe. These millions had to be fed and clothed and housed; their children had to have medical attention, milk, and cod-liver oil. In spite of all that could be done for them, there were places where they died like flies. The refugees, naturally, brought with them the menace of pestilence. After the war, most of the survivors had to be helped to re-establish themselves either in their ancestral homes or elsewhere. The homelands of the war sufferers were often so taxed by the war that they were unable to care for them properly. Americans had to assume a great deal of the responsibility if these unfortunates were not to perish.

A special problem of war is the rehabilitation of the wounded and crippled. Because of their great numbers, these victims of war constituted a problem of great urgency at the end of the last war. Much ingenuity was expended upon the effort to restore them as far as possible to self-support and to a normal existence. The relief of

⁸ Edward T. Devine, "War Relief Work in Europe," in *War Relief Work, The Annals of the American Academy*, September, 1918, Vol. LXXIX, pp. 1-8 (edited by J. P. Lichtenberger).

the widowed and orphaned is also an important war problem. These problems last for many years after a war. In recent years they have been recognized as legitimate concerns of the government and are no longer to any degree in the sphere of private charity.

War brings a sense of solidarity, a consciousness of membership in the in-group. The effect of wartime social solidarity upon social problems is not uniform in the various problematic areas. There is a truce in internal struggles. This means that processes of reform are checked. "Decent reformers," as Carver remarks, ". . . by a tacit understanding, all declared a truce when the war came on. They felt that, however meritorious their reforms might be, it would be criminal in war time to dissipate their own energy, or distract that of other people, from the great task of winning the war."⁹ For a longer or shorter time, the sense of tribal solidarity covers existing institutions with a mantle of sanctity. At the same time, there is a reawakening of humanitarian spirit in the attempt to relieve those suffering from the worst of the ravages of war. As Devine remarks, existing institutions of social work tend to be somewhat neglected.

Idealism runs rampant wherever it can be identified with the object of winning the war. When America was at war in 1917-1918, there were great moral crusades in the training-camp cities. Continence was proclaimed as the policy of the army. All this had a dual purpose: to preserve the lily-white purity of the soldier's sexual life and to prevent ineffectiveness resulting from venereal disease. The prohibition of alcoholic liquors likewise presented a fortunate combination of moral idealism and practical military advantage. Food was scarce in the war years, and it seemed all-important to conserve the grain which ordinarily went into the making of beer and whiskey. Under such circumstances it was only natural that those who felt strongly about the evils of drink should at last get a hearing. The result was the ill-advised prohibition experiment.

Minorities and under-privileged groups tend to make gains, at

⁹ Thomas Nixon Carver, *Government Control of the Liquor Business in Great Britain and the United States*, Oxford University Press, 1919. (A publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.)

least temporarily, under war conditions. When war comes, the nation needs all its talent, and it cannot afford to continue the discriminatory policies of peace time. A 1939 newspaper dispatch tells of a bid by Hitler for the services of non-Aryan technicians now in exile. He offers them complete repatriation, with the restoration of all rights. There is no record that any Jews have accepted his offer. American Negroes made great apparent gains during 1914-1918. Their wages rose; their status increased correspondingly. When Negroes joined the army, there were loud cheers from both races. When the black soldiers returned, there was a reaction. How much was retained of what had been gained during the first World War it would be difficult to say.

The cause of woman's rights registered great and permanent gains during the years 1914-1918. The equality of the sexes is now so completely accepted that it is difficult for us to realize how recently it was established. In the years just before 1914 the English suffragettes were waging a desperate battle for those rights which women now take for granted. Militant suffragettes had become political criminals. They broke shop-windows, raised riots, burned empty buildings, hotels, and race-track stands. When they were arrested, they went on hunger strikes, feeling that the government would be forced by considerations of humanity to release them before they starved. On Derby Day in 1913 one militant suicided under dramatic circumstances. There were a few bombs, mostly defective. One author lists six pages of crimes attributed to suffragettes in 1914. When the war came, the situation changed with miraculous suddenness. The controversy disappeared; women by the millions aided the national effort in various phases of war work. The labor shortage ended many useless disabilities and exclusions in the economic sphere; change of the mores ended many others. By 1917 a new consensus on woman's rights had evidently crystallized. Asquith, the old enemy of woman suffrage, now led the argument for it. It went into effect in 1918. A similar metamorphosis of the mores gave women the vote in the United States.

There are other and less easily discernible changes in the moral consensus, each one of which affects problematic areas of society in some way. For example, Americans received a liberal education

on the subject of venereal disease during the period of their participation in the World War of 1914. If we are now approaching the stage where venereal disease will cease to be a social problem in the true sense of the word and become a medical problem only, it seems likely that this is partly the result of our war experiences. There were numerous changes of similar nature whose bearing on social problems is not immediately apparent, so that it would not be easy to say whether they resulted in net gains or losses for humanitarianism. War compels the rapid expansion of certain fields of social work, which means that a great number of persons must be utilized who have been trained hastily or not at all. Some damage is done to standards of social work, and some persons are admitted to the profession who are not distinct assets. But many persons receive some education in the needs of various welfare fields, and are thereafter influential in supporting social-work activities. It is difficult to say on which side the balance is weighted. One result of the strain which war puts on institutions of social work is definitely favorable; war necessitates improved organization of social-work activities, and this improved organization persists after the emergency with beneficial results.

In some other fields it is difficult to say what the effects of the war have been because we do not know how remote or contingent a causal relationship to consider significant. In 1867 one Carry Moore married a Dr. Gloyd. She loved him to distraction, but he was a confirmed alcoholic. He had acquired the vice of excessive drinking while a soldier during the Civil War, and within a few months of his marriage he drank himself to death, in spite of all that his grieving bride could do to prevent it. That bride, cheated of her husband by the demon rum, became the Carry Nation who at the turn of the century terrorized saloon-keepers with her hatchet. Should we then regard the Prohibition movement, at least as far as Carry Nation was concerned, as an aftermath of the Civil War? To how many decimal points shall we carry our calculation of the consequences of a war?

In war there is a shortage of labor, a situation exactly opposite to that which has prevailed throughout most of European civilization in the last few years. There is a shortage of everything, a want

of all the necessary goods of life. There is much to do, and not enough hands to do it. Because of the labor shortage, there is vast increase in the employment of women and children. There is overtime work pushed beyond the limit of human endurance; there is employment of women in occupations for which their physique is not suited; there is employment of children below age. In some families the increase in the number of wage earners brings an increase in real income.

After a tour of Europe in 1919, Homer Folks of the American Red Cross summed up the human costs of the great war as follows: It had produced ten millions of homeless persons. It had subjected forty-two millions to the rigors of rule by the enemy for longer or shorter periods; some of these had been deported and subjected to forced labor, virtually sent into slavery. It had produced some millions of soldier-dead and corresponding millions of widows and orphans. It had produced some ten million empty cradles. It had unleashed diseases which, aided by starvation, killed uncounted millions. It had left all Europe impoverished. Perhaps this is as good a summary as one could wish of the effect of war on social problems. What is perhaps most revealing is the emphasis in such a summary upon the elemental matters of human welfare. Nothing is said about the loss of standards in the labor field, or about, say, the neglect of the fine points of child placement. If social workers fail to speak of such things, it is because the social problems created by war are such grim threats to life itself that everything else fades into insignificance by comparison.

The Army as a Social Institution

Every civilized nation has its army and its military establishment. In the piping times of peace, and in the democratic nations, the military organization occupies a subordinate place. Soldiers must take orders from civilians. When the prospect of peace seems favorable, the army may suffer sharp losses of personnel and be forced to economize rigidly. When war comes, the situation changes. The army fights the battles; it will win the war; therefore its needs come first. There is either an actual military dictatorship or something closely approaching it. The army institution dominates all

others. Family, school, church, the economic system, the ordinary processes of government, must all be sacrificed to the imperious demands of the military machine. The army pervades the whole of life. It is therefore important to try to understand the nature of the army institution.

The army is a social machine by which a million men are enabled to act with a single will. In order to meet a crisis, men necessarily adopt a military form of organization; this is the *raison d'être* of military organization and discipline.¹⁰ The organization of the army has taken shape through some thousands of years of evolution in which new techniques have been slowly evolved and less effective techniques eliminated.

The army achieves its result of activating a million men with a single will by effectively annihilating the individual will of the soldier. It overrides the individual will; it refuses to recognize that the individual will exists and acts as if it did not exist. The soldier must obey. Orders come all the way down from the top. Everyone obeys someone. Everyone is responsible to someone. But no one is responsible to his subordinates or may be questioned by them. The flow of commands, of will, is in one direction only.

When a man becomes a soldier, he surrenders to his duly constituted superiors his right to think and act as an individual. He makes a voluntary sacrifice of his private will, his last voluntary act until the military machine at length disgorges him; and if he is conscripted, one might argue about the voluntary nature of this surrender. In any case, the army must start with some sort of consent on the part of the soldier: he must somehow want to do his bit. The army instills in the man the habits of the soldier, and it has its own techniques for this, but it must always build upon pre-existing habits and attitudes. Men can become soldiers because their previous life has so conditioned them that the military way of life is possible.

When a man has made the sacrifice of his own private will, it

¹⁰ The material that follows is for the most part based upon observation of the American army. More democratic forms of army organization have sometimes been attempted, for example, at various times in the American armies and in the new Russian army. It is the opinion of the writer that all armies would tend to reproduce, sooner or later, most of the structure here described. For a description of the army system of the U.S.S.R., see Albert Rhys Williams, *The Soviets*, Harcourt Brace, 1937, pp. 499-507.

remains for the army to instill in him those habits of obedience which make him the perfect instrument of the will of his superiors. The army begins to teach him to obey orders. There are a great many orders to obey, for one reason, because the living together and working together of great masses of men demand regulation of the minutiae of existence, for another, because it is thought good to give the private soldier plenty of practice in obeying orders. Orders are multiplied. The emphasis is upon precision, upon snappiness in executing commands, upon the synchronization of the movements of masses. Close order drill and the manual of arms are well adapted to this sort of training. There is also a multitude of petty regulations in any army. They are and must be enforced in an utterly humorless manner, and they involve much ordering about.

There is great emphasis upon appearance. It is thought that a man cannot possibly be a good soldier unless he holds himself erect, salutes in a crisp manner, and keeps his uniform spotless. One might suppose, with all this emphasis upon appearance, that uniforms would be so designed that it would be easy to keep them presentable; but if one supposed this he would be utterly wrong. Uniforms, except a special few adapted to exceptional conditions (destroyers are called the "dungaree navy") are very hard to keep clean and presentable. Private soldiers suspect that buttons are put on the uniforms just because they are hard to shine! Certainly the emphasis upon appearance plays a real part in the making of the soldier. This emphasis is based upon a sound psychology, at least in part, because there is a close relationship between morale and appearance. And it is often true that the less time the private soldiers have for themselves the better it is for their morale.

The social system of the army involves a caste-like division between commissioned officers and enlisted men, originally derived from actual caste differences between the two groups. The officer is a gentleman; the enlisted man is the instrument which he uses in his profession. In all respects the officer is set off from the enlisted man. He wears a uniform of superior quality and bears glittering insignia of rank. He lives better than the men; draws more pay; stays at better hotels; smokes a different brand of cigarettes. The officer cannot gamble with enlisted men. He cannot carry a package. If he

were, with the most honorable intentions, to court a sergeant's daughter, he might be relieved of his commission. In the presence of enlisted men, the officer must always behave with gentlemanly reserve, exacting the last ounce of respect due him and his rank.

A considerable amount of army training consists of learning the ritual of respect toward commissioned officers, a subject known as military courtesy. The private salutes when he meets an officer; he salutes first and holds the salute until recognized. Between the officer and the man there is an immense social distance. In the old Austrian army, it is said, the enlisted man was supposed to keep an actual physical distance of five paces from the officer. The private is supposed to ask the permission of his immediate superior, the noncom, before speaking to the commissioned officer. When he speaks to the officer, he refers to himself in the third person.

In some measure, the social distance between the officer and the man is functionally appropriate. It helps to make subordination bearable by preventing any real clash of personalities. In the army, ceremony not merely regulates the relationship between officer and man; often it *is* the relationship. The wise officer does not overstep his ceremonial limits; he avoids a clash of wills by restraining himself to the exercise of his generally accepted institutional prerogatives. The army has even evolved a "voice of command," a flat, emotionless but vibrant tone which gives the command with complete impersonality. By staying within his own sphere, by rigidly observing the decorum proper to his rank, by making his domination an impersonal thing, the officer makes it possible for the men to say, "We salute the uniform and not the man."

Subordination to the commissioned officer is also possible because he has prestige. Prestige is a quality with which the leader is endowed in the imagination of those he leads, whether rightly or wrongly we need not say. The leader, such as the officer or the teacher, shows only a small and resplendent portion of his personality to the persons he leads, and they immediately fill out the total picture of the man in the same shining pattern. The social distance which we have described is a necessary condition of the officer's prestige, and therefore of the smooth working of the army system.

It is often said that familiarity breeds contempt. In the army, carefully regulated unfamiliarity breeds respect.

This ritual of respect, however, is nearly all a one-way respect. The officer must return the private's salute. If he is wise, he will studiously avoid overstepping the ritualized limits, and he will as studiously demand the fulfilment of all that is legally due him. But it is contrary to the idea of the army for the superior to make any direct concessions to the will of the subordinate. In civilian life we surround ourselves with certain rituals of respect to others. We say *please* and *thank you*. One of the first things we teach children is to say *please*; all our lives we keep on saying it and hearing it, unless we join the army. All this is a concession to the autonomy of the other person. It is precisely these concessions that the army cannot make. The officer cannot say *please* because the private is not supposed to have any will of his own. That is the nature of the army system. The wise officer, and most of them are quite wise in such matters, avoids all situations where the private might do something for him of his own free will. That way lies sycophancy.

So rigid is the military system of annihilating the individual will that it accepts very few excuses for non-performance of duty. Freud has pointed out that the excuse, "I forgot," will be accepted in many places; but there are two persons who will never permit it to stand: one's sweetheart and one's drill sergeant. Every forgetting, every omission, every neglect, every sub-standard performance, is treated as an instance of the surgence of the private will of the soldier and is sternly penalized. Only so can the army maintain discipline.

Like the commissioned officer, the non-commissioned officer must maintain discipline. He cannot, however, employ the same methods. He cannot employ any great amount of social distance. He must live with the men; he is one of them. His office may be taken away from him for any small misdeed and he may revert to the ranks. He must meet the men on their own level, answering their force with his own force and employing the harsh persuasions of army penalties. It is here that the struggle between the army system and the buck private's private will is carried out. It is the sergeant whom the men hate. The non-com must be something of a natural leader or his cause

is lost. The development of a staff of efficient non-coms is one of the most difficult parts of organizing and training an army.

The army has a culture which differs sharply from that of the larger group. It has its own traditions, its own lores, its own culturally transmitted attitudes. It has also, as we shall see, its own moral code by which soldiers live and die. The songs, the tall tales, the rumors, sagas, and meaningless catchwords developed by the American Expeditionary Force would fill volumes. Linton has made an excellent case for an interpretation of certain phenomena as forms of spontaneously generated totemism.¹¹ The process of adjustment to army life involves as one of its aspects the assimilation of the army culture.

When an army system is functioning properly, we say that the soldiers display *morale* or *esprit de corps*. In order to display these qualities, an army must not only be well drilled; it must also be activated by a sense of pride in army membership, and a sense of army solidarity. Patriotism helps, but is perhaps not altogether necessary; Caesar's Tenth Legion had *esprit de corps*, but one may question whether it was patriotic in the modern sense. In order to have a good army, most of the soldiers must have real faith in their fellows and in their commanders. *Esprit de corps* is perhaps commoner and easier to obtain than *morale*. Any outfit that is well dressed, well equipped, and well drilled would be likely to have *esprit de corps*. Troops may be said to have *morale* when they show their ability to fight and to hold on against odds. The English rearguard action at the beginning of the first World War and the French defense of Verdun rank as great exhibitions of *morale*. Neither *esprit de corps* nor *morale* is in any way inconsistent with a great deal of grumbling and apparent internal friction in the army system. All soldiers grumble, at least according to tradition. Quite possibly it makes them better soldiers.

Roucek has described the transition from civilian to military life in the following vivid passage:

The soldier finds out that the military life is a hard one. It involves a renunciation of the comforts and securities of a normal domestic

¹¹ Ralph Linton, "Totemism and the A. E. F.," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 26, pp. 296 ff.

existence. The denial of the body, the deprivation of the senses, the suppression of spontaneous impulses, the forced drills, the exhaustion of the marrow, the neglect of cleanliness—all these conditions of active service leave no place for the normal decencies of existence. In the place of the average life is offered iron-bound discipline, a development of the sense of duty, a worship of obedience to authority, a new clothing, a regular and planned existence, a lack of informality in social usages, the absence of womankind, relatives, friends. The soldier is swallowed up in this current without any regard to his previous background, his previous attitudes, or his intellectual capacity. . . . All individuality and initiative are suppressed. . . .

The most important events in men's lives in such days are passed to and fro in letters. All the emotions are poured out in written script, disguised or declared, adorned with all the phrases of sentiment. Letters give an outlet to the emotions, and they are read and reread with great pleasure because they recall all the pleasant aspects of civilian life. Little traits of behavior are recalled, even though they once seemed commonplace and tedious.¹²

Of all this we question only the phrase "the neglect of cleanliness," at least in respect to the American forces. Nor does it seem likely that cleanliness is neglected in any modern army. Under front-line conditions, of course, cleanliness becomes almost impossible, which may justify the phrase.

The army toughens men. It must toughen them so that they can endure hardship, so that they can kill or be killed. When civilians are being recruited and trained, the army must accept men who faint at the sight of a hypodermic needle, and turn them into heroes who can face death without flinching. It is a hard job, but it can be done. This is the rationale of much of the army regimen and a great deal of the army culture. This is the reason for the long marches completed on aching feet, for the interrupted sleep, the chilly barracks, the hard-boiled non-coms, the unpleasantness of taking orders, the lack of holidays, the parades on any and all occasions, the boxing matches, and all the things which revolt the occasional sensitive soul which is subjected to the regimen. There develops in the army a cult of toughness for the sake of toughness: it is a good thing to be tough and the toughest man is the best man. The soldiers fight with one another because it is the thing to do. Each one wants to be able to

¹² Joseph S. Roucek, "Social Attitudes of the Soldier in War Time," *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1935-1936, Vol. XXX, pp. 164-174.

say, "I can take it and I can dish it out." They cultivate vulgarity and obscenity and the stronger forms of profanity because it is virile to do so; they swear and threaten one another constantly in order to show how tough they are. Refinement, of course, is taboo; coarseness is the thing sought after. In comrade relations, or in time of danger, it is one for all and all for one; in all other matters it is dog eat dog. Aggressiveness is a necessity for survival in such a group. The character ideal of the army is that of the hard-boiled non-com made famous by certain recent movies. There seems no possibility of doubting that the toughening process really works.

Some of the toughening process is art and some of it nature. The military tradition has evolved through some centuries. No one person planned it but many persons have improved upon it, and the tradition is wiser than any of its practitioners. We may explain how such machines work without implying that anyone has planned them to work in this way and no other. It is clear, for example, that one thing which makes men willing to die is the fact that the army has interrupted all their life plans and their life-long habits and prevented them from making any plans of their own thereafter. They are willing to die because there is now less to tie them to life. It is doubtful whether anyone planned army institutions with this end in view, but that is the way they work.

The ultimate aim of all this, it should be said, is to weld the men together into a social machine which will not disintegrate in a crisis situation. The parts of the machine must fit together perfectly; the parts must be interchangeable, and the succession to authority must be clear and undisputed. Every man must be so trained that he performs his job mechanically. It is interesting to note that any less well-organized group experiences a considerable period of confusion and delay when it meets a severe crisis. Now this confusion and delay would be fatal in the face of an enemy army; therefore one man is made responsible and is trained, as far as possible, to meet all crises that are expected to arise.

The army achieves its results, but at a terrific cost. It is not really possible to annihilate the will of the individual soldier; it is merely possible to force that private will to express itself in some other form, which is often a vicious one. The army technique breeds its own

forms of resistance. The attempt to annihilate the individual engenders a particularly vicious form of individualism. The one-way flow of will from the superior to the inferior generates a counter-will which resists authority in all its forms. The soldier traditionally shirks his duty; he "soldiers" on the job. The use in common speech of the words "soldiering" and "regimenting" is eloquent of popular recognition of these military vices. And "passing the buck" (*non est mea culpa*) is widely known as the "old army game." This shirking of duty may become quite extreme. The writer has seen a work detail of fifty or more men start off with two men to watch them and arrive at its destination with no more than half of those who started. After a time, the soldier spends his mental energy in figuring out ways to shirk his duty; it is as natural that he should do so as that a prisoner should try to escape from prison. Apparently the military form of organization cannot remain efficient for any length of time. An army is almost certain to be inefficient just because it is an army.

A few officers of rare ability manage to build up in the soldiers a personal loyalty strong enough to overcome in large part this resistance of the soldier against domination. For such leaders of men, the soldiers give that last ounce of exertion which, as it has been said, can never be commanded but must always be offered up freely. Robert E. Lee was such a man; so, probably, was Stonewall Jackson, and many stories tell of the devotion which Napoleon inspired. General Pershing was not of the breed of which we speak. It should be noted that such officers are more than institutional figureheads and they are more than efficient managers and commanders; they manage somehow to become real as persons. They do much to overcome the institutional handicaps of the army.

The conditions of the soldier's life change from generation to generation, but there is a characteristic soldier mentality which seems to have been about the same in all ages and places. The soldiers who threw dice for the garments of Christ have much in common with the men in the front lines in the twentieth century. The military mentality is in part a result of the actual conditions of war, and in part a product of the army as a social environment. The soldier is constantly subordinated, and he is subjected to a rigorous routine; therefore he has great need of a life of his own which is not sub-

jected to army regulations. This he finds in barracks life, in amusements, often vicious, or in phantasy. The soldier is subject to an alien will. Usually he does not even know the meaning of the operations in which he takes part; he can make no plans of his own because he is under orders. Therefore the soldier is irresponsible; he does not know what the plans of the high command are, neither is he greatly interested in them. (This same disinterest is said to be observable in Fascist nations. It obviously stems from some of the same roots.) Because he can make no plans, because he is deprived of many of the comforts of life, because a great deal of his time is spent in just waiting and those empty hours must be filled somehow, because life itself is uncertain, the soldier adopts a philosophy of life on a short-term hedonistic basis—hence his vices.

He develops his own characteristic morality. He must be obedient; he must do his duty in a fashion, that is, he must not shirk in the hour of danger. His morality permits, however, an endless amount of trickery against constituted authority. He must be loyal to his own in-group, but that is not difficult because it is a very small in-group. He stands by his comrades. That is just about the sum total of the soldier's moral code on the positive side. The military machine has him; it regulates him; he has no longer much need of morality. Rather, he has need of escape. He achieves a moral code which facilitates escape.

The soldier's morality condones a great many things which are not permitted in civil life. The soldier despises civilians; he believes that they hate him (soldiers and dogs keep off the grass). Almost any trick upon a civilian is legitimate. The soldier also hates men in different branches of the service. The sailor hates the marines; the infantry hates the cavalry; everybody hates the military police. Probably he also hates his own officers and even the well-intentioned Y.M.C.A. All these hates found expression in 1918 in the bitter question, "Who won the war?"

As to sex morality, anything is permitted except homosexuality. Naturally the soldier does not expect to keep promises made to women. The soldier's life does not permit either privacy or fastidiousness in the sexual life; therefore he can visit a prostitute and after-

wards stand in line with a hundred others while waiting for a prophylactic.

The sense of property is completely metamorphosed in the army. Partly this is a matter of the want of goods and the lack of money. Anyone who has observed the complicated financial operations by which a private soldier sometimes raises a dollar will understand this. Partly it is a matter of a changed morality. The soldier has little respect for the property of others. He "scrounges," to use a euphemism of the first World War, and his morality justifies him in scrounging.

Of course there is no taboo upon such ordinary vices as drinking and gambling in the army. Of course one gambles with his pay, and gets drunk if he wins. The compulsion is all in favor of such indulgence rather than against it.

Obviously there are compensations in the soldier's way of life. Moral irresponsibility is a great privilege for some. For others, the sense of social security in the army system is worth all its sacrifices, even the dangers of war. The easy comradeship and tribal solidarity of the barracks life also gives many otherwise frustrated persons a sense of belonging. In the actual combat situation, which even in war is rare, there are, of course, yet other compensations. If anyone doubts that army life has its compensations, let him attend a convention of the American Legion. It is perfectly clear that for many of the veterans, their war experiences mean about the same thing as his college does to the old grad at the reunion.

In the officer ranks, the penalties of the military form of organization are scarcely less. It is apparently not possible to paralyze the will of the subordinate without also paralyzing his intelligence. Officers are under orders; they, too, are taught to believe that the man giving the commands is always right. There is little or no flow of ideas from the bottom to the top of the officer ranks, and, since one can come to the upper ranks only after long service in the lower, there is little creativeness on any level. In war time, the officer ranks are enriched by a great number of able persons trained in other professions and not accustomed to thinking in the military grooves. These men must go through a period of apprenticeship, but, after

they learn the rules of the game, they probably contribute heavily to the improvement of traditional army methods.

The entire routine of army existence in the officer ranks contributes to the sclerosis of the army as a social system. The routinization of life, the emphasis upon ceremony and upon appearance, upon externals, the personal disorganization of the army officer in time of peace, the hierarchical system, the seniority system of promotion, the maddening slowness of promotion, lack of encouragement for originality and initiative, the freedom of military thought from vitalizing influences from the outside, emphasis upon past rather than future wars, the prejudices of caste and class unmodified by knowledge of or contact with the larger society and the changing world but rather enforced and rigidified by the narrow routine of the army post, contempt for the ideas of civilians—all these things conspire to make the army officer unduly conservative. This, in brief, is why armies are inefficient just because they are armies. Anyone who doubts that these things do in fact have an effect upon the military mind has only to read the works of Liddell Hart, in which the stupidities of the first World War are exposed with brutal realism. Probably Hart is somewhat unfair to the generals, but his comments are in the right direction. He is the army's best friend because its severest critic.

The army officer does, however, learn certain things extremely well. His training is narrow but it is thorough. An intelligent officer—and there are few who are not intelligent, however antediluvian their social and political opinions—is often one of the keenest practical psychologists in the world. He understands the art of command, which he has perfected by long practice, by trial and error, and by observation of others. The officer is often a wonderful administrator; he has drive and ability to get things done, and he knows men. The trouble is that the officer, because of the world he lives in, has a short-blooming mind. Since there is no way to eliminate those who have gone to seed, there are likely to be men in high office in almost any army who could not successfully organize and conduct a Sunday School picnic. The matter of efficient army organization calls for our best thought.

In sum, we may say that the social system of the army is one of

dominance and subordination made bearable by social distance. Like any other social system, it has its own inherent strength and weakness. Its strength is its adaptation to crisis situations. Its weakness arises from the crushing of the more desirable manifestations of individuality. In time any army tends to become stagnant; it must be constantly revitalized if it is to function properly.

The process of levying and training a large civilian army puts great strain upon the army system. There is a shortage of officers in both commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. The army's caste system comes dangerously close to breaking down. In the peace-time army, the caste system works fairly well because there is in fact a great social gap between officers and men. Under war conditions, this tends to be less true. The conscripted soldiers are from all walks of life, and there are some who serve out the war as privates in spite of blue blood and social-register backgrounds. Among the new officers many utterly lack any of the hallmarks of gentility. Many are ill-trained, having neither the necessary technical knowledge nor any familiarity with the art of command. Many of us remember with amusement some of the "shavetails," and "ninety-day wonders" who exercised command in the first World War. Their impersonations of the army officer were sometimes rather weird. The men resent domination by such men, and rediscover all the soldier's ancient techniques of expressing this resentment. There is a great shortage of efficient non-coms. When one considers the inherent difficulties of the task, the achievements of England and America in training civilian armies in the 1914-1918 war seem little short of miraculous.

When the actual fighting begins, the ritual of the army undergoes rapid simplification. No longer does the private ask the permission of the non-com before speaking to the captain. Salutes are often overlooked; the salute becomes a real mark of respect to officers whom the men admire. They salute the man and not the uniform, which is a horrible departure from military tradition. Natural leaders appear among the men, and the men are apt to pay as much attention to them as to their officers. Once the men have tasted blood, it is not easy to get them into the training-camp and parade-ground state of mind again. There is more than humor in the statement that war certainly plays hell with an army.

At the present time, modifications of the army system are also being forced by changing technologies. Many of the army techniques arose when private soldiers were mainly peasants and country louts who could be shoved around like checkers on a board. Present-day armies are composed increasingly of specialists. No doubt these men must be soldiers first and technicians afterwards, but there is nothing very military in the business of overhauling airplane motors, and the orthodox military procedures are likely to interfere with such necessary jobs. As the army comes to use more and more machines, it must devise new social techniques to handle men who are technicians and mechanics rather than simple soldiers.

There are many indications that military authorities today are becoming enlightened as to the dangers of the military organization and its peculiar need for constant injections of new life. This seems to be particularly true of England. Liddell Hart, bitterest critic of the generals of the first World War, is said to have been consulted about the defense of Britain. Old officers have been retired, and relatively young men put in command. It is said that the entire army is being democratized in that many caste distinctions are being eliminated; henceforward it will be easier for able men to rise from the ranks. We read that during war all promotions will be from the ranks; the "ranker" will no longer be made to feel that he is a "temporary gentleman." Even the Sam Browne belt, which cost a pound, has been eliminated because some of the new officers might not be able to afford it. All social distinctions between officers and men are to be abolished when men are off duty. Obviously it will increase the efficiency of the army if able men from all classes are given an opportunity to attain commissioned rank. Napoleon understood this when he announced that every private soldier had a marshal's baton in his knapsack. In the early months of the War of 1939 a dispatch announced also that the British will attempt to explain to the men what they are doing. This should go far to correct the paralysis of intelligence and the irresponsibility of the soldier. The French have practiced it for some generations. No doubt this is one reason why the French army is so strong in the non-commissioned ranks.

We have dealt at some length with the army institution because in

time of war the army dominates the national scene. The army takes some millions of men and molds them into the pattern which we have described. Every other institution must then take the shape which the needs of the army demand. The military psychology pervades the whole of life. In war time everybody is a soldier, the housewife in her kitchen, the teacher in his classroom, the servant of God in his pulpit. In war everyone is in some sense and degree under orders. Therefore morality decays, because moral responsibility is based on autonomy. A short-term hedonism takes its place. There is no phase of life which war does not touch. Even women's clothes reflect it; when men seek glory at the cannon's mouth, a miniscule cannon accents the femininity of milady's hat.

Like the rule of the army over the private soldier, the domination of army institutions over other institutions has its limitations. Family, church, and school may give way temporarily, but they retain their vitality, and in the end they re-establish themselves. In conquered areas, it may seem that the institutions of the people have been destroyed. Their houses are gone; the people are without food; they lack everything but the desire to live. Over all rules a military dictatorship which regulates everything minutely. But the mores of the people somehow persist; their institutions continue to live in a sort of way.

War and Revolution

Hocking has stated that a war is not merely a collision of physical forces, it is also a collision of will against will. One may win a war either by crushing the enemy's armies or by destroying his will to fight. In a total war the army must be supported by the entire nation if it is to fight effectively; therefore it is possible to win or lose a war on the home front.

The technique of modern war involves a determined assault upon the enemy's morale. The heavy artillery of propaganda plays just as important a part as any other weapon; a thumping big lie can be as valuable as a military victory. The object of the game is either to wear down the enemy's morale to such an extent that he is unable to resist effectively or to start a revolution in the enemy country.

England and France at the start of the War of 1939 declared their

unwillingness to deal with a Hitler government. In other words, they would fight the German people until the advent of a revolution in Germany. This seems like unconventional warfare, but the Allies won the first World War in part by just such tactics. Actually such warfare is less unreasonable than it seems at first sight. Modern wars involve great masses of men; modern weapons give a great advantage to the defensive, and as long as any considerable body of enemy troops retains the will to fight it is very difficult to crush them. It is just as feasible to apply the long, slow pressure of economic warfare, and to hope that it will so undermine the enemy on the home front that his armies will no longer be able to resist.

For a number of reasons, dictatorships seem to be particularly liable to revolutionary upset. The normal safety-valves of political activity are completely absent in such a social system; there is no way to express disapproval of the government except by some act of rebellion. Dictatorial methods of government are certain to make many enemies, to alienate large sections of the population, but the dictator cannot know surely who his enemies are. A dictator-ridden country is like a boiler with suspected weaknesses and without either a safety-valve or a pressure gauge. There is no way of letting off steam or even of knowing how great the pressure is. The first intimation of trouble is an explosion. For these and other reasons, it is commonly accepted as true that the dictators must continue to give their people victories or lose their hold upon office. This interpretation has not been sufficiently tested, but it seems to have merit. The leaders of a democratic nation can accept defeat; perhaps they will lose their offices, but the government will go on. When dictators are discredited, their lives as well as their offices are in danger. If this is the case, a dictatorship cannot accept defeat, and the struggle must go on until a revolution breaks out. But propaganda, indoctrination, and the ruthless methods of the secret police may be able to prevent a revolution for a long time.

We know that wars have often ended in revolutions. The matter has not received a great deal of study, perhaps because the nature of the association between war and revolution seems obvious. It is far from obvious. Nevertheless, we may venture the following generalizations:

War produces revolution because it weakens the influence of the mores. The mores decay, being replaced, as we have seen, by hedonistic life-adjustments. The mores become unenforceable, because the community and family can no longer retain their hold upon the individual and thus direct his behavior: war enables individuals to escape from the watchfulness of parents, wives, neighbors, and parsons. Because the mores are weakened, radical social changes become more possible.

War produces widespread poverty, which acts as a solvent of all existing institutions. The object of economic warfare is to starve the enemy into submission. Its basic conception is that if a man is hungry enough, and his wife and children are hungry, he will revolt. War destroys the little security of the little man—that hold upon respectability which ordinarily suffices to make him conservative. When that security is gone, he becomes dangerous to the established order.

War exacerbates all existing social struggles. It begins, of course, by having just the opposite effect, by producing a heightened sense of social solidarity. But a long war ends by producing great embittering of class relations, by setting the city of the rich and the city of the poor at one another's throats. Partly it is the economic dislocation of war which does this; inflation weighs more heavily upon the poor than upon the rich. There are other hardships of war which impinge more sharply upon the poor than upon the rich and well-born. In many war services, the poor pay with their lives and the rich pay with money.

The iron repression of war creates rebellion. Waging a war involves great regimentation of the lives of the people. We have seen how this regimentation, in the army, creates rebellion and a corrosive individualism. The greater the sacrifices demanded of the nation, the greater must be the regimentation and the accompanying rebellion. The individualism which we have mentioned, the individualism of shirking, is only one aspect of rebellion; this rebellion also involves a strange kind of solidarity, the solidarity of the oppressed. As repressive measures increase, they tend to lose their effect and must become ever harsher. Propaganda also loses its effect, and the people become unified in a leaderless, aimless opposition to the existing regime. This is the soil in which revolutionary movements grow.

War creates social chaos, under cover of which revolutionary movements can form and gain headway. War dislocates whole populations, creates millions of refugees, takes millions of individuals out of the communities where they are known, disorganizes all institutional routines. If there is a nucleus of revolution anywhere in the population, it now has an opportunity to gather other elements to it and organize for action.

Returned soldiers often become successful revolutionaries. The soldiers are bitter and discontented. Often they are jobless and feel they are discriminated against. They see civilian life with a jaundiced eye. They have got in the way of fighting. They have been shot at before, and are not afraid of the Cossacks. Sometimes they have guns. A few soldiers in a revolutionary mob can make it an effective fighting unit.

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THE PROSPECTS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

■
Ralph Linton

Anthropologists make the most reluctant prophets to be found in the ranks of the social scientists. Trained to the study of societies and cultures as wholes evolving through time, they have had abundant opportunity to observe the effects of inconspicuous events which owed their importance to accidents of time and place. As long as the nod of a peasant's head can decide the Battle of Waterloo, the prediction of immediate happenings must lie in the realm of the soothsayer rather than of the scientist. However, below the shifting surface of chance-determined events there are currents that sweep this foam along. Napoleon might have won at Waterloo if the peasant had not lied to him, but he could not have re-established his empire in the face of an exhausted France, an aroused Europe, and the British control of the sea. No one can forecast the outcome of even the next battle in a war, but it seems possible to predict with a considerable degree of probability the lines of development which will lie open to European civilization during the next few generations. I say lines of development, since there will cer-

tainly be opportunity for choice at various points; but unless all history is at fault, the choices will be limited and certain trends will have to be allowed to work themselves out. Most of these trends began long before the first World War and, in the long view, both this war and the War of 1939 seem to be symptoms and not causes of the transformation now under way in Europe.

The most that we can say of the immediate results of the War of 1939 is that its effects on the general course of events will probably be considerably less profound than either patriots or writers of imaginative fiction assume. Victory, no matter where it falls, is not going to usher in the millennium. It will merely release energy and resources which can be turned to solving Europe's problems. The war itself, various novelists to the contrary, is not likely to plunge Europe into a new Dark Ages in this generation or even in this century. Pictures of the existence of a little handful of survivors after the collapse of Western civilization derive a certain gloomy splendor from their very remoteness from experience. Their relation to the probable aftermath of the present struggle is much the same as that of a medieval dungeon to a crowded, cheap boarding house. However, the idea of collapse is so popular at present that it may be well to see what wars have been able to accomplish against civilization in the past. There is no lack of material for such a study, for these protagonists have played their parts again and again and with little change of plot.

War and Civilization

In comparison with war, civilization is a parvenu. Even in the broadest meaning of the term, *i.e.*, the custom of living in cities, it can be traced for only six or seven thousand years. War, on the other hand, is older than man as we know him. Even as I write this, scientists are patiently chipping the rock from the skull of a war casualty of a quarter-of-a-million years ago, an ape-man, not yet fully human, who died from the stroke of a stone axe. It is significant that what they find most exciting in this discovery is that the axe blade must have been hafted; earliest evidence of a composite tool and of the intelligence required to invent it. That beings able to make tools should use them for killing each other, is so much in line

with human behavior always and everywhere that it excites only a passing interest.

After the first World War a small group of wishful thinkers put forward the theory that war was a late development in human history, and mustered certain carefully selected evidence in support of their stand. Apparently they were inspired by the hope that war might be nothing more than a temporary aberration of our species, something our ancestors had grown into and our descendants would presumably grow out of in the normal course of events. This theory has never been accepted by professional anthropologists and it can be maintained only by a clever juggling of definitions as well as facts. There is every reason to believe that long before our ancestors became fully human, each man pack held a territory of its own. We can scarcely doubt that, like most other carnivorous pack animals, such a horde would protect its own territory against invasion and invade the territory of other hordes when hungry or in flight from enemies. The only human groups who will not behave in this way today are those who have learned from sad experience that submission is their only chance of survival. Whether such simple contests for territory are to be called wars is a matter of choice. At least groups fought with groups, enemies were slaughtered, and an unbroken line of development links these first contests with what has been lately happening along the Maginot line.

Civilization was, therefore, developed in the face of war and has had it as a constant accompaniment. In spite of this it has grown and flourished. Surprisingly few civilizations have been destroyed by war and most of those which have succumbed were already so ill from other causes that war merely administered the *coup de grâce*. It may be urged that modern war is so different from its predecessors as to invalidate all comparisons, but actually its uniqueness, especially as regards potentialities for destruction, has been greatly overrated. Any professional military man knows that the principles upon which successful war must be waged have not changed since the dawn of history, while the destructive intent of war has certainly diminished. The Romans razed towns which resisted too stubbornly, selling the whole population into slavery and ceremonially plowing and sowing with salt the site on which the city had stood. The Mongols, prob-

ably the most hard-headed of all conquerors, deliberately set out to exterminate entire populations as the simplest method of guarding their far-flung lines of communication. However, coming down the centuries, such extreme measures have been more and more relegated to the beginners and amateurs in the work of conquest. Dead men can neither pay taxes nor buy goods under preferential tariffs and cities are needed as centers for trade and administration. When the modern, experienced conqueror destroys goods or populations, he does it regretfully and with the full knowledge that he is diminishing his chances of long-range profit from victory.

In Europe there are still other factors which will keep intentional destruction to a minimum. However uninhibited Europeans may have been in their dealings with native peoples, they have developed an elaborate ritual for wars among themselves. In fact, their wars during the last two or three centuries have been so hedged about by rules of the game that they have had much the quality of sporting events played with an eye on the gallery. There are plenty of indications that this era of good sportsmanship is drawing toward a close. Formal declarations of war, the immunities of non-combatants, and the rights of neutrals too feeble to defend themselves all seem to be in train to go the way of the earlier truce of God and battle by herald. However, these patterns are not dead yet and they will exert a mollifying influence as long as there are strong neutral nations whose good will is worth keeping. Many of us are old enough to remember the tales of the German atrocities in Belgium, the effect of these stories, whether true or false, on American public opinion, and the ultimate results to the Germans. Most of us have become harder and more skeptical since then, but even dictators who boast in one breath of the brutality of their nations are careful to add in the next that they have the highest respect for international law. We may doubt whether there is one of these gentlemen who would order the extermination of a conquered nationality or even the razing of a city after its surrender unless he was quite sure that he could suppress all news of it.

It might be added, parenthetically, that even purposeful destruction of this sort seems to be curiously temporary in its effects. Cities that were razed and sown with salt usually seem to flourish again

within two or three generations, and regions which had been completely depopulated, according to the historian, were rich and crowded a century later. Even the extermination of some little nation of antiquity, announced again and again by conquerors, was nearly always followed by the re-emergence of the same nation, usually stronger than before and always thirsting for the blood of its exterminators. Nations, when they are genuine cultural and ethnic entities conscious of their own existence, seem to possess an amazing vitality. It is almost impossible to exterminate even a numerically insignificant nation; quite impossible to exterminate a modern European one with a population running into millions. Even if it could be done, the effects would be incidental for the fate of European civilization as a whole. This civilization is continental in scope and the elimination of even several of the lines into which it is divided would not mean its disappearance.

The real danger to European civilization lies, therefore, in the destruction incidental to the actual fighting in the War of 1939 and in the exhaustion which is sure to afflict both victors and vanquished. The effectiveness of modern weapons is usually overrated by civilians. The last war is still close enough to give us a fairly clear picture of what they can and cannot do. Although there have been some technical advances, there have been no revolutionary innovations and there are not likely to be. Modern science is still international in scope and the steps preliminary to the development of death rays, atomic bombs, or any of the other devices dear to science-fiction magazines would be known to all nations if they were known to any. Today we have to deal with moderately improved artillery, greatly improved tanks and aeroplanes, and a chemical warfare which has been improved little if at all. The increased effectiveness of every one of these through inventions subsequent to 1918 has been successfully countered by improvements in defense. This struggle between offensive and defensive has been going on ever since the first shield was devised to turn a spear, with superiority fluctuating back and forth; but at present the defensive seems to have the better of it. Note the reluctance of modern generals to send their forces against prepared positions, or of modern air forces to raid properly defended bases. It seems safe to predict that in spite of the complexity

of modern material there will be no swift victories against large or powerful nations.

It also seems safe to predict that the end of the war will not see the great cities of Europe so many heaps of smoking ruins. Although air raids are vastly more effective now than in 1918, the defense is also vastly better, making such attacks an expensive business. The maximum damage which they can do may be judged from Spain and China, where the attackers had nearly a free hand; and these experiments indicate that a city may be bombed for weeks and still remain eighty to ninety percent intact. Some of those who read this may remember the news reels of Franco's entry into Barcelona and the almost complete absence of scars of war along his route in spite of the terrific strafing to which the city had been subjected. Moreover, the uniform failure of air raids to destroy civilian morale may have an important influence on the development of this sort of warfare. If bombing only hardens civilian resistance, while consuming planes and material, it may be wiser to leave residential areas alone and concentrate on military objectives. The extreme reluctance of both sides, in the early months of the war, to begin bombing enemy cities suggests that some idea of the sort may have penetrated even the military mind. It seems probable that the present conflict, like the last one, will cause much damage in any territory actually fought over, but that the area involved will be comparatively small and that all countries will emerge with their cities, lines of communication, etc., fairly well intact. The significant damage to national resources will be in terms of materials and credits used up rather than in those of structures destroyed.

The War of 1914-1918 also offers fairly good data on which to predict the probable destruction of life. The losses during that struggle were very large in absolute terms but comparatively small in percentage ones. Europe is so densely populated that it can afford a wastage of life which would have ruined any ancient civilization, with the possible exception of China and India. Actually, the losses in the last war were made up so easily that they scarcely affected the long-range population trends of the area. The only new lethal factor today is the possible use of poison gas in the bombing of civilian populations and the effectiveness of this is still problematical. It is

still impossible to lay down high concentrations of gas over areas of any size by dropping bombs, while the effectiveness of scattered gas bombs against civilian populations provided with gas masks remains to be seen. All past experience of civilian behavior shows that people can adapt themselves to new forms of attack with surprising speed. The first gas attacks might bring panic and consequent heavy losses through their novelty, but once this had passed, one suspects that gas bombs would produce fewer casualties than an equal quantity of high explosive.

There is one other threat to European populations which must be taken into account: the possibility of bacterial warfare. The potentialities of this type of attack are so little known that we cannot estimate its results. However, it seems questionable that any power will resort to it at the present time. A war disease, in order to be both effective and safe for the user, would have to be one which was new to the enemy group and at the same time so old to the people employing it that they had already acquired a considerable degree of immunity. Spain quite unintentionally used bacterial warfare of this sort in its conquest of Mexico. The small-pox which it introduced to the American aborigines was as deadly to them as the Black Death to Europeans, and did much to weaken the Aztec resistance. However, there is no disease which would meet these requirements in a modern European struggle. All the diseases which have reached that continent to date have swept it from end to end and there is nothing to choose among the various nationalities in matters of immunity. The initiators of bacterial warfare would have to begin, therefore, by artificially immunizing the whole of their own population to the disease which they expected to use. The possibility of keeping any epidemic on one side of a frontier is too small to be considered seriously. Such immunization might or might not work under epidemic conditions, for bacteria themselves seem to be highly mutable and capable of developing strains of unusual virulence or even with new qualities. Lastly, we still do not know the factors responsible for ordinary epidemics and we are by no means sure that they can be artificially induced. Since at least the technical advisers of all dictators are thoroughly familiar with these facts, it seems unlikely that pestilence will be deliberately added to the other horrors

of war. We may expect an increase in disease in Europe both during and immediately after the war; tired and underfed populations fall a ready prey to infections. However, short of the appearance of some new disease of surpassing virulence, it is unlikely that Europe will be swept by epidemics severe enough to disrupt civilized living.

Everything considered, a European debacle of the H. G. Wells type seems highly improbable. This war may be a little more destructive than the last, if it continues long enough, and all the nations are entering it poorer, but the chances are that they will emerge from it much as they emerged from the last one. The only difference will be the deeper poverty and increased confusion of the survivors. Great and widespread civilizations do not end in the splendor of flame and battle. They die bit by bit through centuries. It is exceedingly improbable that the student of a thousand years hence will consider this war as even a turning point in history. He is more likely to see it as a minor event which made certain pre-existing difficulties more acute and accelerated the working out of trends already present. What we are witnessing is not the dramatic suicide of Western civilization but a single phase in a long grey process of wearing away. It would be as hard to say where this process began as to set the beginning of the decline of Rome. Perhaps the first unmistakable sign was the defeat of a European power by an Asiatic one in the Russo-Japanese war.

Periods of Cultural Change

Whatever the immediate causes of Europe's condition, it is easy for the anthropologist to recognize it as the outcome of certain processes which have been at work in many periods of history and which seem to be inseparable from the growth of civilization. Unfortunately, our understanding of these processes has advanced about as far as the Greek understanding of physics and chemistry had advanced in the third century B.C. Like the Greeks, we have gathered a mass of descriptive material, can show that certain things have happened again and again, and can even tell, by rule of thumb, what the further course of development is likely to be. We can also make shrewd guesses as to why certain things happen, but we have no techniques for testing our theories, and when it comes to controlling

the forces at work we have about as much skill as the Greeks had in dealing with electricity.

In their upward course, civilizations seem to progress by leaps and bounds rather than at a steady walk. Periods of extremely rapid development normally alternate with much longer periods of slow advance or even retrogression. Such flowering seasons cannot be traced to any single cause but in most cases they seem to have been associated with a sudden increase in the society's resources or a contact with some other society from which it could obtain a store of new ideas. However, neither of these causes always produces such an effect, and other and more obscure factors must enter in. The most important mutation of this sort of which we have record took place in the Near East about seven thousand years ago and seems to have been set in train by the development in this region of a combination of agriculture and dairying. This provided a balanced ration of starch and protein and made possible a much denser population than the world had seen before. A boom period followed and within a few centuries the people of this area developed city life, with all its intricacies of industrial specialization, trade, and administration. They learned to smelt most of the metals, invented writing, the wheel, the plow and the loom, and in general laid the economic foundations of all the civilizations of the Old World. The basic patterns established at this time still control the lives of the peasantry of all oriental countries and even, to a considerable degree, those of Europe. The peasant with his ox on the land became the unchanging foundation upon which civilizations rose and fell. They passed like waves, leaving the depths unstirred.

To discover any other cultural mutation as profound as this we must go backward, to man's first use of tools and fire, or forward, to the industrial revolution. These three stand as the highest distance-markers along man's road. The discovery that power could be obtained from fuel, in combination with the invention of the experimental method in science, has given a release of human energy comparable only to that which took place when hunters became farmers. However, it has done much more than this. It has struck at the very foundation upon which the whole inherited fabric of European civilization was built and to which its patterns have

become adapted by centuries of trial and error. The peasant with his ox and the guild craftsman of the unmechanized city were known factors whose behavior was predictable. The mechanic with the tractor and the trade unionist as factors are still largely unknown. Now that goods can be produced in hitherto undreamed-of quality and quantity, tangible property is taking on strange new qualities which puzzle us much as the value suddenly accruing to land must have puzzled the first hunters turned farmers. We have painful proof that many of our inherited techniques for living and working together are no longer meeting our needs, but we do not know just what is wrong. We are in desperate need of a breathing space in which to survey the situation, and unless all history is at fault we are going to get it before long.

There were no social scientists about to witness and record the course of the last great mutation, but we have records of many of the smaller flare-ups of civilization which have occurred since. These indicate that such flare-ups are not only sudden but also tend to be very one-sided. When any group has a sudden release of energy it is almost certain to use it for the development of new ideas along only a few lines. It seems almost as though societies, like many people, could think of only one thing at a time. Thus the great period of Greek advance, with its brilliant record in art, philosophy, and abstract science, was an almost static period as far as technology was concerned. We know that physicists and mathematicians who tried to apply their discoveries to practical ends, were jeered at by their contemporaries or at best apologized for. It was also a period of political confusion and, from the modern point of view, of incredibly bad government. Plato might dream of the Republic, but the actual business of governing was left to mobs or tyrants, and practical men accepted this as inevitable. In the long run this complacency became one of the main factors leading to the Greek collapse. Resources were wasted in misrule and in endless petty wars which, it seems to a modern observer, could have been avoided by the use of a little intelligence.

Such one-sidedness of interest and culture growth seems to be the rule rather than the exception and it is probably one of the main causes of the irregular rate of culture advance. Civilizations operate

as wholes and the institutions of which any one of them is composed are all more or less interdependent for their successful performance. Although the organization of any civilization is flexible enough to allow room for change, any very marked maladjustments between institutions interfere with the successful functioning of the society and reduce efficiency. When a civilization advances rapidly in certain directions while remaining fairly static in others, more and more of its energy and resources have to be devoted to stopping the gaps left as the new and old draw apart. In time the drain becomes so great that progress even in the selected direction slows and finally ceases. The confusion within a culture, produced by rapid disharmonic growth, is thus a potent check on such growth. To reduce these abstractions to concrete terms: our own society's fixations on science and technology have carried us far ahead along these lines. At the same time we have ignored vital problems of distribution, as between both individuals and nations. Our ability to produce has so far outstripped our ability to get goods to people that we can keep things going only by periodic shutdowns or actual destruction of products. Even in the best of times we are faced with unemployment and with a steadily increasing cost of war preparations. We recognize that further advances in science and technology will only aggravate these problems, yet the fixation still holds. It seems as though the only thing which will stop further development along these lines will be the cutting down of resources until research can no longer be supported. I believe that most workers in scientific fields consider that this trend is already recognizable. In spite of the recent increase in the number of research laboratories for industry, basic research in pure science is finding itself increasingly handicapped by lack of funds. There may be money for cyclotrons and memorial buildings, but there is a decrease in both salaries and security for the scientist. The situation is more acute in Europe than in America, but even here the period of easy research seems to be drawing to a close and with it the period of rapid technological advance.

How far any society will go in this process of one-sided development seems to be determined mainly by its resources. As long as the disharmonies can be taken care of by any sort of temporary measures,

the society will drive forward along its selected line with all the singleness of purpose of a psychotic dominated by an *idée fixe*. When the disharmonies finally become so great that further progress is blocked, there succeeds a period of adjustment and reintegration. Because of the high value which we attach to the idea of progress for its own sake, we are prone to think of such periods as times of retrogression. Thus we class the Hellenistic culture which succeeded that of the great period in Greece as a decadent culture. However, we must admit that it was a much more comfortable period for the average Greek to live in. Although the culture had retreated from its farthest peaks of advance and discarded many of the conflicting ideas of the earlier period, what it lost in content it gained in organization. The development of the previously neglected aspects of culture and the abandonment of some of the new things closed the gaps and made it possible for the society to function smoothly once more.

The degree of retrenchment required for the reintegration of a culture which has become disorganized through disharmonic growth will depend partly upon the length to which the disorganization has been allowed to run, partly upon the economic resources of the society. A rich society can carry on longer in the face of disorganization and can reintegrate at a higher level of complexity than a poor one. The great catastrophes to culture come when a period of wealth which has made possible the development of extreme disharmonies is followed by one of poverty. Then the whole superstructure of the culture may collapse, as Roman culture collapsed in Europe, because of the low level of complexity to which the society must descend to find anything solid. After the fall of Rome, Europe found itself so impoverished that it had to retreat almost to the peasant level in order to develop a working integration.

It is highly improbable that European culture will have to retreat this far to find a basis for its reorganization. Even under the worst conditions enough of modern science and technology will survive to provide economic resources far above those of the Dark Ages. However, there can be little doubt that Europe is entering a period of comparative poverty which will make drastic cultural retrenchments necessary. Although the War of 1939, with its consumption of

resources, is hastening the process, this decline began even before the first World War and is traceable to the operation of another universal cultural process, that of diffusion or culture borrowing.

Culture Diffusion

We know that civilizations not only grow irregularly but that they also grow by a combination of invention and of borrowing from each other. It is this ease of borrowing which makes it so hard to generalize about the evolution of civilization or to arrange the civilizations of which we have record in any sort of developmental series. Given a particular combination of circumstances, a society can transform its method of life within two or three generations simply by taking over things which other groups have invented. The Japanese are the outstanding example of this, having gone from hand industries and a feudal organization to modern industrialism within the time of a single long life. It is true that few groups have ever gone about the reconstruction of their civilizations as deliberately and systematically as the Japanese have, but borrowing goes on wherever two groups of different culture are brought into contact. Today, European science and technology are being borrowed all over the world and the speed with which they are spreading will be realized by anyone who has revisited an oriental country after even an interval of ten years. This fact is likely to have more effect on the future of Europe than half a dozen wars like the present one.

Throughout most of its history, Europe itself has been a borrower rather than a donor. The very plants and animals which made settled life on the continent possible came to it from Asia, together with all its basic technologies from smelting to printing. Seen in the long view, Europe has been an appendage of Asia, a marginal area poor in resources and inhospitable in climate, which has functioned mainly as a refuge for defeated tribes. Until the lucky chance which opened to Europeans a new continent, rich and sparsely inhabited, they were fighting with their backs to the sea against the steadily expanding Mongoloid peoples to the east. America gave the white race a new and secure breeding ground and poured wealth into the mother continent. The result was one of those bloomings of culture already discussed. Europe awoke from the lethargy that had fol-

lowed the fall of the Roman Empire and went forward to widespread conquests. Most of these conquests, it is true, were made against peoples who were remote and far below the Europeans in technological development. Long after the Spaniards had looted Mexico and Peru, the Asiatic Turks were at the gates of Vienna. However, they strengthened the Europeans in their own continent and gave them far-flung outposts from which to trade. Then, before this first flare-up had run its course into cultural stabilization, came the great technological revolution with its still more profound changes. The European advance swelled upward in a sort of spring tide fed by trade, conquest, the continent's supply of coal and iron, previously of little value, and above all, by a new and unique ability to make quantities of goods cheaply. The Europeans were now able to substitute for the more brutal forms of tribute exaction subtler methods of exploitation based on the exchange of manufactured goods for raw materials. These proved vastly more profitable in the long run. Wealth poured into Europe and its population increased by leaps and bounds until the area became crowded with people who lived by selling the products of their skill on other continents. This was made possible partly because these ignorant heathen lacked the skills, partly because the Europeans dominated them politically and could force them to buy.

It is an open question whether Europe could have held this monopoly of machine technology and such world-wide control for very long even if it had taken steps to preserve them. However, it must seem to the future historian that what has actually been done verges on madness. Europe has deliberately equipped its subject peoples to throw off its yoke. Each move in this process has been inspired by some bit of opportunism or immediate profit, but the net results are deadly. At the same time that European peoples have been increasing their exploitation of native populations and drawing the social lines against them more and more rigidly, they have been taking a steadily increasing number of native subjects into their military forces and giving them the training which will make it possible for them to revolt successfully. Moreover, they have used these native troops against other whites, thus giving them tangible proof that they will have good chances of victory against their rulers. The

only thing now lacking for the casting off of the European yoke is a good supply of munitions factories in the subject territories, with the trained personnel needed to run them. This is an important omission but one feels that it will soon be made up. With wings over Europe, what safer place for such factories than in the colonies, and the supply of cheap and easily intimidated labor is an added attraction.

Even deadlier for Europe in the long run is the transfer to non-European groups of modern machinery and the knowledge not only of how to run but also of how to make it. Mass production is no longer a European monopoly. Japan undersells Europe in the few unmechanized regions still left and even China and India loom as formidable competitors in the near future. It does not help matters now that it was the Europeans themselves who first introduced the machine into these civilizations, urged on by a desire for capital outlets and by the low costs of native labor. Europe has given to its subjects the weapons and skills by which its own greatness was achieved and that greatness will inevitably go from it with the gift. To put this in technical terms, the diffusion of European technology and science to the rest of the world has robbed Europe of its advantage. Since these have become, or are about to become, world property, the continent sinks once more to its millennium-long position as an appendage of Asia and, for the immediate future, as a poor and overcrowded one.

It seems rather curious that, in spite of the writing on the wall, the Europeans should still go on scrambling for disappearing foreign markets and for colonies already seething with revolt and that they should be ready to spend more to obtain these doubtful blessings than they can conceivably get out of them. However, this is in line with the usual behavior of societies. In time of stress they will try every familiar technique for meeting new situations before they try either to analyze the situations or to develop new and realistic techniques for dealing with them. Europe will have to develop such techniques if she is to survive, and even the victor in the present war can only put off meeting these realities for a little longer.

It seems safe to predict that Europe will emerge from the struggle impoverished in fairly direct ratio to the length of the war. The victor

will be little better off than the vanquished since he will have slight chance of recouping his losses on the outside. The spread of the machine and the theft of world markets by neutral powers will see to that. New colonies and more ruthless exploitation of populations still too backward or too few in numbers to resist successfully, will provide only a momentary respite. Europe will have to reorganize to survive with even a semblance of civilization, and the sooner it can set about the task the better.

Probable Patterns of Reorganization

The problems involved in such a reorganization are complex and many of them not too clearly perceived. The matter of political reorganization is the simplest, at least on its face. One of the first steps to recovery should be a federated Europe with a removal of the silly trade barriers of the last twenty years. Such a removal could not increase the sum total of Europe's resources, but it would aid greatly in making the best use of them. Unfortunately, it seems improbable that even this obvious step will be taken immediately after the war. The Allies, to judge from their past record, are more interested in their long familiar game of international politics. England will always see even a federated Europe as a threat, and sabotage it with a university accent. The Nazis are frankly out to create a German conquest-empire on Assyrian lines with tribute-paying subjects permanently excluded from any hope of participation in government. To do this will require a victory much more complete than they are likely to have, while the possibilities of subject sabotage in a modern conquest-state still remain to be explored. It seemed at one time that such a state might be created about the Communist ideology but this now appears to be out of the question. Now that their concept of internationalism has been shown to be merely a way of getting Russian espionage done inexpensively and of expanding the size of Stalin's empire, Communism will not appeal to most Europeans. The choice between Russian and German domination in Europe would seem to be mainly a matter of preferring your despotism with dirt and inefficiency or without. Creation of a European federation through the spread of Fascist ideologies, is also impossible, since Fascism is first of all nationalistic and tribal. Even the

victory of a Fascist bloc must be followed, in the nature of things, by a battle among the Fascist brethren over the loot. In spite of these practical difficulties, some sort of federation, preferably with a central authority strong enough to regulate trade and exchange and stop interstate wars, seems to be the only solution. Otherwise anemic post-war Europe will be bled still whiter by wars and armament races. One wishes that there might be some chance of a change in heart, for countries can live together amicably even without federation, as the Scandinavian nations or the United States and Canada show. However, one suspects that to get these European powers to forget their old hates would require a miracle, and we live in a scientific era.

On the social side, the lines of reorganization are much harder to forecast because of the multiplicity of factors involved and the novelty of some of the problems. The great wealth of Europe even in recurring depression periods has made it possible for the nations to avoid meeting the distribution situation squarely. They have been able to support their unemployed on their surplus much as imperial Rome supported its slave-displaced proletariat on the tribute from the provinces. Only a few of the smaller and poorer countries, notably the Scandinavian states, have tried to remedy the situation and even these have not felt the full impact of imperialistic industrialism.

The first easement of the European post-war situation will have to come through a reduction in population. No matter what the theoretical possibilities of supporting vast numbers of people on synthetic products, our culture is still geared to old-fashioned farm production of food and of many raw materials. The continent is badly overcrowded and probably will be for some generations. This part of the readjustment can be trusted to take care of itself. European birth rates have been dropping steadily in all the countries to the west of Poland since before the first World War. Even the frantic efforts of certain dictators to get their subjects to produce more cannon fodder have met with only moderate success. With the modern widespread knowledge of birth-control techniques, the linkage between population and economic resources has become exceedingly close. Faced with a sharp drop in their accustomed standards of living, the members of any group will cut down their

reproduction rate and it would take a policeman in every bedroom to prevent it. How long the necessary reduction will take is a question, but it should be accomplished within a century at the outside.

This decline will ease the economic stresses over a long period but it will not help in the immediate future. To meet the problems of tomorrow, a reorganization of the whole social structure will be necessary. Moreover, this reorganization will have to be more basic than anything of the sort during the last few thousand years, because of the new factors introduced by the industrial revolution. Many of the institutions which will have to be developed to meet the current conditions will certainly be at variance with current European patterns and ideas and will probably require a strong hand for their introduction. For this reason, the best speed in adaptation will probably be attained in countries with strong authoritarian governments rather than in the democracies. It is even a large question whether democracies can survive the first period of extreme stress, for this sort of government is unquestionably a luxury. It has inevitable accompaniments of compromise and muddling-through which only wealthy or unthreatened groups can afford. It would be reckless to predict, however, that all Europe will go into dictatorships. There may well be countries in which the value of personal liberty is felt to be so great that it will be maintained at all costs. Such countries may be able to struggle along with various make-shifts until they see how the new ideas put into practice in the dictatorships really work and then take over the best of them. Inhabitants of such countries are probably to be pitied in the immediate future, envied in the more remote one. Even the staunchest of democracies will have to be prepared for a much greater degree of centralized governmental control than we, here in America, consider compatible with democratic institutions. Increased control of this sort is always an accompaniment of culture stabilization, the periods of greatest individual opportunity being also the periods of greatest cultural and social disorganization.

Although every dictatorship must have its dictator, it seems probable that most of these authoritarian governments will really be controlled by highly organized party groups, of which the Communist group in Russia and the Nazis in Germany may be con-

sidered prototypes. It seems highly improbable that these groups will be predominantly proletarian in any country which has a strong and numerous bourgeoisie. The Communist thesis seems to be based on a fundamental misconception of the potentialities of the proletariat as these are revealed in labor movements, etc. The intelligent, disciplined, and presumably altruistic proletariat of the Marxians seems to be a concept on a par with Rousseau's concept of the perfect natural man. Both make good talking points and are excellent tools with which able leaders can flatter the populace for their own ends. The proletariat, when left to itself, tends to be alternately timid and frantic and to have about the breadth of vision which one would expect from peasants and factory workers. It has great potentialities for destruction but apparently very few for reconstruction. Note the state of the Russian experiment after twenty-odd years. Technical and organizing skills of the sort required to run a modern state, especially a state in difficulties, are much commoner among the bourgeoisie than among the proletarians, and when the former have been wiped out in accordance with the best revolutionary dogmas, the latter are left to flounder. It is one thing to make a machine go, another to make a factory go. Apparently the revolution cannot succeed until it has bred and trained another generation of specialists and organizers, and then it usually discovers that it has merely created a new bourgeoisie.

Dictator parties are most likely to come out of the bourgeoisie and especially out of those elements in it which have retained the bourgeois ideology without the income. The number of such individuals in all European states may be expected to increase after the war, continuing the trend which began long before it. After all, most European countries will be in very much the state of Germany between the Versailles Treaty and Hitler. These expropriated bourgeois possess technical skills and organizing ability and the threats of the organized proletarians are ringing in their ears. They would be fools not to take control. Also, it happens that owing to certain changes brought on by the industrial revolution they can take over the administration both profitably and conscientiously. They can keep themselves clear of any taint of property seizures, except in the name of the state, and still make a very good thing of it. Changes in

the relative value of property and employment are now underway which are truly revolutionary although generally unrealized. Mechanization, declining foreign trade, and increased taxation of steadily widening scope are affecting the actual values of real property and capital. Individual equities in these are becoming less and less important because of their vulnerability. Note the diminishing opportunities for investment, with the consequent drop in interest rates, the weight of real estate taxes and the threats of inflation and capital levies. The most valuable possession which any one will be able to retain during the European post-war period will be a secure job with an assured monthly pay-check. The most secure of all jobs are those dispensed to party members by a party securely in power. Only purges or revolutions can affect them. The individual can thus work to save his country with the comfortable assurance that his country will then save him in turn. He can be scrupulously honest and still profit greatly.

Within the dictatorships we can expect a rather thorough socialization of resources and capital, which will be made easier by their diminishing value to individuals. After all, the dictator and his party want to rule with as little friction as possible and it is better to have the ill will of a few persons, formerly of great wealth, whose goods have been expropriated, than the ill will of thousands to whom these lucky few are a constant irritation. Since jobs will be the main values, it seems probable that there will be a development of property rights in jobs and, unless European family patterns change profoundly, a tendency to make them hereditary. Even if the jobs themselves cannot be passed on, the vital matters of pull and a start in government service remain. If a single party group stays in power for as much as two generations, we may expect to see a caste system emerging, with various semi-hereditary sub-castes for different kinds and levels of administrative work. Since the government will control most of the society's activities, these office holders will probably constitute a majority of the population, with the non-office holders the real expropriates. Since loss of a job will mean relegation to the status of outcast, with loss of both prestige and livelihood, we may anticipate that the average officeholder will be exceedingly cautious and conservative, docile to all above and stern to all below, to put it

mildly. The qualities which will make for success in such a system will be those which would make for success in a garrison officer plus, perhaps, if there is an ideology insisted upon by the party, more than a touch of the priest. The rule book will replace the Bible and there will be a general realization that it is much better to do nothing on one's own initiative than to do anything wrong.

Such a system, combined with a scanty margin of resources rather evenly distributed, will spell the end of all but trivial scientific research and certainly of all vigorous or original thinking. It cannot take full form until the reorganization of the society has become successful enough to avoid frequent emergencies; but once this point has been reached, the system will freeze the status quo much as the cultures of India and China were frozen prior to the impact of Europeans upon them. The efficiency of such systems may actually be exceedingly high as long as the society and its well drilled officials are not confronted by any unfamiliar situations. Note the successful working of Chinese culture and government throughout most of that country's history. It may even function well in aggressive situations, as long as the other side develops nothing new in equipment or tactics. Many despotisms have developed able generals and devoted soldiers, whose courage was bolstered by the knowledge that they would be executed if they failed. It is quite conceivable that a series of such dictatorships might restore a certain measure of prosperity to Europe if they could resist the temptation to fight among themselves. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that they could unless they were confronted with some threat so great that they had to bury their individual ambitions.

Although life under such a rigid system is particularly abhorrent to those trained in the American tradition, it is not necessarily unhappy. In fact it may be very satisfying to those who have been reared under it. When the future place of an individual in any society can be forecast for him from the moment of his birth, he can be trained to fit that place both technically and psychologically. Such an individual knows the exact range of the goals which he can conceivably achieve, usually a rather narrow one, and the full number of his rivals. Actually, he is subject to fewer thwartings and disappointments than one of our own youngsters who has been

taught in school that there is no limit to his opportunities but finds that the only thing he can really be is a filling-station attendant. In highly organized, rigid societies, the average person probably has a higher degree of emotional security than among ourselves, and the general level of happiness is certainly no lower than what it is in the battle royal which we call individual opportunity.

Any system of society, rigid or not, has to provide the individual with various compensations for the thwartings which it imposes upon him. We may assume that this will continue to be the case until we are all conceived in bottles and reared in psychological laboratories in the fashion of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*. If these future European states are to survive they must provide their people, especially the unfortunate non-party members, with certain satisfactions and aids to self-respect. Here a new feature of the present civilization arises to complicate matters for the planners of the future state. In practically all past societies, the individual has derived a large share of his compensations from a belief in the supernatural. If he performed his social rôle to the best of his ability he would be rewarded in heaven, if a Christian or Moslem, or promoted to a higher caste in his next incarnation, if a Hindu. The usefulness of this concept is indicated by its universality in the more complex societies. Many of the simpler ones did not state future rewards so clearly, but there also, the supernatural offered compensations. The discontented could turn to prayer or magic as an escape from reality. Firm in the belief that he had taken steps to better his condition, he would await the outcome without socially disruptive explosions. Personal hostilities could be taken out on a wax image with the assurance, unshaken by actual observations, that the enemy would soon die. Students of such primitive groups have noted that there is a dichotomy between magic-working tribes and violent tribes. Those in which hostilities are worked off in open physical attack do not undertake malevolent magic against enemies, and vice versa. When we speak of a violent and godless man there is more than a rhetorical linkage involved.

It seems well-nigh certain that supernaturalism is on the way out of our culture, and nothing has appeared, as yet, to take its place. The old faith has been ruined by our acceptance of a mechanistic

universe and a hope that man can control it as soon as he knows the laws according to which it works. A God who cannot work miracles is of only academic interest to worshippers and is not likely to keep many of them for long. Natural law has done more to undermine religion than all the attacks of the Communists or, still more, of the convinced atheists, pathetic in the intensity of their negative faith. The Communists have combatted religion because they believe, and rightly, that it is a preventive of revolution. They have grasped one part of its social significance when they call it the opiate of the people. However, they have failed to look beyond the revolution. Life is painful enough for most people under most circumstances to make an opiate almost a necessity and the need for one would seem greater in a rigidly totalitarian society than in most other places.

In the current totalitarian states, which may be counted the prototypes of many more to come, devotion to the party and identification with the state are being put forward as religion substitutes. It is not unjust to point out that these also owe their efficacy to a belief in miracles. Good times are coming for all, and especially for the faithful, if only they will trust and hold out. Meanwhile a little amusement and release can be obtained from hunting heretics. What will become of these emotional attitudes when the totalitarian states are successfully organized and settle down to dull routine with no miracles in the offing, offers an interesting field for speculation. It must be very hard to derive satisfaction from identifying oneself with a state which is running smoothly and without opposition. And yet the dictators must find a substitute, for they will be dealing with godless folk who will the more easily slip into violence on that account. Of course the church may make its peace with the new despots as it has with many despots in the past, but the situation is a good deal more involved and demands considerably more than a formal recognition of religion or its establishment on legal terms. To bring faith to life once more, church and state must stamp out not only science but the rumor and memory of science.

A last word about the possible future of the Americas in the present state of the world. The situation here differs from that in Europe in at least one tremendously important respect. Europe is overpopulated

and impoverished and harder times lie ahead. The Americas are not overpopulated; they are and will be rich because of the extent of their natural resources; and they depend so little on outside trade that its complete stoppage would not trouble them greatly. At present we are disorganized socially and therefore will have to reintegrate our culture to conform to actual conditions, but our surplus is so large that we should be able to reintegrate at a much higher level than that of Europe. For the same reason, we can stand a good deal of disorganization and economic maladjustment and still keep our disinherited on this side of revolution. Only colossal stupidity or a sheep-like following of European fashions will usher in a dictatorship here. We are unquestionably due for more government control, but the secret police and the concentration camp are still a goodly distance in the future and are likely to recede still farther as the prestige of things European declines. We even have a margin which makes it safe for us to lag a little and to struggle along with old ways, while Europe does its experimenting in the reintegration of machine civilization. We can then take over those patterns which seem to work best. Our civilization, when it takes final shape, will not be the same as that of Europe and it will embody our own system of values. Chief among these is the right to call our souls our own and to criticize loudly and publicly the people we elect to office. These values will probably be maintained even if the new civilization provides a little less opportunity to individuals of certain predatory types than the present one does. Beyond that it is unsafe to guess. The very release from the pinch of necessity, which is America's blessing, is the curse of the would-be prophet, for it means that the possibilities of working adjustments are that much greater.

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